The Role of ASEAN in the South China Sea Dispute

China is a trading partner to more than 125 countries worldwide, positioning it to leverage economic influence to achieve its political and strategic interests. This provides China with a means to assert its dominance in the South China Sea. Moreover, Chinese aid has effectively deepened the divisions among ASEAN members regarding the dispute.

This conflict arises because the South China Sea connects the maritime world of the Middle East with the Indian subcontinent and Northeast Asia. Oil transported from the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea is approximately three times the quantity that passes through the Suez Canal. Additionally, around two-thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies and 60% of Japan’s come via the South China Sea.

In addition to its strategic location, the South China Sea holds about 7 billion barrels of oil as reserves and approximately 900 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The Chinese believe that its depths contain oil reserves that exceed those of any other region in the world, except for Saudi Arabia.

Based on this, China claims sovereignty over the South China Sea and has attempted to affirm its rights in various ways. However, several countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia, reject these claims. The United States has engaged in this dispute on grounds of maintaining the safety of maritime trade routes and its historical presence and alliances with other parties. Conversely, the regional organization known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) holds a different perspective on this dispute.

The historical context and development of ASEAN have influenced its political role, as the leaders of ASEAN member states focused their efforts on promoting economic, industrial, and trade cooperation while largely sidelining political issues. However, the inseparability of political and economic matters necessitated ASEAN’s involvement in political matters, beginning with foreign ministers affirming the region’s neutrality. The concept of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality dominated the fourth ASEAN ministerial meeting in 1971, as well as a meeting of foreign ministers that year. They sought to declare their intention to integrate this concept into ASEAN’s official policy.

The United States, Japan, and ASEAN member countries, which denounced China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, failed to take effective measures against these aggressive behaviors, deepening skepticism regarding ASEAN’s utility for regional security. China benefits from its economic influence over some ASEAN members to manipulate the procedures related to the South China Sea, with the economic relationship with China recognized as a significant source of influence on ASEAN.

ASEAN’s approach has been criticized for being ineffective, especially since Burma joined the organization. A lengthy debate has ensued concerning the potential resolution of the southern dispute, as most member states, including China, recognize that the conflict requires a multilateral approach.

The Secretary-General of ASEAN has pointed out that the South China Sea could become as destabilizing as Palestine. Despite China exceeding its boundaries, there is a collective interest in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

There are two perspectives on the South China Sea dispute: China’s view regards it as a sovereignty and ownership issue that falls outside the scope of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The second perspective is that Southeast Asian nations reject the Chinese viewpoint, insisting that the law of the sea should apply to the dispute.

In recent years, several confrontations have erupted over these conflicting claims, the most severe being between China and Vietnam, while confrontations between the Philippines and China have not escalated to gunfire or serious violence.

China prefers direct bilateral negotiations with other parties. However, many neighboring countries argue that China’s size and economic and military power give it an unfair advantage in these negotiations.

Some countries contend that China should negotiate with ASEAN, the regional organization that includes Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia; however, China opposes this approach while ASEAN remains divided on how to resolve the disputes.

The South China Sea dispute involves China on one side and neighboring countries on the other, and the conflict remains manageable. China, which claims ownership of most of the sea, is keen to affirm its historical and legal rights while simultaneously being open to reaching understandings and agreements with other countries, either individually or as members of the ASEAN Economic Community.

However, the potential for the dispute to spiral out of control is exacerbated by the United States’ direct or indirect involvement as a superpower, despite not being a regional country. The U.S. utilizes this involvement to demonstrate its military might, particularly since the second term of former President Barack Obama, adopting a new strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to exert pressure on China, the rising international power that competes economically with the U.S.

Since President Donald Trump took office, U.S.-China relations have faced turbulent winds that verge on hurricanes and a trade war, due to Trump’s hardline stance towards Beijing. He is deeply frustrated by the trade deficit with China and has openly stated that China is attacking the U.S. with unconventional deterrents.

Adding to the complexity in the South China Sea is that other countries have asserted their presumed sovereignty by deploying military forces and establishing bases. For China, restoring sovereignty over these islands implies the use of force, a choice Beijing approaches with caution as it upholds the principle of righteousness and avoids aggressive warfare in favor of dialogue. Yet, it does not hesitate to exercise its right to self-defense under international law.

Domestically, the Chinese government faces pressure to affirm its sovereignty over its maritime domains by establishing military bases and deploying forces to resolve the issue, as retreat would signify enemy advancement. The U.S. is attempting to intervene in a manner that reflects its absolute bias toward Japan and incites other Southeast Asian countries against China.

Beijing has notably adopted a power-centric approach to exert effective control over maritime transport, raising regional suspicions and even fears of Chinese dominance. This was evident in the Scarborough Shoal incident with the Philippines in 2012, the oil platform incident with Vietnam in 2014, and ongoing extensive land reclamation efforts since 2014.

It is clear that China has not developed a distinct or coherent strategy regarding the South China Sea; rather, various actors and interest groups are attempting to impose their own interpretations of China’s positions and roles in the South China Sea.

When Southeast Asian nations became aware of the potential vast reserves of energy resources in the region, the Republic of China government drew an official map with a line known as the “nine-dash line,” encompassing most of the South China Sea in 1947, which it publicly issued the following year. This line became the foundation for the Republic of China’s claims, yet it has become a significant source of contention in the South China Sea disputes.

This paper, therefore, seeks to explore the process of managing the conflict in the South China Sea and the potential roles of institutions, particularly ASEAN, in reducing dependence on China and lessening aggressive actions by China while attempting to resolve the South China Sea dispute.

Research Problem of the Study:

The South China Sea area is witnessing disputes between two superpowers, China and the United States, vying for influence over the strategically important region. To ease tensions and conflicts, ASEAN has intervened to maintain peace in the area.

The South China Sea is located on the southern border of China, home to numerous islands, coral reefs, and sandy shores. Its most distinguishing feature is its strategic location as a maritime trade route, which is one reason the United States has engaged in this conflict to protect its trade routes.

Chinese foreign policy reflects its intent to expand its control in the region, not merely through rhetoric but also through a firm set of policies and tangible actions. Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has implemented a more confident and proactive international policy, asserting that “the South China Sea islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times.” This assertion regarding the maritime region has fueled Washington’s interest, as ASEAN countries see the U.S. as a guarantor of their security and an affirmation of the organization’s leadership in Asia to counterbalance stronger Chinese influence.

Hence, the research problem revolves around a central question: What is the nature of the role ASEAN plays in resolving the South China Sea dispute, how firm is the role of the organization, and what are the consequences of this role?

Several sub-questions arise from the main question:

• What is the demographic profile of the South China Sea region?
• What are the causes of the South China Sea crisis?
• What role does ASEAN play and what policies will it enact to attempt to resolve the South China Sea dispute?
• What tools does the organization use in its attempts to mediate the conflict?
• What are the consequences of ASEAN’s intervention in the South China Sea dispute?

Objectives of the Study:

• To determine the strategic and geographic significance of the South China Sea region.
• To clarify the nature of the conflict in the South China Sea, the stages it has gone through over the years, and the major issues and crises it has encountered.
• To identify the causes of the conflict in the South China Sea, the positions of the countries involved, analyze changes in their policies as a consequence, and the potential implications of these policies on regional and international stances.
• To highlight the extent of threats posed by maritime boundary disputes to international and regional stability, particularly in strategically vital waterways for international trade, such as the South China Sea.
• To elucidate ASEAN’s role and its interventions in the conflict, whether through diplomatic or non-diplomatic means.

Importance of the Study:

The importance of the topic lies in shedding light on the role of ASEAN and international organizations in attempts to settle and mitigate the intensity of disputes in the South China Sea region, with an inclination toward focusing on the practical and scientific significance of the study.

The scientific importance is reflected in the outcomes resulting from ASEAN’s intervention in resolving the South China Sea dispute and the complexities currently facing the region, alongside various attempts to gather and assess evidence to support facts to derive strong conclusions aimed at testing hypotheses concerning the conflict’s causes. ASEAN has been China’s third-largest trading partner and has intervened in the dispute with other parties to achieve peace and regional security.

International law principles have been utilized to define the role of the Asian Peace Council in conflict resolution and the impact of the ASEAN Political Security Community in recommending potential solutions to the dispute, ensuring a long-term resolution to the conflict.

On the other hand, the practical significance pertains to defensive realism, a fundamental component of the security framework through which China maintains its presence in the region and addresses gaps via the direct application of ASEAN’s diplomatic capabilities to address issues in the South China Sea. This includes the analysis of information and clarification of the geopolitical strategic importance of the area, associated international laws and customs related to disputes, as well as identifying the strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN and delineating maritime areas for which each state has the right to claim according to international law. There is an urgent need to delineate maritime boundaries among the sharing states, prevent interference in each party’s internal affairs, and reject the threat of violence, as security tensions in East and Southeast Asia have drawn the attention of experts over the decades.

Previous Literature:

The South China Sea is a strategically significant region, where numerous conflicts have arisen, notably the U.S.-China conflict and regional disputes in Asia. This has led ASEAN to intervene to maintain regional peace, and the literature highlights ASEAN’s role in conflict management, especially the conflict between Beijing and Washington.

The literature regarding ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea can be divided into two main focuses: the first relates to studies covering the conflict in the South China Sea, while the second pertains to ASEAN’s role in managing peace in the region.

First Focus: Studies Addressing the Conflict in the South China Sea:

A review of the literature shows that this focus underscores the strategic importance of the region for all nearby countries alongside China and the U.S. Thus, we will elucidate the reasons behind the U.S.-China conflict over the South China Sea. Several studies concentrate on highlighting the strategic importance of the South China Sea and the competitive dynamics between the U.S. and China in the area, recognizing that the region holds strategic, economic, and political significance for both countries. We can categorize the literature in this first focus into two directions that clarify the reasons the U.S. is provoking a dispute in the South China Sea and the factors behind China’s disputes in the area.

(First Direction): Regarding the Implications and Perspectives of the Conflict for the United States: The U.S. engaged in this conflict due to the prevailing situation in the Asian region—a struggle between their political systems, where China exhibits a repressive communist regime compared to America’s democratic capitalism, alongside their differing ideologies. Thus, the U.S. aimed to dominate Southeast Asia, particularly the South China Sea. It sought to maximize its benefits in the region while attempting to restrict the other party’s advantages, aiming for a policy that creates an environment of peace and stability compliant with the law. As such, the U.S. must strive to achieve a balance against China, which possesses a legal advantage in this area due to its proximity to the sea. Consequently, the U.S. has taken measures to weaken China’s maneuvers with coastal nations, taking it upon itself to prevent Chinese dominance in the South China Sea.

(Second Direction): Regarding China’s Implications and Perspectives in the South China Sea: Primarily, the entirety of the South China Sea is claimed by China as its territory according to the 1982 Law of the Sea, where all coastal states possess the right to exercise their rights within their exclusive economic zone. China, therefore, aims to protect itself, claiming historical ownership over the entire sea. Consequently, it seeks to restore its influence and legitimacy over the area in lawful ways. There are historical and external validations affirming China’s ancient dominance over the region, as it engaged in fishing and production activities there and was the first nation to govern the South China Sea islands, considering them part of its territory. Therefore, China is committed to safeguarding its interests and sovereignty in the region by all available means, recognizing that the prosperity of the area is contingent on maintaining peace throughout the region.

In conclusion, the literature on this focus has illustrated that the future of China’s rise remains open to membership, which is not inherently adverse but rather serves to encourage the promotion of peaceful exchanges between them. This is especially true after China has indicated a desire to be seen as a respectful member in Asia rather than a source of threat. The U.S. should enhance its relationship with China despite its urgent desire to maintain military superiority over China. Henry Kissinger has emphasized that China’s rise in the region represents a strategic defeat for the United States and poses threats to regional peace, which may lead to an arms race and exacerbate tensions between the two countries. However, these studies do not clarify how to eliminate or alleviate this conflict but rather highlight its causes. What we seek to accomplish in these studies is to propose solutions for a call to peace in the region.

Second Axis: The Role of ASEAN in Managing Conflict in the South China Sea:

The existence of conflicts in the Asian region has prompted many countries to seek the establishment of their own organization. The mission of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is to promote peace and prevent crises while focusing on creating economic blocs and cooperation among them to become one of the most significant economic coalitions in the world. Hence, the US-China dispute became a reason for intervention to prevent the escalation of war between the two nations, and in this axis, we will categorize the literature into two directions.

(First Direction): This axis focuses on the positive role of ASEAN in managing disputes. ASEAN recognized the necessity of reaching a negotiation regarding the South China Sea, thus providing platforms for dialogue and cooperation. In this context, its role was facilitative when countries called upon it to resolve disputes among them. Indonesia intervened in the dispute between China and the US and preferred the organization to resort to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. This intervention by ASEAN was a crucial factor in China’s entry and participation with other countries, with the Chinese Foreign Minister declaring that China seeks peace, not war. The Deputy Prime Minister also agreed on the need to resolve conflicting claims according to the 1982 UN law. He also aims to address non-traditional security challenges. ASEAN successfully resolved the regional dispute concerning China, with all parties agreeing to adopt a code of conduct for the South China Sea and to fly over it without resorting to threats of force, with China practicing a policy of restraint in its activities.

(Second Direction): On the flip side, even with ASEAN’s intervention, conflicts continue. China has used its economic power to protect its interests, and the Philippines responded aggressively to China’s position, protesting against all of China’s approaches. In retaliation, China restricted agricultural exports to the Philippines. Consequently, the United States intervened against Chinese power to deter its regional dominance, while China rejected US interference, preferring bilateral dealings in crises to exert pressure on the weaker party. Additionally, Chinese practices have eroded trust between the conflicting parties and hindered resolution efforts. China remains a source of concern for its neighboring countries in the region, and there is a division within ASEAN due to the aid China provides to some of its members.

The United States’ involvement has escalated the conflict in the South China Sea, shifting the dispute from the four East Asian countries to the United States, which views itself as a key player in preventing Chinese hegemony in the region and the unilateral exploitation of its resources. This scenario poses a bloody future for the region if China and the United States remain in conflict, representing one of the most dangerous scenarios globally. Therefore, if China continues to reject US intervention, ASEAN should resort to methods such as those of the United Nations, which all parties will rely on to avoid a clash between China and the United States.

Sixth: Theoretical Framework

Liberal Theory:

Liberal theory is one of the most significant theories in international relations, characterized by its multifaceted approach. It acknowledges non-state actors such as international organizations and multinational corporations and analyzes their roles in international affairs. Liberalism shares some aspects with realism but also diverges in others. Key contributions of liberal theory include the theory of utility, the theory of democratic peace, the idea of the end of history, the role of international law, and the theory of interdependence. Despite its contributions to international relations, liberalism has faced criticisms regarding its core assumptions.

The fundamental assumptions of liberal theory include:

1. States are equal to other non-state actors; transnational actors are critical entities in international politics. International organizations, in certain specific issues, can act independently to achieve their interests.
2. NGOs, transnational organizations, multinational corporations, and human rights organizations also play roles in international politics. Individuals can have significant influence in some instances.
3. Liberals believe that economic interdependence and other forms of interdependence lead to a modernization of state behavior. Given the interconnected world, where links are not only economic but also cultural and political, discussing interdependence tends to lead towards globalization discussions.
4. In a world characterized by globalization, liberals argue that states, international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, and even individuals operate within a complex environment of alliances and networks.
5. According to liberal theory, international issues are expansive and multifaceted. Liberals reject the idea that security-military issues dominate international politics, seeing economic and social issues as important in their own right, sometimes even viewed as security-related from a different perspective.
6. Unlike structural realism, which views international issues from top to bottom, emphasizing international anarchy and power distribution’s influence on state behavior, liberals see the international environment as a bottom-up approach.
7. Liberal theory rejects power politics as the sole driver of international relations, believing that international cooperation and mutual benefit are the foundations of international relations; international organizations and non-state actors shape state preferences and political choices.
8. Liberals believe that humans can progress toward perfection, countering realists who assert that war is the natural condition of global politics. They view the state as an important actor in international relations, alongside multinational corporations, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and interest groups crucial to international interactions.

This theory will be used to understand and demonstrate the role of regional and international organizations as influential actors in relationships, impacting the development trajectory of these regional disputes, such as ASEAN’s role in settling the South China Sea conflict.

Seventh: Conceptual Framework of the Study

This study aims to present concepts and mechanisms of international cooperative action to address international armed conflicts by identifying their significant causes and addressing their effects on societal peace. The study will begin with a definition of international armed conflicts and a historical overview of the term, distinguishing it from domestic conflicts, explaining how to differentiate between them, and providing real-world examples of international armed conflicts.

Next, it will clarify the concept of international mechanisms and how the terms stipulated in relevant international charters and treaties have been dealt with, the measures taken concerning precedents in addressing international armed conflicts issued or adopted under such charters, treaties, and international law governing them.

First: Conflict:

Conflict is broadly defined as a situation of interaction characterized by non-coexistence between two or more actors, where there is a contradiction and misalignment in interests and objectives. The sources of conflict can be material (natural resources or geographical territory) or moral/ideological (such as ideology or identity).

Conflict can be defined as a national will contention among states due to differing motivations, goals, ideas, resources, and capabilities, leading to conflicting foreign policies. It represents an actual clash between the conflicting parties due to the conflict of interests and can also be understood as a social situation arising when two or more parties seek to achieve opposing or incompatible goals.

Second: International Armed Conflicts:

An international conflict is an understanding among states concerning a clear, rootable, and negotiable topic. It differs from international tension, which is perceived as expanding and considered a political phenomenon that does not accept peaceful resolution and is marked by substantial contradictions aimed at broadening demands without altering power balances.

Conflicts arise from convergence or collision between different orientations or incompatibility in interests between two or more parties, leading the involved parties to reject the status quo and attempt to change it. This interaction between at least two parties serves as a fundamental criterion for classifying conflicts.

International conflict is the disagreement between two or more states over specific issues or matters, often concerning mutually beneficial resources such as borders, water, or natural wealth. Disputes typically arise over borders and may expand or contract due to external intervention.

Thus, the term “international conflict” refers to a situation arising from the clash of viewpoints between two or more states or opposing interests regarding a particular subject or issue, which initially appeared contradictory but may be peacefully resolved through diplomatic methods, provided there is willingness to approach common ground.

International conflict can be defined as a struggle among international persons due to political, legal, economic, or ideological reasons regarding an issue that ultimately resolves in either reconciliation or war.

These conflicts may have either a legal or political nature. Legal procedures aim to settle conflicts of a legal nature, meaning the parties invoke legal issues, while political or diplomatic procedures generally apply to political disputes, where conflicting interests emerge that cannot be settled through judicial or international arbitration.

It is worth noting that many political disputes arise from originally legal disputes; thus, no international conflict exists that does not involve, in some form, points of international law.

There exists a convergence of competences on the international law level since political conflicts and legal disputes are not inherently separate. Some disputes can be resolved through other solutions and procedures; every theoretical attempt to differentiate between political and legal disputes ultimately fails.

Third: Peaceful International Mechanisms:

Settlement refers to an agreement among disputants to end the conflict through peaceful means. It can be defined as the efforts made to address an existing dispute or conflict between two or more parties.

Political settlement involves negotiations and attempts at reconciliation between parties in conflict, away from the use of force. Thus, the elements of resolution encompass several dimensions (the number of parties involved in the dispute, the comprehensiveness or limitation of the settlement, the time factor, and the legal competency of the conflicting parties).

Peaceful settlement mechanisms encompass various methods, including:

1. Negotiations: Negotiation involves measures taken to achieve a state’s external goals concerning a specific issue, leading international relations peacefully and avoiding disputes and wars. The UN Charter, under Chapter VI, Article 33, states that any parties to a conflict that might threaten international peace and security must solve it peacefully through negotiations, mediation, inquiry, reconciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.

Negotiation is one of the oldest and most accepted methods for resolving international disputes, often considered a preliminary phase of dialogue between warring parties. It represents discussions between two or more conflicting parties aiming to reach a solution that satisfies all involved actors, which can be states, organizations, or both, whether bilateral or multilateral. Negotiations may be direct and public or indirect and confidential.

2. Mediation and Conciliation: These are diplomatic settlement means that involve the participation of a third party among the parties, either to mediate between them or to try to bring them closer together. Investigation differs slightly from mediation and conciliation as it seeks to reveal the truth more than anything else.

Mediation resembles good offices in that it aims to reconcile the different views of disputing parties, whereas it diverges from good offices as the mediator participates in the negotiations, unlike the good offices where the mediator simply proposes mediation without participating in talks.

Conciliation, good offices, and mediation share the common goal of all disputing parties trying to relieve tension; however, this method often comes from a stronger party that seeks to mend the fissures and pressure both parties toward reaching an amicable resolution. Conciliation may occur based on the willingness and choice of the parties; this is termed voluntary conciliation. In contrast, if it is invoked under the pressure of another party or if parties resort to it due to a prior agreement between the parties, it is referred to as compulsory conciliation.

Eighth: Methodology:

The most suitable approach for this study is the role-based method, referring to the behavior stemming from actions and decisions that affect others. Pioneers of this approach include Holsti, John Dewey, and George Herbert, who applied the approach to numerous issues requiring an understanding of state behavior toward a specific situation or matter. Their aim was to reinstate the role of decision-makers in international relations to provide an analytical framework on issues. Therefore, this study aims to clarify the role of ASEAN in the dispute over the South China Sea and the policies the organization adopts to alleviate the intensity of the conflict using the role-based method, which helps study behavior as a political role undertaken by organizations and international actors. To ensure its effectiveness, the organization must understand the nature of the external conditions accompanying the performance of this role and the extent of their positive and negative impacts on the outcomes achieved from this performance. Furthermore, it should consider the capacity size necessary for it to fulfill this role to mitigate the conflict in the South China Sea.

Chapter Division of the Study:

The study is divided into three chapters:

The first chapter is titled “The Importance of ASEAN and the South China Sea” and includes three main sections: the first section defines the South China Sea, its demographic location, and the countries surrounding it. The second section discusses the strategic and vital importance of the South China Sea, while the third section covers the establishment of the Southeast Asian Organization (ASEAN), its charter, and its founding member states.

The second chapter addresses “The Causes of the South China Sea Crisis and Its Historical Development” in two sections. The first section deals with the reasons for the crisis in the South China Sea and the conflicts among nations to assert sovereignty over this region, while the second section explores the historical development of the crisis in the South China Sea since its inception.

The third chapter focuses on “ASEAN’s Role in Settling the Dispute in the South China Sea and Its Consequences,” consisting of two sections. The first section clarifies the decisions made by ASEAN in an effort to resolve the dispute in the South China Sea, while the second discusses the outcomes of the decisions taken by ASEAN to resolve the conflict.

Chapter One: The Importance of ASEAN and the South China Sea

Introduction:

The South China Sea is considered one of the strategically important regions in Asia and the world. It serves as a geopolitical area with significant impact on regional and international relations. Given that the region’s name is associated with China and lies within the Chinese regional sphere, China places considerable importance on this sea as it is seen as a vital area for various reasons, including energy resources, ports, maritime straits, and its connection between the maritime world of the Middle East and South Asia to Northeast Asia. This significance has led the United States to prioritize this sea, aiming to establish a presence in it and create alliance relationships with other nations in the region to prevent China from monopolizing it and influencing U.S. security interests.

Moreover, the Asian continent has distinguished itself through advancements in various economic, social, and political domains, owing to its large population. This has prompted efforts to establish a political and economic bloc that aligns with its requirements and challenges in the twenty-first century. Consequently, the idea of establishing ASEAN was initiated, originally including five member countries sharing common goals to create a political alliance aimed at resolving disputes peacefully. Over time, it transformed into an economic alliance focusing on development, growth, and regional economic integration, and sought to prevent new conflicts in the area, as laid out in the Bangkok Declaration of 1976, which defined the primary objectives of ASEAN. Many countries have since joined the organization, making contentious issues central to its work; thus, ASEAN has been approached for peaceful resolution in the South China Sea issue.

In this chapter, we will clarify the demographic location of the South China Sea and its strategic emphasis, alongside explaining the establishment of ASEAN, its charter, and objectives.

Section One: The Demographic Location of the South China Sea

Identifying the geographic location is a crucial starting point due to its importance in highlighting the area’s characteristics and neighboring factors. The name “South China Sea” directly indicates a relationship with China, which emphasizes the need to highlight China’s position in relation to this designation.

The South China Sea is the largest sea in the world after the five oceans, covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometers. It is situated at the western end of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing the area extending from Singapore to the Taiwan Strait. China borders the South China Sea from the east and southeast, making it the longest-stretching country along this maritime area, with a coastline of 18,000 square kilometers from the Yalu River estuary on the Chinese-Korean border in the north to the Pearl River estuary on the Chinese-Vietnamese border in the south. The vicinity of this sea includes several strategically significant waters, such as the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, the latter being the most critical for China’s strategic interests.

The South China Sea is located near the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, and Taiwan to the north, separated from the East China Sea by the southern part of the Taiwan Strait, and from the Pacific Ocean by the Philippines and Taiwan, including Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan to the east. It is bordered by Borneo, East Sumatra, and the Bangka-Belitung Islands to the south, the Indochina Peninsula to the west, and it connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans via the Bashi Channel, Sulu Sea, and Malacca Strait. Significant islands include Hainan, Huangyan, and the four major archipelagos: Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha, while the Gulf of Thailand, Gulf of Tonkin, and Natuna Sea are also considered parts of the South China Sea.

The waters of the South China Sea form part of the Pacific Ocean, extending from the southwestern end of Singapore and the Malacca Strait to Hong Kong and the Taiwan Strait in the northeast. The area consists of hundreds of islands, rocks, and reefs, mostly concentrated in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Acknowledged for its essential role as a crossroads for maritime trade, these waters are viewed as a reservoir of substantial oil and natural gas reserves. While the South China Sea is larger in area than the Arabian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, it shares significant similarities with these regions. It is embroiled in overlapping and conflicting claims about its resources, and the countries involved in these maritime disputes appear ready to employ military force to defend what they perceive as vital national interests in these waters. The South China Sea is the second busiest maritime passage globally, carrying a third of the world’s shipping trade.

The sea is bordered by some of the most dynamic and powerful countries in Asia, including the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Major rivers flowing into the South China Sea include the Pearl, Mekong, Rajang, Agno, and Pasig rivers.

Section Two: The Strategic Importance of the South China Sea

The South China Sea comprises a group of islands that possess great strategic significance, serving as geographical gateways to the sea. The threat of their closure would have significant negative repercussions on countries relying on shipping for trade. As regional countries and external powers become increasingly aware of the South China Sea’s importance, its geographic location as a vital waterway has transformed it into one of the key flashpoints on the map of international interactions. Moreover, the available resources in the area further underline its strategic importance.

Mineral Resources and Communications:

The South China Sea contains significant mineral and fishery resources, as well as vital cables for international communication services. This has made it a focal point of interest for both distant and nearby nations, enhancing its strategic significance, as controlling it serves as an entry point for influencing the international economy, affecting both global trade and navigation.

Rare earth minerals, comprising 17 chemical elements on the periodic table, are vital because they provide crucial components in technology. Although the availability of minerals in the South China Sea is still being assessed, significant deposits were recently found off the eastern coast of Japan. Previously, China used its de facto monopoly on these minerals to punish Japan during the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.

According to studies by the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the South China Sea maintains one-third of the world’s marine biodiversity and contributes about ten percent of the global fish catch. Major marine species include herring, mackerel, anchovies, shrimp, crab, and small fish. It is estimated that 40% of fish stocks are collapsed or overexploited, with 70% of coral reefs being severely depleted, mainly due to overfishing and destructive practices such as dynamite and cyanide fishing.

Despite the emphasis on hydrocarbon reserves, some scholars propose that disputes over fishing rights might have emerged as a larger driver of conflict. The annual Chinese fishing ban under the auspices of environmental protection is viewed merely as another method to assert sovereignty. The South China Sea is teeming with fishing vessels, with China alone sending 23,000 fishing boats in August of this year after lifting its annual ban.

Oil and Petroleum Resources:

The South China Sea holds vast energy reserves estimated at 23 to 30 billion tons of oil and 16 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. In recent years, it has become one of the busiest international shipping routes, with over half of global goods transit passing through the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. Oil, liquefied natural gas, coal, and iron make up the majority of shipments, with over 100,000 container ships and other commercial vessels crossing these straits yearly. The majority of energy supplies traveling to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan pass through the South China Sea, making it essential for the economies of East Asia.

Oil Reserves:

Despite varying estimates, the region is believed to have confirmed oil reserves of no less than 7.7 billion barrels, with optimistic estimates reaching as high as 213 billion barrels. If true, this would amount to approximately 80% of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves. While Beijing has suggested that the Spratly and Paracel Islands may also contain oil reserves, no reliable estimates exist for these areas, yet many believe there is a significant hydrocarbon prize in the region.

Natural Gas:

Natural gas may be the most abundant and sought-after hydrocarbon resource in the South China Sea, with reserves estimated at around 266 trillion cubic feet, accounting for about 60-70% of the region’s hydrocarbon resources. Most discovered hydrocarbon fields in the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines predominantly contain natural gas rather than oil.

As with oil, estimates of natural gas resources in the region vary widely. One Chinese estimate puts natural gas reserves at 2 quadrillion cubic feet, with Beijing hoping to produce 15 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas annually. Another Chinese report estimates 225 billion barrels of oil equivalent in the Spratly Islands alone. It is hypothetically possible that total gas resources in the South China Sea could approach 900 trillion cubic feet, equivalent to Qatar’s natural gas reserves, which holds the third-largest reserves in the world.

China’s absolute refusal of any external interference in the South China Sea is driven by its fear of the United States attempting to exploit its influence in various oil-rich regions of the world to embarrass China and undermine its future position, thereby denying it an effective and influential role, especially since its investment in the promising resources of the South China Sea reduces its dependence on imported oil from the Gulf region. Indeed, imports from this area increased from 39% in 1990 to 60% in 2003, with projections reaching 80% by 2020.

Ease of Navigation:

The geographical linkage of the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea has rendered them among the most important maritime routes in the world, with the Malacca Strait geographically terminating at the southern entrance to the South China Sea. This is especially critical for the region’s countries, most of which are oil importers. Consequently, a closure of the Malacca Strait would negatively affect these nations’ economies. There is a Chinese concern regarding the United States using its military superiority through naval fleets in the area, so China strives to solidify its presence in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea.

This significance increases as it represents the shortest route connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Hence, China sees the necessity to protect it from any external powers, whether regional or global, that could disrupt maritime movement. The importance of the South China Sea extends beyond China; it is also vital to other regional countries for their economic development. Vietnam, for instance, aimed to increase its maritime economy share by 7% by 2020, while the Philippines considers maritime connectivity essential not only for its prosperity but also for its political unity, therefore encouraging its coastal residents to engage in maritime trade.

In 2015, tensions and regional disputes escalated concerning the ownership of the South China Sea as it represents a vital artery for international trade, comprising more than India’s GDP and the ASEAN’s combined output. The United States recognizes that China’s control over the region and its exploitation of its resources poses a significant threat by restricting the movement of vessels and commerce transiting through it. Thus, the importance of maritime passageways has begun to inform comprehensive strategies in the political, economic, trade, and technological arenas. It retains significant importance due to the dense traffic of vessels transporting hydrocarbons from the Arabian Gulf to Southeast Asian countries. Given its geostrategic significance, China seeks to protect it by countering and surrounding powers that attempt to disrupt the regional balance and stability, while simultaneously the United States works to activate regional alliances and revive India’s maritime role to create a balance of maritime power.

The Strategic Importance of the Islands in the South China Sea:

The islands of the South China Sea also possess major strategic importance, leading them to become a source of conflict among nations. China seeks control over the most important islands, namely: Spratly, Paracel, Bratas, and Macclesfield, and disputes these territories with other countries.

The Spratly Islands group is divided across eleven territories over an area of 1,000 square kilometers, with disputes primarily between China and Vietnam, escalating to military clashes, resulting in Chinese control over the Spratlys. The Paracel Islands, situated midway between Hainan Island’s southern coast and central Vietnam’s coast, consist of ten islands and rock formations covering 200 square kilometers. After defeating Vietnam in 1974, this archipelago came under Chinese control.

Disputants attempt to assert their claims to these islands through historical claims, with China in a favorable position as the first to discover them. Disputes particularly intensify over Spratly and Paracel Islands due to their significance, with lesser contention over Bratas and Macclesfield.

Consequently, the geostrategic significance of the South China Sea has made it highly important, especially as China enters a phase of economic growth, necessitating oil and natural gas supplies to enhance its economy and secure its status and control over energy routes.

Vietnam, on the other hand, refutes Chinese claims over these islands, asserting its sovereignty and noting that China never claimed sovereignty until 1940, having governed the Paracel and Spratly Islands since the seventeenth century. The Philippines asserts sovereignty over the Spratly Islands due to their geographic proximity. Malaysia also claims sovereignty over Spratly Island, while both Malaysia and Brunei assert rights over the South China Sea as it lies within their economic zones. Additionally, China and the Philippines compete over the Scarborough Shoal, referred to as Huangyan Island. Given its increasing importance, major regional powers are beginning to create stable strategies to manage their long-term goals as foundational elements in state structure.

Section Three: ASEAN Organization

When discussing the Southeast Asian Organization, we must understand its foundation, objectives, importance, and the reasons for its establishment. Therefore, this section will be divided into several parts.

First: The Establishment of ASEAN:

The ASEAN Alliance was established in Bangkok, Thailand, as a political alliance among Southeast Asian countries on August 8, 1967. Initially, it focused on counteracting communism in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, aiming to politically coordinate among five countries: Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In 1984, Brunei joined, and the alliance transitioned from a political coalition to a regional economic cooperation framework among its members. They worked together on unifying manufacturing policies and liberalizing trade with respect to product lists, while implementing national policies to substitute imports for the protection of emerging industries. They adopted a traditional development model, substituting natural resources for imports to develop their human resources. Both Malaysia and Singapore pursued open policies toward foreign investment, and the organization succeeded in establishing an investment savings policy without relying on external resources. In 1991, the establishment of a free trade area paved the way for removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, thus revitalizing the ASEAN economy.

Charter of ASEAN:

The charter includes the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN and went into effect in 2008, becoming binding for all its members.

Objectives of the Organization:

The Bangkok Declaration of 1976 established the main objectives of the ASEAN alliance as follows:

1. To accelerate economic growth to improve living standards and encourage active cooperation and mutual assistance in research, economic, and social domains.
2. To maintain regional peace and political stability in the face of major powers, respecting justice and the rule of law in its relations with regional countries.
3. To engage in fruitful relations with regional powers and international institutions sharing common interests.
4. To promote studies of the region and foster social progress.
5. To link and utilize agricultural, industrial, and trade activities and expand their scope among member states alongside improving transportation and communication.
6. It seeks to establish a free trade organization among its members by eliminating all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and strengthening relations with third countries like Japan and South Korea, marking a modern definition of economic integration.

Importance of this Bloc:

ASEAN’s importance in the global economy has increased, especially following rising growth rates and its growing contributions to global trade, distinguishing it from the economies of developing countries. This is a result of increased productive and agricultural rates and a rise in export value alongside a decrease in income disparity, with an uptick in local and investment savings.

Principles on Which ASEAN Was Founded:

Several principles underpin ASEAN’s relationships with its members, established in 1976, which outlined the following:

1. The necessity for cooperation among all member states.
2. Resorting to peace and renouncing conflicts and threats.
3. Seeking peaceful solutions to disputes and differences.
4. Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
5. Respecting the sovereignty and independence of member states and the integrity of the national identity of all nations.
6. Granting each state the right to lead its own affairs free from external intervention.

Second: Challenges and Perspectives Facing ASEAN:

ASEAN was established amidst conflicts and divisions among its member states, leading to ethnic and border disputes. However, the alliance succeeded in creating security visions and also achieved investment cooperation amidst the rise of Vietnamese-Soviet threats and increasing Chinese influence. With many members feeling a shared danger, they built a regional foundation for achieving security and economic welfare.

Given the challenges, it is essential to identify ASEAN’s function, factors of its success, and the future of the alliance amid these challenges, which we will outline in the following points.

The Function of ASEAN:

The organization aims to fulfill two essential functions for all its members:

1. Security Function
2. Economic Function

However, it is crucial to remember that the organization initially functioned as a political alliance to resolve existing political issues within the region.

Security Function:

The organization formed part of regional security arrangements, emerging to motivate its members to build trust, understanding, and unify perspectives on regional security concepts. ASEAN fostered trust and cooperation amongst its members, known as the “collective mindset,” but it did not prioritize traditional methods of collective security and lacks formal mechanisms for dispute resolution, thus failing to achieve its security function. Consequently, they aimed to form a security alliance known as the ASEAN Regional Forum; however, this also did not prescribe a method for the use of force in conflicts, relying instead on its high diplomatic status.

Economic Function:

The organization’s tangible success came in developing and enhancing the economic sphere, managing to increase trade rates among member states and establishing joint projects, of which only a few have been accomplished. Member states did not adhere to the organization’s regulations. Conversely, trade rates increased, leading to growth in local markets, attracting foreign investments to member states. The need for a common market arose, leading to the establishment of the free trade area, which included tariff reductions enhancing economic cooperation between states and opening avenues for engagement with major nations, promoting relations in trade and investment.

Conclusion:

The strategic importance of the South China Sea has led to disputes and confrontations between China and the United States over dominance in this vital geostrategic area, with neither side allowing a single power to control it, threatening the interests of the other. This region will likely become a focal point for escalation between the United States and China in the coming years, given the rise of China in the international system alongside a decline in U.S. dominance. One of China’s primary objectives is to protect its maritime security and foster deeper cooperation with Southeast Asian nations.

ASEAN’s goal centers around economic growth and enhancing trade, investment, and industrial cooperation while maintaining regional stability and security. This alliance has opened its members to the outside world, enabling them to compete with foreign nations, providing global market-serving productivity. Today, this bloc has become a focal point for global attention after transforming from a small regional assembly facing external pressures and comprising developing nations into a model for developing countries to emulate.

Chapter Two: Causes of the South China Sea Crisis and Its Historical Development

Introduction:

The South China Sea is a focal point of competing interests on an international scale. Consequently, several factors have led to the escalation of conflict into a dispute, including natural resources and strategic gains associated with controlling the area. Disputed regions include the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin, among many other locations. In the context of China’s growing ascent, it poses a threat to regional security and peace due to its expansionist ambitions aimed at reorganizing its power to become a global power capable of competing both globally and regionally. This situation presents a challenge to the United States, particularly with China continually modernizing its military alongside several regional countries. The American presence in the region has led to increased tensions, creating an environment that raises alarms about the potential onset of a world war.

Conversely, there are sharp disagreements among the countries bordering the South China Sea regarding sovereignty rights, which entail legal consequences surrounding various military, commercial, maritime, economic, and tourism activities. China has claimed sovereignty over 80% of the sea area through historical and geographical arguments justifying its claims over the region. Other nations bordering the sea, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, reject this claim, asserting the illegitimacy of these arguments and deciding to resort to international courts and to adhere to international maritime law.

These disputes have a rich history; it cannot be said that they are recent but rather are the outcome of a series of disturbances in relations between China and some Asian nations bordering the sea. Therefore, in this chapter, we will clarify the various reasons contributing to the escalation of disputes over the South China Sea and elucidate the historical development of this issue through two main sections: one outlining the reasons for the conflict and the other detailing the historical evolution of the dispute in the area.

Section One: Reasons for the Dispute in the South China Sea

Countries around the world have rushed to the South China Sea, leading to competition and conflict between regional nations. This situation has drawn international attention to the importance of this strategically significant location, especially among those studying political realities and their interactions with this distinctive geography. China has the longest coastline in this area, covering approximately 18,000 square kilometers, rich in energy resources, oil, and gas, with estimated reserves of 30 billion tons of oil and 16 trillion cubic meters of gas, along with reserves of mineral and fish wealth. Additionally, it houses international communication cables beneath its surface. Furthermore, four strategically significant islands are located in this area: Dongsha (the eastern islands), Nansha (the southern islands), Zhongsha (the central islands), and Xisha (the western islands). Thus, competition and conflict have erupted over the significance of this location and its considerable influence on global trade and navigation. China claims 80% of the sea as its sovereign territory, a position rejected by the other countries, which compete to secure their share of these vital waters. China has taken control of two islands, namely the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which have energy resources. However, the Philippines and Vietnam contest this claim, as the Philippines has proximity to the Spratly Islands, and Malaysia has also claimed sovereignty over them. These disputes led to appeals to international courts and adherence to the United Nations Law of the Sea in 1982.

Despite regional rivalries, the United States entered the fray upon realizing the geostrategic importance of this location for its military and commercial interests. It recognized that the South China Sea is key to the surrounding waterways, prompting the U.S. to engage unilaterally and forge alliances with Australia and Japan. China, striving to control a significant portion of the sea, sought to enhance its hierarchy and deploy land tactics and an effective moderate policy to exploit the resources available. China has indicated that hydrocarbon resources are being exploited by other nations in a manner that causes concern for its national interests. These maneuvers represent a potential vulnerability for American power in the Pacific region amid China’s rise as it has reached second place economically, trailing only the United States. The strategic region has transformed into a hotspot for conflict and competition among global powers, owing to geostrategic considerations that converge the interests of major states.

The South China Sea is a region witnessing a major crisis that could escalate into a dispute among many countries. Initially, the conflict involved China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei regarding who would assert control and sovereignty over the South China Sea. Tensions escalated when China claimed sovereignty over vast stretches of this sea, built artificial islands, and conducted naval patrols in its waters, worrying the bordering states. The United States intervened, accusing China of militarization, leading to mutual accusations between the two sides.

The core of the disagreement centers around sovereignty over the waters and the islands within them, with countries asserting sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as over the reefs and sandbanks such as Scarborough Shoal. The conflict heightened due to the region’s wealth in natural resources and minerals compared to neighboring areas and its status as an important maritime passage laden with immense fish wealth. Consequently, in 1947, China released a map delineating the two chains of islands as part of its territory, claiming historical rights stretching back centuries and asserting control over an area denoted by the “nine-dash line,” extending hundreds of miles east and south of Hainan Island in southern China. However, Vietnam rejected this, asserting that China only claimed the area in 1940, while it had been under Vietnamese control since the 17th century, with evidence to support this claim. The Philippines also claims sovereignty over the two chains by virtue of geographic proximity, exacerbating the conflict. Subsequently, disputes arose between China and the Philippines over the coral reef known as Scarborough Shoal, which China refers to as Huangyan Island, located 800 kilometers from China and 160 kilometers from the Philippines.

Moreover, Brunei and Malaysia have claimed that the South China Sea falls within their respective economic zones, as defined by the United Nations Law of the Sea, with Malaysia also asserting ownership of some Spratly Islands. However, the most serious confrontations have occurred between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

Confrontations in the South China Sea included China taking control of the Paracel Islands, encounters between China and Vietnam led to the death of over 70 Vietnamese soldiers. In 2012, a maritime confrontation between China and the Philippines occurred at Scarborough Shoal, ending with mutual accusations of sovereignty violations. China destroyed two Vietnamese exploration platforms in late 2012, while in 2013, the Philippines filed a lawsuit at the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the United Nations Charter against China to contest China’s claims. Tensions flared again between the Vietnamese and Chinese in 2014 due to China towing a drilling platform near the Paracel Islands. All these conflicts occur because the region is rich in oil, estimated to contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil.

Other sources believe that confirmed oil reserves in the South China Sea may reach 7.5 billion barrels. China refers to the South China Sea as the “second Persian Gulf” and plans to invest $30 billion over the next twenty years to exploit the oil resources in the area, projecting a yield of approximately 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas each year.

The United States has sought to exploit the points of contention between China and its neighbors to thwart China’s attempts to gain regional prominence. China has urged the U.S. not to intervene in the crisis, yet the U.S. aims to prevent Chinese dominance over international waters, as doing so would threaten its existence and commercial mobility in Asia. In response, China has implemented various policies to counteract the American threat and prevent the U.S. from controlling the area. These include enhancing its long-term military presence and developing its naval fleet to reclaim Taiwan. Its military forces are being balanced against American military presence in the region. To this end, China has deployed cruise missiles to counter American ones, in addition to building military and civilian facilities in the area, all serving as deterrents against American influence if it attempts to control the region. China has also invested in aircraft carriers though it recognizes their limitations against U.S. challenges. Thus, it focused on bolstering its submarine capabilities as a threat to American carriers and other surface vessels, establishing coast guard units to safeguard itself in the event of armed conflict with the United States, considering its surface fighters would be vulnerable. Additionally, China has founded a maritime militia, dubbed the “little blue men,” consisting of hundreds of fishing vessels to carry out reconnaissance and intelligence operations in disputed areas, while arming its coast guard with heavy weapons, ensuring it is prepared for confrontations with any disputing nations.

Section Two: Evolution of the Conflict over the South China Sea

From 1900 until the beginning of World War I, there was little significant interest from the countries bordering the South China Sea or major powers, and no international confrontations occurred over it. However, this changed in the following years with numerous disputes and clashes involving France, Germany, and Japan, establishing naval bases or supply lines in the area.

Countries bordering this sea presented evidence supporting their sovereignty claims over these islands. China claimed these regions had been taken from it through unjust treaties and that the Spratly Islands had been an integral part of its territory for nearly two thousand years. In 1947, China released a detailed map featuring an 11-dash boundary, which was later revised to nine dashes, indicating its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. However, Vietnam responded by asserting its rights to these islands, claiming that China did not assert ownership before 1940, while Vietnam made its claims as early as the 17th century. The Philippines also claimed sovereignty over the two chains, citing its geographic proximity to the Spratly Islands. Both Malaysia and Brunei asserted their claims to areas within the South China Sea, declaring them part of their economic zones as defined by the United Nations Law of the Sea.

By May 1939, the Japanese occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands during World War II. The Japanese Empire used the islands for various military purposes, claiming that the islands had not been claimed by anyone when the Imperial Japanese Navy took control of them. After the war, Japan was compelled to relinquish control over the islands in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which did not specify the new status of the islands. The People’s Republic of China made various claims on the islands during negotiations over the 1951 treaty and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958.

The 1954 Geneva Accords, which ended the First Indochina War, granted the Republic of Vietnam control over Vietnamese territory, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In 1974, as North Vietnam began to gain momentum in the Vietnam War, the People’s Republic of China employed military force to take over the Paracel Islands, seizing Yagong Island and a crescent-shaped group of reefs from South Vietnam. The PRC aimed to prevent the Paracel Islands from falling under North Vietnam’s control. The United States, amidst warming relations with the PRC, promised not to participate on behalf of the PRC. In the latter half of the 1970s, the Philippines and Malaysia began to reference the Spratly Islands as part of their territory, and on June 11, 1978, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1596, declaring the northwestern portion of the Spratly Islands as Philippine territory.

Conflicts escalated into military confrontations in the South China Sea between 1988 and 1999, categorized into two types:

Type One: Disputes between China and the countries bordering the South China Sea, where numerous clashes occurred. In 1988, clashes took place between Chinese and Vietnamese naval fleets at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, resulting in several Vietnamese vessels sinking and 72 Vietnamese sailors losing their lives. Tensions resurfaced in 1992 when China seized 20 Vietnamese cargo vessels transporting goods from Hong Kong. In 1994, a confrontation erupted between the two nations in Vietnam’s internationally recognized waters over oil exploration platforms. Again, in 1995, China clashed with the Philippines after occupying the “Audi-Odi” reef, which the Philippines claims as its territory and maintains a military presence on. In 1999, China lodged a protest against the Philippines due to an attack by a Philippine artillery ship on Chinese fishing boats. The same year, Malaysian vessels fired upon a Chinese fishing boat, rekindling tensions between the two countries in 1996 with an hour-and-a-half artillery exchange near Campos Island.

Type Two: Incidents without China’s presence. In 1995, Taiwanese artillery fired at a Vietnamese supply vessel in “Aitoabo.” Tensions flared between the Philippines and Vietnam in 1998 and 1999, with Vietnamese forces firing at a Philippine fishing boat near “Tenent” Reef, and also firing upon a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft over the same reef. In 1999, a near-confrontation occurred between Malaysia and the Philippines over a reef occupied by Malaysia in the Spratly chain.

Despite attempts by China to portray the South China Sea conflict as a bilateral issue, adhering to negotiations and principles of good neighborliness while refraining from using force to resolve disputes, the conflict has transformed from bilateral disputes to a global issue for two reasons:

1. The signing of what became known as the “Code of Conduct” in 2002, which allowed for conflict resolution within the framework of ASEAN and thereby internationalized the dispute.
2. The involvement of the United States in the conflict and the push for internationalization starting in 2010.

Thus, the period before 2002 lacked an international character, remaining confined to bilateral relations between China and each of the disputing nations over the South China Sea, with each side continually asserting its historical and legal rights to ownership of the contested islands and regions.

Between 2002 and 2010, attempts to establish a regional framework for addressing the dispute arose, evident through the signing of the Code of Conduct in 2002 during the eighth ASEAN summit to de-escalate tensions, especially between China and the Philippines. The signing parties committed to adhere to the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter and sought confidence-building measures through peaceful means, committing to:

• Applying principles of equality and mutual respect, and ensuring freedom of navigation and aviation in the South China Sea according to international law.
• Engaging in direct consultation and negotiation without resorting to or threatening the use of force.
• Refraining from actions that would complicate or escalate disputes or impact peace and stability, including settlement on uninhabited islands.
• Voluntary cooperation across several sectors, such as marine environmental protection, scientific research, and organized crime.

The period from 2010 to 2016 marked a decisive change in the history of the dispute and conferred an international character on it, chiefly due to a significant shift in the position of the United States, expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, emphasizing the following:

• The necessity for conflict resolution due to its significance for regional stability and the need for a mechanism to facilitate this.
• Respect for international law concerning ensuring freedom of navigation and access to shared Asian maritime areas, which represent core interests for the U.S.

This American policy prompted the Philippines to bring a complaint against China before the International Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which ruled in favor of the Philippines—a decision rejected by China to prevent internationalizing the dispute and insisted on maintaining bilateral negotiations and regional cooperation per the 2002 Code of Conduct.

China’s refusal to recognize the court’s ruling and its insistence on historical perspectives stem from several arguments, including:

• The tribunal’s ruling favoring the Philippines contradicts signed international agreements, especially the Paris Agreement between the U.S. and Spain in 1898 and other accords that established the boundaries of the Philippines.
• Arbitration contradicts the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in 1982, which acknowledges the right of signatory nations to choose their dispute resolution methods, thereby asserting that the Philippines cannot unilaterally resort to arbitration. The Code of Conduct also emphasizes resolving disputes through direct negotiations, with the Philippines’ reliance on arbitration encouraging other nations, such as Indonesia, to threaten similar actions for their disputes with China.

All of this aims to shape global public opinion to confine Chinese policy in the South China Sea, driving China to bolster its military capabilities in the area by establishing a naval base for its fleet, which has contributed to an arms race among regional nations, as evidenced by the following:

• Vietnam, known for its maritime traditions, has modernized its military despite economic hardships, acquiring two frigates, mine sweepers, and ten attack boats from Russia.
• In 2009, Malaysia purchased submarines of the “Scorpene” type to enhance its ability to protect its waters.
• Indonesia plans to construct twelve submarines by 2024, acquiring South Korean “Changbogo”-class submarines and Russian “Kilo”-class submarines.
• The Philippines lacks real military capabilities to defend contested areas but relies on a mutual defense agreement with the U.S. to protect its interests in those regions.

There seems to be a significant disparity in power balances favoring China, whose military spending has surged influenced by the Taiwan issue, strategic competition with India, the evolution of American presence in the Pacific, and a growing concern over the technological gap separating Chinese power from Western counterparts. This arms race resulting from the economic growth of most Southeast Asian countries places the region at risk.

Conclusion:

Through our understanding of various reasons that have contributed to the conflict and the rising tensions, we see that they significantly impact various regions, and escalating tensions concerning China diminish its leverage over stronger competitors, especially the United States. This has also unveiled conflicting interests and divisions among nations.

The importance of the South China Sea has made disputes likely amongst nations, and America’s approach to what is termed the Asian crisis presents a challenge to its future position, especially following Indonesia’s recourse to the U.S. and China’s ascent, which has enhanced its military capabilities becoming a strong competitor. However, the South China Sea continues to experience fluctuations of stability and instability intermittently. Therefore, a measure of flexibility in negotiations is essential to resolve the dispute with minimal losses. In the next chapter, we will discuss the role of ASEAN in its attempts to resolve disputes among its members and with China regarding the South China Sea, along with decisions it intends to announce to settle this conflict.

Chapter Three: The Role of ASEAN in Settling the South China Sea Dispute and Its Implications

Introduction:

Since its establishment in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has faced numerous regional security challenges. The conflicts of the Cold War in Vietnam and Cambodia, along with regional disputes among member states such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia, have long concerned ASEAN. In the 21st century, regional disputes in the South China Sea have dominated the security agenda of the ASEAN Community, as reconciling the diverse national interests and ambitions of its member states to present a cooperative regional front proves to be extremely difficult.

Thus, this chapter will clarify ASEAN’s position, either individually or collectively, in dealing with maritime disputes to determine whether its policies and decisions will influence the resolution of conflicts among its member states and China or maintain the status quo. Therefore, it is essential to understand its decisions to explore the implications of these choices, especially considering the organization’s loose structure and established rules.

Section One: ASEAN’s Decisions to Address the South China Sea Dispute

Member states in any regional organization often have varying interests regarding specific issues, a predicament that has afflicted ASEAN as it navigates the South China Sea dilemma. Despite China’s initial strong objections, ASEAN managed to place the dispute on its agenda and claimed some success in addressing issues related to the Spratly Islands while demonstrating the collective identity of Southeast Asia. This identity represents a significant step for ASEAN as a bridge to build trust and security between Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. However, the essence of the dispute in the South China Sea remains territorial sovereignty rather than maritime law issues.

ASEAN’s role in the Spratly disputes entered a new phase with the disagreement between China and the Philippines over the Mischief Reef. ASEAN leaders are determined not to allow the controversy to hinder their ultimate goal of establishing a peaceful, free, and neutral zone in Southeast Asia alongside the economic development this aims to generate. In this context, some observers believe that ASEAN should adopt a unified stance against China to persuade it to resolve the issue through peaceful and multilateral means, avoiding actions that could destabilize the region.

For some analysts, ASEAN lacks an official position on South China Sea disputes, leading to the conclusion that the organization does not take a firm stance requires some clarification, especially against the backdrop of persistent claims by ASEAN leaders emphasizing the organization’s centrality in addressing regional security issues. It could be argued that ASEAN has achieved a central role in the regional structure, not only by being a hub for economic integration initiatives but also by providing a platform for political and economic dialogue and engagement.

In 1992, ASEAN’s initial declaration regarding the South China Sea did not favor any side; rather, it emphasized the renunciation of force and urged all parties – be they ASEAN members or China – to exercise restraint, calling on all claimants to adopt this declaration and commit to the principles of a treaty of friendship as the foundation for establishing a code of conduct.

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed by all ASEAN Foreign Ministers and China’s special envoy in November 2002. In 2004, ASEAN and China agreed on an action plan and guidelines for implementation in 2011.

Subsequently, ASEAN articulated its six-point principles concerning the South China Sea on July 20, 2012, during talks in Bali, reaffirming ASEAN’s commitment to the following:

1. The full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea from 2002.
2. Adherence to the guidelines for implementing the Declaration concerning the conduct of parties in the South China Sea from 2011.
3. Early conclusion of a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea.
4. Full respect for universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5. Continued exercise of restraint and non-use of force by all parties.
6. Resolution of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Hanoi clarified that the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to maritime commons in Asia, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. Additionally, ASEAN expressed support for a cooperative diplomatic process concerning regional disputes in the South China Sea, which directly contradicts China’s assertion that the South China Sea represents a core interest. Tensions have been exacerbated by the joint military exercises conducted by the United States and South Korea in the Yellow Sea in July and August 2010.

The ASEAN-China meeting in November 2012 in Beijing yielded no progress, confirming that both ASEAN and China were committed to initiating discussions aimed at formulating a legally binding code of conduct, despite the lack of tangible outcomes. Former Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino defended ASEAN’s performance regarding the South China Sea, positing that ASEAN acts as a unified group on issues of interest to all its members, not just the four claimants. ASEAN engages in discussions with China regarding the South China Sea across various forums, as the stakes are high for ASEAN, with the South China Sea being a critical issue at the heart of the organization. Failing to address this matter would severely damage its credibility. ASEAN should not take sides on the various claims but rather adopt and publicly announce a neutral, forward-looking stance encouraging peaceful resolutions.

The differences between claimant and non-claimant states within ASEAN imply that the long-standing method of slow, consensus-based decision-making is under significant pressure. In late 2012, the ASEAN Secretary-General warned that the South China Sea could become as destabilizing for Asia as Palestine is for the Middle East. In 2013, the Philippines asked an international court in The Hague to hear its arguments against China’s activities. Furthermore, the ASEAN summit did not mention the term “South China Sea” in its joint statement, which called for respect for the sovereignty of each nation and international law.

Consequently, China decided to soften its position towards ASEAN as a group, enacting diplomatic strategies with several countries in the region through more positive stances. Despite this, it remains committed to resolving the issue through direct negotiations with the relevant parties while continuously striving to avoid internationalizing the matter. Chinese leaders pledged to engage in consultations with Southeast Asian nations to prevent escalation of tensions and maintain cooperative relations, avoiding potential conflict. This initiative was widely welcomed in the region as a crucial step, considering that China had previously rejected any efforts from ASEAN members and their Western allies, particularly the United States.

Furthermore, Beijing has offered a series of attractive measures to ASEAN, advocating for stronger integration with regional economies. Among China’s efforts to emphasize cooperation and peaceful solutions to mend regional ties:

• Promoting China as a major regional partner.
• Enhancing China-ASEAN cooperation through the establishment of a free trade area, expanding investment and financing channels to strengthen relations.
• Beijing attempted to bolster its bilateral relations with several ASEAN member states, particularly those embroiled in territorial disputes with China, such as Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam, by offering economic packages.
• Stressing Beijing’s perspective on collaboration with ASEAN countries, alongside China’s friendship with individual nations in the region, is key not only to strengthening economic ties between China and the regional organization but also aligning with ASEAN’s shared values and interests.

It is observable that ASEAN is trying to balance the threats and interests posed by China. The business opportunities and trade that this rising power offers, alongside Beijing’s calls for establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership, appear more promising in the long run than Japan’s assistance measures.

Beijing’s explicit statement supporting dialogue with Southeast Asian nations regarding desertification agreements marks an important step forward toward creating a more favorable environment for a multilateral resolution of the issue. However, China needs to continue consultations with ASEAN concerning a counter-terrorism committee in a manner that enhances and strengthens mutual trust through shared understanding and compromise.

In the first half of 2017, ASEAN and Chinese officials met three times to discuss the code of conduct for the South China Sea, and on February 27, both sides agreed on the fundamental outlines for a draft framework.

The code’s primary purpose is to “establish a rules-based framework containing a set of standards to guide the conduct of the parties and enhance maritime cooperation in the South China Sea.” Thus, the final code of conduct for the South China Sea is likely to be voluntary and non-binding.

The second goal is to “enhance mutual trust and cooperation, prevent incidents, manage incidents should they occur, and create a conducive environment for resolving disputes by peaceful means.”

The third goal is to “ensure maritime security, safety, and freedom of navigation.” The parties also emphasized their respect for and commitment to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, with some ASEAN nations expressing concerns that the dispute threatens to undermine this freedom.

Among the principles of the code of conduct for parties in the South China Sea is that the code is not a tool for resolving regional disputes or maritime boundary delineation issues since ASEAN member states have not granted the organization a mandate to resolve disputes which can only be managed by the claimants themselves, through either legal arbitration or political negotiations, either bilaterally or multilaterally. The second principle is adherence to the principles of the UN Charter. The third principle is a commitment to the complete and effective implementation of the biodiversity agreement that ASEAN and China have previously agreed upon. The fourth principle emphasizes respect for each party’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity under international law, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, a new item that reiterates principles one and three, using repetition to highlight their importance in managing relations between ASEAN and China, especially considering the increasing asymmetry in power between China and Southeast Asian nations.

The final part of the framework consists of five final goals, which encourage other countries to respect the principles outlined in the code of conduct for the South China Sea and emphasize the necessity of having mechanisms to monitor the implementation and review the code and its nature, along with its entry into force.

On August 6, 2017, in Manila, the Foreign Ministers of China and ASEAN endorsed the framework for the code of conduct in the South China Sea, which had been approved earlier by a senior officials’ meeting between ASEAN and China regarding the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in Guiyang. On May 19, 2017, Chinese leaders presented a statement that had been delayed due to disagreements among some ASEAN members on how to characterize the dispute. ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their desire to adopt the framework to facilitate progress on a mutually agreed timeline. The Singaporean Foreign Minister described the framework as an important document as it represents a commitment on behalf of the ten ASEAN nations and China to make progress on this issue.

On November 20, 2018, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development approved a joint regional strategy for East Asia and the Pacific launched by ASEAN. On June 1, 2019, the U.S. Secretary of Defense announced that the United States would comprehensively strengthen military relations with ASEAN nations over the next five years. Indonesia also reached an agreement with the United States in 2018 to enhance cooperation on security issues, which includes protecting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Nonetheless, some countries hold doubts about the U.S. security cooperation strategy, with Malaysia perceiving that U.S. intervention in the South China Sea would provoke significant regional disputes. The Philippines views the United States as imposing its stance against China regarding the South China Sea and undermining relations between China and the Philippines. It sees the United States as using the Indo-Pacific strategy for its own interests in attempts to interfere with Chinese sovereignty issues, including its interventions in South China Sea disputes.

In October 2018, China and ASEAN held their first-ever naval exercise in history, an unprecedented event proposed initially by Beijing in 2015 amid increasing tensions over the South China Sea dispute. It is evident that Beijing aimed to ease tensions with ASEAN members, thus the primary logic behind this strategic dimension is the balance of power, with various mechanisms aimed at avoiding escalation of open confrontation at sea, which ASEAN primarily seeks to encourage.

ASEAN has maintained a balance between China and the United States to foster a more stable development for the organization. Still, the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy has disrupted the geopolitical balance in the region and heightened the divide in interests among ASEAN nations. Concerning military affairs, military exercises involving the U.S. and ASEAN have become multilateral. Since 2019, the United States has conducted extensive joint naval exercises with ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, while also continually increasing its arms sales to ASEAN member states, selling drones and wheeled armored vehicles to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand.

The United States has attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of other Southeast Asian nations. Overall, the U.S. strategy has penetrated the internal values of ASEAN, rendering the shared values of the organization more fragile and intensifying the inherent contradictions between human rights and sovereignty. In 2017, ASEAN proposed sanctions concerning the South China Sea and East China Sea, drawing attention from U.S. political circles. The ASEAN’s intention to intensify the narrative surrounding the South China Sea disputes permits closer alignment with the United States. As ASEAN’s reliance on the U.S. increases, a core issue of survival will be the security of Southeast Asian countries under U.S. oversight, placing ASEAN in a security dilemma.

In 2020, tensions intensified between China and the United States; the U.S. Secretary of State praised global opposition to China’s actions in the South China Sea, reiterating that it is among its territories. Consequently, the U.S. scheduled frequent naval deployments in the area. These developments occurred following Joe Biden’s inauguration as president, while ASEAN sought to operate as a mediator to achieve stable power balance among major powers through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. However, the U.S.’s influence and geographic coverage granted it a significantly strategic position that attracted regional and international attention, while the U.S. tried to incorporate ASEAN into its search for allies, consequently undermining the neutrality ASEAN aimed to maintain. Therefore, ASEAN’s developmental prospects can be characterized by both opportunities and challenges.

Chapter Two: Consequences of ASEAN’s Decisions in Resolving Conflicts

Through examining the decisions discussed in the previous section, we find that some decisions were weak while others had little to no impact. This reveals the organization’s shortcomings and its inability to resolve conflicts comprehensively. Additionally, these decisions have produced certain outcomes, including:

The decisions highlighted the influence of member states on ASEAN’s decision-making capacity. This was evident as decisions are made by consensus, and with the addition of new members, achieving agreement on decisions has become increasingly difficult.

Moreover, ASEAN’s loose structure is a fundamental factor contributing to the organization’s weak decisions. The organization tends to prioritize individual member interests at the expense of collective security.

Decisions and announcements have frequently faced objections, as seen in the Manila Declaration (1992) and Bandar Seri Begawan (1995, 2002). These instances demonstrated the organization’s ability to work together, yet did not lead to conflict resolution. Despite optimistic predictions regarding conflict resolution, ASEAN resorted to the Hanoi Declaration (2010), in which the United States acted as a mediator at Vietnam’s request. However, this upset China and resulted in the establishment of a joint working group between ASEAN and China.

In 2012, ASEAN failed to reconcile its decisions during the Phnom Penh meeting, resulting in no joint statement being issued. Members blamed each other during the meeting, ultimately leading to its failure. Vietnam expressed concerns regarding China, prompting both the Philippines and Vietnam to request the chair of the meeting address Chinese aggressions. However, Cambodia, Thailand, Brunei, Laos, and Myanmar objected to mentioning these aggressions, fearing it would pose a regional threat and jeopardize the peace process. In contrast, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam insisted on including this reference. This division among members prevented a joint resolution and endangered regional security.

At the Naypyidaw meeting in 2014, new concerns emerged with the Philippines and Vietnam involved in incidents with China regarding maritime issues. ASEAN’s stance was less assertive, and tensions escalated until a confrontation between China and Vietnam occurred, resulting in gunfire during the event termed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident, which led to anti-China protests in Vietnam.

The situation calmed during the Vietnam conference (2020) due to the escalation of the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in cooperation between China and ASEAN. However, tensions and grievances re-emerged when discussions regarding activities in the South China Sea arose.

Decisions were also influenced by external pressures, as ASEAN was characterized by its rejection of communism, which fostered distrust between its members and China. However, with the accession of new members, votes in favor of China increased.

Furthermore, ASEAN’s behavior often lacked firmness in its decisions, illustrating its failure to achieve regional peace despite pursuing preventive diplomacy and cooperative security. Its frameworks were not ideal, and its theories were rooted in classical regional integration and institutional bargaining, contributing to its weakness.

These factors indicate the insignificance of parties within ASEAN, with interest groups limited to economic and commercial issues, while the role of governments overshadowed that of supranational institutions, greatly diminishing the effectiveness of its decisions, as evident in the organization’s announcements and meetings.

ASEAN’s weakness in resolving disputes between its members and China stems from individual stances and fear of conceding any portion of sovereignty to powerful regional institutions, which has allowed disputes in the region to persist.

As the number of member states has increased, decision-making processes have faced difficulties, significantly deteriorating the decision-making process of the organization.

However, we cannot deny the organization’s success in mitigating security rivalries among its members and its significant role in preventing new conflicts, as well as its substantial contributions to disaster response and piracy prevention, establishing shared principles to address critical challenges resulting from external pressures.

ASEAN cannot claim sovereignty over its members in the region, as its goal is peaceful resolution; thus, it found itself in a predicament, leading to increased disputes among its member states during the Laos meeting.

Moreover, China does not accept ASEAN’s decisions as it is not a member of the organization, further weakening ASEAN’s position on the matter, along with China’s obstruction of member states’ attempts to challenge its actions, as Malaysia did.

Nonetheless, under this situation, the Philippines managed to escalate the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Similarly, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei also heightened tensions due to their adversarial stance toward China.

After Indonesia appealed to the United States for mediation, the American presence in the seas to promote naval and aerial security posed a considerable challenge to China, which reconsidered its approach towards ASEAN and engaged in economic integration with it to offset the burgeoning influence of the United States.

However, internal disparities among member states regarding national interests were evident in its decisions, including security interests that surfaced after the US Defense Secretary announced a strengthened relationship with ASEAN countries. Simultaneously, the US planned military exercises in the region, capitalizing on the situation. Indonesia, in 2018, signed an agreement to enhance cooperation on security issues through freedom of navigation, which alarmed both China and raised concerns for Malaysia and the Philippines regarding US involvement in the region.

Additionally, ASEAN member states maintained economic interests with the United States, and US influence on the regional economy increased. Some states sought to enter into economic cooperative relations with the US, like Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore, while others, like Laos and Brunei, remained indifferent.

Politically, a significant struggle exists between communism and capitalism, manifested in China’s stance and ASEAN countries’ resistance to communism, along with the US’s capitalist presence alongside ASEAN, making disputes even more pronounced.

This opened the door for US intervention in ASEAN countries, encroaching on internal affairs, leading to dissatisfaction from Malaysia and the Philippines.

Nonetheless, ASEAN remains more significantly influenced by China. Thus, it must establish common values while maintaining differences among its members to evolve into a united and strong organization that forms an organized community, ensuring its security and preventing it from falling into a spiral of conflicts with other nations.

ASEAN needs to maximize its strengths and minimize weaknesses, face challenges, and seize opportunities through further improvements. The first step is to coordinate internal interests and promote the healthy development of the integration process. The second is to reduce excessive dependence on major powers such as the US, China, India, and others, alleviating the security dilemma while seeking common ground for fruitful economic cooperation, maintaining reservations about disagreements with other nations, pursuing shared interests, and expanding existing regional cooperation mechanisms and outcomes to avoid the domination of individual powers. Thirdly, in cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN can actively play its role as an organization, building ASEAN’s community, strengthening its cohesion and competitiveness. Only in this way can beneficial cooperation extend to all, maintaining the region’s security and stability and preventing it from slipping into chaos or insecurity.

Conclusion:

For ASEAN, this is a critical moment to reunite member states in a manner that enhances their regional influence and develops their capacities to alleviate concerns about a rising China. At the same time, these countries should seize the opportunity to expand their economically beneficial relationships with China into a reliable strategic partnership rather than be overshadowed by the protracted nature of South China Sea disputes.

Final Remarks:

Ultimately, the dispute remains unresolved, and ASEAN’s role has not been effective in resolving disagreements in the region for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons is that ASEAN does not wish to act as a third party in disputes unless requested by its members, as the organization aims to enhance relationships among its members to foster cooperation. Additionally, its role in resolving disputes often involves formulating the necessary mechanisms due to the effectiveness of regional mechanisms.

China’s assertiveness and military strengthening, especially in maritime capabilities, have caused its neighbors to question its intentions, claiming its policy will be offensive rather than defensive as China asserts. Such concerns have escalated with China’s growing economy, as it retains control over a significant portion of the region in providing oil, especially since China has become the second-largest oil consumer globally. In the absence of effective cooperation mechanisms, China cannot restrict freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, notably as its economy is export-driven. Thus, China might impose an air defense zone to establish strategic superiority.

Outcomes:

The South China Sea represents a significant geopolitical component in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region due to its critical location controlling the most important global maritime routes and containing vital energy reserves.

China’s strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region hinges on its capacity to achieve economic and geopolitical gains against regional competitors concerning the South China Sea, which it claims.

In the South China Sea, China emerges as a regional power intent on expanding its influence in its most vital geopolitical rival’s arena within the Asian continent. The extent of China’s capability is determined by imposing its expansionist logic on the Spratly Islands and seizing as much of the region’s wealth as possible, while simultaneously preventing the United States from exploiting these disputes to enforce encirclement or containment policy against China by economically and militarily strangling it through controlling transit routes in the region, which represents the lifeline of the Chinese mainland.

Nations continue to assert sovereignty over the region, viewing it as part of their economic zones, rendering negotiations fruitless. This has compelled China to reconsider its position to avoid losing ground against the US while maintaining its national objective, particularly the economic aspect. Consequently, it has offered ASEAN several attractive measures to economically integrate regional powers, thereby ensuring its security against the United States while compelling Asian countries to rely increasingly on it for trade and investment.

China’s ongoing claim of significant ownership of the South China Sea puts it in direct confrontation with Vietnam and the Philippines. Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei also have overlapping claims with China, complicating the issue, particularly with the presence of the United States in the region, which has interests in providing regional protection, alongside ASEAN’s desire to promote peace in the area.

We note that the attempts to control oil, gas, fish, and mineral resources underlie many claims, even though this relies more on expectations of future discoveries than on proving existing reserves. Moreover, the desire to utilize claimed lands to expand Exclusive Economic Zones potentially allows a country to control and exploit natural resources provides additional motivation.

The South China Sea disputes constitute a collection of disputes not easily comparable to other regional disputes, necessitating a distinction between the roles played by external players and ASEAN in Southeast Asia’s security in general, particularly concerning bilateral disputes. Criticism directed at ASEAN’s reluctance to act in these contexts must be measured against the organization’s declared objectives.

American interests in the South China Sea include freedom of navigation, unimpeded commercial shipping, and peaceful resolution of regional disputes in accordance with international law. We found that the conflict in the South China Sea jeopardizes over $5 trillion in trade passing through these strategic waters annually, putting the US relationship with China at stake.

ASEAN should play a role in managing conflict and serve as a bridge to build trust and security between its members and China. In some respects, it has contributed to a regional forum for leveraging its diplomatic power to mediate a peaceful settlement in the South China Sea dispute. However, we find that its efforts cannot succeed unless claimant states are willing to engage in multilateral negotiations.

There exists a remarkable approach for ASEAN to manage conflict in Southeast Asia, characterized by an informal anti-legalistic approach. By adopting an opportunity-focused perspective, it is evident that Southeast Asian nations are reluctant to rely on legal tools for dispute resolution if they encounter favorable conditions.

The primary objective of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific is to contain China and maintain US dominance in the region. ASEAN is working to serve as a mediator to achieve a stable balance of power among major powers through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, but its influence and geographical coverage afford it a highly significant strategic position, attracting the attention of Asia and the international community.

The United States has sought to win over and even incorporate ASEAN into its search for allies, undermining the neutrality ASEAN has endeavored to uphold through its policy of balancing major powers. Therefore, the prospects for ASEAN’s development can be described as both opportunities and challenges.

ASEAN faces the risk of differentiation and challenges arising from the inflation of geographical contradictions. It may choose to remain on the margins or reshape its balance between major powers. From ASEAN’s perspective, it has complex problems such as over-reliance on the economies of regional powers and limitations in unifying and coordinating the internal interests of member states.

We find that the primary security objective of Southeast Asian nations is to maintain internal stability, with external conflicts not serving this purpose.

No progress has been evident between China and ASEAN regarding a binding code of conduct to avoid crises in the South China Sea.

We observe that while China may have softened some intimidation tactics, it continues to seek greater control over the sea and airspace within the South China Sea. Various attempts to persuade China to freeze destabilizing actions, such as land reclamation, have not succeeded, and Beijing continues to lag in negotiating a binding code of conduct with ASEAN.

The dispute over the code of conduct presents a challenging political dilemma for the United States, which holds substantial economic, strategic, and political interests in the South China Sea. The US supports the code of conduct, but China suspects Washington merely seeks to restrict the behavior of the People’s Republic.

The United States has no option but to maintain its policies prioritizing the Asia-Pacific region and support diplomatic efforts focused on ASEAN to alleviate tensions and issue a code of conduct, initiating further steps that could restore lasting peace in the South China Sea.

The claimant nations within ASEAN have firmly committed to their unwritten agreement to reach some form of resolution with China before making attempts to resolve overlapping claims. It is likely that disputes within ASEAN in the South China Sea will remain dormant for a considerable time to come.

We find that the role ASEAN can play is rather complicated, as five of its member states are embroiled in conflicts within the South China Sea, with four asserting claims of sovereignty over all or parts of the Spratly Islands. This creates a situation where ASEAN cannot serve as a mediator or third party between China and other claimants. Differing perceptions of ASEAN members regarding China, particularly concerning its participation in the South China Sea disputes among Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei, will impact how ASEAN approaches these issues.

One of the main obstacles to agreeing on arrangements related to joint development in the Spratly Islands lies in the lack of consensus concerning the specific geographical area subject to joint development. This issue is compounded by the fact that the claimants have fundamental disagreements about the appropriate mechanism for addressing these issues, as China calls for bilateral negotiations while ASEAN claimants advocate for negotiations between China and ASEAN.

There are indications that developments in the South China Sea will greatly influence how regional disputes are managed in the future.

ASEAN must not allow the South China Sea issue to affect its broader positive relations with China. It is required to engage several major powers, including China, the US, and Japan, on regional security issues. The capacity of ASEAN to present a united front and a viable framework for managing the conflict in the South China Sea could determine whether regional security is driven by power politics, as claimant nations within ASEAN individually seek strong supporters or regional cooperative arrangements to mitigate the vast power disparities between China and smaller regional states.

ASEAN’s current approach does not serve the material interests of all its members, especially the Philippines and Vietnam. It fails in this regard because its model of engaging China is unable to reconcile the diverging interests of its members. Its approach allows China to exploit its internal disputes, thereby preferring to build long-term consensus, which provides China with the necessary time to achieve its regional objectives.

Recommendations:

ASEAN must play an effectively balanced role while maintaining an increasingly charged sense of unity among its members.

ASEAN should endorse the efforts of its members, like the Philippines, and exert the necessary pressure on China to operate within the ASEAN framework, preparing for the possibility of holding an international conference to reach an agreement. This might lead to engaging a subset of interested ASEAN members who could then develop mechanisms to report back to ASEAN.

The United States should form a coalition of like-minded countries that can attempt to shape and influence China’s behavior, convincing its leadership that its firm stance in the maritime domain contradicts its own interests and those of the region.

The US must press China to be transparent about its intentions and encourage other nations to do the same.

While the US remains neutral in sovereignty disputes, it should encourage all parties to pursue their claims peacefully and in accordance with international law.

The US should also urge China to accept restrictions on its behavior as outlined in the code of conduct and deter China from taking actions that increase the risk of conflict.

The US should encourage ASEAN to develop its draft code of conduct, including measures to mitigate risks and a dispute resolution mechanism. The US should then work with ASEAN to persuade Beijing to sign and implement it.

The US should continue to assist the Philippines and Vietnam in enhancing their maritime security and surveillance capabilities, such as through improved monitoring systems, allowing them to deter and respond to Chinese incursions into their exclusive economic zones without facing repercussions. Similar assistance should be provided to Malaysia if requested.

The US should be prepared to respond to future Chinese coercive actions, including utilizing US naval forces to deter China’s ongoing use of quasi-military vessels as well as imposing economic sanctions on Chinese energy companies should they engage in exploration in disputed waters.

To reduce the risk of incidents between US and Chinese forces, both militaries should fulfill their joint commitment to conclude an agreement regarding air encounters by the year’s end.

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