The Russian Stance on the Escalating Situation in the Middle East
The “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” and its military consequences in the Gaza Strip have brought certain gains for Russian interests. This operation has diverted Western attention, particularly that of the United States, away, albeit partially, from the Ukrainian front, which heavily relies on Western military and economic support. It has also highlighted Western double standards and allowed Russia to present itself as a more reliable and neutral mediator, thus reinforcing its role as a major player in the Middle East. However, Russia is cautious about the conflict expanding into other regional countries to avoid threatening its strategic interests. Consequently, this paper discusses Russia’s concerns about potential escalation in the Middle East and the Kremlin’s efforts to control it.
Russian Concerns
As the Middle East intermittently teeters on the edge of a broader regional conflict related to the anticipated response to the assassination of the former Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh—an escalation that some regional and international actors may seek as part of efforts to reshape the region—Russia is working to manage the situation to prevent it from spiraling into a scenario that could alter the existing regional balance of power. This balance, which granted Moscow significant political and military influence, is primarily centered around Syria and based on equilibrium between the major competing regional powers. The Russian concerns about a potential regional confrontation can be outlined as follows:
Opening a New Front for Its Forces
Russia does not want its forces stationed in the Middle East, especially within the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base, to be drawn into a new conflict that could scatter its military efforts while the Ukrainian front remains active. Despite Syria’s attempt to distance itself from the current regional escalation, a war on the northern front between Israel and Hezbollah could extend into Syria. This would necessitate coordination and exchange of intelligence and military information between Moscow, Tehran, and Tel Aviv regarding the paths of fighters, missiles, and drones to avoid breaching Russian airspace or harming its military assets. Given that uncertainty is a primary characteristic of military confrontations, the potential for the situation to spiral out of control remains, keeping Russian concerns about direct military threats to its interests.
Collapse of Middle Eastern Allies
Moscow aims to manage Iranian responses so that they do not exceed mere retribution, assigning greater responsibility to regional proxies. This approach stems from an understanding of the significant costs and risks associated with a full-scale war between Iran and Israel. Such a conflict could only end with the complete removal of Iran from the regional balance of power and the destruction of its military capabilities, which would result in a significant loss for Moscow. Iran has been a crucial regional ally and a military supplier since the outbreak of the Ukrainian war, providing drones and ballistic missiles. The strategic alliance between Russia and Iran has also bolstered Russia’s ability to withstand international sanctions.
A regional war would mean that Iran might lose its capacity to continue supplying Russia with military resources, as its already limited military capabilities would be further strained. Iran would need to conserve its arsenal of drones and missiles for external defense, possibly requiring Russian military support, including advanced Russian air defense systems and modern fighters. However, Russia’s ability to provide such support is currently limited. Additionally, weakening a strategic partner like Tehran would be akin to losing one of the cards Russia uses in its rivalry with Washington, affecting its influence from the Middle East to Latin America and Central Asia to the Caucasus.
Moreover, the possibility of Syria becoming a direct or proxy battleground could lead Israel to destroy a system that Russia has invested significantly in politically and militarily. This would allow Western influence to expand in Syria, thereby depriving Moscow of a key pillar of its strategic influence in the Middle East. Hezbollah might also be forced to recall some of its fighters from Syria to Lebanon in the event of a large-scale war with Israel, weakening pro-Syrian government groups in their struggle against internal opponents and destabilizing Assad’s government.
Disruption of Relations with Israel
Russia has maintained balanced relations with Israel since the end of the Cold War, granting Israel significant freedom to operate in Syrian airspace to undermine deep Iranian entrenchment in Syria through an Israeli-Russian dispute resolution mechanism. This has effectively prevented friendly fire incidents, despite Russia’s strategic relationship with Iran and its positive relations with Iranian regional proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. However, an Iranian-Israeli war would disrupt this balance, forcing Russia to side with Iran. This could lead Israel to provide direct support to Ukraine, contrary to its current “careful balance” policy of offering only humanitarian aid and limited air defense systems while avoiding Kyiv’s requests for tanks and air defense systems or imposing sanctions on Russia.
Harm to Russian-Gulf Relations
Russia’s balancing policy extends to its relations with Gulf countries, which have become more entrenched since the Ukrainian war, reflecting the Gulf’s strategic shift toward diversifying international partnerships. The economic interests between Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE within the OPEC+ framework are significant. Similar to the Israeli case, any potential Russian alignment with Iran during a regional conflict would harm its interests with the Gulf, particularly given the economic importance of these relationships in mitigating Western sanctions. Gulf countries have played a role in circumventing sanctions and sending financial resources to Moscow. They are also major sources of investment in Russia, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar holding a substantial share of total Arab investments in Russia, concentrated in sectors such as gas, oil, real estate, infrastructure, logistics, and food.
Increased U.S. Military Presence
The American military buildup in the Middle East has reached unprecedented levels, the largest in terms of equipment and combat capabilities since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. It represents the largest concentration of American naval and air power in modern history, including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines equipped with offensive missiles, advanced fighters, and reconnaissance ships. This disrupts the “strategic parity” with the United States that Moscow seeks to establish in the Middle East through enhancing its defensive presence, accessing military bases, serving as a primary arms supplier to regional states, and utilizing its semi-military forces such as Wagner.
Weakening Iranian Militias
Moscow has close ties with Iranian regional proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, viewing them as a tool in its competition with the United States in the Middle East. This reliance on semi-military forces helps reduce the political and financial costs of Russian interventions, fitting within the Kremlin’s belief in supporting groups fighting the U.S., similar to U.S. support for the Ukrainian army. This Russian approach is reflected in Moscow’s provision of advice and military support to the Houthis in Yemen, including a visit by Russian military intelligence officers in late July to assist in training exercises. There have also been reports of Moscow’s intention to supply the Houthis with anti-ship cruise missiles, although this was later retracted due to Saudi opposition. Collaboration between Russia and the Houthis has been evident in meetings between Houthi representatives and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in July, following a similar meeting in January. The potential role of Iranian proxies in a possible regional war would expose them to exhaustion and destruction, losing Moscow one of its winning cards.
Growing Chinese Influence in the Middle East
Although Moscow and Beijing share a vision for altering the current international order towards a more equitable system and view the Middle East as a crucial arena for reshaping power equations and changing the balance of power among major powers, this does not eliminate competitive tendencies and differing interests that might emerge in the future. Therefore, Russia fears that any regional escalation might lead to a larger role for China in the Middle East, as seen with China’s mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 and the agreement between Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions in July. This raises sensitivities about encroachments on its influence in the region.
In conclusion, despite the primacy of the Ukrainian war in Russian foreign policy, the Kremlin cannot ignore daily developments in the Middle East due to their impact on the balance of power. Russian efforts in the near future may aim to deter escalation by imposing a political balance against the American military buildup, ensuring that its balancing partnership with conflicting regional parties remains intact, while retaining its ability to influence regional developments.
