In a scenario reflecting unconventional ambitions, U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed his desire to control the Panama Canal, purchase Greenland from Denmark, and annex Canada to become the 51st U.S. state. Some view this as a revival of the “Monroe Doctrine,” articulated by former U.S. President James Monroe in December 1823 during his State of the Union address to Congress. The doctrine aimed to prevent foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere, effectively treating Latin America as a U.S. protectorate or traditional sphere of influence, off-limits to external powers.
This has raised several key questions: How will Latin American countries deal with Trump’s second term in the coming phase? Will they succeed in curbing his expansionist ambitions, or will they be forced to coexist with the status quo?
Limited Options:
Most analyses suggest that Latin American countries do not have complete freedom in dealing with the United States, leaving the region with limited options:
Pursuing Appeasement with Trump: Most Latin American countries may seek to balance pragmatism in their dealings with Washington, fearing that Trump could impose sanctions that would negatively impact their economies. However, they must also maintain national pride and protect their sovereignty. This view is supported by several indicators, such as Colombia’s shift from confrontation to a more conciliatory approach with Washington after tensions flared on January 26, 2025, when President Gustavo Petro prevented two U.S. military planes carrying deported Colombians from landing. In response, Washington threatened to impose tariffs on Colombian exports, forcing Petro to immediately backtrack and agree to accept deportees, including those arriving on U.S. military planes, “without restrictions or delays.” This is logical given the proximity of Colombia’s 2026 presidential elections and increasing political opposition, pushing the government to adopt a more pragmatic approach in dealing with the U.S. Similarly, Mexico has chosen a cautious, practical approach in dealing with the Trump administration to avoid direct confrontation. President Claudia Sheinbaum and senior Mexican officials are working to make progress on border control and combating drug trafficking, demands that Trump has placed on Mexico, warning of additional tariffs. Despite Brazilian President Lula da Silva’s displeasure with the treatment of a group of migrants who arrived in Brazil handcuffed, he has expressed a desire to avoid any conflict with the U.S., emphasizing the importance of maintaining the historical relationship between the two countries. Some interpret this as a pragmatic approach to protect Brazilian exports like steel, automobiles, and industrial goods, which could be negatively affected by Trump’s protectionist policies, leading to a devaluation of the Brazilian currency against the dollar. Additionally, there are political concerns that the U.S. administration might support Lula’s rival, Jair Bolsonaro, in the 2026 elections.
Expressing Willingness to Cooperate with Washington: Some Latin American countries may seek to cooperate with Washington and benefit from Trump’s trade policies, such as Argentina. For example, due to the ideological alignment between President Javier Milei and Trump, Milei has expressed a desire to replace the Argentine peso with the U.S. dollar and rejected the previous government’s proposal to join the BRICS group, stating that his government’s foreign policy differs significantly from that of the previous administration. Milei has also announced his readiness to withdraw Argentina from the Mercosur trade bloc (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) if necessary to reach a free trade agreement with the U.S. El Salvador has also expressed a desire to cooperate with the U.S., agreeing to receive undocumented migrants and Americans who have committed crimes on U.S. soil, housing them in the largest prison in Latin America. Similarly, Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala have agreed to serve as transit points for deported migrants from the U.S.
Calculated Escalation: Several analyses suggest that some Latin American countries will not easily succumb to Trump’s demands and will continue to resist his policies, albeit in a limited manner. This could manifest in the positions of leaders like Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba, especially after Trump re-listed Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism and designated Venezuelan drug cartels (Tren de Aragua) as foreign terrorist organizations. In this context, Latin American countries’ strategies in dealing with the Trump administration may oscillate between pragmatism, cooperation, and calculated disagreement. According to some experts, Trump’s “Latin America strategy” may be more practical than ideological. While he has isolated U.S. allies like Mexico and Colombia to push them to concede on issues like tariffs and immigration, he may negotiate with authoritarian regimes in other Latin American countries, such as Venezuelan President Maduro, to achieve the same goals. This is evidenced by the January 2025 visit of Trump’s special envoy, Richard Grenell, to Venezuela, where he met with Maduro—whom the U.S. government does not recognize as the legitimate leader—and secured the release of six American detainees.
Significant Opportunities:
Latin American countries may be able to exploit certain opportunities to deal more effectively and freely with Trump’s second term:
Diversifying Partnerships: Trump’s return to the White House and the resulting pressures on Latin American countries may push the region to diversify its external partnerships by strengthening ties with major powers like China, Russia, and Europe to enhance its negotiating position. Beijing presents itself as a reliable partner for Latin American countries by strengthening economic ties and taking advantage of the trade and investment opportunities these countries offer to China. This contrasts with Trump’s rhetoric, which portrays the region as a source of illegal immigration, crime, and drugs. When recently asked about U.S.-Latin America relations, Trump responded, “They need us more than we need them… We don’t need them.” Additionally, these countries are prepared to engage with Beijing. For example, Brazil exports more to China than to the U.S. and Europe combined and is a founding member of the BRICS group, demonstrating that it is possible to break free from economic dependence on the U.S. and improve relations with Beijing. Similarly, the Colombian president announced plans to strengthen ties with China after Trump threatened Bogotá with sanctions and tariffs. Before taking office in 2023, the Argentine president indicated he would not engage commercially with China, but just one year later, Milei praised China, the world’s second-largest economy, as a trustworthy trading partner. Moreover, over 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and in 2023, eight Latin American presidents made official visits to China, the highest number in a single year. Trade and investment relations between China and the region have also grown significantly, with expectations that they will exceed $700 billion by 2035. Russia remains present through diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American countries, most of whose governments have resisted U.S. pressure to condemn Russia in the United Nations and other international forums over the war in Ukraine. It is also worth noting that the region accounts for 21.3% of U.S. foreign trade, equivalent to over $1 trillion according to the United Nations. If the region consciously seeks other trading partners, the U.S. economy will undoubtedly be negatively affected.
Leveraging the Immigration Issue: Latin American countries may be able to pressure Trump on the issue of immigration and mass deportations, which could eventually have negative consequences for the U.S. The lesson from the past several decades—including Trump’s first term—is that instability in Latin America does not remain confined to the region but inevitably extends to the U.S. Mexican cartels (drug trafficking gangs) have not only gained long-term influence in their own country but have also fueled the fentanyl epidemic, which has killed over a quarter of a million Americans since 2018. Venezuela’s economic collapse, accompanied by instability in recent years, has produced one of the world’s largest refugee crises, with over half a million Venezuelans fleeing to the U.S. Thus, instability in Latin America is bound to affect the U.S.
Utilizing International Competition: Trump’s “America First” policy may accelerate Latin America’s journey toward greater autonomy, enabling countries in the region to develop more balanced international relations and stronger local institutions by maneuvering between the U.S., China, and Russia, seeking better deals and more favorable terms. Trump’s response to China’s growing influence in the region may offer better U.S. terms for dealing with Latin American countries. This view is reinforced by the widespread belief that turning to China carries significant risks, as debt defaults and failures in some Chinese-backed projects, such as in Ecuador, have raised doubts among Latin American countries about relying too heavily on China. This will ultimately encourage regional leaders to balance their relations between Beijing and Washington, not favoring one over the other, and exploiting the sharp polarization between the two to benefit all countries in the region.
In Conclusion:
It can be said that Latin American countries’ opportunities to form a collective response against the U.S. are still limited at present. However, the region has a long history of resisting U.S. initiatives, and this period should be no exception. By leveraging existing multilateral mechanisms and cooperating to design regional strategies to reduce dependence on the U.S. market—such as boosting intra-regional trade, joint infrastructure projects, and investment in regional supply chains—Latin America can effectively deal with Trump’s second term.
