The confrontation of varied and divergent representations has put the American government under significant tension, prompting it to pursue an indirect support policy for Ukrainians as early as 2014, a policy that changed in scale but not in nature in February 2022. This lack of change results from the balance of conflicting representations that have not significantly evolved with the large-scale Russian invasion. Within this indirect framework, intelligence sharing and cyber support have been prioritized, yielding significant outcomes for both Ukrainian and American security.
Accompanying this analysis is a map on “American Representations of a Strategic Russian Threat” and a timeline of the evolution of American representations regarding Russia.
On March 10, 2022, just two weeks after the new phase of the war between Russia and Ukraine erupted on February 24, the General Paul Nakasone, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), detailed the support he was providing to the Ukrainian armed forces before the Senate: “We share a lot of intelligence, but with an evolution: the intelligence we share is accurate. It is relevant and actionable.” This conflict has thus revealed the active participation of the United States in the digital space. American cyber actors, whether government (NSA, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), etc.) or private entities (Google, Microsoft, Amazon, etc.), are involved in the cyber defense of Ukrainian infrastructures and cyber-offensive operations against the Russians, relying on a significant American capacity for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, and cyber-attacks.
However, the policies of support from successive American governments to benefit Ukrainian institutions, since 2014, have been marked by a conflict of representations regarding Ukraine and its importance as a territory to defend, support, or conquer. In the “Dictionary of Geopolitics,” geographer Yves Lacoste defines a geopolitical representation as “a construction, a set of ideas that are more or less logical and coherent.” As a theatrical representation, this notion allows actors in a conflict to “describe part of reality more or less accurately… [enabling them to understand their environment and act upon it, giving it meaning.” Here, the “theater piece” corresponds to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and becomes the subject of divergent and rival interpretations by the involved actors, notably Americans, Ukrainians, or Russians. These rival interpretations shape the strategies adopted to influence the conflict.
Thus, the American government is caught up in rivalries of representation. On one hand, there is restraint, or non-engagement, to preserve political or security interests with Russia, or to concentrate American resources on other issues. On the other hand, there is a desire for strong intervention to support and aid the Ukrainian government in defending against Russian armed forces. This conflict is complemented by another, between the representations of the American and Russian governments concerning the Ukrainian territory and the global space. For these reasons, the administrations of Presidents Obama (2013-2017), Trump (2017-2021), and Biden (2021-) have implemented, since 2014, a strategy of indirect support to Ukrainian institutions, where technical intelligence sharing and cyber support hold a privileged position.
I. American Representations That Encourage Limiting Intervention in Ukraine
An American desire to avoid provoking Russia and to maintain a political dialogue with Vladimir Putin’s government
American policy toward Russia has primarily focused on clearly signaling to Russian authorities the U.S. intention to avoid direct confrontation and maintain political dialogue, while avoiding any sign that could be interpreted as provocation by Russian authorities.
American officials initiated a dialogue aimed at deterring and calming Russian authorities as early as October 2021, convinced of the imminent Russian military invasion. At the request of President Joe Biden, CIA Director William Burns traveled to Moscow in early November 2021 to issue warnings to Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Biden himself engaged in telephone conversations with President Putin on December 7 and 30, 2021, encouraging him to cooperate. By conveying a message aimed at convincing that neither the United States nor the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are at war with Russia or desire regime change, American authorities attempt to counter Russian accusations that the Atlantic Alliance is engaged in a war of aggression against Russia.
American representations of Russian power draw on the register of strategic uncertainty, leaning on a vision of an irrational, paranoid, and hypersensitive Russian president. These representations impose a policy of caution on the American government. Admiral Michael Rogers, former NSA director from 2014 to 2018, asserts that this American caution also factored into President Putin’s decision to launch the invasion on February 24, 2022:
“February 2022 was very consistent with Crimea in 2014, very consistent with Georgia in 2008. We were the only ones asserting that Russia was going to do this… We were, however, surprised and frustrated at this violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. It was completely unacceptable. Self-defense or preemptive action, no one could believe that. There was no justification from the American point of view… Russia believed that the West would probably not respond. As in Georgia and Crimea. We did nothing.”
An American desire not to engage militarily with Russia
In strategic terms, American representations of Russian nuclear power and the quality of Russian armed forces have led American policymakers to rule out direct military confrontation. National security officials believed the risk of nuclear escalation was too significant. American representations of nuclear risk date back to the early Cold War and continue to influence American strategic calculations regarding Russia.
Russian nuclear doctrine hints at the use of nuclear fire only in cases of aggression against its territorial integrity. In the Ukrainian context, this leaves significant room for interpretation: do Crimea, the separatist republics of Donbas, and the newly formed Kherson and Zaporizhzhia republics, which were annexed by Russia via “referendums,” qualify as Russian territory? Would a confrontation on Ukrainian soil between American and Russian forces justify the launch of nuclear weapons for the Russian leadership? All these unanswered questions have been raised and have not altered the historical strategic positioning of American officials. It is in this strategic framework that President Putin has repeatedly weighed the threat of using Russia’s nuclear arsenal, thereby seeking to bolster American representations. As detailed by Keith Payne in 2017, head of the strategic studies and defense department at the University of Missouri, American armed forces have a cautious analysis of the Russian nuclear threat, perceiving that the Russian arsenal is more modern than the American one and that the Russian doctrine, linking nuclear threats to obtaining conventional tactical gains, inhibits a firm and deterring response.
To this nuclear determinant is added the American analysis of the military balance of power on the ground. In assessing the risks of military confrontation, the American government has likely overestimated its adversary, reinforcing a cautious stance. American intelligence perfectly detected the imminence of the Russian invasion, but neither they nor the Department of Defense (DoD) were able to provide a clear and precise assessment of Russian military capabilities.
A rivalry between the government and isolationist currents
Domestic politics is a powerful determinant of American foreign policy, and as of 2023, there is a growing tension with isolationist currents advocating for an end to American interventionism. A former high official from the Trump administration explains that, in the context of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Republican isolationist currents actively denounced foreign interventionism, deemed wasteful and ineffective, and failing to address the problems facing the American people. Alongside this, an isolationist current exists within the Democratic Party but struggles to make a convincing case to the Biden administration. A letter dated June 30, 2022, signed by 30 Democratic representatives from the Congressional Progressive Committee, calling for negotiations with Russia, sparked significant tensions, prompting those involved to retract their request by citing poor internal coordination.
These two currents are heirs to conservative isolationists, for Republicans, and liberal isolationists, for Democrats, who interpreted strictly, in the 19th and 20th centuries, the warning from President and founding father George Washington in his farewell address to the nation in 1796:
“The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. […] Europe has a set of primary interests that do not concern us or which only remotely affect us. […] Our true policy is to steer clear of permanent alliances.”
In this view, foreign policy becomes “a necessary evil” that should allow the country to retain “the greatest possible freedom in relation to the international system.” Public opinion remains the decisive factor for the Biden administration, which prefers to alienate interventionist political circles if necessary.
A division of the “strategic chessboard” in Washington D.C.
American political and strategic circles are divided between proponents of increased support for Ukraine, in response to an identified Russian threat, and those who advocate concentrating efforts on the military challenge posed by China, considered the most significant threat to the United States. Political institutions (White House, Congress), administrations (National Security Council (NSC), Department of State (DoS), and DoD), and think tanks are marked by these divides.
Ideologically, researcher Marlène Laruelle explains that there is a fracture line between individuals imbued with a more pragmatic framework—linked to the American “realist” tradition—who prioritize directing foreign policy against a dangerous Chinese expansionism, and those characterized as ideological—connected to the American “idealist” tradition—who promote a firmer confrontation with Russia in the name of fighting authoritarianism, protecting human rights, and promoting democracy.
For instance, the DoS and Washington D.C. think tanks are seen as actors more supportive of strong backing for Ukraine and a determined confrontation with Russia, particularly due to their missions to promote democratic principles and human rights. In contrast, the DoD, which is institutionally less concerned with democratic issues but tasked with preparing the American armed forces for a “Chinese military challenge,” is more inclined to favor less costly and less direct support for Ukraine to avoid diverting its resources.
The limited influence of American intelligence agencies
Representations of political power have been poorly informed by those from the national security apparatus, which generally does not favor confrontation with Russia.
The quiet competition between American and Russian intelligence services never ceased after the disbandment of the USSR in 1991. Confrontation in cyberspace has even become a crucial aspect of this “espionage competition.” However, this has not been taken seriously by policymakers.
After World War II, the development of American intelligence services expanded their mandate. The broad classification process and increased resources, facilitated by the Cold War and the fight against terrorism, led to “an unprecedented expansion of secret bureaucracy.” This expansion has impacted decision-making processes by increasing the distance between these bureaucracies and political circles. The perception of the Russian threat was not the same between intelligence services and decision-making circles. From the fall of the USSR in 1991 to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. electoral process, these representations were not shared, illustrating the limited influence of these secret bureaucracies on political decision-making.
II. Representations That Motivate Action in Support of Ukrainians
Cultural frameworks of American interventionism
American officials are heirs to a political tradition that designates the United States as having a specific responsibility to protect its own democratic experience beyond its borders. This need for protection, along with the strategic surprises that punctuate American history, has given rise to a strong interventionist current and the establishment of a comprehensive diplomatic, security, and military apparatus.
The cultural and ideological frameworks proposed by political scientist Louis Balthazar are particularly useful for understanding the determinants of the American national style. The concepts of “manifest destiny” and American “exceptionalism,” which some respondents also referred to as “strategic responsibility,” help frame the representations of the political leaders that influence decision-making. The American government believes it must act in favor of Ukraine considering its commitment to firmly uphold the principles defined by the United Nations Charter, including the fundamental respect for borders.
Furthermore, a significant cultural determinant of American political power is the necessary protection of its democratic experience outside its borders. The American nation emerged during a revolutionary process between 1776 (Declaration of Independence) and 1787 (U.S. Constitution). However, this initial victorious war led President George Washington to advocate for the establishment of a professional federal army to complement the militias, which, though sacred under the Constitution, were militarily inefficient and failed to prevent the defeat of 1812 against the British. His wish was granted by 1815. This mechanism of adaptation and institutional evolution has been triggered by each strategic surprise. This was evident in 1898, following the destruction of an American ship in Cuba, and again in 1917 when the British government informed the American government of a looming threat, drawing it into World War I. The shock of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, marked another turning point. Consequently, at the end of World War II, President Truman sought to evolve institutions: the National Security Act of 1947, a cornerstone of the current national security architecture, was designed to prevent another surprise. The September 11 attacks reactivated this representation and contributed to the formulation of a global counter-terrorism strategy abroad. The Russian interference in the 2016 American electoral process constitutes the latest strategic surprise.
This representation of vulnerability toward external threats partly underlies the support policy for Ukraine as a means to mitigate the strategic threat emanating from Russia. In the context of American cyberspace, this is embodied in the Persistent Engagement doctrine and in offensive operations conducted in the digital space in 2018, 2020, and 2022 to safeguard the American electoral process.
American Representations of a Strategic Russian Threat
During the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991, the American political class glimpsed hopes of a rapid democratization in the post-Soviet space. Russian President Boris Yeltsin embodied this hope, but his transition was perceived merely as a fleeting wave by a remaining Soviet “deep state.” Indeed, during the First Chechen War from 1994 to 1996, the American government allegedly supported separatist forces, influenced by the representations of conservative American circles that viewed Russia as too powerful to remain unchanged without posing an existential threat to the United States. This analytical error had a significant impact on the resurgence of the Soviet “deep state.” The Chechen War re-solidified the Russian security system and facilitated the rise of Putinism.
American representations differ from those of the Russian state and explain the strategic surprises of the 2010s. While the Russian security system regrouped as early as 1996, the awakening was more delayed within American institutions. A shift in tone is observed during President Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, which served as an open challenge to American policy globally. However, this legacy of mistrust alone was insufficient to awaken policymakers to the strategic dimension of the Russian threat, and there is consensus among respondents that Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 constituted a late awakening, while Russian interference in the 2016 electoral process marked a point of no return. The Russian threat regained a strategic dimension, and Russian cybercriminal activities, notably the SolarWinds cyberattack (2020) and Colonial Pipeline (2021), contributed to this mental revolution.
Thus, the resurgence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 occurs in a radically different context from March 2014. Gavin Wilde summarizes it well: “The war in Ukraine has reinvigorated the entire apparatus regarding Russia: intelligence agencies, Cybercom, the DoD, and the military.” This reflex has been “natural” and reinforced by the reactivation of old Cold War representations.
Political circles in favor of strong support for Ukraine
Political and influential circles in Washington D.C. share common positions on the war in Ukraine and exert pressure on the American government to intervene decisively in favor of Ukraine.
Marlène Laruelle points out a distinction between what she terms the “decision-making circles” and the “political or influence circles” concerning the war in Ukraine. The former, of which the Biden government is the main actor, pursues a cautious policy as they must account for various constraints. This policy of caution contradicts the political or influence circles, which are very present in Washington D.C. and largely support a strong support policy for Ukraine. A significant number of officials from the DoS or the NSC, alongside numerous think tanks, voice strong opinions in the public debate. These figures often have career profiles as “Cold War veterans,” having spent part of their careers before the disbandment of the USSR or having held positions related to transatlantic and European issues. Several representations explain these outspoken positions:
- The frustration of the DoS, former diplomats in think tanks, and Democratic Party officials concerning Russia, owing to the failure of the Obama administration’s reset policy between 2009 and 2014. This conciliatory policy was not seized by President Putin;
- The November 12, 2012, vote by the Russian legislative body (Duma) on a law regarding “foreign agents,” which allowed the Russian government to legally constrain NGOs receiving support or funds from abroad;
- Within the Democratic Party, this frustration transformed into anger following Russian interference in the 2016 national elections. For Democrats, this interference facilitated President Trump’s victory, although no definitive link was established.
Ukraine becomes the icon of the perfect American ally
The historical relationship between the United States and Ukraine does not date to February 2022 or March 2014. In Washington D.C., a statue of Taras Shevchenko, a Ukrainian poet and national figure, was erected in 1964 and features an inscription stating:
“Dedicated to the liberation, freedom, and independence of all captive nations. This monument to Taras Shevchenko, 19th-century Ukrainian poet and fighter for Ukraine’s independence and for the freedom of all humanity—who, under the yoke of colonial and foreign imperialist Russian tyranny, calls for ‘the new and just law of Washington.’”
The expressed representations are quite clear and resonate with current narratives. While the context has changed, this statue embodies the consistency of an American policy supporting Ukraine’s political independence.
This historical closeness has facilitated American engagement since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The establishment of an institutional partnership since 2014, covering multiple domains (institutions, economic and budgetary support, technical cooperation, training, arming, cyber) has allowed for the gradual building of proximity and sufficient trust to foster representations of the reliability of the Ukrainian ally. The leadership demonstrated by President Zelensky (2019 – ) and the determination of Ukrainian forces have subsequently affirmed the strength of new American representations of a determined and heroic Ukrainian ally requiring American support.
This proximity was not taken for granted by the Biden administration. Several respondents also mentioned difficulties in building trust in the Ukrainian institutions, perceived as corrupt and infiltrated by Russian intelligence services. For this reason, the Ukrainian government and its supporters within American political circles have been able to utilize American cultural codes to deploy an effective communication strategy.
The confrontation of these varied and divergent representations has put the American government under significant tension, prompting it, as early as 2014, to adopt an indirect support policy for Ukrainians, a policy which changed in scale but not in nature in February 2022. This lack of change results from the balance of this conflict of representations that has not significantly evolved with the large-scale Russian invasion. Within this indirect logic, intelligence sharing and cyber support have become prioritized dimensions, yielding important outcomes for both Ukrainian and American security.
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