The Military Confrontation between Afghanistan and Pakistan: Roots, Repercussions, and Future Scenarios

The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have witnessed in recent years a worrying and escalating tension, which reached its peak in 2025, showing clear signs of transition to a stage of direct military confrontation. The Pakistani army launched air raids on border areas within Afghan territory, especially in the provinces of Khost, Kunar, and Paktika, and even the capital Kabul on October 9, 2025(1); which was met with firm responses from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and pushed the political and security scene between the two countries to an unprecedented level of tension.

At the heart of this escalation are two intertwined issues: the activity of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the historical conflict over the Durand Line; both of which not only threaten the internal security of the two parties but also impose serious repercussions on the stability of South Asia as a whole. Data issued by international sources indicate that between 2021 and 2025, more than 1,200 border violations and 712 airspace violations of Afghanistan by Pakistan were recorded(2), figures that clearly reflect the scale and continuity of the crisis.

There is no doubt that the scope of these tensions goes beyond the narrow national framework to acquire complex regional and international dimensions, given the geopolitical importance enjoyed by the two countries in South Asia. Any direct military confrontation between them would directly affect major strategic projects, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as well as counterterrorism efforts and refugee and migration movements across the region. Neighboring countries – such as Iran, India, China, and Russia – as well as international organizations, primarily the United Nations, are closely following these developments with great concern, fearing a slide into a wider state of regional instability. These concerns have prompted regional and international parties to intensify mediation efforts; where negotiation rounds were held in Doha, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, leading to a truce that included a commitment not to support armed groups and respect the national sovereignty of each party(3). However, the durability of this agreement remains contingent on close monitoring and a firm political will from both sides.

Against this complex backdrop, this study seeks to analyze the causes of the recent tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to read its dimensions from the perspective of the two parties by reviewing the official and unofficial views in Kabul and Islamabad in order to unravel the roots of the dispute and identify the factors contributing to its escalation, and to develop a clearer understanding of how each party perceives the sources of threat and the circles of interest.

Historical Background of the Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, since their inception until today, are based on a ground laden with historical mistrust, geopolitical competition, and successive security transformations. The Durand Line is one of the most prominent axes of disagreement between the two countries; this line was drawn in 1893 between the then ruler of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, and the representative of the British Indian government, Sir Mortimer Durand, as a temporary agreement to define the scope of influence between the two parties. Despite the ratification of this line in the Rawalpindi Treaty of 1919(4), Afghanistan did not recognize it as an international border even after the establishment of Pakistan in 1947(5). This historical rejection has been a constant source of tension and has transformed in the Afghan national consciousness into a symbol of resistance against the colonial legacy.

In contrast, Pakistan insists on the legitimacy of this line and considers it the basis for organizing its border relations. This fundamental disagreement has contributed to the eruption of repeated confrontations within the border and tribal regions, particularly in Khost, Kunar, and Paktika, remaining a constant factor in producing instability within the trajectory of bilateral relations.

With the dawn of the 1980s, Pakistan’s role in Afghan affairs increased, becoming a key determinant in the political and security trajectory within Afghanistan. During the jihad against the Soviet Union, Islamabad provided extensive support to the jihadi factions, not only within the framework of its alignment with the United States and the West, but also to entrench its influence and prevent the emergence of an Afghan regime aligned with India. After the withdrawal of the Soviet army and the country’s slide into civil war, Pakistan continued to support specific parties and contributed during the 1990s to the rise of the Islamic Emirate (Taliban) in line with its well-known “strategic depth” strategy, aimed at creating an Afghanistan aligned with Pakistan’s national security requirements. Even after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent transformations in the international landscape, Pakistan remained a key player in the Afghan file, albeit with a more complex relationship with the Islamic Emirate(6).

With the return of the Islamic Emirate to power in 2021, the bilateral relations at the outset seemed closer to openness and coordination, especially after the visit of the head of the intelligence service in Pakistan at the time, Asim Munir, to Kabul, but they soon transitioned to a new phase of greater fragility and complexity(7), where the strategic partnership was replaced by a state of security competition and mutual suspicion. While Islamabad accuses the Islamic Emirate of harboring elements of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan within Afghan territory(8), Kabul affirms that this movement is separate from it and officially denies its presence in the country(9). These mutual accusations, alongside border clashes and air raids, have increased the tension, especially in the tribal areas. In light of this scene, it is clear that envisioning the future of relations between the two parties requires an in-depth review of security policies, the activation of regional diplomatic channels, and the establishment of joint mechanisms for crisis management. For the continuation of this confrontational course not only threatens the security of the two countries, but is also likely to deepen the state of instability within South Asia as a whole.

Recent Transformations and the Start of Confrontations between the Two Countries The air strikes carried out by Pakistan on the night of October 9, 2025 on the outskirts of the Abdul Haq junction in Kabul marked a pivotal turning point in the trajectory of the recent tensions; as Islamabad claimed that the target of the operation was the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Noor Wali Mehsud(10), and this strike came while the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Emirate, Amir Khan Muttaqi, was on a diplomatic visit to India; which Kabul – and many international parties – considered a blatant violation of national sovereignty and a breach of previous arrangements. The attack was followed by the rumble of violent explosions in several areas of the capital; resulting in dozens of civilians being injured and some killed while being transported to medical centers.

This not only undermined whatever trust remained, but also triggered a series of countermilitary moves in the border provinces, with mutual accusations of initiating hostilities, and increasing ground deployment and air and ground patrols from both sides. This escalation led to the deterioration of the diplomatic climate and the growing warnings issued by the United Nations and human rights organizations.

From an international law perspective, Pakistan’s reliance on the principle of “preventive defense” requires proving the existence of an imminent armed threat, in addition to the existence of formal security agreements that allow action within the territory of another state. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter stipulates the legality of self-defense solely in the event of an “armed attack”; which makes any military intervention outside this framework, and without the consent of the state concerned, closer to the characterization of aggression(11). Kabul affirms that there is no joint mechanism or formal understanding that allows this type of operations, while Islamabad sees the activity of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan within Afghan territory as a direct threat that requires intervention.

However, international human rights reports expressed concern over the lack of distinction between military targets and populated areas, and the use of excessive force in densely civilian environments. The conflicting narratives have deepened this climate of polarization and pushed towards a mutual propaganda war, weakening the mechanisms of transparency and accountability, and making it more difficult to contain the escalation.

The humanitarian, social, and cultural repercussions of this escalation have also expanded, reflecting the transition of the crisis from the purely military domain to the realm of “human security” and the social fabric between the two peoples. Reports have continued to emerge about the rising number of civilian casualties and forced displacement operations, in addition to direct impacts on civilian and sports activities, including the killing of Afghan cricketers, and the response of the Afghan Cricket Federation by announcing its withdrawal from competitions held in Pakistan(12). International organizations – including UN agencies – have called for restraint, protection of civilians, and the reactivation of mediation channels, fearing the expansion of the escalation circle.

Recent developments have proven that the absence of an impartial and reliable monitoring system supported by regional or international parties makes the possibilities of renewed confrontations and their expansion into wider arenas a real possibility. Accordingly, containing the crisis requires work on three parallel tracks:

• Commitment to ceasefire agreements and prevention of cross-border operations, and strict adherence to the distinction between military and civilian targets.
• Establishment of official and transparent channels for investigation and accountability regarding mutual accusations.
• Activation of regional and international mediation roles to rebuild trust and address the roots of security and political disputes in the long term.

The absence of these approaches may lead to a deepening of instability in South Asia, leaving millions of civilians in both countries exposed to further risks.

Explaining the Conflicting Perspectives in the Border Crisis between the Two Countries The Afghan Perspective: Based on recent developments, it rests on three main pillars: defending national sovereignty, accusing Pakistan of supporting terrorism, and defining the Islamic Emirate’s position on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. These pillars have emerged clearly in the official speeches and media stances following the Pakistani air strikes on the provinces of Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, and Paktika. The Islamic Emirate, which today assumes the role of the central government, affirms that these attacks represent a “blatant violation of Afghanistan’s airspace and national sovereignty”, describing them as “provocative” and “irresponsible”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also summoned the Pakistani ambassador in Kabul, stressing that “the protection of Afghan airspace is a red line”(13), in an attempt to entrench its legitimacy as a sovereign authority, despite not yet having official international recognition.

These messages fall within the framework of political defense, as much as they reflect a message to the region and the world that the Islamic Emirate considers itself committed to protecting the integrity of Afghan territory. Field reports indicate that the Emirate’s forces repelled Pakistani attacks in the Nari area of Kunar province and Shinwar in Nangarhar; suggesting a transition of tension from the stage of indirect confrontation to limited military confrontation on the ground.

At a deeper level, the Islamic Emirate accuses Pakistan of historical and ongoing support for terrorist groups, which Kabul sees as a direct threat to Afghan security, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and some branches of the ISIS organization, which – from Kabul’s perspective – have been used as a geopolitical pressure card(14).

In contrast, Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of turning into a safe haven for these groups, and considers the Emirate’s inability to contain them a major reason for its military escalation. This accusatory exchange has led to a widening of the trust deficit and the summoning of military force as a parallel tool to diplomacy.

The Islamic Emirate’s position on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan is one of the most sensitive and complex files within the system of disagreement; as Kabul denies any organizational relationship with the movement, and affirms that it is an independent entity that does not fall under its authority. However, Pakistan claimed the targeting of its leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, inside Afghan territory, before it later became clear that he was in the tribal areas within Pakistan and is still alive(15). Statements by Afghan officials also indicate that between 2021 and 2025, more than 1,200 border violations and 712 airspace incursions were recorded by Pakistani forces within Afghan territory, which the Emirate considers evidence of a systematic interventionist policy. At the same time, it affirms that it does not allow the presence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan within Afghan territory(16).

The Pakistani Perspective: Pakistan, on the other hand, bases its vision on three counterpoints: fear of the activity of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan originating from Afghan territory, repeated calls for the Emirate to take concrete measures against it, and focus on the security of the common border. Since the return of the Islamic Emirate to power in 2021, Islamabad has claimed that the movement is using the border areas of Afghanistan as a haven to plan attacks against the Pakistani army. Official statistics indicate that the year 2025 alone witnessed more than 300 attacks in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, many of which were attributed to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. The Pakistani Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, stated in an interview with “Geo News” channel that “the environment is hostile”, warning of the possibility of renewed confrontation at any moment(17).

In the international context, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif conveyed this position to the United Nations, calling on the Islamic Emirate to ensure that Afghan territory is not used as a platform for attacks against neighboring countries. While Kabul considers this issue a Pakistani internal affair, Islamabad calls for direct dialogue with the movement within its territories. In bilateral forums, such as the Doha negotiations and the trilateral meetings in Kabul, Pakistan demanded verifiable actions against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), while the Emirate stressed the need to provide accurate intelligence information about the locations of these groups. In March 2024, the Pakistani representative to the United Nations called on the Security Council to pressure the Emirate to sever its ties with the movement(18). After the diplomatic path stalled, Islamabad resorted to unilateral military operations, including air strikes within Kabul, Khost, Kunar, and Paktika; which further exacerbated the tension. This approach reflects a dual strategy that combines political pressure and the use of armed force.

These developments have pushed the bilateral relations into a new phase of strategic complexity, requiring active diplomacy, regional monitoring mechanisms, and a comprehensive review of security policies, to prevent the crisis from sinking deeper.

The Regional and International Dimensions of the Conflict The current tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be reduced to a bilateral dispute alone, but rather represents a multi-layered crisis with clear regional and international extensions. The continuation of this escalation, if prolonged, would transform it into a direct threat to the security and stability equations in South Asia and its surroundings. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a strategic project that is part of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, aimed at linking western China to the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, is one of the most affected areas by the rise of this tension. Although China has shown interest in extending this corridor to include Afghan territory, in the hope of expanding its economic influence and strengthening its regional partnerships, the state of mistrust and the deteriorating security on the borders have placed these plans before real obstacles.

At the level of regional interactions, the positions of neighboring countries and international institutions reflect the extent of concern about the possibility of the conflict circle expanding. The United Nations, headed by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, has called for restraint and direct dialogue between the two parties, stressing the need to protect civilians. Statistical reports indicate that since October 9, 2025, dozens of Afghan civilians have been killed and hundreds injured, raising the level of humanitarian concerns. Security experts have also warned of the absence of effective regional mechanisms to manage crises between the two parties; a factor that makes the possibility of a slide into open confrontation more present and growing(19).

At the international level, the equation of regional security after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2021 has entered a new phase of geopolitical competition. On the one hand, the United States continues to follow the Afghan file from the perspective of combating transnational terrorist threats, with repeated accusations of the presence of activity by organizations such as ISIS and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan originating from Afghan territory. On the other hand, Russia is monitoring the scene from the perspective of protecting its strategic depth in Central Asia, and is seeking to strengthen regional security coordination to contain the potential risks. This overlap between international actors further complicates the crisis; as the arena of tension between Kabul and Islamabad has become a point of intersection between local calculations and major geopolitical conflicts.

Accordingly, it becomes clear that containing this crisis will not be possible through a single security treatment, or through unilateral pressures, but rather requires a comprehensive approach based on respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, building mutual trust, and strengthening regional cooperation to ensure that the border dispute does not turn into a conflict that threatens the security structure across South and Central Asia.

Potential Analysis of the Repercussions of the Continued Conflict between the Two Countries The ongoing disputes and mutual military escalation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in recent years could lead to deep and multidimensional repercussions, which can be summarized in the following main axes:

Security Implications: The current confrontations will have complex and intertwined security implications. The first manifestation of this is the collapse of bilateral trust and the cessation of security cooperation channels between the two parties. Previous efforts were made to establish joint mechanisms for information exchange, border management, and confronting armed groups, but the Pakistani air strikes and the military responses from the Islamic Emirate have completely paralyzed these trajectories and increased the level of mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad.

As a result, the impact will not only be limited to reducing cooperation in counterterrorism, but will also open the door to harmful rivalries in the fields of intelligence, military capabilities, and even cyber warfare. The decline in security coordination, especially in border areas, will expose both countries to greater terrorist risks and increase the likelihood of an escalation of cross-border attacks.

As a result, the impact will not only be limited to reducing cooperation in counterterrorism, but will also open the door to harmful rivalries in the fields of intelligence, military capabilities, and even cyber warfare. The decline in security coordination, especially in border areas, will expose both countries to greater terrorist risks and increase the likelihood of an escalation of cross-border attacks. Similarly, the state of instability in regions such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where ethnic groups intersect and armed factions are active, may ignite waves of internal and regional violence.

Implications Related to Human Rights: From a human rights perspective, the war will entail grave humanitarian consequences that primarily affect civilians. The air strikes and exchanges of fire in areas such as Paktika, Khost, and Paktia have led to the forced displacement of thousands of Afghan families. UN reports indicate that since October 2024 until now, more than 1,500 families have been displaced or crossed the borders, and this figure rose in 2025 to more than 80,000 people(20). These waves of migration create immense pressures on the humanitarian, service, and economic infrastructure of the host countries, further exacerbating humanitarian crises on a wide scale.

In addition to this, the violations – including the fall of civilian, women, and children casualties due to air strikes – have led to strong local and international condemnations. Despite the calls of the United Nations and human rights organizations for compliance with the provisions of international humanitarian law, the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms has contributed to the continuation of these violations, negatively impacting the credibility of the parties involved on the international stage.

Economic Implications: The conflict will be negatively reflected on regional projects and local development in both countries. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is one of the most exposed sectors; as it represents a massive strategic investment aimed at linking western China to the port of Gwadar, and there had been talk of the potential extension of the project’s advantages to Afghanistan. With the exacerbation of violence on the borders, the safety of roads and infrastructure projects is threatened, which has prompted Beijing to express serious concerns about the possibility of the conflict spreading and impacting its investments and strategic position. The crisis will also result in a decline in foreign investment, disruption of border trade, and an increase in the security spending of both countries; which will disrupt growth and development paths and reduce prospects for regional economic cooperation.

Geopolitical and International Implications: The continuation of the conflict increases the likelihood of transforming it into a proxy confrontation, as the presence of major interests of actors such as China, India, Iran, Russia, and the United States in the trajectories of Afghanistan and Pakistan makes it possible for each of them to support certain parties to achieve regional influence gains. New Delhi may resort to initiatives to reduce Pakistani influence in Kabul, while Beijing may, in order to protect CPEC and its interests, adopt more effective and perhaps broader security roles if the protection conditions for infrastructure deteriorate. Iran, due to the sectarian and tribal ties across the borders, may also enter the arena with its own leverage tools, while the intelligence competition between Moscow and Washington can exacerbate the polarization of local parties and complicate the scene.

These dynamics carry the risk of transforming the conflict into an arena of confrontation between regional or international allies; a factor that makes the stability of South and Central Asia vulnerable to greater risks. Managing this crisis requires a comprehensive approach based on active diplomacy, the establishment of oversight and crisis management mechanisms, and multilateral cooperation aimed at containing the escalation and preventing the transformation of the dispute into a conflict that threatens regional stability.

Possible Scenarios for the Afghanistan-Pakistan Crisis We review here four possible scenarios for the course of the crisis, each of which reflects alternative paths to escalation or resolution:

The First Scenario: In this scenario, the continued Pakistani air strikes and ground operations in the cross-border areas, including parts of Kabul city and border areas such as Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, and Bajaur, would plunge Afghanistan and Pakistan into an escalating cycle of entrenched violence. If the Islamic Emirate repeats its position that “the national airspace is a red line” and threatens a military response to any aggression(21), the possibility of widening the scope of confrontations increases. In this case, the borders will turn into an arena for proxy conflicts between regional players such as India, Iran, and China; a factor that would lead to a loss of control over local parties and further complicate the geopolitical scene. The continuation of the fighting will also undermine internal security in both countries and pose a direct threat to border economic projects and infrastructure, while the humanitarian, economic, and security repercussions may reach a level that makes the return to the path of peace and dialogue much more difficult.

The Second Scenario: In the event that diplomatic negotiations between Kabul and Islamabad fail, a political and security deadlock will become entrenched. The situation may reach the point of severing diplomatic relations or reducing the level of cooperation; which would lead to the cessation of the exchange of intelligence information, the closure of trade routes, and the escalation of military misunderstandings. In the midst of this vacuum, armed groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, ISIS-Khorasan, and the Balochistan Liberation Army may seize the opportunity to expand their activities, taking advantage of the lack of security coordination; a development that portends a wider deterioration of internal security in both countries.

The Third Scenario: This scenario focuses on a negotiation track aimed at calming the situation, and it can succeed through the mediation of third parties such as Qatar, Turkey, and China, which maintain balanced relations with both parties and have the ability to create an atmosphere for dialogue and trust-building. Joint mechanisms for border management, security information exchange, and monitoring the activities of militias are key tools to prevent the outbreak of accidental clashes and improve local security.

In this context, negotiations were held in October 2025 in Doha between Afghan and Pakistani delegations, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, and resulted in an agreement on an immediate ceasefire(22). Although the details of the implementation have not been fully revealed yet, follow-up rounds have been scheduled to ensure the implementation of the understanding. This step indicates that even in the midst of the deadlock, windows can be opened for de-escalation if there is political will and regional support. Resuming bilateral dialogues on counterterrorism is an entry point not only to reduce the pace of violence, but also to build broader cooperation in the economic, humanitarian, and cultural fields. In the best-case scenario of this scenario, confidence-building steps would lay the groundwork for short-term security and economic understandings.

The Fourth Scenario: This scenario is the most ambitious and hopeful at the same time, and is based on turning the dispute into an opportunity to launch comprehensive regional cooperation. In it, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the participation of their neighbors in the Middle East region (Iran) and India and the Central Asian republics, establish new security treaties in South Asia. These partnerships could include the joint management of shared water resources, regional infrastructure projects, cross-border trade, and the energy sector (electricity and gas). Strengthening the role of regional mechanisms – such as SAARC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – can also contribute to unifying security and economic policies. If this path is accompanied by a firm political will and long-term confidence-building programs, there is a real possibility of extricating the two countries from the vortex of violence and transforming South Asia from an arena of competition into a space for economic and security convergence, where common interests replace historical fractures, and the foundations of sustainable development for future generations are formed.

Conclusion The recent conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan reflect not only historical and geopolitical disputes between the two countries, but also the emerging complexities in the security structure of the South Asian region. From the Durand Line to the issue of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and from intelligence competitions to economic projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, all these elements have played a role in shaping the current crisis. The air strikes, ground clashes, and mutual military interactions have reinforced the climate of mistrust to the point that even diplomatic efforts in some cases have faced suspicion and fragility. In this context, the internal security of both countries is facing multiple threats, while semi-armed groups benefit from the existing gaps to expand their influence. This situation not only weakens the bilateral stability, but also exposes the regional security to danger.

However, recent developments indicate that the diplomatic path has not been completely closed, as the Doha negotiations in October 2025, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, resulted in a fragile ceasefire agreement. While the actual implementation of this agreement requires continuous monitoring and strong political will, it can serve as a starting point for rebuilding trust and reducing tensions. The role of third countries in creating an environment for dialogue, especially those that maintain balanced relations with Kabul and Islamabad, may also be effective in facilitating the path to peace. In addition, rereading security and economic relations within the framework of regional cooperation can pave the way out of the deadlock and towards lasting stability.

Ultimately, the future of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on the extent of the two countries’ ability to overcome historical conflicts and focus on common interests. Each of the proposed scenarios, from the escalation of conflicts to regional cooperation, carries its own implications and requires a careful analysis, effective diplomacy, and multilateral participation to choose the most appropriate path.

Given the escalation of geopolitical rivalries between global powers, Afghanistan and Pakistan must avoid becoming an arena for proxy conflict, and instead – rather than confrontation – seek to develop joint mechanisms for crisis management and enhance economic development and protect human security. Through dialogue, confidence-building, and regional cooperation, it is possible to arrive at a vision where peace is not a distant dream, but a realizable reality.

References:

1. “Afghanistan-Pakistan Ties and Future Stability in Afghanistan” — USIP (Peaceworks No. 175). Deep historical/political analysis with policy options for Pakistani and international actors; excellent for understanding structural roots and scenarios. United States Institute of Peace
2. “Pakistan’s Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan” — International Crisis Group. Clear, short briefing that explains Islamabad’s strategic calculus and implications for cross-border tensions. crisisgroup.org
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