Iran is entering a new phase with the absence of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Constitutionally, the country will not face difficulty in filling the vacancy; the Iranian Constitution lays out clear provisions on this matter. The critical dimension, however, is that this transition is unfolding in the midst of an active confrontation involving the Islamic Republic.
Article 111 of the Constitution stipulates that in the event of the Leader’s death, resignation, or dismissal, the Assembly of Experts must act “as soon as possible” to appoint a new Leader (without specifying a timeframe). Until then, a council composed of the President, the Head of the Judiciary, and a jurist from the Guardian Council—selected by the Expediency Discernment Council—will temporarily assume the Leader’s duties. The article explicitly defines this body as provisional. While it obliges the Assembly of Experts to choose a new Leader swiftly, it does not define how long they may deliberate, what happens if consensus proves elusive, or how long the interim arrangement may last.
War Is War
“War is war. We recognize the power of the United States military and its capacity for force, but we are capable of harming it and threatening its interests.” This is how an Iranian official I met in Tehran described the situation as the United States and Israel carried out attacks on multiple targets on the morning of February 28, 2026.
The strikes targeted the office of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as the ministries of intelligence and defense, security command offices, the Atomic Energy Organization, and the judiciary building. The attacks were distributed across Tehran, Lorestan, Alborz, Tabriz, Qom, Chabahar, Kermanshah, Ardabil, Khorramabad, Urmia, Isfahan, Mahabad, and Bandar Abbas. Iran responded with missile and drone strikes on U.S. military bases in the Gulf region and on targets in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Following the 12-day confrontation in June 2025—when Israel and the United States attacked Iran and Tehran retaliated with missiles and drones—talk of renewed war is no longer hypothetical. It is a tangible reality threatening all parties.
After decades of shadow conflict—where coercion, deterrence, and influence overlapped without open war—the confrontation has crossed long-observed thresholds dating back to the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The “gray zone” concept no longer adequately explains the situation. The equation shifted dramatically after “Al-Aqsa Flood,” the war in Gaza, and the rise within Israel of a strategic assessment that views Iran as an existential threat.
While hostility between Iran and the United States is not new, it has reached unprecedented levels. The confrontation has evolved beyond tit-for-tat exchanges into a systemic struggle. This transformation has been marked by intensified American use of sanctions, financial pressure, and covert operations, aiming to prepare the ground for a short and decisive battle. Yet from the Iranian perspective, the American objective remains unattainable.
Iran has sought to avoid total war. This is not merely situational pragmatism but a deeply embedded feature of its strategic culture, shaped by the heavy human and developmental toll of the Iran–Iraq War. Tehran combines readiness for confrontation with an inclination toward calibrated escalation—preferring a controlled conflict whose costs it can absorb rather than an all-out war.
Iran engaged in negotiations over its nuclear program and sought to present legal and religious arguments against nuclear weaponization. Proposals included transforming Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons into parliamentary law and diluting 60% enriched uranium into reactor fuel. However, Iran was not prepared to abandon enrichment itself.
According to Abolfazl Amouei, special assistant to the Speaker of Parliament, the Iranian negotiator’s mandate was to preserve the core of the nuclear program—its scientific and technological foundation—especially enrichment. Iran insists on maintaining the full chain: raw materials, scientific knowledge, industrial capacity, reactor production, and fuel fabrication.
An Iranian security expert I interviewed stated that excluding the possibility of confrontation has permanently left Iran’s strategic mindset. “This time, we knew the American side was not serious,” he said, noting that the U.S. negotiator did not take notes during talks, suggesting that a decision had already been made and negotiations were merely a pretext for attack.
He emphasized that Iran possesses capabilities unknown to its adversaries—“non-missile, non-drone, and not nuclear.” While acknowledging the overwhelming material superiority of the U.S. military, he insisted that Iran is not weak. It can endure significant losses and inflict substantial damage on American interests. “If it becomes an existential threat, it will be existential for everyone—not just the Islamic Republic.”
Missile capabilities remain the crown jewel of Iran’s deterrent system. The program has evolved through three generations: an initial short-range, imprecise phase; a second generation with improved accuracy but limited range; and a third combining precision with long reach. Unlike the nuclear program—subject to international inspections and partial transparency—little is publicly known about Iran’s missile infrastructure.
Sanctions barred Iran from acquiring advanced weaponry. For decades, its military budget remained relatively low compared to regional states, at around 3% of total state expenditure until 2022, rising to 4% and now approaching 6%. Early on, Tehran prioritized domestic missile technology. While a ballistic missile might cost $1 million internationally, Iran reportedly produces comparable systems for roughly $2,000 through decentralized production cells across the country, enabling resilience even under harsh conditions.
The Leadership Structure
Returning to the question of succession, it unfolds on two levels: the formal constitutional mechanism and the underlying political-security balance that ultimately shapes the outcome.
Legally, the Assembly of Experts elects the Supreme Leader. The Constitution provides interim arrangements to prevent a leadership vacuum. However, in practice, key institutions exert significant influence over the process. A successor must secure at least two-thirds of the Assembly’s votes. Failing that, the provisional council outlined in Article 111 could theoretically govern indefinitely.
Numerous meetings held by Khamenei before his death—including sessions with the Assembly—suggest that succession scenarios had been examined. Yet these discussions assumed normal circumstances, not an open military confrontation with the United States and Israel.
During the transition, the provisional leadership body serves as a constitutional safeguard. However, the weight of the period depends less on its duration and more on elite consensus. In times of war or acute security crisis, the regime prioritizes decision control and stability. Political review or reform becomes secondary.
The most consistent scenario with Iran’s state logic is the rapid selection of a successor who preserves the system’s hard core—likely a principlist or consensus conservative figure capable of securing a smooth vote within the Assembly and signaling institutional cohesion domestically and internationally.
Closely linked is a scenario in which the security-military establishment—especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—assumes greater influence during the transition, backing a symbolic leader who provides constitutional and religious cover for a more centralized security-driven governance structure.
Another possibility is collective leadership, should consensus on a single candidate prove unattainable. In such a case, prolonging the transitional phase to manage risk may be preferable to imposing a divisive figure.
A cautious pragmatic settlement—electing a more flexible personality regarding major dossiers—remains conceivable, but likely only after immediate security concerns are stabilized. Such flexibility would aim to reduce attrition without compromising core security principles.
Much speculation has surrounded the idea of Mojtaba Khamenei inheriting the position. However, this scenario appears the least probable and may have effectively closed if he perished alongside his father. Moreover, Khamenei himself repeatedly signaled opposition to hereditary succession. Even if theoretically viable, such a path would depend on elite cohesion, acceptance within the Assembly of Experts, endorsement by the religious establishment (hawza), and the broader security context.
Elite fragmentation leading to instability is the least likely yet most consequential scenario. Strong institutional and security mechanisms mitigate this risk by enabling a short, managed transition.
Ultimately, three institutions will shape the next phase: the Assembly of Experts, the security establishment—particularly the Revolutionary Guard—and the religious seminary establishment.
The most probable outcome is the swift election of a conservative leader ensuring regime continuity, or a consensus figure with expanded security oversight.
Conclusion
Leadership transition in Iran, regardless of circumstances, remains institutionally manageable under Article 111, which ensures continuity through a temporary council until the Assembly of Experts reaches a decision—albeit without a defined timeframe. In the context of open war and the transformation of the conflict from a “gray zone” to systemic confrontation, regime priority will be continuity and calibrated control before political compromise.
This analysis therefore anticipates either the election of a consensus conservative leader or a lower-profile figure accompanied by enhanced security institutional influence. If consensus proves elusive, the transition may lengthen or shift toward a collective leadership formula. The legitimacy of the next Supreme Leader will hinge on the ability to balance deterrence, negotiation management, and mitigation of domestic attrition. The immediate test will be the speed of elite agreement, the cohesion of the security circle, and its capacity to absorb social shock while preventing broader instability.
