The Next Day: Competing Arrangements for the Future of Gaza Strip
There have been conflicting proposals for the future of Gaza Strip after the cessation of military operations. These range from its direct re-occupation, to the resistance factions taking charge, to a proposal that a local authority linked to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and supported by Arab states should take control. However, the decisive factor in the success of any proposal is the ability of the resistance to defeat the occupation.
During the early weeks of the Israeli war on Gaza in October 2023, the Biden administration leaked expectations that the war would not last beyond the end of the year or the beginning of the new year. The aim of these leaks was to pressure the Israeli allies to avoid prolonging the war. The Americans saw that the Israelis were not fighting a war to destroy Hamas, as they claimed, but a brutal, vengeful war that could have repercussions for the United States itself as the main supporter and indirect partner in the war. Washington also calculated that the “irrationality” of the Israeli political leadership and its war machine could lead to an inescapable quagmire for the Israeli ally and a difficult electoral dilemma for the Biden administration.
The Americans told Israeli leaders that every war ends with a political vision, a negotiated agreement, or a political project, and that they must present their vision for Gaza after the ceasefire. Although some members of the Israeli war government expressed acceptance of the American advice, Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to discuss the end of the war or the next day. He repeatedly called for the continuation of the war until Hamas was uprooted from Gaza, the captives were retrieved, and what he describes as absolute victory was achieved. Thus, the war continued beyond the New Year holidays, beyond Easter, and into its seventh month, and it is still ongoing.
However, it is clear that the Israeli army, despite the enormous destruction it inflicted on Gaza’s cities, villages, and refugee camps, and despite the massacre it committed against its residents, could not uproot Hamas, retrieve the Israeli captives, or achieve “absolute victory.” In several areas the Israeli army invaded and claimed to have successfully destroyed Hamas’ infrastructure and combat brigades, the resistance operations rooms resumed work as soon as the fighting intensity decreased. Municipalities and the Ministry of Interior’s agencies also resumed operations with the available tools and resources, and residents began returning to their destroyed neighborhoods. Israeli forces were soon forced to return to Beit Hanoun, Jabalia and Jabalia Camp, and the Zeitoun neighborhood, where they had previously declared mission accomplished.
This failure, rather than American pressure, reignited the debate over the “next day.” The debate expanded from ministers and Knesset members to include military leaders and soldiers’ families. A statement by hundreds of soldiers’ families described the war as absurd, noting that soldiers were facing death again in areas they had previously fought and believed they had achieved their objectives. They called for an end to the war. On Nakba Day (or Independence Day for Israelis), May 14, a fierce debate erupted among the different visions for the next day during speeches by ministers and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Those advocating for an Israeli plan for Gaza’s next day see it as the only guarantee to protect military gains and outline a clear end to the longest war in Israel’s history. For Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, who also spoke on Nakba Day, it was crucial to emphasize the failure of the Israeli war and reject the visions Israeli leaders have for Gaza’s future.
What are the main visions for the “next day” after more than seven months of war? And what do these visions reveal about the various parties’ views on the future of the conflict in Palestine and the Middle East?
Return of the Palestinian Authority
The vision advocating for the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern Gaza originates from the Biden administration, perhaps encouraged by Arab states close to Washington and deeply invested in the Palestinian issue. However, Americans acknowledge the deep-rooted corruption within the PA and its lack of tangible popular support in both the West Bank and Gaza. This led Washington to emphasize the need to reform and rebuild the PA, a point repeatedly made by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his meetings with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas since the war began in October. Abbas responded to American pressure by dismissing the 18th PA government in February, headed by Fatah member Mohammed Shtayyeh, and forming a technocratic, non-factional government on April 1, 2024, led by independent economist Mohammed Mustafa. However, despite the formation of a technocratic government being an important step from the American perspective, it is not sufficient to rehabilitate the PA.
The Biden administration did not initially show particular interest in the Palestinian conflict, but the war on Gaza brought the Palestinian issue back to the American agenda. Washington realized that Middle East stability and the security of Israel cannot be achieved without resolving the conflict. This drove Washington to re-propose the two-state solution as a path to end the conflict and resume normalization between Israel and its Arab and Islamic surroundings. The American plan for Gaza’s next day is seen as part of this negotiation path towards the two-state solution. However, from the American viewpoint, it is the PA, not Hamas, that should represent Palestinians and undertake the negotiating role towards the two-state solution. Therefore, uniting the West Bank and Gaza under PA rule and providing the PA with the means to represent Palestinians and negotiate on their behalf is crucial.
There is another reason behind the Biden administration’s adoption of the PA’s return to Gaza. If the war aims to dismantle Hamas’ rule and influence in Gaza, Americans believe that only the PA and its security apparatus can confront the remnants of Hamas post-ceasefire. Continued Israeli military occupation of Gaza would only perpetuate resistance and legitimize the resisters. Any Arab or international military force might be seen by Gaza residents as a new form of occupation. Only the PA would be difficult to label as occupiers and could recruit enough Gazans to maintain security and dismantle what remains of Hamas’ weapons.
It is possible that Washington does not object to a national Palestinian reconciliation, involving Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups relinquishing their arms entirely, joining the PLO, and transforming into political parties participating in public life, either before or after a final conflict resolution and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
After the controversy stirred by Galant’s statements, Israeli media reported that military leadership sources indicated that the cost of reoccupying Gaza and establishing an Israeli military administration would not be less than $20 billion annually. It was implied that such leaks were meant to suggest military opposition to the idea of reoccupation advocated by Netanyahu’s right-wing religious allies, and to support Defense Minister Galant’s call for Palestinians to manage their affairs under Israeli-imposed limits.
Gantz’s Concealed Occupation and Netanyahu’s Delay
Former Chief of Staff and Resilience Party leader Benny Gantz, who joined the War Council after October 7, 2023, held a press conference on May 18. He warned Prime Minister Netanyahu to develop a government strategy by June 8 or he would resign and work to form an alternative national coalition government. Alongside demands related to negotiating the release of Israeli captives in Gaza, passing a non-discriminatory national conscription law, and continuing the Rafah invasion, Gantz proposed a complex and unclear vision for Gaza’s post-war governance.
Gantz’s vision revolves around establishing an international-Arab-Palestinian administration while retaining Israeli security control over Gaza. He excluded Abbas and Sinwar, meaning both Hamas and the PA, from this envisioned administration. While he mentioned Americans, Europeans, and Arab states, he did not specify their roles. Would this mean forming an administration of cooperative Gazans protected by an international force during a transitional period, or would these international and Arab parties actually govern Gaza? He was clear that Israel would retain security control, implying an ongoing military presence in Gaza, conducting security operations as needed. Gantz’s vision for the next day is essentially a disguised occupation, involving international and Arab partners.
A statement from Netanyahu’s office rejected Gantz’s ultimatum but did not address the details of Gantz’s proposed strategy for the coming months. It can be assumed that Netanyahu does not oppose all elements of Gantz’s vision. Netanyahu has repeatedly stated he will not accept a PA administration replacing Hamas in Gaza, criticizing the PA for failing to combat terrorism in the West Bank. Netanyahu has also expressed a desire to find cooperative local elements to manage Gaza and reach understandings for Arab forces from specific countries to assist in security and counterterrorism. However, Netanyahu’s exact intentions for Gaza’s future remain unclear, especially if he indeed plans to end the war soon. There is broad consensus in Israeli political and media circles that Netanyahu is obstructing efforts within the government and War Council to develop a clear vision for the next day. This is corroborated by the Biden administration. Understanding Netanyahu’s approach to the Gaza war is essential to understanding his stance on Gaza’s future administration.
One of Netanyahu’s goals for the war is to avenge the October 7 attack by the resistance and teach them a lesson that ensures deterrence. Additionally, Netanyahu aims to depopulate Gaza as much as possible, viewing it as a strategic challenge to Israel. Israelis have long seen Gaza as a stronghold of Palestinian nationalism and a source of political and resistance forces. In the 1950s, Israelis, with American and UN support, attempted to resettle Gaza refugees in northern Sinai, but the plan failed. In the current crisis, Netanyahu initially saw the war as an opportunity to depopulate Gaza by pushing residents to the Egyptian side under the pretext of safety. However, this plan faced stiff resistance from the Gazans and was rejected by Egypt, which found support from the Americans. Confirming the difficulty of convincing Egyptians to accept the displaced, Netanyahu shifted tactics.
It is also clear that Netanyahu wanted, and still wants, the war to lead to the displacement of as many residents of Gaza as possible. Israelis have always viewed Gaza as a strategic challenge to the State of Israel. They see Gaza, due to its demographic structure, the way its identity formed, and its political climate after 1948, as a stronghold of Palestinian nationalism and the womb of its various political and resistance forces. In the 1950s, with American and UN help, the Israelis tried to find a way to resettle refugees who had settled in Gaza (and who represent the majority of Gaza’s population) in northern Sinai, but the attempt failed. In the early months of the current crisis, Netanyahu believed the war provided an opportunity to solve the Gaza issue by displacing as many residents as possible to the Egyptian side of the border under the pretext of ensuring their safety. However, despite the brutality of the war, the displacement plan faced strong resistance from the overwhelming majority of the residents who insisted on staying in Gaza, and the Egyptians rejected Netanyahu’s proposal. The Egyptians soon found support for their position from the Americans. The Egyptian rejection did not deter Netanyahu from his displacement project but led him to change his approach and means to achieve the same goal.
What Netanyahu has been working on, since he realized the difficulty of convincing the Egyptians to accept the displaced people from Gaza, is creating an environment in Gaza that will push residents to voluntarily migrate, if not during the ongoing war, then immediately after it ends. Supported by the government and the war council, the Israeli army has relentlessly, under the guise of defeating Hamas, worked from the early days of the war to destroy factories, farms, universities, schools, government and municipal institutions, mosques, churches, houses, residential buildings, and markets. The goal is to turn Gaza into an unlivable place, an environment that repels life. The longer the war drags on, the closer Netanyahu gets to achieving his goal of destroying livelihoods in Gaza and making voluntary migration more likely.
Netanyahu might also see the prolonged war as a way to address other major challenges facing Israel, securing himself a place in history as the second founder of the State of Israel after Ben-Gurion. A continuous war in Gaza, at varying intensities, a second front in Lebanon, and a broader, more intense escalation in the West Bank could, Netanyahu might think, enable him not only to displace a significant number of Gaza residents but also those from the West Bank; and possibly permanently neutralize the security threat from Lebanon, pushing Lebanon and most Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, to sign peace treaties and normalize relations with Israel. This could enhance Israel’s chances of survival and prosperity for another hundred years.
For all these reasons, the prolonged war must be considered one of the possible scenarios for the next day. However, if the Americans, other Western allies, and Israeli opponents can push Netanyahu to accept an exchange agreement that includes a ceasefire within the next few weeks or months, the most likely scenario for the next day for the Israeli Prime Minister will include the partial reoccupation of Gaza, exactly as Minister Gantz envisions.
Hamas’s Vision
On the evening of May 15th, Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s political bureau, delivered a speech on the anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba. Because the days and hours leading up to his speech witnessed an intense debate about the “next day,” Haniyeh found it necessary to present Hamas’s vision for the future management and governance of Gaza. In his speech, Haniyeh spoke as someone who understands the true burdens and pains of war on the Palestinian people, and the scale of losses and sacrifices imposed on Gaza’s residents. But he also spoke with the confidence of someone who sees that the Israelis have failed to achieve the goals of the war, saying: the Israeli war cannot destroy Hamas, and that “Hamas was created to stay.” Haniyeh rejected all forms of foreign occupation of Gaza, saying: the future management and governance of Gaza will be decided through consensus between Hamas and other Palestinian resistance forces in Gaza.
In this brief statement about the “next day,” Haniyeh intended to convey that Hamas remains an active force in Gaza, that the Israeli war has failed to undermine the movement’s presence and influence, and that, in partnership with other resistance forces, it will decide the nature of governance and how Gaza’s affairs will be managed post-war. Importantly, Haniyeh’s rejection of all forms of occupation did not include rejecting the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, or at least some form of connection between the future administration of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority. Conversely, Haniyeh completely avoided saying that Hamas would form the government, indicating that Hamas’s leadership understands that insisting on returning to rule Gaza would mean no reconstruction, and that most Arab and Western countries would not contribute to the exorbitant reconstruction costs. Additionally, if Hamas returns to power, national Palestinian reconciliation is unlikely to begin, with or without Abbas.
Therefore, it is likely that Hamas will continue to resist if an exchange agreement ensuring a complete ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is not reached. However, if such an agreement is reached, Hamas and other resistance forces in Gaza will likely opt for a technocratic government formed of Gazans who will not cooperate with the occupation or implement Israel’s post-war agenda, with some connection to the new technocratic government in Ramallah, paving the way for national reconciliation. This administration will work to reactivate Gaza’s bureaucracy, known for its efficiency and integrity, ensure security, assist the people of Gaza, and handle reconstruction during a transitional period that could last several years.
This does not necessarily mean that Hamas would refuse an administration formed of notable and public figures from Gaza. However, they would certainly not accept such an administration to be made up of collaborators with the occupation or those seeking to confront the resistance forces.
Competing Visions
As with all other aspects of this war, it is difficult to be certain of the direction events will take regarding any of the various visions for the future of Gaza and its governance. It is certain that the United States, and the United States alone, can pressure the Israelis and push them in this or that direction. What has become clear in recent months is that the United States genuinely wants to stop the war and move towards a practical and viable vision for Gaza’s governance, which helps in resolving the two-state solution and advancing towards it. The Biden administration is making intense efforts to show its differences with Netanyahu and his government, aiming to maintain the support of the Democratic left and American Muslim voters. But it is also clear that Washington does not want to escalate pressure on Netanyahu’s government, first, because Biden needs Jewish votes and financial support in the upcoming presidential elections; and second, because a majority in the Senate and House still stand by Netanyahu and oppose any move by the Biden administration to disengage American policy from Israeli policy.
In such a situation, Netanyahu could succeed, if he manages to contain Israeli opposition and the protests of detainees’ families and soldiers, in prolonging the war, and even expanding its scope, both Palestinian and regionally, and gradually swaying the American stance, bit by bit, towards war. If Netanyahu chooses this path, the future of Gaza, like all the axes of the Palestinian conflict, will remain open to the possibilities of ongoing fighting. However, if Netanyahu concludes that continuing the war is futile regarding the overall future of the conflict and his political future, and that the benefits of reaching an exchange agreement and ceasefire outweigh the benefits of further war, it is likely that the United States would accept a compromise with the Israelis regarding the next day and how to govern Gaza and manage its affairs.
The United States might not object, for example, to an administration composed of Gaza’s notable figures and public personalities, with merely a nominal relationship with the Palestinian Authority, especially if this vision gains support from America’s allied Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. Washington’s proposal to return the Palestinian Authority to Gaza as an alternative to Hamas’s rule stems from the Biden administration’s belief that this step would pave the way for negotiations on the two-state solution. However, given the near consensus within the Israeli government on rejecting the two-state solution, and the rising power and influence of Jewish settlers in the West Bank, Biden administration officials seem to realize, what the whole world has known, that the two-state solution is no longer necessarily the most realistic option for achieving peace.
In general, regardless of the nature of the American-Israeli consensus on the vision for the “next day,” it is certain that any administration in Gaza would not be possible, and even if formed, it could not function without the acceptance of Hamas and other resistance organizations, regardless of the extent to which the Israeli war succeeds in weakening Hamas’s military capabilities. With Hamas’s increasing popularity in the West Bank and Gaza, it seems unlikely to restore Palestinian national unity and establish a stable governance system in both the West Bank and Gaza without Hamas.
