Since the fall of the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” has dominated official positions in Syria, forming the new transitional government on its own. Its leader, “Ahmad al-Shara,” became the commander-in-chief of the Syrian government, with several key positions held by leaders from within the organization, including the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the head of intelligence. However, there are numerous challenges facing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s complete control over rule in Syria. These challenges originate not only from what the organization calls the “remnants” of the former regime, but also from within the Syrian opposition itself, linked to “conflicts and disputes among the factions.”
The proliferation of weapons and factional conflicts present a major issue for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s efforts to monopolize military power through the Ministry of Defense in the new transitional government. While the legacy of war typically includes military weapons and equipment, the legacy of the Syrian war includes, in addition to a vast array of arms scattered across various regions and factions, numerous large and diverse factions that challenge the new transitional government’s attempts to impose its complete control on Syria. This scenario could easily devolve into a new civil war among the armed factions in Syria unless managed carefully.
Factional Conflicts
There are significant fears that the Syrian situation could deteriorate into a ghost of civil war, fueled by current indicators and potential scenarios regarding conflicts among armed factions. This is in light of the existence of many other organizations in Syria besides Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which can be summarized as follows:
The Proliferation of Armed Factions in Syria: Numerous armed factions exist in Syria, differing in their orientations, ideologies, foreign relations, and organizational cohesion. Estimates suggest that there are more than 80 factions, with other estimates exceeding one hundred, in addition to inactive or dissolved factions that may see the current general climate in Syria as an opportunity to re-emerge. This could increase the number of factions capable of posing security threats and possessing non-state weapons to the hundreds. The Syrian Ministry of Defense associated with the new transitional government has announced that Minister of Defense “Marhaf Abu Qasra” held 47 intensive sessions with leaders and officers from more than 60 military formations to agree on the necessity of integrating all formations into the new ministry’s structure. Many factions refused calls to disarm, including Kurdish and local factions, and factions opposed to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which had previously engaged in armed conflicts with it, as well as terrorist factions associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Marginalization of Defected Officers from the Assad Regime: Defected officers from former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime represent another issue, especially given their marginalization in the current dialogue about forming a new Syrian army. These officers have joined parallel formations, primarily the “Free Syrian Army,” while some remain dormant or in exile. What distinguishes them is their diverse geographical backgrounds, from Damascus and its countryside to Aleppo, Homs, Deir ez-Zor, and other provinces. They possess prior conventional military experience and have taken opposing political stances against the Assad regime, refusing to participate in the Syrian war or to attack regime opponents. The marginalization of thousands of defected officers and Free Syrian Army forces could lead to armed unrest. Colonel Riad al-As’ad, the founder of the Free Syrian Army, indicated that the number of Free Syrian Army forces is about 6,000 officers, some of whom have joined factions, while others have sought refuge in Europe due to difficult circumstances. Some remain neutral, refusing to associate with conditional foreign entities. He warned against repeating past scenarios of marginalization that led to the establishment of parallel structures if defectors feel excluded. He criticized the promotion of civilian figures to high military ranks directly, while ignoring experienced defected officers who have yet to be utilized. Colonel Malik al-Kurdi, Deputy Chairman of Free Syrian Army General Staff, confirmed that militia factional mentality still dominates the overall situation in Syria, without transitioning to state management principles or methods. He pointed out that any defected officer wishing to return to the armed forces must be endorsed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and typically must hail from Idlib province, which the organization controlled, or must have connections with its members, criticizing the transitional government’s neglect of Free Syrian Army leadership.
External Pressures to Reappoint “Manaf Tlas” as Minister of Defense: Reports indicate that there are external pressures to bring back Colonel Manaf Tlas, former commander of the 105th Brigade in the Republican Guard, to Syria to take on a prominent leadership role in the new Syrian army, with some advocating for his appointment as Minister of Defense. This reflects an international desire to rely on defected officers and to reject foreign fighters in high military positions, alongside concerns about Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham monopolizing leadership roles in the new Syrian army. Despite opposition from the organization, which insists on maintaining control over leadership positions, this proposal signals a renewed examination of notable former military leaders with opposition stances against the previous regime, who enjoy good international relations and may be pressured to enable them to improve the public perception of the planned military. If such prominent figures return to Syria and are marginalized by the transitional government, they and their supporters could pose a security challenge capable of exploiting the new regime’s failures to build a counter-popularity based on military experience, loyal forces, and local and international reputations.
Syrian Fighters’ Frustration with the Rise of Foreign Fighters: Estimates suggest that around 3,800 foreign fighters from various nationalities, including Uighurs, Albanians, Caucasians, Turkestanis, Uzbeks, and Chechens, are operating within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, not to mention foreign fighters within other organizations. The leader of the Syrian transitional government, “Ahmad al-Shara,” pledged to grant citizenship to foreign fighters who assisted Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Recent military appointments and promotions included foreign fighters in both mid and high ranks in the new Syrian army. This situation fuels Syrian anger due to national and ethnic factors, particularly among former Syrian officers who defected from the Assad regime, who believe that Syria should have its army composed solely of Syrian military personnel capable of protecting the country and its national security. Foreign fighters in Syria are seen as “mercenaries” or “international terrorists” who do not belong to the country and have not previously served in institutional armies. The reported abuses and violations by foreign fighters against Syrians are expected to amplify this anger.
Dissatisfaction among Factions over Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Control of the Army: There is noticeable dissatisfaction from many factions, which some factions publicly hide, regarding Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s dominance over the army. This discontent will significantly affect negotiations regarding the formation of a unified army, depending on the outcomes of discussions about the role and presence of armed factions in the new army and the extent to which Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham monopolizes leadership roles. Many Syrian fighters are concerned that the new army may exhibit discrimination based on sect or political affiliation, specifically favoring elements from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, as expressed by some leaders in the Free Syrian Army. This could hinder some factions from joining the Syrian army, contributing to the creation of a sectarian and factional military, which many international, regional, and Syrian parties advise the transitional government to avoid. If Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham proceeds to establish sole control over the new military institution, it could contribute, in light of the fluid proliferation of arms in Syria, to the formation of parallel armed groups and result in defections from factions that have agreed to join the military due to discrimination against them.
Widespread Arms Availability among Individuals and Groups in Syria: After over a decade of multi-party conflict, the availability of weapons in Syria has become a reality, encompassing various regions and creating numerous security challenges for any authority seeking to monopolize power and violence. A substantial number of individuals are expected to refuse to surrender their weapons and conceal them from security sweep operations due to a lack of trust in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and armed factions. This is exacerbated by ongoing abuses that the transitional Syrian government claims are merely “individual transgressions” by its affiliated elements. The proliferation of arms in fragile security environments can transform them into organized weaponry through the formation of local groups with political, religious, or criminal objectives.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Composition from Various Factions and Brigades: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is not a single faction but rather consists of various internally diverse factions and brigades that differ ethnically and nationally. There are entire brigades composed of foreign fighters from specific nationalities, such as the “Tawheed and Jihad” Brigade, which includes Uzbek fighters from Central Asia, making the organization itself internally fractured. Although “al-Shara” has largely succeeded in asserting control over subordinate factions and preventing them from using weapons or operating as independent military formations outside of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the years of the Syrian conflict indicate that the organization does not have complete and absolute control over its supportive factions. It has engaged in armed clashes with other factions and arrested leaders in supportive factions that changed their allegiance. Therefore, while these factions may express higher loyalty to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s leadership, at the grassroots level, they have varied loyalties and affiliations that could develop into separatist tendencies in the future, including foreign brigades and more radical brigades within the organization that may reject the political and ideological transformations promoted by the transitional government leader, “Ahmad al-Shara.”
SDF Conditions for Joining the Army as a Unified Force: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) demand decentralization in Syria, while the Kurdish National Council, comprising 17 parties, calls for the implementation of a federal governance system to ensure a degree of Kurdish autonomy and self-government in northern and eastern Syria, which would ensure the continued dominance and influence of Kurdish forces in those areas. In response to calls from the Syrian transitional government to join the army and disband factions, the SDF requires that it join the new army as a unified force, maintaining its presence within the military as a single military block led by the commander of the SDF. This arrangement allows SDF to act somewhat like an independent faction within the army, capable of making separate decisions when political conflicts arise. For his part, Minister of Defense “Marhaf Abu Qasra” rejected the SDF’s proposal regarding its integration into the army. He stated it would not be appropriate for Kurdish armed groups stationed in the northeast to remain a military block within the armed forces. “Abu Qasra” accused the SDF leadership of “stalling” its handling of the issue of disbanding itself and integrating into the army, indicating ongoing tensions between the SDF and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham that may escalate amid the organization’s desire through the transitional government to control all Syrian areas.
The National Army’s Stance in Northern Syria: The future relationship between the Syrian National Army factions and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is marked by several challenges and uncertainties. While both sides appear to be aligned under Turkish sponsorship, previous years of conflict reveal numerous issues in the trajectory of their relationship, with factions and fighters transitioning between the two sides. Additionally, the Turkish-backed “National Army” factions are closer to Ankara, serving as its arm in northern Syria against Kurdish forces. As transitional government leader “Ahmad al-Shara” seeks a compromise with the Kurds to ensure political stability for the Syrian state and its new authority, Ankara’s security calculations will likely compel it to maintain control of its factions in northern Syria under the pretext of safeguarding its national security and preventing the Kurds from threatening Turkey. The Syrian National Army is one of the largest factions in Syria, having launched the “Fajr al-Hurriya” operation in northern Syria, alongside Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s formation of the “Operation Room to Confront Aggression,” which targeted the capital Damascus. The Syrian National Army comprises numerous factions that maintain sub-division among themselves instead of functioning as a unified entity, despite its size.
Druze Factions Preventing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham From Entering Sweida: Over the years of the Syrian conflict, Sweida has sought to maintain a neutral stance towards the conflict by distancing itself from various factions and forming locally based Druze forces to prevent any external attacks on the province. These forces have continued to sustain their position following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s takeover of governance in Syria, not yet posing a threat to the organization’s authority in Damascus. However, they represent a challenge to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s efforts to assert its influence and military control in Sweida province and to efforts to reinforce the presence of the new transitional government in the area.
Local armed factions are active in Sweida. Before the regime’s fall, these factions united in a single operations room and expelled all remnants of the former Syrian army and its security centers from the province. The two largest Druze factions in Sweida, “Men of Dignity” and “Mountain Brigade,” have indicated that their cooperation with the transitional government’s Ministry of Defense for integration depends on negotiations about the mechanism for joining, the formation of the army, and the nature of military presence in Sweida, aiming to create a non-sectarian national army.
Notably, there was an incident where armed factions in Sweida prevented a convoy from the military operations command from entering the city when a military convoy from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, along with its associated General Security apparatus, approached the province in early 2025, prompting joint operations factions in Sweida to mobilize and demand the convoy return to Damascus, which it did.
Reports suggest that the order to prevent the convoy came from the spiritual leader of the Druze community, “Hekmat al-Hajri,” who emphasized that no military presence from outside the province would be tolerated. “Hekmat al-Hajri” stated that the incident of returning the convoy of the Interior Ministry’s General Security body to Damascus and preventing it from entering Sweida stemmed from a lack of coordination between the two sides.
- Ahmad al-Awda’s Forces Control Dara’a Province: The forces led by “Ahmad al-Awda” operating under the Southern Operations Room umbrella, particularly the Fifth Corps and the Eighth Brigade, are among the most prominent armed factions in southern Syria. Due to their proximity to Damascus, they were the first forces to enter the Syrian capital after former President Bashar al-Assad fled, even before Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the “Confronting Aggression” operations room arrived in the capital. They are also considered among the primary and best-funded factions in Dara’a province.
“Al-Awda” enjoys regional acceptance, as reports indicate he has received support from the external “MOK” military operations room that was based in Jordan, where his family resides, according to reports. Allegations suggest he has received support and funding from state sources due to family ties with the Syrian businessman Khalid al-Muhamid residing in this state. “Al-Awda” is also said to have good relations with Russia.
To date, “Ahmad al-Awda” has shown no willingness to surrender his weapons or disband his military faction that controls extensive areas of eastern Dara’a, despite meetings he has held with leaders of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, including “Ahmad al-Shara.” “Al-Awda” seeks specific guarantees before any steps toward integration. Spokesperson for the Eighth Brigade, Nasim Abu Ara, noted a lack of belief in the idea of factional dissolution, given that his forces possess heavy weapons and full equipment, arguing that it is more beneficial for his troops to integrate into the Ministry of Defense as a military body. This brings us back to demands for joining the new military as unified military blocks.
Remnants of the Assad Army Setting Ambushes for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Forces in the Coast: Areas like Tartus and Latakia continue to pose security challenges for the new transitional government in Syria, due to the presence of armed elements associated with the previous regime in the coastal regions. On December 22, 2024, the Syrian Ministry of Interior of the new transitional government announced the death of 14 of its personnel and injuries to 10 others during an ambush set by what they described as “the remnants of the Assad regime” in the countryside of Tartus.
Elements affiliated with the Assad regime are likely to continue ambushing forces of the new transitional government in the coastal area, which will pose a potential security threat despite ongoing sweep operations. Reports indicate that many former Syrian army operatives hide and evade capture in Tartus and Latakia, with many refusing to surrender their weapons and expressing fear of retaliatory tendencies directed against them. Indeed, reports confirm attempts to organize the remnants of the former regime, who have taken refuge in the coastal mountains.
Previously, loyalists to the Assad regime kidnapped seven people and killed two from a security patrol affiliated with the new government in Latakia province, threatening to slaughter the captives if forces loyal to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the new government did not withdraw from the Jableh area in Latakia, according to a statement from the Syrian transitional government on January 14, 2025.
Moreover, former Syrian army elements in other provinces are exhausting forces affiliated with the new transitional government led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. For example, on January 22, 2025, the Syrian News Agency reported clashes between the General Security and Military Operations bodies of the transitional government and “remnants of the Assad regime” in the village of Ghor al-Gharbi in western Homs, where an arms and munitions cache was seized.
Continued Presence of Groups Linked to Hezbollah and Iran in Syria: Despite announcing the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters and Iran-affiliated militias upon the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, there are indications of continued presence of groups linked to them in Syria.
Syrian media have reported that intensive preparations are underway for a large military operation in the al-Laja region in eastern Dara’a countryside, involving several local factions in the area alongside forces from the Eighth Brigade under the Southern Operations Room. The military operations administration will oversee this campaign targeting groups accused of cooperating with Hezbollah.
Decline in Trust between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Factions: While a friendly atmosphere characterized the relationship between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Muslim Brotherhood following the fall of the Assad regime, there are signs of declining trust between the two sides, stemming from past conflicts during the governance of Idlib. The accusation by “al-Shara” directed at the Brotherhood before the collapse of the Assad regime alleged their involvement in protests against Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib. In June 2024, “al-Shara” accused the Brotherhood of instigating popular protests against him at the behest of Turkish directives.
Sources indicated that “al-Shara” views the protests in his Idlib stronghold as attempts to steer the area toward greater security chaos, transforming it into an area resembling Turkish-controlled territories, thus integrating it into Turkish-controlled zones in preparation for future agreements between Turkey and Russia.
Escalation of Terrorist Threats from al-Qaeda and ISIS: Ongoing threats facing Syria stem from the presence of terrorist groups on its soil, mostly affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS, compounded by the issue of ISIS prisoners in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces. These terror organizations see the security and factional volatility in Syria as a favorable opportunity to maintain a foothold in the country. They aim to escalate their terrorist attacks, enhance their influence, and treat the downfall of Assad as a new opportunity to restore peak terrorist activity in Syria. Terror groups have seized some arms and supplies left behind by the former Syrian army and its loyalist militias amid the regime’s collapse, training and recruiting new members.
ISIS’s influence and position are expanding in the Syrian desert, which is a major stronghold for the organization, particularly in Deir ez-Zor. Concerns persist that ISIS will exploit disturbances and military operations in northeastern Syria to its advantage. The Syrian Democratic Forces have reported that ISIS has executed a number of attacks against them in Deir ez-Zor and its countryside, as well as in Hasaka. The Syrian Observatory documented 13 operations conducted by ISIS cells within the “Self-Administration” areas since the beginning of 2025 until January 21, 2025. The Syrian Democratic Forces also indicated that ISIS attempted two assaults on their prisons since the downfall of the previous regime to release their members.
Divergent References
In conclusion, the armed factions in Syria do not emerge from a single foundation; some are established on sectarian and religious bases, others on ethnic and national grounds, and some still hold political ideas and orientations. Additionally, there are regional factions along with interest-based armed groups closer to mercenaries. These factions have fought each other as well as against the Syrian regime over the years, complicating the integration of these factions under a single national framework into a unified institutional army. Furthermore, the exclusionary approach of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham towards other factions, coupled with their marginalization in military hierarchy and positions, may deepen this issue.
This significant divide, the large number of diverse Syrian factions, and the substantial volume of informal arms make the specter of civil war a not unlikely scenario in Syria, particularly if the new transitional government fails to skillfully manage the issues of “loose and rampant arms” and “multiple competing factions” through adept and conciliatory policies, based on the principles of building military institutions, and making a genuine transition from “militia” to “army,” instead of forming an army with a militia mentality.
