Israel, in partnership with the United States, launched a military operation against Iran called “Lion’s Roar.” The operation came roughly six months after the Twelve-Day War (June 13–24, 2025) against Iran, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed as a major victory, claiming that Israel had succeeded in destroying Iran’s nuclear program and missile capabilities.
Shortly after Israel’s “celebration” of the war victory, Israeli assessments began to question whether the Israeli/U.S. strikes had actually destroyed Iran’s nuclear program entirely or eliminated its missile capabilities, without downplaying the other achievements of the war.
Similarly, the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) noted in a research paper that the battle against Iran was incomplete; the Israeli/U.S. attack on the nuclear program temporarily removed the nuclear threat but did not eliminate the Iranian threat. The paper emphasized that strategically removing the Iranian threat might require either overthrowing or collapsing the Iranian regime.
It noted that unless a nuclear agreement imposes strict international oversight on Iran’s nuclear program and prevents Iran from reaching “nuclear threshold” status, Israel must act independently to prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program from the post-war position, whether through covert intelligence operations or military intervention.
Most Israeli analyses assessing the damage to Iran’s nuclear project concluded that the U.S./Israeli strikes caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear knowledge, human capabilities, and facilities, but did not completely destroy the program.
The future of the program depends primarily on Iran’s determination to rebuild and Israel’s intelligence monitoring capabilities. Based on this assessment, Israel reinforced its approach that ending the Iranian threat is not achieved through an agreement with the Iranian regime—even if it addresses Israel’s concerns—but rather by changing or toppling the regime itself.
Operation “Lion’s Roar”
Israel began preparing for a new battle with Iran at the end of 2025, shifting Israeli rhetoric from “We destroyed Iran’s nuclear and missile program” after the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 to a new narrative emphasizing that Iran was rebuilding its missile capabilities. These missile capabilities were framed as an existential threat to Israel.
Notably, the preparation for the current operation focused primarily on Iran’s missile program rather than its nuclear program, unlike the previous war, which targeted nuclear facilities and concluded after the U.S. strikes.
The Israeli plan envisioned a strike against Iran, independently but with U.S. approval. Apparently, the plan was for a military strike in June 2026, as confirmed by Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz. The timing was politically strategic, coinciding with the upcoming Israeli elections in October, with Netanyahu aiming to boost his electoral prospects through the operation.
Several reasons explain the timing of the military operation:
- The start of protests in Iran, which Netanyahu viewed as a sign of weakening the regime during the Twelve-Day War, provided an opportunity to exploit domestic unrest to weaken the regime from within. A military strike could either expand the protests or reignite them with greater momentum.
- U.S. statements that the country would support protesters and that assistance was forthcoming. The New York Times reported that on January 14, Netanyahu asked then-President Donald Trump to postpone the U.S. strike against Iran, the same day Trump stated that killings in Iran had stopped and no executions of protesters were planned.
Some interpreted Israel’s request as due to the Israeli defense system’s lack of readiness post-June war, and estimates that Iran might retaliate if attacked by the U.S. Others attributed it to doubts that a U.S. strike alone could decisively weaken or overthrow Iran due to insufficient preparation.
The Israeli request to delay was part of preparing a large-scale military operation and coordinating a joint U.S.-Israeli military action. This explains the high level of military and security coordination before the war, including Netanyahu-Trump meetings in February.
In January, Israeli security leaders held talks in Washington with their U.S. counterparts, including Mossad Director David Barnea and head of military intelligence Shlomi Binder, culminating in a visit by Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir to meet U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Kim. CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper had also visited Israel to coordinate the planned attack. Israeli sources described this coordination as historically unprecedented.
This is the first war in which the U.S. and Israel participated directly together. Previously, Israel fought wars without U.S. involvement, and the U.S. fought regional wars without Israeli participation. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. rejected Israeli attacks on Iraqi missile sites to maintain the Arab coalition. During the Twelve-Day War, U.S. participation was limited to a single strike, mainly to end the war by destroying Iran’s nuclear program, without continuous involvement.
The U.S.-Israeli partnership in the war increased domestic support in Israel. A Tel Aviv University INSS survey showed that 81% of Israelis supported the joint military operation against Iran, 63% supported continuing until the regime was overthrown, and 62% were willing to endure the war for a month or more. Another survey by the Israel Democracy Institute indicated that 93% of Israeli Jews supported the operation. By contrast, a unilateral Israeli strike against Iran previously had only 52% support.
Israeli Objectives of the War
Israel’s strategic aim is the disintegration of the current Iranian regime—not necessarily by war’s end, but as a key step. During the operation, Netanyahu repeatedly called on the Iranian people to rise against the regime, relying on renewed protests after the initial strike targeting leadership.
The main Israeli goals:
- Destroy Iran’s strategic military power—nuclear and missile programs—which are the source of Iranian influence and threat in the region. Israeli estimates indicate that at the war’s start, Iran had about 2,500 ballistic missiles, 500 fewer than before the June war, with production partially resumed.
- Weaken internal regime structures—security, government, and economic institutions—by targeting police, Revolutionary Guards, Basij forces, oil reserves, and cyber attacks on state and financial institutions. The goal is to destabilize the regime internally, reduce its ability to handle rebellion, and weaken its prestige.
- Create internal chaos that strains the regime post-war. Some advocated overthrowing the regime, supporting Kurds and opposition groups, but Iran’s resilience and ongoing missile attacks limited such plans, keeping the focus on weakening the regime internally.
- Netanyahu’s political and electoral considerations—a successful strike could strengthen his position ahead of October elections and help overcome previous political failures.
Since late 2025, Israeli media and political discourse emphasized the need for a second strike, focusing on Iran’s long-range missile program. Netanyahu viewed the war as a potential historic moment in his political career.
Endgame From Israel’s Perspective
Israel sees the war’s end as achieving most of its goals, despite weekly costs of about 20 billion shekels (~$6.5B), including military spending, economic disruption, and damage compensation. The Israeli Ministry of Finance allocated $9B for the war, despite the 2026 defense budget rising to 112B shekels, with costs expected to increase as the war continues. Extended conflict could reach 100B shekels (~$33B), about 15% of Israel’s 2026 total budget of 642B shekels.
Israeli military data suggest over four weeks are needed to achieve all objectives. Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir asked Israelis for long-term patience, indicating the war could exceed the June 2025 duration. Fronts in Lebanon and Hezbollah missile attacks increase pressure and economic burden, shaping two possible scenarios:
- Israel/U.S. agree on a fixed end date, declaring operations successful. Trump and Israeli leadership support this coordinated plan.
- Trump unilaterally ends operations early, forcing Israel to either comply or continue independently. Israeli decisions depend on destroyed missile capabilities and pressure from Trump.
Israel intensified attacks in recent days, postponing a ground operation in Lebanon to concentrate resources on Iran, aiming to inflict maximum damage on Tehran. A U.S. decision to stop the war would likely compel Israel to follow suit.
Conclusion
The current war enjoys broad support across Israeli political factions and among Israeli Jews. Maintaining internal support is essential for the 4–5 week duration Israel seeks. However, ultimate continuation depends on President Trump’s decisions, which could halt operations.
Domestic support is tied to the gap between military achievements and internal costs. As the conflict progresses, continued Iranian missile attacks and Hezbollah participation may reduce public support, prompting Israel to escalate attacks on Iran, especially Tehran, to increase the internal burden on the Iranian regime post-war.
