Israel has launched a large-scale military operation targeting cities and refugee camps in the northern West Bank, naming it the “Iron Wall”, with the declared objective of eliminating armed resistance and preventing its spread. Estimates indicate that Israel has killed 69 Palestinians, demolished hundreds of homes and commercial structures, and displaced over 40,000 Palestinians from the Jenin camp, the Nur Shams and Tulkarm camps, the Far’a camp in Tubas, and the Al-Ein camp in Nablus since the operation began on January 21 until March 19, 2025 (1).

This military operation in the northern West Bank follows previous limited operations in areas and camps where resistance is active. It comes after the targeted assassination of hundreds of resistance fighters, the killing of hundreds of civilians, the systematic and deliberate destruction of infrastructure and services, the demolition of entire residential blocks, and an economic siege on the population. Israel seeks to reshape the geography and demography of the camps through policies of demolition, displacement, and targeting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which is responsible for providing services in West Bank camps. This reinforces Israel’s broader project across the West Bank. Israel classifies this operation as the largest since the “Defensive Shield” operation in 2002, which invaded Area (A) and destroyed nearly 400 homes in Jenin camp. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has stated that the operation will expand to other areas of the West Bank (3).

This paper aims to contextualize this operation, analyze its outcomes, and assess its implications for the northern West Bank camps, as well as its impact on the future of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its relationship with Israel.

Context and Scope of the “Iron Wall” Operation

Israel escalated its military attacks on Palestinian camps since mid-2021, when the West Bank saw the emergence of the “Jenin Brigade”, affiliated with Islamic Jihad. Formed in Jenin camp, this brigade is the largest armed resistance group in the West Bank since the Second Intifada (2004). It was founded by Jamil Al-Amouri following the Jerusalem uprising and the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle in 2021; Israel later assassinated Al-Amouri.

The Jenin Brigade gained prominence in September 2021 after six Palestinian prisoners escaped from Israel’s Gilboa prison. The group declared its ability to protect escaped prisoners if they reached the camp and vowed to confront Israeli military incursions into Jenin city and its camp (4). Its operations later expanded to armed attacks in the West Bank and areas occupied since 1948. The brigade’s model was quickly replicated in other camps, including Balata in Nablus, Far’a in Tubas, Nur Shams and Tulkarm camps, and Aqabat Jaber in Jericho.

Similarly, the “Lions’ Den” group emerged in Nablus in 2022, inspired by the Jenin Brigade. Throughout 2022 and 2023, Israel managed to limit the latter’s activities and eliminate its leadership through military operations and security policies, but it failed to fully dismantle the Jenin Brigade despite the high number of assassinations targeting its leaders and members.

Before the war on Gaza, Israeli raids on West Bank cities and camps resulted in the killing of 421 Palestinians by Israeli forces, including 58 resistance fighters assassinated directly. The highest toll was in Jenin, with 144 Palestinians killed (59 in the camp), followed by 98 in Nablus.

Among the most notable operations targeting resistance in the camps was “Wave Breaker” (5), launched by Israel in March 2022, which targeted Jenin and Nablus, killing over 100 Palestinians. Israel also carried out “Home and Garden” in Jenin and its camp in July 2023, attempting to crush the resistance that had repelled previous incursions. In response, the Jenin Brigade named its counter-operation “Jenin’s Fury”.

Since Israel’s war on Gaza began on October 7, 2023, it has continued its escalation in the West Bank, viewing the camps as incubators for armed resistance that it fears may grow and organize similarly to Gaza, under the principle of “unity of battlefields” and alignment with the “Axis of Resistance”. By March 19, 2025, Israel had killed 943 Palestinians in the West Bank, including 273 in Jenin (55 in the camp), over 210 in Tulkarm (65 in Nur Shams camp, 52 in Tulkarm camp), and 86 in Tubas. Israel also pursued the Jenin Brigade with assassinations, killing 275 resistance fighters (106 in Jenin, 91 in Tulkarm, 27 in Nablus, and 35 in Tubas) (6).

Israel employed sudden raids for assassinations and arrests, explosive-laden drones, and airstrikes, while also launching large-scale military operations involving thousands of soldiers. The most prominent was “Summer Camps”, which targeted northern West Bank cities and camps in late August 2024, aiming to dismantle resistance formations.

Objectives of the Operation

Israel claims that the “Iron Wall” operation has solely security-related objectives, namely eliminating armed resistance. However, its ongoing actions on the ground and statements from military and civil administration officials indicate geopolitical and demographic motives tied to Israel’s broader project of annexing the West Bank and imposing full Israeli sovereignty.

Israel seeks to reduce the refugee population in the camps by dissolving them and turning them into neighborhoods subordinate to Palestinian cities. Statements from Israeli officials confirm this, expressing Israel’s intent to remain in these camps long-term, despite their location in PA-controlled areas (Area A). The military also prevents refugees from returning to their demolished homes or repairing damage caused by its operations, even after achieving its alleged goal of ending armed resistance by displacing most of the population.

Another Israeli objective is preventing the reformation of new armed resistance groups or the involvement of freed prisoners in resistance activities (7). Israel fears the camps—especially in Jenin and Tulkarm—which, despite previous destruction, have regenerated resistance across generations, becoming fortresses where fighters from surrounding areas join and hide.

From a broader perspective, Israel’s actions in the targeted camps are part of a project to erase the Palestinian refugee issue in the West Bank by attacking camps symbolically linked to the Nakba (1948 catastrophe), which represents collective refugee suffering. Refugees maintain the camps’ structure despite overcrowding and isolation, united by their right of return and rejection of resettlement.

The camps differ structurally from surrounding Palestinian cities and villages, as they consist of families from various Palestinian regions with shared social and economic struggles. They rely institutionally on UNRWA for basic services (health, education, infrastructure) across 19 West Bank camps.

Administratively, the camps are governed by popular committees linked to the PLO’s Refugee Affairs Department, which coordinates with UNRWA to prevent internal conflict and improve services.

Israel aims to dismantle the camps and restructure them with new architectural, social, and administrative designs, altering internal roads and urban layouts to erase their distinctive features (high population density, narrow alleys, simple housing). It also seeks to redefine the camps as city neighborhoods, transferring service responsibilities from the UN to Palestinian municipalities under the PA’s Ministry of Local Government. This deepens the rift between refugees and the PA’s “two-state solution”, which does not guarantee refugees’ right of return.

Israel’s approach also undermines UNRWA’s international mandate (8), established to provide relief until a just resolution for refugees is reached.

Israel began these measures by targeting infrastructure, rendering the camps uninhabitable after destroying roads, sewage networks, and public facilities, forcing residents into indefinite displacement while maintaining a military presence.

The dismantling of the camps complements Israel’s previous policies of economically besieging UNRWA, reducing its role in West Bank camps, and ultimately banning its operations in the West Bank and Gaza (9). This aligns with provisions of the Trump administration’s “Deal of the Century” (2019), which called for abolishing Palestinian refugees’ right of return and absorbing West Bank refugees under PA governance with Israeli restrictions.

Implications

Israel’s targeting of the West Bank—and this operation in particular—has geographic, demographic, and resilience-related consequences:

  1. Entrenching Regional Divisions: Israel has long sought to fragment the West Bank through bypass roads, checkpoints, gates, and the separation wall, turning governorates into isolated zones. This facilitates Israel’s plans to annex Area C (62% of the West Bank) by pressuring Palestinians to leave, as seen in Tubas (78.3% Area C).
  2. Expanding Israeli Military and Civil Administration Control: The Civil Administration now oversees Area A (previously under PA control), restructuring camps and bypassing the PA by coordinating directly with Palestinian figures (11). The military governs through direct orders, ignoring PA liaison offices.
  3. Deepening Social and National Divisions: Israel encourages normalcy in cities while imposing military exceptionalism on camps, creating disparities between northern and southern West Bank regions.
  4. Creating Living, Economic, and Environmental Crises: Israel has destroyed infrastructure, including 15.63 km of roads in Jenin, 21 km of water networks, and electricity/sewage systems (12), worsening poverty and unemployment.
  5. Turning Public Opinion Against Resistance: Israel uses collective punishment to widen gaps between affected and unaffected areas, promoting the narrative of “security vs. livelihood” to weaken resistance support.
  6. Increasing Silent Migration: Economic siege and repression push Palestinians to emigrate for survival.

Implications for the PA and Its Role

The “Iron Wall” operation also aims to undermine the PA’s governance in Area A, transferring autonomous powers to municipalities independent of the PA, mirroring Israel’s “Village Leagues” plan (1981).

The PA has not resisted this Israeli approach, instead:

  • Cooperating security-wise with Israel, arresting resistance elements to maintain financial and political support.
  • Remaining passive as Israel reimposes civil administration rule in PA sovereign areas.

The PA has faced criticism for pursuing resistance fighters, surrendering sovereignty to Israeli raids, and failing to address humanitarian crises (13).

On December 5, 2024, the PA launched its first large-scale military operation in Jenin camp, “Homeland Shield”, targeting resistance fighters it labeled “outlaws” and “Iranian proxies”. The 48-day operation killed 14 Palestinians (6 PA forces), arrested hundreds, and was accompanied by pro-PA rallies condemning resistance (14).

However, Israel continued assassinating Jenin Brigade leaders and destroying infrastructure, increasing the PA’s burden for reconstruction.

Despite resistance weakening after camp evacuations, Israel deployed heavy armored vehicles, signaling long-term occupation—erasing PA sovereignty in parts of Area A. The PA’s inaction risks expansion to other West Bank camps, undermining the “two-state solution” and its own future.

Conclusion

This operation differs from past Israeli campaigns in scale and intent, marking a new phase of direct, prolonged control over Palestinian areas.

Israel’s success in the northern West Bank sets new precedents, exploiting favorable conditions:

  • U.S. (Trump administration) support
  • Arab and international silence on genocide in Gaza/West Bank
  • PA’s political and economic weakness, continued security coordination
  • Declining popular and factional resistance

Israel seeks to impose a permanent reality where Palestinians are subjugated by military force, rejecting concessions that could advance the “two-state solution”.

Meanwhile, the PA and factions remain divided:

  • The PA clings to its role and ties with Israel, despite targeted weakening.
  • Factions opposing the PA are marginalized, absent from the political scene due to relentless targeting.

Without unified resistance or international intervention, Israel’s annexation plans advance unchallenged, threatening any future Palestinian statehood.

References

  1. “Martyrs of Palestine… “The Iron Fence Aggression,” Shirin Observatory, (accessed March 26, 2025), https://www.shireen.ps/home
  2. They are areas under the security and administrative control of the Palestinian Authority under the Taba Agreement in 1995.
  3. “Katz on Operation Iron Wall: ‘Jenin First, Then Operation Will Expand to All of Judea and Samaria,’ religious sector homepage, January 22, 2025 (accessed March 25, 2025), https://bit.ly/3FDH0Vs
  4. “Jenin Battalion… I was established to defend escaped prisoners and became the shield of Jenin camp,” Al Jazeera Net, December 22, 2023 (accessed March 21, 2025), https://bit.ly/4iBWLLi
  5. “The Most Prominent Israeli Military Operations in the West Bank Since the Second Intifada,” Al Jazeera Net, September 4, 2024 (accessed March 17, 2025), https://bit.ly/41NNjP8
  6. “Martyrs of Palestine… Search in a dedicated period,” Sherine Observatory (accessed March 28, 2025), https://www.shireen.ps/home
  7. “Displacement of West Bank Camps in the Framework of War,” Al Jazeera Net, February 25, 2025 (accessed March 22, 2025), https://bit.ly/41QhcwT
  8. “About Us,” UNRWA website (accessed March 25, 2025), https://www.unrwa.org/ar/who-we-are?tid=85.
  9. “What does the UNRWA ban in Gaza and the West Bank mean for Palestinians?” BBC Arabic, 8 January 2025 (accessed 21 March 2025), https://bit.ly/3FL2Fv5
  10. They are areas under Israel’s security and administrative control under the Taba Agreement of 1995.
  11. Naela Khalil, “Special | Israeli occupation plans to dismantle Jenin camp and turn it into a neighborhood of the city,” al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 12, 2025 (accessed March 25, 2025), https://bit.ly/425hRe7
  12. “Humanitarian Update No. 274 | West Bank,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the oPt, 20 March 2025 (accessed 25 March 2025), https://bit.ly/4j2Y8Cy
  13. Ibrahim Rabaya, “The Invasion of Jenin… Dismantling the camp and redefining the colonial relationship,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, February 25, 2025 (accessed March 25, 2025), https://bit.ly/4hLddra
  14. “The campaign of the Palestinian security services in the Jenin refugee camp… “The roots and consequences of the crisis,” Roya Center for Political Development, January 28, 2025 (accessed March 25, 2025), https://bit.ly/4l0Qfzi
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Security studies