The position of ASEAN in the North China Sea dispute is complex. What initially appeared as a regional issue has turned into a struggle for influence and a show of power between the rising power in the region, China, and the United States. For ASEAN, this presents a dilemma of determining which of the two relationships is more beneficial for security, as well as for the growth and economic prosperity of the region. Moreover, through this dispute, ASEAN has a chance to strengthen its position as a regional organization by offering a platform for negotiations, but it could also, conversely, demonstrate its lack of influence, or even its triviality, when serious stakes are involved. Thus, the situation in the South China Sea is critical not only for determining the future of the region but also for that of ASEAN. How will the development of the dispute affect the future of the organization?
ASEAN’s Involvement Since 1992: A Brief History
ASEAN first became involved in the South China Sea dispute in 1992, when tensions rose between Vietnam and China over oil exploration in the region. This resulted in both countries occupying the Spratly Islands, leaving ASEAN powerless. Later, in 1994, the Philippines proposed the idea of establishing a Code of Conduct (COC) in the region to limit China’s increasingly aggressive actions. It was not until 2002 that a preliminary document, which did not commit the parties to anything, was signed (Thayer, 2003, pp. 76-77). The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) promotes, among other things, the peaceful resolution of the dispute, preferably through recognized international institutions and regimes, such as UNCLOS, treaties on freedom of navigation in the region, and finally, as a last point, the adoption of a consensus-based code of conduct (ASEAN, 2002).
It took until 2011 for the recommendations for implementing the DOC to be adopted. Following this, ASEAN published another document, its “Six-Point Principles,” which reiterate the commitment of the ministers from member countries to draft and eventually adopt the COC, to maintain and implement the DOC, and to recognize international institutions as a means of peaceful dispute resolution. China commented by emphasizing that the future COC should have a consensual character and insisted that discussions on this matter should take place “at the right time,” stating that the DOC must be well-established before proceeding to discussions for the COC (Thayer, 2013, pp. 80-81).
Just a few days ago, on March 8, 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that a preliminary draft of the Code of Conduct had been drawn up in conjunction with the ten ASEAN member states. This code could include measures regarding the militarization of the region, the building of offensive capabilities, as well as freedom of navigation, posing a challenge for ASEAN and China, which must reach a consensus (Bodeen, 2017). It took fifteen years, from the DOC, for a first concrete step toward establishing a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to be taken. Considering the complexities of the issues involved, as well as China’s reluctance to potentially limit its actions, coupled with its tendency to disregard treaties it has signed when they are not in its favor (see, for example, the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague concerning the South China Sea in 2016), the future remains difficult to predict. However, this new development at least promises the holding of discussions that will get to the heart of the matter and may lead to the long-awaited Code of Conduct.
A Test for ASEAN’s Survival as a Regional Organization
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has generally fulfilled its functions well, given that there has not been any armed conflict between its member states since then. Although disputes among certain members have often not been directly resolved by the organization, it has still played an important role in facilitating dialogue and peaceful conclusions through other international instances, which aligns with its mandate to promote peace (Ba, 2016, p. 50).
However, the situation in the South China Sea is different. While in the 1990s and early 2000s ASEAN and China enjoyed good relations and allowed the former to balance the influence of the United States, which still had a presence in the region, the latter’s withdrawal to focus on the Middle East, coupled with China’s increasingly ambitious stance, has reversed this dynamic. Tensions between China and ASEAN member countries have increased, and the regional organization has had to change its approach to deal with this new challenge. However, finding common ground has proven impossible, and ASEAN is in danger. Without being able to play a significant role in resolving the dispute, its credibility will be at stake, and without that, its survival could be difficult (Tong, December 21, 2016).
China has maneuvered within the dispute with stubbornness and strength, unwilling to cede what it considers historically its territory and leaving very little chance for ASEAN to reach a consensus among its members—a task already complicated by the fact that only four of them have claims and that most are economically dependent on trade with China. China is also taking advantage of this situation by buying Cambodia’s veto power, which consistently opposes any ASEAN resolution that could threaten China’s dominant position in the sea. It also prevents fishermen from ASEAN member countries from accessing what it considers its territory while sending its own fishermen directly into the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of its neighbors. Ultimately, it prefers to engage in bilateral negotiations, effectively ignoring ASEAN’s multilateral operating mode, and refuses to acknowledge an unfavorable ruling by the International Arbitration Court, despite being a signatory of UNCLOS (Emmerson, 2017, p. 8). Today, ASEAN finds itself powerless against a more powerful and reckless player, with the “ASEAN Way of multilateral consensus… losing badly to the ‘Chinese Way’ of unilateral expansion” (Emmerson, 2017, p. 5).
ASEAN is therefore facing an existential crisis. On one hand, it is divided among its members, who are very reluctant to relinquish any of their sovereignty, each having their national interests to protect, whether they are part of the dispute or not, and each sharing a varying relationship with China. It has thus become complicated for ASEAN to unite its members around a consensus and to stand united against China’s rising power (Tong, December 22, 2016). On the other hand, it is sidelined by China, which prefers bilateral discussions, giving it the considerable advantage of being a larger, more populous, richer, and stronger country than any individual ASEAN member (Tong, December 22, 2016). Despite the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 by ASEAN member states and China (ASEAN, 2002), the latter does not uphold its commitments. What can ASEAN do? Under current circumstances, very little, and if it fails to demonstrate its usefulness in the region, it risks losing the influence it exerts as a form of “soft power.”
Which Power to Turn To?
As China gets what it wants by intimidating its opponents and acting unilaterally, ASEAN might consider looking toward the United States, which, under Obama, initiated a pivot to Asia, seeking to strengthen ties with its Pacific allies. Doing so would indeed make sense, considering the bilateral security arrangements that member countries have with the American power, in addition to the prospect of greater trade volume through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, since last January, ASEAN may want to reconsider this option. Indeed, the TPP has very little future now that President Trump is in power, who has described the agreement as a very bad ‘deal,’ considering it a backdoor for China (Emmerson, 2017, p. 11). One of the issues with this statement is that China is not a part of the TPP, and indeed, the treaty represents an opportunity for economic expansion in the region, both for ASEAN members and for the Americans, allowing the former to become less dependent on China and enabling them to rely on the United States both economically and in terms of security. This would result in curbing the expansionist momentum of the Asian giant and allow for a balance of power in the region. However, now that one of the treaty’s most crucial signatories will not ratify it, it would be impossible to maintain (Emmerson, 2017, pp. 12-13).
Caught between some disinterest from the United States toward the region since Donald Trump’s election and the aggressiveness of China, ASEAN faces a dilemma regarding which great power could help stabilize the region in terms of security while allowing member countries to pursue their economic growth objectives. While, from a realist perspective, the United States is best positioned to ensure a balance of power in the region, the answer is not so straightforward. The U.S. cannot promise the economic aspect of such an arrangement, while on the other hand, China is the main trading partner for the vast majority of ASEAN members. The most beneficial outcome for ASEAN and the region as a whole would be for the organization to diversify its relationships, thus reducing its dependence on great powers and allowing it to play a significant role in the future (Ba, 2016, p. 53). However, to achieve this, it must rely on the commitment of its members to such a vision, which is not guaranteed for the reasons mentioned throughout this article, and it must also count on the continued involvement of the United States in the region, which will also be a challenge given the new administration.
Toward What Future Is ASEAN Heading?
In conclusion, ASEAN faces multiple challenges in the South China Sea. First, the organization must enable itself to play a significant role in resolving the conflict. To do this, Tong proposes three solutions: “narrow down the development gap among ASEAN members and build up mutual trust within the organization; improve the decision-making mechanism by modifying the definition of consensus and consultation; and empower the ASEAN High Council” (Tong, December 23, 2016). Applying these recommendations could make ASEAN a more effective organization, less divided, and thus allow it to weigh in when it comes time for a unified voice to represent Southeast Asian states. Changing its internal structure would thus be the most effective means of ensuring its survival.
Ultimately, the dispute in the South China Sea is shaping up to be a battleground for the power plays of great powers. ASEAN has an interest in multiplying its relationships to avoid being caught between two giants. This may prove more challenging, but it is essential that it does not distance itself from one power only to gravitate toward another if it wishes to maintain its autonomy and once again become a significant player when decisions need to be made about the region’s future. ASEAN is facing substantial challenges, and its ability to address them will be crucial not only for the future of the region but for the future of the organization itself.
Sources
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