Targeting the Regime: The Second Round of the U.S.–Israeli War on Iran
The second U.S./Israeli war on Iran began in the early hours of Saturday, February 28. The first wave of airstrikes, launched from Israel, targeted the top political and military leadership of the Islamic Republic, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, Commander of the Supreme Defense Council Ali Shamkhani, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Mohammad Pakpour, and Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh. The strike resulted in the assassination of Khamenei and other senior first-tier leaders. Shortly thereafter, U.S. forces deployed around Iran joined the assault, expanding the campaign to a broad range of targets.
Iran’s response to the U.S./Israeli attacks came as expected, employing medium-range missiles and drones. Iranian retaliation struck targets in Israel and Jordan, as well as U.S. military positions in Iraq and across all Arab Gulf states—except Oman, whose port of Duqm was shelled the following day. By the evening of the first day of war, reports indicated that commercial shipping vessels had received Iranian warnings prohibiting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
This marks the second U.S./Israeli war on Iran in less than nine months. It is expected to last several days, possibly weeks, and to be extensive both in the types of targets struck and in geographic scope across Iran. Notably, the war erupted just two days after a U.S.–Iran negotiation round in Geneva, which the Omani mediator described as having made significant progress and bringing the parties closer to peace.
How, then, did President Trump pave the way for war? What are the real objectives behind it? And what might it ultimately produce?
The Road to War
Although negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program were advancing, President Donald Trump’s statements throughout the final week of February increasingly pointed toward a military option. Anyone listening to his State of the Union address before Congress on February 24 could sense that war was becoming more likely. While he addressed Iran briefly, his remarks revealed a lower ceiling for negotiations than Iranian officials had been projecting.
Trump stated clearly that he believed Iran had resumed its nuclear program following the June 2025 strikes on its nuclear facilities. For the first time, he explicitly described Iran’s missile system as a threat to Europe—and possibly even the United States. In effect, he rejected Tehran’s assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and demanded a complete halt to uranium enrichment. He also insisted that Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal be included in negotiations—demands Iran has consistently refused.
Nevertheless, Iran showed no sign of retreat. On the same day as Trump’s address, Ali Larijani arrived in Muscat to deliver Iran’s initial draft proposal to the Omani mediator for a potential agreement with Washington. This proposal was meant to form the basis of the third negotiation round.
On February 25, Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff offered the first positive signal, suggesting that Trump might accept a symbolic level of enrichment and that missile talks could follow a nuclear agreement. This indicated a departure from the “zero enrichment” demand previously viewed by Iranian officials as humiliating.
However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly countered with harsher remarks, insisting Iran must dismantle its entire nuclear capability and that its missile arsenal posed a direct threat to U.S. security. No deal, he argued, could exclude missile discussions.
The third negotiation round took place on February 26 in Geneva, described by Trump as the “last chance.” Held largely indirectly and across two sessions, it ended with Omani statements suggesting tangible progress. Iran’s foreign minister described the talks as serious and indicated expert-level discussions would resume in Vienna on March 2, potentially followed by a fourth round.
Yet on February 27, Trump publicly expressed dissatisfaction, accusing Iran of lacking clarity and credibility. While stating he preferred not to use force, he suggested it might be necessary and said he would wait for the next round scheduled for March 6.
That same day, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued a statement from Vienna indicating that inspectors believed Iran possessed over 9,000 kilograms of enriched uranium at various levels but were uncertain of its location or status.
Despite the negotiation momentum, U.S. military mobilization around Iran signaled preparation for war. Multiple sources—including Omani mediators—reported that Iran had offered substantial concessions in the third round, including abandoning capabilities enabling nuclear weapon production and expressing willingness to discuss missiles and regional influence in later stages. Iran also reportedly proposed significant economic cooperation opportunities for U.S. firms.
So why did Trump proceed with war in coordination with Israel?
In his address announcing the strikes, Trump downplayed the nuclear file and instead emphasized five decades of tense U.S.–Iran relations, suggesting his administration could no longer coexist with the Islamic Republic regardless of negotiations. While reiterating that Iran would not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons, he offered little new evidence of active weaponization. The most striking portion of his speech came at the end, when he addressed the Iranian people directly, suggesting they had a historic opportunity to free themselves from the regime.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu similarly addressed Iranians—particularly minorities such as the Baluch and Kurds—encouraging regime change. The initial targeting of Iran’s top leadership underscored that Israeli objectives extended beyond nuclear concerns toward dismantling the current governing structure.
In other words, this war may be about the fate of the Islamic Republic itself—not merely nuclear or missile disputes.
War Scenarios
For the Trump administration, sustaining a prolonged war would be politically difficult, lacking majority public support and facing congressional opposition. Israel’s calculus may differ, and it could resume attacks in future rounds.
From a U.S. perspective, the war could be short—three days to a week—or extend for weeks. In either case, it would involve intense, nationwide strikes.
In a short war scenario, targeting would continue against leadership figures, air defenses, missile launch sites, ports, military installations, naval bases, command centers, and remaining nuclear sites. The objective would be to weaken and disorient the regime, create space for opposition movements, and force concessions in future negotiations. Trump’s comment to the BBC suggesting he knew who could lead Iran next hinted at possible outreach to factions within the regime.
In a longer war scenario, strikes would expand to economic infrastructure, government institutions, administrative centers, and potentially even cultural and religious institutions. This approach aligns more closely with Israel’s perspective—aiming to break the regime structurally and render it vulnerable to collapse.
Iran understands the imbalance in military power. Its strategy, evident from day one, aims to raise the war’s cost and shorten its duration. Iranian missile strikes have already disrupted life in Israel and parts of the Gulf, particularly Bahrain and the UAE. If Iran succeeds in closing the Strait of Hormuz, global economic consequences would be severe.
Should the war lengthen and the regime’s survival become directly threatened, Iran may activate regional allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen to target Israel, U.S. forces, or shipping lanes such as Bab el-Mandeb. Yet the complex circumstances facing these allies may limit their involvement.
Consequences of War
Regardless of duration, Iran will emerge exhausted. The scale of exhaustion depends on the war’s intensity and success of U.S./Israeli strikes. However, regime collapse remains unlikely without a ground invasion and external occupation.
The Islamic Republic is ideological but institutionally dispersed. Power is distributed among multiple political and military bodies: the Supreme Leader’s office, presidency, parliament, Guardian Council, Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts, Revolutionary Guard Corps, regular army, Basij network, intelligence services, and internal security forces.
Although public distance from the regime has grown since 2008, it retains a broad social base across regions and ethnic groups. Severe damage could lead to internal strife rather than automatic collapse—a prospect deeply concerning to neighboring states due to refugee flows and cross-border instability.
Regime change without foreign invasion would require deep fractures within both political and military structures, coupled with substantial public alignment behind one faction.
Nor is the war likely to eliminate Iran’s nuclear or missile capabilities entirely. If IAEA estimates are accurate, Iran retains thousands of kilograms of enriched uranium, including over 400 kilograms enriched above 60%. The storage locations remain uncertain. Missile sites are widely dispersed across Iran’s vast territory. Moreover, nuclear and missile technologies are domestically developed.
Still, war-induced exhaustion will carry consequences: reduced regional influence, possible loosening of control in Iraq, shifts in Yemen, and greater inward focus. If the regime survives intact, it will face a choice—accommodation with Washington to preserve what remains, potentially involving political or strategic adjustments, or continued resistance and reconstruction, possibly including renewed pursuit of nuclear deterrence.
In either case, unless U.S. congressional dynamics shift after midterm elections, the Iranian regime is likely to remain President Trump’s primary foreign policy target.
