Internal divisions in Israel, particularly after the collapse of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, have emerged over various issues. These divisions converged in Israeli streets, forming a large social protest bloc opposing the Israeli government. The initial disagreement arose over the resumption of aggression on Gaza through aerial and ground military operations on March 18, 2024, and the government’s abandonment of the agreement—seen by protesters and opponents as a betrayal of Israeli detainees. The rift deepened with the government’s decision to dismiss Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar on March 21, withdraw confidence from Government Legal Advisor Gali Baharav-Miara on March 23, and culminate in the passage of a law altering the composition of the Judicial Appointments Committee on March 28.

These milestones highlight the speed at which the Israeli government made decisions within ten days on issues lacking political and social consensus—decisions that strike at the core of Israel’s political and social fabric before and after the Gaza war. Consequently, warnings of a potential “civil war” in Israel have multiplied, voiced by politicians and public figures, should the government persist in its policies—especially its control over state institutions and the marginalization and weakening of the judiciary (1).

Constitutional Changes and the Israeli Right’s Agenda

The government’s enacted decisions signal a forceful return of constitutional changes. For instance, the law altering the Judicial Appointments Committee was the central issue that divided Israel in 2023 before the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. This law is the essence of the constitutional changes sought by Justice Minister Yariv Levin, the architect of these reforms (2). Protests previously forced the government to retreat from passing the law, but it has now succeeded.

Under the previous nine-member committee, the judiciary held greater representation through judges and lawyers from the Israeli Bar Association. The new law, however, grants a political majority over professional input in judicial appointments, particularly for the Supreme Court. The government’s legal advisor opposed the law, arguing it strengthens political influence at the expense of professional standards (3).

Table 1: Changes of the Committee for the Appointment of Judges in Israel

ChangeMeaning
Replacement of representatives of the Bar Association selected by the Bar with lawyers selected by politiciansGranting a majority to the political side of the committee, where lawyers with a political background consistent with politicians will be selected.
Requires the support of 5 members of the Committee to select judges of the Supreme Court instead of a majority of 7 membersIn practice, the judiciary’s ability to oppose the appointment of a judge is abolished, and politicians will have the ability to appoint a judge to the Supreme Court.
If there is no agreement to appoint a Supreme Court judge within a year, the opposition and the coalition in the committee propose 3 candidates, one of whom will be chosen.In this case, too, the judges have no influence over the judge’s appointment to the Supreme Court.

The opposition links the dismissal of the Shin Bet chief and the attempt to remove the legal advisor to the constitutional overhaul, viewing them as part of the right-wing’s project to control state institutions—especially those enforcing the law. In the short term, Netanyahu’s motives differ from the right-wing’s: while the right seeks judicial reform, Netanyahu dismissed Bar and Baharav-Miara to avoid their support for an official inquiry into security failures in his office. Notably, the Shin Bet’s investigation was bolder than the military’s regarding the October 7 failures. The military’s probe focused on tactical failures on the southern front, whereas the Shin Bet blamed the government’s policy of “containing Hamas” and deepening Palestinian division as the ideological and political groundwork for the October 7 failure. The Shin Bet had even proposed assassinating Hamas leaders before the attack (4).

Beyond dismissing the Shin Bet chief, the government’s move to oust the legal advisor is seen by the opposition as the peak of executive overreach into law enforcement bodies. The goal is to appoint a compliant legal advisor who can justify government decisions legally and defend them in the Supreme Court. The opposition views the legal advisor as the “last fortress” against judicial dismantlement, given her frequent opposition to government decisions—such as opposing Itamar Ben-Gvir’s appointment as National Security Minister, rejecting lenient conscription laws for ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredim), supporting an official inquiry, and opposing Bar’s dismissal. She also approved investigations into the Interior Ministry regarding leaks about police probes into settler violence in the West Bank and authorized an inquiry into the Prime Minister’s Office.

The Israeli divide deepens as the government delays legislation on Haredi conscription while the defense minister refrains from issuing mass conscription orders (since, without a law, conscription must follow general draft rules). This issue gained urgency post-war, given the military’s need for soldiers amid heavy reliance on reservists who served hundreds of days in Gaza and Lebanon. Government inaction risks mass reservist refusal in future operations, especially as Israel plans intensified Gaza fighting and needs troops for buffer zones in Syria and Lebanon.

The government hesitates due to legal, political, and social dilemmas. A law exempting Haredim (as demanded by coalition parties like “Yahadut HaTorah”) would deepen divisions and encourage reservist refusal, while a Supreme Court strike-down is likely. Conversely, broad conscription (as the military and most Israelis want) could push Haredi parties to quit the government. Recall that former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was dismissed for refusing to back a Haredi-friendly law, insisting on consensus or opposition party “State Camp’s” approval.

Factors Behind the Return of Constitutional Changes

Several factors emboldened the government to resume constitutional changes without fearing domestic backlash:

  1. Gallant’s Dismissal: Netanyahu fired Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5, 2024, during the Lebanon campaign—his second dismissal of Gallant. The first, in March 2023 amid protests, triggered massive unrest, forcing Netanyahu to backtrack. This time, protests were minimal, and Gallant was replaced by inexperienced Foreign Minister Israel Katz, signaling Netanyahu’s confidence in wartime impunity (6).
  2. The War Factor: Netanyahu learned that war fatigue limits protest capacity and provides cover for controversial changes. Post-Gallant’s second dismissal, protests focused narrowly on detainees, not systemic issues, emboldening Netanyahu to push judicial reforms during Gaza operations—a miscalculation, as opposition proved resilient.
  3. The Trump Factor: The new U.S. administration under Donald Trump influenced Israel’s decisions, with Netanyahu drawing parallels to Trump’s rapid, dramatic moves. Netanyahu framed both as battling a “deep state” weaponizing the judiciary against right-wing leaders: “In America and Israel, when a strong right-wing leader wins, the left-aligned deep state distorts the judiciary to thwart the people’s will… They won’t win in Israel or America. We stand strong together” (7). Unlike the Biden administration, which opposed Israel’s 2023 judicial overhaul and froze Netanyahu’s White House visits, Trump supports such changes as executive prerogatives.

Repercussions of Government Policies

The government’s decisions carry major consequences:

  1. Escalating Protests: Anti-government demonstrations now merge demands for hostage deals, opposition to constitutional changes, and outrage over Bar and Baharav-Miara’s dismissals, forming a broad protest bloc. Polls show 70% distrust the government, and 50% oppose its constitutional changes. Labor unions (e.g., Histadrut) and tech workers threaten strikes if the Supreme Court’s rulings are ignored.
  2. Reservist Refusal: Rising numbers of reservists refuse service, citing the government’s ceasefire violations, failure to free detainees, and lack of Haredi conscription. Only 50% of reservists reported for duty recently, with many believing Gaza operations serve political, not security, goals (9).
  3. Eroded War Legitimacy: The war exacerbates societal rifts, becoming a partisan project that fuels hatred and delegitimization. Divisions may spread to academia, healthcare, culture, and even the military, disrupting their functions.

Conclusion

April 8, 2024, marks a pivotal moment in Israeli protests, widening their scope and deepening divisions. On this date, the Supreme Court will rule on Bar’s dismissal, signaling its stance on the legal advisor’s potential ouster. Possible scenarios:

  1. Court Accepts Petitions Against Bar’s Dismissal: The right will accuse the court of overreach, escalating efforts to delegitimize it. The government may comply to avoid unrest, economic strikes, and mass reservist refusal.
  2. Court Upholds Dismissal: This would embolden the government to fire Baharav-Miara and weaken protests tied to judicial defiance.
  3. Partial Acceptance (Likely): The court may reject the dismissal’s process (e.g., lack of due deliberation on conflict-of-interest concerns, given Shin Bet probes into Netanyahu’s Gaza-Qatar funding ties). This middle path would placate and anger all sides, preserving governmental authority while critiquing its execution.

References

  1. Moshe Al-Hanti, a civil war is not necessarily a bloody war. We are at its peak, Haaretz, March 29, 2025 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://shorturl.at/BL7gU
  2. Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The Judicial Coup: Abolition of Checks and Balances and Unfettered Power to the Executive Branch, Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), July 24, 2023 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://www.acri.org.il/post/__869  
  3. Sivan Helei et al., Final Passage of the Fundamental Law of the Judicial Coup, Opposition Left (Knesset), “We Will Abolish it in the Next Government,” Ynet, March 27, 2025, (accessed March 31, 2025), https://shorturl.at/SqY38
  4. Lilech Shoval, head of Shin Bet Bar: My dismissal is not against the backdrop of 7/10, Israel Hayom, March 16, 2025 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://rb.gy/tclr0n
  5. Yoav Zeitoun and Alexander Luksh, IDF Against Exemption Law: 10,000 Haredi Can and Should Be Recruited in the Year Coming, Ynet, January 8, 2025 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bkyujjjiyg  
  6. Moran Azoulay, In Time of War, and for the Second Time in Government, Netanyahu Fired Galant, Ynet, November 5, 2024 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/rjz5hrpzyx
  7. Gili Cohen and Ya’ara Shapira, Netanyahu’s tweet on Israel’s deep state, Kan 11 website, March 19, 2025 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://shorturl.at/SF0fF
  8. Ben Samules, Biden on the judicial coup: I hope Netanyahu backs down from it, Prime Minister: We will not make decisions based on external pressure, Haaretz, 28/3/2023, (accessed March 31, 2025), https://shorturl.at/AA5lq
  9. Iris Laal, For the First Time in Israel, Refusal to Fight Can Be Within Consensus, Don’t Waste It,” Haaretz, March 30, 2025 (accessed March 31, 2025), https://shorturl.at/2kKto
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