The upcoming 2024 US presidential elections have sparked serious global debate about the future of American foreign policy. In the past, the United States’ primary focus was on the Soviet Union. However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, political analysts shifted their attention to Asia, particularly to predicting China’s ability to compete.
While recent global events, such as the war in Ukraine, the subsequent tensions with Russia, and the conflict in Gaza, have temporarily diverted attention from the competition between the US and China, this issue remains critically important.
Throughout my long diplomatic career, I’ve had the honor of meeting with high-ranking US officials, including Secretaries of State, and listening to them share their thoughts on American foreign policy priorities and the driving forces behind them. The consistent idea I have gathered is that American foreign policy is always driven by the notion of a “perceived enemy,” which serves as the most convincing domestic justification for the high costs and significant risks associated with America’s global exercise of power and influence.
On the other hand, my diplomatic experiences have also provided me with numerous opportunities to interact with senior Chinese officials regarding China’s foreign policy. As a result, my observations are shaped by my understanding of American foreign policy and diplomacy, as well as Chinese views on American perceptions and policies regarding Beijing. These observations are particularly relevant because they significantly impact expectations concerning the next US administration, whether led by Harris or Trump.
Beijing: A Growing Threat
China’s initially slow growth, coupled with its cautious foreign policy, led to it being categorized under the umbrella of the developing world, which calmed American concerns about Beijing. This period of relative indifference was followed by attempts to promote social and political development in China through economic strategies and tools, particularly by encouraging more efficient trade and boosting the rising appetite for consumerism.
These economic strategies aligned well with the reform programs of former Chinese President Deng Xiaoping, which included the development of a “socialist market economy,” the transformation into major corporations, and the encouragement of the private sector. As a result, Beijing’s economic weight grew, making it more competitive in global markets. This is when underlying American concerns began to surface.
I vividly recall the fears of experts and intellectuals at the turn of the last century, who warned of China’s potential to take over American companies in Asia. These concerns intensified after Xi Jinping, a more determined and assertive leader, took office, reaching their peak following the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Since October 2022, the party has held three annual plenary sessions, during which economic aspirations and security policies were prominently highlighted.
The Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated Western, particularly American, anxiety, as the mindset of “you’re either with us or against us” became prevalent. In contrast, China adopted a calculated approach to this conflict, refraining from criticizing Russia except when the latter threatened to use nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.
This stance has heightened US concerns about the spread of Chinese technology, Beijing’s growing economic weight, its expanding footprint in global markets, its increasing role as a consumer of energy and minerals, and its rising influence in Asia.
China and the U.S. Elections:
Documents from U.S. national security and official statements from both the Biden and Trump administrations clearly reflect that the prevailing view in America today considers China—not Russia—as the other superpower for the foreseeable future. As a result, China has become the country causing the greatest concern for the United States. In reality, the entire American political establishment is now preoccupied with China, which possesses unparalleled economic and technological capabilities, even as the U.S. retains its military and political influence.
Recently, it has been observed that Trump has unexpectedly adopted a confrontational policy toward China, contrary to his usual rhetoric and strategy, which typically promotes deals. This confrontational approach has extended beyond economic matters, with Beijing being labeled a “reactionary” and even dangerous power. Even traditionalist Biden did not change course upon taking office. On the contrary, he intensified certain measures against Beijing, such as imposing stricter restrictions on technology transfers. This strongly indicates that both American political parties now view China as a principal adversary.
What has both frustrated and surprised China is that this crucial and sensitive strategic relationship is being treated in the U.S. in a populist manner, feeding rather than alleviating concerns. This approach starkly contrasts with the Nixon/Kissinger strategy, which was more tactful in dealing with global politics, carefully balancing threats and opportunities.
Considering its traditional political outlook, Beijing does not expect a significant shift in U.S. policy, regardless of whether the presidential election results in a Harris/Walz administration or a Trump/Vance administration. Nevertheless, Beijing will continue to closely monitor the tone and actions of the next U.S. administration. Since the U.S. is widely viewed as being in a transitional phase, China is unlikely to draw premature conclusions about American policies now, especially since it has experienced similar strategies during both the Trump and Biden administrations. With Trump, the tone was aggressive, accompanied by controlled measures, while Biden maintained a quieter tone with equally firm actions.
If the Democrats win, there may be a better understanding of Chinese culture and history within the U.S. administration, particularly since the vice-presidential candidate, Tim Walz, has lived in China. However, it is worth noting that Walz has also been a strong advocate for human rights in China, indicating that U.S.-China relations will not be entirely smooth.
In short, China remains uncertain about the United States and who will be elected, but it views the outcome of the upcoming U.S. elections as having limited short-term impact. What truly concerns Beijing are the long-term effects that the elected administration’s policies will have on the current “China debate” in America.
Three Potential Trends:
The “China debate” in the U.S. can be categorized into three main intellectual trends, each with its own approach and tools for dealing with Beijing.
The first group of analysts frames U.S.-China relations within the context of a cold war, arguing that the competition between the U.S. and China “must be won, not merely managed.” In contrast, the second group of strategists views the “competition” between the two nations as a situation that should be “managed rather than solved,” as it is not a zero-sum game. Meanwhile, the third group of strategists believes that “adaptation” is the only realistic approach to addressing this ongoing challenge between the two powers.
Although these three perspectives dominate American discourse, only the Chinese can accurately describe their vision for global foreign policy and their expectations of the U.S. Over the years, Beijing has gradually revealed its stance, which often includes an element of threat—reactively—while emphasizing shared interests, principles of cooperation, and mutual respect at the same time. This approach has resonated strongly in the developing world.
Beijing is fully aware that U.S.-China relations have a significant impact on its interests and foreign policies. Therefore, in the coming decades, both powers will closely monitor each other. Given their vast size and enormous global influence, it is crucial that no misunderstandings occur between the two sides.
