How Is Washington Reshaping Its African Influence Through a Bilateral Approach?
The contours of U.S. foreign policy have gradually taken shape during Donald Trump’s second term, dispelling African nations’ fears that the new administration might disengage from the continent. Those concerns initially stemmed from the Trump administration’s skepticism toward international organizations, its aversion to multilateral diplomacy, and its preference for bilateral dealings. The “America First” approach also revived a climate of mistrust and unease that had marked relations between Washington and African states during Trump’s first term. Reports further indicated that the new administration intended to add more African countries to the existing U.S. travel ban list (currently 26 nations). Moreover, it appointed only three ambassadors across the continent — in South Africa, Morocco, and Tunisia — while other posts were either occupied by holdovers, interim envoys, or remained vacant.
In addition, the administration planned to reduce its diplomatic footprint in Africa by closing embassies (in Lesotho, Eritrea, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Gambia, and South Sudan) and consulates (in Cameroon and South Africa) as part of a cost-cutting initiative — reinforcing the perception of growing U.S. disengagement from Africa.
A previous diplomatic spat between Washington and South Africa foreshadowed the abrasive diplomacy Africa would face during Trump’s four years in office. During a May meeting in Washington between Trump and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, the former harshly attacked his counterpart using a video promoting false claims of “white genocide” and land seizures in South Africa. The confrontation turned out to be a retaliatory move by Trump after South Africa filed a case at the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza. It also followed remarks by South African Ambassador Ibrahim Rasool, who accused Trump of stoking racial divisions and using “dog-whistle” language — coded rhetoric that appears harmless to the public but carries a hidden message for specific audiences. In response, Washington expelled Rasool and nominated L. Brent Bozell III — a conservative media critic and pro-Israel figure — as U.S. ambassador to Pretoria.
Trade, Not Aid
The Trump administration’s noticeable lack of interest in Africa coincided with a decline in U.S. influence on the continent. In 2024, the United States closed its military bases in Chad and Niger at the host countries’ request amid growing popular resentment of Western powers. Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Sudan — threatening to evolve into a prolonged conflict — has been seen by many analysts as proof of America’s waning clout, given Washington’s inability to exert the political leverage needed to halt the fighting.
As the world transitions toward a multipolar order, some emerging African powers have sought to fill the vacuum left by U.S. withdrawal. Yet, a recent high-level summit involving the presidents of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal suggested that Washington remains acutely aware of intensifying geopolitical competition in Africa. Most notably, the summit revealed that the U.S. is moving away from relying on traditional heavyweight African economies — South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia — to project its influence, instead favoring smaller, strategically chosen states. This shift likely stems from the fact that the major African powers mentioned are members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Such a realignment will have significant implications for Africa’s political and security landscape.
The Trump administration has declared its intent to counter competition for influence and resources in Africa through commercial opportunities rather than traditional diplomatic and security cooperation programs — replacing aid with trade. However, this “trade not aid” model could create a dual-edged situation that risks undermining Washington’s ability to reassert its influence across the continent.
At the same time, the U.S. signaled plans to scale back its military operations in Africa. General Michael Langley, head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), stated that African nations must build the capacity to handle their own security, terrorism, and insurgency challenges. Although Washington’s military presence in Africa was never extensive, it helped mitigate risk levels that were typically too high for many American investors compared to their Russian and Chinese counterparts.
Given the economic, political, and human costs African states face when confronting regional and global security threats — including insurgencies and jihadist movements — many may feel compelled to seek security partnerships with other powers. Russia’s active involvement in the Sahel exemplifies this dynamic.
To counter that, Washington claims that American investment provides a form of security guarantee — as illustrated by its mediation of a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. To promote this approach and compete with China and Russia’s less restrictive engagement policies, the U.S. has proposed relaxing some of its own core values, such as human rights, and suspending investigations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Yet, for Africa, such an approach risks exacerbating insecurity and conflict in the medium to long term. The peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, for instance, was largely transactional — a minerals-for-peace arrangement where peace itself was a secondary condition. The agreement failed to address the deep-rooted issues fueling instability in eastern DRC. Thus, this kind of “deal-based mediation,” which substitutes sustainable political solutions with short-term bargains, cannot serve as a long-term mechanism for peace and conflict resolution.
Two factors explain this short-term approach.
First, Trump’s domestic electoral base — to whom he pledged that the U.S. would not engage in protracted security entanglements abroad but would instead pursue limited, economically rewarding engagements. This promise constrains the U.S. from implementing comprehensive peace agreements, as doing so would require sustained oversight from both the administration and Congress — a vacuum that warring parties could exploit.
Second, Trump’s personal ambition to win a Nobel Peace Prize, which lacks genuine strategic motivation. He reportedly lamented not receiving the prize despite mediating the DRC–Rwanda deal. Consequently, Washington risks pursuing superficial, ineffective conflict resolutions after that failure.
The Risk of Multiple Actors
Another pressing question is whether the United States will intervene to balance the growing involvement of emerging Middle Eastern powers in Africa — a trend that threatens to deepen existing insecurity, particularly in the Horn of Africa. There, the convergence of regional and Middle Eastern geopolitical rivalries increases the likelihood of proxy wars, with different powers supporting competing local actors. The main challenge is not competition from America’s traditional rivals — Russia, Iran, or China — but from “friendly” states whose policies in Africa diverge from Washington’s. It remains uncertain whether the Trump administration will restrain these allies in key African theaters or allow them free rein — even when their agendas clash.
African Skepticism
Washington’s bilateral approach has limited its engagement with African countries and undermined efforts to build a unified foreign policy framework to strengthen U.S.–Africa cooperation. This, in turn, has fueled skepticism, mistrust, and unease among African governments, prompting them to diversify their diplomatic and economic ties toward other emerging powers. The new global geopolitical landscape signals a continued decline in U.S. influence in Africa — forcing Washington to manage strategic competition with Russia, China, and others using different tools.
Adding to Washington’s diplomatic challenges is the fact that some of these emerging powers are simultaneously vital to other U.S. alliances and security frameworks in key regions.
For Africa, failure to strike the necessary balance risks turning the continent into a battleground for proxy wars, where local actors manipulate competing external interests for political or economic gain. As seen in the transactional mediation between the DRC and Rwanda, shallow interventions — rather than long-term commitments — are unlikely to produce sustainable peace. Indeed, since June, the warring parties have failed to honor their commitments, and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has reported 1,087 civilian deaths in Ituri and North Kivu during that period.
Finally, some African governments — eager to curry favor with the Trump administration — may sign unequal agreements that threaten to undermine international law and their own political and social stability in the long run. This trend is already visible in the growing number of African nations signing deals to accept third-country migrants deported by the U.S., such as Rwanda, which agreed in August to take in 250 deportees under a new accord.
