Ahmad al-Shara, the head of the new Syrian administration, identified four priorities before being appointed as the president of the transitional phase in the country: filling the power vacuum, maintaining civil peace, rebuilding military and security state institutions, and restoring Syria’s status and international relations.
The fourth priority has been of predominant importance to al-Shara since the day after the fall of the Assad regime and the takeover of operations led by him in Damascus. This focus intensified after he was entrusted with running the executive authority for the transitional phase (January 29, 2025).
Syria holds geopolitical significance that enhances its role and status regionally and on the international stage; it is influential in the security of Jordan and the Gulf Arab states, serves as the Arabs’ only gateway to Lebanon, and its position in the Eastern Mediterranean basin affects the stability of Western European countries. This was evident during the years of conflict in Syria, which impacted European countries in terms of illegal migration and drug trafficking that originated from Syria to European coasts like Greece and Italy.
Moreover, Syria’s geographic location makes it a favored transit point for gas pipeline projects connecting the Gulf Arab states and Europe. This has been, and continues to be, one of the major reasons many regional countries wish to maintain a presence in Syria. The regime change provided an opportunity for international and regional actors to reposition themselves or enhance their influence in Syria. Since the first week after the fall of Assad, Damascus has witnessed intense diplomatic activities, including frequent visits from intelligence chiefs, foreign ministers, leaders, and international envoys from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Germany, France, Russia, and the United States.
First: Syria’s Regional Positioning and Its Implications
The fall of Bashar al-Assad and the emergence of a new government in Syria opened the door for Damascus to reposition regionally after nearly two decades of alignment with Iranian and Russian influences and distancing from most Arab countries, not to mention the West.
Damascus leaned towards Tehran shortly after Bashar took power, coinciding with a growing distance between him and Arab countries, particularly Gulf states. Assad’s openness to Iran and Russia peaked after the outbreak of popular protests in 2011, and subsequently, Damascus chose to fully align with Iran and Russia due to the support both provided to Assad against the “popular” Syrian opposition.
Upon taking office, the new Syrian administration sought to redefine Syria’s regional position and curb Iranian influence in the country. In contrast, it worked to establish strong relations with Gulf countries and Turkey, a strategy evidenced by the reception of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the day after Ahmad al-Shara was entrusted with the presidency of Syria for the transitional phase in late January 2025. This was followed by al-Shara’s visit to Riyadh and then Ankara.
The new regional positioning of the new Syria was expected, as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have played a longstanding pivotal role, albeit to varying degrees, in supporting the Syrian opposition against the Iranian-backed Bashar al-Assad. These countries were among the first to sever relations with Assad due to his use of violence against popular protests in 2011 and are well-placed to influence the U.S. and Western stance on lifting sanctions against Syria. They can also significantly contribute to the recovery of the Syrian economy by launching multiple projects in energy and land transport, along with their expertise in development and reconstruction.
The Syrian administration showed commitment to the prevailing concept of Arab national security. For example, al-Shara rejected the Trump plan aimed at relocating Gaza’s residents, as is the case with other Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The new Syria is expected to provide fertile ground for cooperation between Arab states and Turkey, thereby enhancing convergence between them, as evidenced early on through Turkish-Saudi and Turkish-Jordanian coordination to successfully navigate the transitional phase.
Iran’s capacity to exploit the Syrian arena for its interests or national security is expected to diminish greatly; Syria will not serve as an indirect battleground between Israel and Iran in the longer term. Iran had previously capitalized on its growing influence in Syria to create a military balance with Israel through its branches scattered across Syria until 2024.
However, this new positioning of Syria has not alleviated Israeli concerns; Israeli security institutions have classified the new Syrian administration as a threat that could, in the future, be greater than the risks posed by Iranian influence on Israel.
Second: The External Relations of the New Syria
The new Syria opened up rapidly to the world, engaging numerous countries from both the region and the international community.
Regional Level: Syria’s regional relations have expanded more swiftly than its international ties, driven by shared interests between Syria and its regional neighbors, serving as its gateway to the international stage, particularly through Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. These nations benefit from Assad’s downfall or from rebalancing the region after Iranian influence disrupted it.
Turkey immediately showed support for the new Syrian administration, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visiting Damascus in late December 2024, where he called for lifting Western sanctions on Syria. Turkey has a vested interest in fostering unity in Syria and undermining the “self-administration” project tied to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as stabilizing the situation in Syria to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. Turkey also aims to elevate the level of official coordination with the new authority to ensure that Syria does not become a base for any entity threatening Turkey. This cooperation had been opposed by the previous regime due to Ankara’s ties with the Syrian opposition at the time. Turkey also seeks to take advanced steps with Syria involving military and security cooperation, economic agreements, and contributions from Turkish companies to reconstruction efforts.
Saudi Arabia has visibly engaged with developments in Syria, sending an early security delegation to Damascus, followed by a visit from Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to Damascus in December 2025. Riyadh hosted high-level delegations from the new administration, including the Syrian foreign and defense ministers and the head of intelligence, and later invited Ahmad al-Shara to visit Saudi Arabia after his inauguration as transitional president, calling for the lifting of sanctions on Syria and support for its people.
The statements made by officials in the new Syrian administration regarding their desire to establish solid relations with Saudi Arabia and affirming their intent to benefit from Saudi Vision 2030 contributed to fostering positive atmospheres between Damascus and Riyadh. This was further complemented by the opportunities created by Assad’s fall and the assumption of power by his opponents, reopening avenues for restoring the broader Arab role, especially the Saudi influence in Syria and Lebanon, thereby filling the void left by the retreat of Iranian power and ensuring it does not regain its strength.
On the relationship front with Jordan, there have been significant developments aligning with Damascus’s new regional positioning. The previous regime had been a major source of security concerns for Jordan due to its role in drug trafficking and allowing armed militia chaos along Jordan’s borders. Jordan indeed reached a security understanding with the new Syrian administration during the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani to Amman in early January 2025, which included forming a joint security committee to secure the borders and combat drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Some countries, like the United Arab Emirates, remain relatively cautious regarding their engagement with changes in Syria.
Israel, in contrast, is fundamentally uneasy about the changes in Syria, and Israeli officials have embarked on attacking and warning against the new regime there.
International Level: European countries quickly dispatched their foreign ministers to Damascus a few weeks after Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow. This started with visits from German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and her French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot, followed by Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani.
The objectives behind European countries’ communications with the new administration vary; some aim to induce changes in the current situation to align better with international conditions, akin to Germany’s expressed reservations about the “Islamic background” of the new Syrian administration. Others perceive Assad’s departure as an opportunity to drive the new Syrian government to end Russian influence in Syria.
The most positive stance came from the Italian Foreign Minister, who emphasized giving a favorable message to the Syrian administration by visiting the Umayyad Mosque, which holds significant symbolism for many Syrians, and called for lifting or suspending sanctions on Syria. Rome aims to collaborate with the Syrian administration to halt illegal migration.
Russia was also quick to respond, dispatching Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov to Damascus in late January 2025, where discussions focused on reorganizing relations. Weeks later, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call with Syrian President al-Shara, affirming Russia’s readiness to assist in improving Syria’s social and economic conditions. However, the most significant development was the arrival of a shipment of Syrian funds that Russia had printed days after the call between Putin and al-Shara. There were also leaks about a potential agreement between Syria and Russia that would allow the latter to maintain a low military presence in Syria, indicating Moscow’s continued desire to balance Western presence in the region.
In terms of activating international relations, Syria actively participated in the Davos and Paris conferences and the Munich Security Forum, which suggested an initial Western acceptance of the Syrian administration, despite the demands raised in these forums regarding completing national reconciliation.
Third: The Future of the Governance System
Several interconnected internal and external factors will influence the future of the current government, primarily how the Syrian administration manages the transitional phase and navigates the political transformation process, in addition to the economic situation negatively impacted by ongoing sanctions against Syria. Continued economic stagnation will undoubtedly hinder the Syrian administration’s ability to structure military, security, and service institutions on sound foundations, increasing public discontent over time.
Despite the advanced relations the Syrian administration enjoys with influential Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, along with close cooperation with Turkey, it remains unclear whether these efforts will lead to full international recognition of the Syrian administration. The Trump administration’s stance on Syria remains vague; the United States refrained from signing the outcomes of the Paris conference held on February 13, 2025, subsequently stipulating several conditions for lifting sanctions on Syria, primarily the complete cessation of Russian and Iranian influence and ensuring Syria does not become a platform for “terrorist” attacks against Washington and its allies.
Additionally, Germany and France set parameters for their positive engagement with Syria, with the former asserting it would not support “Islamic structures,” while French President Macron discussed during the Paris conference the challenges facing the transitional phase in Syria, primarily the ongoing threat from “ISIS,” and highlighted the importance of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian army and forming a government that represents everyone.
In response to international standards concerning political transition, the Syrian administration announced a national dialogue committee in mid-February 2025, which commenced facilitating dialogue sessions in various Syrian provinces. However, the mission appears challenging given the SDF’s persistent refusal to disband until elections take place in Syria. The same applies to some groups in southern Syria, linking disarmament to state formation and construction of a constitution that guarantees rights. Hence, a lack of consensus in the near future between the administration and other Syrian factions may lead to a decline in international goodwill towards the current administration.
The administration is expected to take new steps, including announcing an alternative government to the current caretaker administration comprised of technocrats that includes a broader spectrum of the Syrian populace, along with launching a national conference after the current committee’s dialogue sessions to foster agreement on the constitution and the upcoming governance system, amid calls from various Syrian groups for the adoption of a decentralized system.
Conclusion
The future of the current Syrian administration hinges on its ability to balance its relationships with regional states that could aid in breaking Syria’s isolation and convincing international parties to lift sanctions, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The current administration faces the challenge of maintaining good relations with all these countries. Internationally, it will be tested in balancing its relations with the West and Russia, without appearing as a sphere of influence exclusively for one side at the expense of the other.
Without a doubt, Israel is one of the most influential actors in shaping the future situation in Syria, especially with the Trump administration, which tends to prioritize Israeli interests. Israel is highly apprehensive about the direction of the Syrian administration and its regional positioning, supporting entities that do not align with the Syrian regime, such as the SDF, and working to convince the Trump administration not to withdraw from Northeast Syria while intervening in Syria’s internal affairs under the pretext of caring for the “Druze” in Syria and the region. The most explicit manifestation of Israel’s position was its campaign of airstrikes and ground incursions into southern Syria just hours after the announcement of outcomes from the Syrian national dialogue conference, which emphasized the unity of Syrian territory and the necessity for the state to monopolize arms while condemning Israeli aggression.
Moreover, perhaps most importantly at this moment, is the internal dialogue and the actions the Syrian administration will take regarding domestic affairs, which will ultimately determine the future of the new administration, including the application of outcomes related to forming a temporary legislative council based on experts, announcing a constitutional declaration, and then continuing the process by establishing a specialized constitutional committee and enacting clear laws that lay the groundwork for elections. If the new administration considers the outcomes of the national dialogue merely as a delegation of authority and an assignment of powers, it will face a wave of internal unrest, negatively impacting the stance of other countries toward Syria.
