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Operation “Kursk”: Will Ukraine succeed in changing the course of the war with Russia?

The attack carried out by Ukraine inside Kursk, which began on August 6, 2024, came as a tactical surprise to Russia. The attack is considered the first of its kind carried out by Kyiv through its regular forces since the outbreak of the war with Russia in February 2022. There were other attempts to penetrate Russian territory, but they were through irregular groups, without Kyiv announcing responsibility for them. The attack came in a complex context for the conflict; Over the past months, Russia has continued to double its military pressure on Kyiv in various areas in eastern Ukraine, such as Kharkiv and Donetsk, where Moscow announced military advances at different points within the two regions in recent months. These military pressures coincided with the continuation of the challenges facing Kyiv in terms of external support for it. It is true that European countries transferred some of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets to it during July 2024, but Ukraine is still concerned about the extent of the continuity of Western support, and Western countries’ commitment to providing Ukraine with its armament needs, not to mention fears of the repercussions of Trump’s potential return to the White House in the November 2024 elections.

Kyiv’s motives

The attack launched by Kyiv against the Russian province of Kursk is linked to a number of main motivations, represented as follows:

1- Attempting to reduce Russian military pressure: One of the main objectives of the attack on Kursk for Kyiv is to try to reduce Russian military pressure, especially in eastern Ukraine. During the past months, Moscow has intensified its military movements in a number of areas within eastern Ukraine, primarily Kharkiv, where Russia sought to use the attack there to establish a buffer zone between it and Ukraine. Donetsk was also a main target for Russian military movements, with Moscow announcing from time to time control of new areas there.

For example, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement on July 27, 2024, that its forces had taken control of the town of Lozovatsky. This town is located east of the city of Pokrovsk in the Ugledar sector in the Donetsk People’s Republic. In a related context, the Russian Defense Ministry announced on August 4, 2024, that the Russian army was able to impose control over the town of Novosilovka Persha in Donetsk Province. From this standpoint, Kyiv aims through its attack on Kursk to put pressure on Russia to threaten Russia’s rear lines, and push Moscow to withdraw some of its forces from the Ukrainian front to defend its territory in Kursk.

2- Obstructing some Russian operations towards Ukrainian territories: Kursk province is important for Russian military operations, especially as it contains the Kalino air base, which is one of the bases used by Russia to attack Ukraine. This base hosts the 14th Guards Air Regiment, which includes about 24 Su-30SM aircraft capable of carrying KAB glide bombs. In this regard, reports indicated that after the attack by Ukrainian forces on Kursk, the Russian Air Force began using the base to strike Ukrainian targets, with approximately 50 bombs per day.

3- Promoting the continued ability of the Ukrainian army to attack Russia: During the past months, Ukrainian forces were in a more defensive position in most locations, as Russian forces possessed the initiative, in light of their continuous attacks on Ukrainian regions. Therefore, the offensive operation in Kursk may have been motivated in part by an attempt to restore the image of the Ukrainian army and restore confidence in its ability to inflict losses on its Russian counterpart. The Ukrainian military operation shows a number of main features, foremost of which is reliance on the element of surprise. The attack was carried out in the early hours of August 6, 2024, and according to many reports, about a thousand Ukrainian soldiers participated in it. The second main feature is relying on a variety of weapons in carrying out the attack, which was carried out through various axes. Tanks and armored vehicles participated in the attack, in addition to swarms of drones and artillery.

4- Working to restore the image of Ukrainian President Zelensky: The Ukrainian military operation in Kursk may help President Zelensky restore his image, especially with increasing doubts about his ability to manage the conflict with Russia. In this regard, Zelensky tried to exploit the attack on Kursk to portray himself in a stronger position. On August 8, 2024, he stated that “Russia brought the war to his country, and it must feel the consequences of what it did.” He added, in other statements on August 10, 2024: “Today, and repeatedly, the commander of the armed forces prepared reports on the front, on our movements and the transfer of the war to the aggressor’s lands… Ukraine proves that it is able to exert the necessary pressure: pressure on the aggressor.”

5- Exporting more pressure to Russian President Putin: The Ukrainian military operation in Kursk comes within the framework of Kyiv’s efforts to export more pressure to Russian President Putin, who will then appear unable to protect Russian territory from the repercussions of the conflict, not to mention the fall of some Russian civilians in the Ukrainian operation. The Ukrainian attack on Kursk also shows gaps in the Russian army. According to many reports, “Ukrainian forces quickly managed to bypass a number of checkpoints and field fortifications that were under the control of lightly armed border guard and infantry units along the border between Russia and Ukraine.”

6- Possessing cards in potential negotiations with Moscow: Kyiv has recently sent many signals about its readiness to start negotiations to end the war. For example, Ukrainian President Zelensky stated in July 2024 that he supports the idea of Russia participating in an upcoming summit on peace in Ukraine organized by Kyiv. Some polls also revealed an increasing acceptance by Ukrainian citizens of the idea of negotiating to end the war. In this regard, the operation in Kursk may be an attempt by Kyiv to possess new cards in any upcoming negotiations with Russia, especially if it is able to control some lands inside Kursk for a longer period or even capture more Russian soldiers.

Despite the variations and lack of clarity regarding the area of Ukrainian progress in Kursk, it seems that Kyiv had controlled, especially in the first days of the operation, some areas. The Institute for the Study of War indicated in a report on August 7, 2024 that Ukrainian forces controlled 11 sites in Kursk. On August 11, 2024, the Russian army announced stopping the Ukrainian advance in some areas inside Kursk, and indicated that Ukrainian forces reached areas about 30 kilometers from the border, although the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Army, Oleksandr Syrskyi, came out on August 12, 2024 to confirm that his forces control 1,000 km2 in Kursk.

Moscow fears the possibility of Ukrainian forces taking control of the Kursk nuclear power plant. On August 10, 2024, the Russian nuclear agency announced that “the cross-border attack launched by Ukraine posed a direct threat to a nuclear power plant located less than 50 kilometers from the combat zone.” Moreover, there are concerns that Ukrainian forces will take control of the gas facility and pipeline in the town of Sudzha located in the Kursk region.

7- Supporting Kyiv’s efforts to reduce Western red lines: It is likely that Kyiv is trying through its recent attack to convince Western countries to reduce Western red lines related to the use of Western weapons in attacking Russian territories. Despite Western countries providing Kyiv with many advanced weapons systems, they insist on avoiding using these weapons in attacking Russian territories. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the long-range ATACMS missiles that can reach targets up to 300 kilometers away. Washington refuses to use Kyiv these missiles in attacking Russian territory, to prevent escalation of the conflict.

8- Convincing Western countries to provide Ukraine with more advanced weapon systems: In connection with the previous goal, Ukraine currently aspires to convince Western countries to provide it with more advanced weapon systems. The attack on Kursk came a few days after the announcement of the arrival of a limited number of F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Coinciding with the attack on Kursk, the United States announced on August 10, 2024, a new military aid package worth $125 million for Ukraine, including Stinger missiles, artillery ammunition and anti-tank systems. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to demand that Western countries obtain long-range weapons to confront Russian attacks.

9- Preparing for the possibility of Trump’s return to the White House: The field developments in the Ukrainian war, including the attack on Kursk, are not separated from the scene of the American elections. There is concern in Kyiv about the continuation of American support for it if Trump reaches the White House, especially with his successive statements regarding his desire to end the war as soon as he comes to power, not to mention that the Republicans were playing the main role in recent months in obstructing the Biden administration’s aid to Ukraine. From this standpoint, the attack on Kursk may be an attempt by Kyiv to anticipate the American elections, and to demonstrate to the next American administration, whoever it is, that Ukraine has not surrendered and still has the ability to embarrass Russia, so its demands must be taken into account in any possible negotiations in the future.

Key determinants

A few hours after the Ukrainian attack on Russian Kursk, some came out to indicate that the attack may lead to a change in the course of the war, which is the scenario that assumes strengthening the Ukrainian military position, which may eventually lead to accelerating the negotiation path and ending the war. However, the ability of the Ukrainian attack to change the course of the war remains linked to a number of key determinants represented as follows:

1- The success of Russian response tools to the Ukrainian attack: The Russian President considered the Ukrainian attack on Kursk as a large-scale provocation, and criticized the attack on civilian buildings, homes and ambulances. Moscow quickly declared a state of emergency in Kursk, and the Russian National Counter-Terrorism Committee announced an operation to combat terrorism in the border areas of Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk on August 9, 2024. These movements came in parallel with sending intensive forces from Russia to Kursk, and carrying out attacks against Ukrainian forces. Moreover, Moscow carried out extensive air strikes, especially on August 9, 2024, on the Sumy region, with the aim of cutting supply lines to the forces attacking Kursk.

These Russian moves may succeed in undermining the Ukrainian operation, returning the war to what it was before the Kursk operation. Perhaps this was evident on August 11, 2024, when the Russian army announced stopping the Ukrainian advance in some areas inside Kursk.

2- Russia expanding the limits of its attacks on Ukraine: It is expected that Moscow will adopt a harsh reaction to the recent Ukrainian military operation in Kursk, especially with the sharp statements made by Russian officials in response to the Ukrainian attack. Russia also carried out a missile attack on the capital, Kyiv, on the night of August 11, 2024, which seemed to be the beginning of a wide Russian escalation against Ukraine. This escalation will weaken the effects of the attack of Ukrainian forces on Kursk, and may pressure Kyiv to withdraw its forces from Kursk.

3- Moscow’s employment of the attack to support its objectives in the war: It is true that the Ukrainian attack on Kursk may negatively affect the image of Moscow and President Putin, but the Russian regime may exploit this attack to serve its interests and support its objectives in the war, by promoting the existence of wide risks posed by Ukraine to the Russian people, by linking the attack on Kursk and NATO and dedicating the idea of a Western conspiracy against Russia. Hence, this scene may be used to encourage more Russians to join the Russian army, which defends Russian territory against Ukrainian and Western conspiracies.

4- The extent of the ability of Ukrainian forces to consolidate their control over some areas inside Kursk: Despite reports indicating the ability of Ukrainian forces to advance in a number of areas inside Kursk, the ability of these forces to consolidate their control over some areas is doubtful, and it is difficult to continue for a long period of time, especially with the wide capabilities enjoyed by Russia, in addition to the difficulties facing Ukraine in maintaining supply lines for its forces participating in the Kursk operation.

5- Limits of Western support for Ukraine after the Kursk operation: Many Western countries, led by the United States, tried to confirm that they were not previously aware of the details of the Ukrainian attack on Kursk. This Western trend implied two possibilities: The first is that Western countries were in fact not aware of the attack, but the other possibility, which is more likely, is that they were aware and showed ignorance of the matter to avoid escalation with Russia, or at least to wait and see what the Ukrainian attack would reach. Regardless of both possibilities, the features of Western support for Ukraine after the Kursk attack will have an impact on the course of the war. Perhaps if Ukrainian forces succeed in consolidating their advance in some locations, Western countries will be encouraged to provide Kyiv with more advanced weapons.

6- Features of American and Chinese interaction with the escalation: The American and Chinese positions remain two main determinants in the course of the Ukrainian war after the escalation in Kursk. China seemed more reserved in its statements towards the escalation, although it implicitly expressed its dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian attack on Kursk. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated on August 12, 2024 that Beijing attaches importance to the situation in the Russian province of Kursk, and the foreign ministry spokesman said that “China’s position on the Ukrainian issue is consistent and clear. We call on all parties to respect the so-called three principles of de-escalation of not expanding the battlefield, not escalating the conflict, and not fueling the fighting.”

On the other hand, although Washington initially indicated that it was not aware of this attack, it later made statements that seemed to indicate implicit American support for Kyiv. For example, Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh said on August 8, 2024: “While they see attacks coming across the border, they should be able to respond.” State Department spokesman Matthew Miller also indicated that “Russia launched attacks on Ukraine from the Kursk region, and that the United States supports Kyiv’s right to defend itself.” This American position may support Ukrainian movements in Kursk, which may also push Beijing to strengthen its political support for Moscow.

7- The possibility of Russia resorting to its allies to obtain new weapons: Russia may seek, after the attack on Kursk, its allies to obtain new weapons to strengthen its position. This is evidenced by the report published by Reuters on August 9, 2024, which stated that dozens of Russian military personnel are training in Iran on the use of the short-range ballistic missile system “Fateh-360”, which launches missiles with a maximum range of 120 kilometers, and is estimated to carry a warhead weighing 150 kilograms. The report added, quoting European sources, that they expect the imminent delivery of hundreds of satellite-guided weapons to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine.

8- Repercussions of European fears of affecting gas supplies: At a time when European countries support Ukraine in its war against Russia, they are at the same time continuing to obtain gas supplies from Russia. Therefore, what is happening in Kursk may raise fears of European countries, especially with the presence of a pipeline to transport Russian gas to Europe in the town of Sudzha in Kursk, not to mention the rise in gas prices in Europe after the Ukrainian attack on Kursk. Hence, these data may lead to divisions within Europe regarding the position on the Ukrainian operation in Kursk, and divisions may encourage the emergence of a current that pressures Kyiv to stop its attack on Kursk and withdraw from there, and enter into new arrangements to negotiate with Russia.

In conclusion, the attack carried out by Ukraine on the Russian province of Kursk reflects the escalating pressures that Kyiv has been exposed to during the past months in light of the continuous Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine, and doubts about the continuation of Western support for it. Therefore, the attack on Kursk appeared to be a gamble by Kyiv, because the attack opens the war to multiple scenarios ranging from escalation and bypassing prohibited areas to pushing towards accelerating the negotiation path. These scenarios depend on a number of variables, foremost of which is the way Moscow responds to the attack, which certainly put it in an embarrassing position.

Mohamed SAKHRI

I’m Mohamed Sakhri, the founder of World Policy Hub. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and International Relations and a Master’s in International Security Studies. My academic journey has given me a strong foundation in political theory, global affairs, and strategic studies, allowing me to analyze the complex challenges that confront nations and political institutions today.

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