Recently, relations between Slovakia and Ukraine have escalated significantly, driven by disputes over Ukraine’s decision to stop the transit of Russian gas to Europe through its territory starting in 2025. Conversely, Slovakia has adopted a stance against the Western sanctions imposed on Russia due to its war in Ukraine, even threatening retaliatory actions against Kyiv due to the damage it incurs from the cessation of Russian gas supplies via Ukraine. Consequently, this conflict is characterized by intertwined economic interests and regional geopolitical dynamics, reflecting broader challenges in balancing energy security with political considerations in Eastern Europe.
Expressions of Tension
Historically, Slovakia and Ukraine have shared a complex relationship, shaped by their geographic proximity and energy interdependence. However, these relations have deteriorated in recent months, summarized as follows:
Ukraine’s Suspension of Russian Gas Transit to Europe: The core of the tensions lies in Ukraine’s decision to halt the transit of Russian gas through its territory, which poses serious economic repercussions for Slovakia, heavily reliant on Russian energy. This decision has increased costs for Slovakia as it seeks alternative energy sources, which it views as a threat to its economic security. Concurrently, Slovakia threatened retaliatory measures against Kyiv, with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stating on December 27, 2024, that he would assess the situation “to take reciprocal actions if necessary,” emphasizing that his country could stop electricity supplies to Ukraine, which relies heavily on these supplies due to its energy crises. Despite these threats, Ukrainian officials have expressed that they are unconcerned about these steps. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky downplayed the threats, calling them a “reflection of Russian pressure on Slovakia,” noting that Fico’s policies have deprived the Slovak people of economic compensations from the transit of Russian gas, warning that this decision could cost Slovakia $200 million annually it previously gained from electricity exports to Ukraine.
Public Clash Between the Ukrainian President and Slovak Prime Minister: Fico’s public criticisms of the Ukrainian president have strained diplomatic relations between the two nations. He has refused to visit Kyiv for a meeting with Zelensky, claiming he is “looking for an alternative date,” while still holding a grudge about his treatment in Kyiv in 2009. On January 19, Zelensky stated that he would not meet with the Slovak Prime Minister, accusing him of overstepping boundaries and involving himself in dubious schemes regarding the payment for Russian gas.
Fico’s Displeasure with the Slovak Opposition’s Alignment with Kyiv: Slovak opposition leader Michal Simecka has used the tensions between the Prime Minister and Kyiv to show solidarity with Ukraine, quickly visiting the country on January 17, 2025, to meet Zelensky and demonstrate Slovak support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. Simecka, whose party recently surpassed Fico’s in polls, expressed his support for Ukraine’s EU membership, stating it is “vital for Slovakia’s interests.” This move was met with widespread disapproval from the Slovak Prime Minister.
Change in Slovakia’s Position on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Since Fico took office in October 2023, there has been a notable shift in Slovakia’s stance regarding the war between Russia and Ukraine. He immediately halted governmental military aid to Kyiv, pledging “not to send another bullet to Ukraine.” This policy contrasts with Slovakia’s previous role as a significant supplier of military equipment to Ukraine, having provided military assistance worth €671 million (~$706 million) between February 2022 and October 2023. Despite Fico’s hardline stance, he allowed Slovak arms manufacturers to continue selling equipment to Ukraine and maintained the operation of a facility in Slovakia that repairs Ukrainian military equipment. Nonetheless, Fico has repeatedly criticized European sanctions against Russia, arguing that they harm Slovakia’s economic interests, positioning him similarly to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Political Alignment Between Moscow and Bratislava: Slovakia’s foreign policy experienced a significant shift with Fico’s unexpected visit to Moscow on December 22, 2024, marking a strategic change in relations between an EU member state and Russia. This visit was only the third by a government leader from the EU since the onset of the war in February 2022, following visits by Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer in April 2022 and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in July 2024, both of which faced severe criticism from European allies. Fico’s visit sparked outrage, particularly from the Slovak opposition, which condemned it as “shameful,” believing it undermined the EU’s efforts at diplomatically isolating Moscow. Reports indicated that discussions between Fico and Russian President Vladimir Putin focused on energy issues, which remain critical for Europe’s dependency on Russia. However, the timing of the visit underscores Bratislava’s desire to strengthen ties with Moscow at the expense of European solidarity with Kyiv. In response, Ukraine expressed deep dissatisfaction with Slovakia’s position, viewing Fico’s policies as serving Russian interests, complicating relations between Kyiv and Bratislava.
Bratislava’s Attempts to Influence Brussels Towards Antagonism Against Kyiv: Fico’s government seeks to sway EU policies regarding Ukraine by highlighting the economic repercussions of halting the Russian gas transit. He estimated that the additional costs for European families and businesses could reach €50 billion annually due to higher gas prices and another €70 billion due to increased electricity costs, asserting that Ukraine’s decision to stop Russian gas transit is not merely a political gesture but a costly move that would burden the European economy. In further escalation, Slovakia threatened to veto any additional EU support for Ukraine, with Fico hinting at halting humanitarian aid for Ukrainians, reflecting a clear strategy to pressure Brussels into adopting positions more aligned with Slovak interests. Furthermore, during the recent Budapest summit, Fico expressed opposition to the EU shouldering the entire burden of supporting Ukraine, especially if Donald Trump decides to reduce American support for Kyiv.
Fico’s Rejection of Ukraine’s NATO Membership: Upon assuming power in October 2023, Fico vowed to prevent Ukraine from becoming a NATO member while he is Prime Minister, presenting another blow to Kyiv’s aspirations for NATO membership as the war nears its third year, stating that “Ukraine’s NATO membership would be a good foundation for the outbreak of World War III.” Additionally, the Slovak Prime Minister has repeatedly accused the West of stoking this conflict, asserting that the war should be resolved through diplomacy rather than military means, openly criticizing Western military and financial support for Ukraine since Russia launched its special military operation in February 2022.
Governing Determinants
Several political, economic, and regional factors could impact the future of the existing tensions between Slovakia and Ukraine, outlined as follows:
Limits of the Stability of the Slovak Government: The future of relations between Slovakia and Ukraine heavily depends on the stability of Fico’s government and the opposition’s ability to challenge its policies. The growing popularity of opposition figures who support Ukraine suggests a potential shift in Slovakia’s foreign policy if political changes occur in the near term, particularly as the Progressive Slovakia party recently garnered 24% support in a January poll, surpassing Fico’s party at approximately 18%.
Opposition’s Capacity to Pressure the Fico Government: The opposition appears united against the Prime Minister’s foreign policy, which they claim is pushing the country towards isolation. Moreover, public opinion in Slovakia is divided; while some sympathize with Ukraine’s suffering, others support Fico’s policies focused on national interests. Crucially, Fico’s trip to Moscow on December 22, 2024, alienated some of his allies. Four deputies from the ruling coalition’s HLAS party distanced themselves from the trip and obstructed some coalition proposals, even announcing a visit to Kyiv. Consequently, the pro-Russian Slovak leader faces his most severe threat since returning to office in October 2023, especially with the opposition planning a vote of no confidence against his government. Should the vote succeed, early elections could be called, potentially signaling the end of Fico’s party, particularly since his coalition holds a slim parliamentary majority.
The EU’s Role in Mitigating the Dispute Between the Two Countries: The EU is expected to play a crucial role in attempting to mitigate the discord between Slovakia and Ukraine, especially amid the ongoing energy crisis. This situation places the EU in the challenging position of balancing Ukraine’s demands for not financing the Russian treasury by allowing Russian gas to transit through its territory against Slovakia’s economic and security needs. Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko has stated that any actions from Slovakia could be considered “against EU rules,” indicating that Kyiv has requested intervention from the European Commission to initiate formal consultations on this issue. The Commission has assured that the EU and its member states have alternative plans to ensure European energy security. However, despite establishing a joint working group to address the crisis, visible tensions emerged with the cancellation of a scheduled meeting between the two parties in Brussels in January 2025, reflecting the complexities and difficulties of reaching a swift consensus on this matter.
Both Countries’ Ability to Provide Alternatives to Russian Gas: The energy sector will remain a critical factor in bilateral relations. As Slovakia intensifies its efforts to diversify energy sources, including imports from Azerbaijan and Turkey, it may succeed in reducing its dependence on Russian gas transiting via Ukraine, thereby lessening the need for contentious negotiations with Ukraine. The impact of these efforts was apparent when Fico discussed securing Russian gas through Turkey with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who committed to finding a solution with Moscow. Likewise, Ukraine’s success in securing alternative energy sources will bolster its resilience against Slovak threats. Ukrainian officials previously indicated that Poland is ready to increase its electricity exports to Ukraine if the Slovak Prime Minister carries through on his threats to cut supplementary energy supplies.
Rising Influence of the Far-Right in Europe: The Romanian presidential elections will significantly influence regional balances in Eastern Europe, especially if the far-right nationalist Kălin Georgescu wins the rerun of the Romanian presidential election in 2025. Known for his pro-Russian positions, Georgescu would threaten the cohesion of the European stance on the Ukrainian crisis, given the likelihood of him aligning with Slovakia and Hungary to form an internal EU front opposing unified policies against Russia. This scenario complicates matters for Ukraine, potentially undermining its regional support, as these three countries are vital for defending Ukraine along its southwestern borders. With upcoming elections in the Czech Republic, Moldova, and Bulgaria, opposition to EU policies countering Russian aggression may widen, weakening collective European efforts and complicating Kyiv’s position further.
Limits of Growing Public Discontent in Slovakia Regarding Support for Ukraine: Public sentiment in Slovakia reflects increasing discontent with EU measures to support Ukraine, particularly in rural areas, showing clear support for the populist “Smer-SD” party led by Fico. In the recent parliamentary elections, the party achieved a landslide victory by relying on rhetoric that emphasizes rejecting sanctions against Russia and prioritizing local issues over international commitments. Notably, this stance aligns with the policies of countries like Hungary, where governments question the effectiveness of the European sanctions imposed on Russia, arguing they have harmed member countries’ economies more than they have affected Moscow. If Slovakia and Hungary decide to oppose the renewal of sanctions, it could weaken EU unity on the Ukraine conflict, deepening existing divisions within the union and intensifying the tensions between Bratislava and Kyiv.
In Conclusion: The tensions between Slovakia and Ukraine reflect the complexities of economic and political interests in Eastern Europe. Amid mutual escalation, the challenges of ensuring energy security and balancing political alliances are likely to persist in the future of relations between the two countries. This shift has significant ramifications, not only for bilateral ties between Bratislava and Kyiv but also for the cohesion of the European Union in the face of geopolitical challenges.
