After India’s independence in 1947, South Asia witnessed a covert intelligence struggle between Western powers, each seeking to strengthen its influence and interests in the region. The reasons behind this conflict were diverse: competition over natural resources, political influence, ideology, and the lingering legacy of colonialism.
It is in this context that Paul McGarr’s book Spying in South Asia appears, the first comprehensive study of the history of the “secret Cold War” in India. The book focuses on British and American intelligence interventions in Indian politics and culture from independence in 1947 until the end of the Cold War. McGarr tells the story of Indian politicians, human rights activists, and journalists as they fought against—or cooperated with—British and American intelligence officers, and how these interventions profoundly and permanently shaped the political and social fabric of South Asia.
The book also explores the relationship between intelligence and state governance in South Asia, as well as the ties between agencies and governments formed in the name of promoting democracy. It seeks to uncover a 50-year battle on the Indian subcontinent.
Historical Context and Trends
The book begins by reviewing the historical and intellectual background of Western intelligence activities—particularly British and American—in South Asia during the Cold War, specifically in India and Pakistan. It shows how the region was not “marginal” in the global East–West confrontation, but rather a center of a silent and complex espionage war.
The author questions the nature of the relationships established between foreign intelligence agencies and South Asian governments, which began under the banner of supporting democracy but later became pretexts for repression. The book challenges prevailing assumptions about the post-World War II era, asserting that the real impact of Western intelligence was not only felt in Europe but also exerted significant political, social, and cultural influence in the developing world.
He highlights that between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s, British and American intelligence carried out covert interventions in countries such as Iran, Guatemala, British Guiana, Indonesia, Congo, and Chile. Indian policymakers condemned these as unacceptable manifestations of neo-colonialism. Yet at the same time, New Delhi quietly strengthened its intelligence ties with the West.
A Not-So-Silent British Withdrawal
In 1947, the world stood at the threshold of a new era. In South Asia, Britain was preparing to withdraw from its old empire—but not quietly. Despite its political departure, Britain sought to maintain its presence in India through the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which it continued to train, supply with information, and secretly cooperate with even after independence. It also created the covert Information Research Department (IRD) to influence media and public opinion.
Britain relied on Indian officers who had served under its authority as “intermediaries” or “secret agents” within the bureaucracy. These individuals played key roles in passing information and maintaining dual-loyalty networks. Britain did not view India’s independence as a total loss, but rather as an opportunity to reshape the relationship in a way that preserved its strategic interests.
The book notes the weakness of the intelligence structure inherited at independence. Unlike the gradual—albeit turbulent—transfer of political authority, the handover of intelligence and security responsibilities was abrupt and problematic. Britain left India without an adequate intelligence system for a sovereign state. This was not surprising, since British intelligence during the colonial era had mainly focused on monitoring and neutralizing prominent Indian nationalists, especially within the transitional governments that emerged before independence.
India was not initially a top priority for other world powers. Unlike Britain’s deep interest, both the United States and the Soviet Union showed relative indifference to developments in the subcontinent. In the absence of genuine attention from other great powers, Britain found a golden opportunity to reinforce its intelligence foothold inside the new Indian state.
Thus, while public independence ceremonies were taking place in 1947, another transfer of power was happening in secret: British intelligence, especially MI5 and MI6 (SIS), began implementing plans to maintain a presence in independent India through covert networks of influence.
Washington’s Communist Anxiety
The CIA began monitoring India in the 1940s but intensified its activity as the Indian Communist Party gained influence. It built secret links with Indian intelligence leaders (particularly under Nehru) and launched joint operations such as monitoring China’s nuclear program from the Indian Himalayas (the Nanda Devi project).
By the early 1950s, the United States—initially hesitant—started viewing India as a strategic Cold War site. Agencies like the CIA and NSA cautiously approached the Indian government, mindful of India’s sensitive non-aligned stance.
Both the British and Americans feared that newly independent India might drift toward the Soviet Union. These concerns drove covert operations to gather intelligence and monitor political trends in New Delhi, Calcutta, and elsewhere.
According to some U.S. sources, between 1946 and 1959 the CIA had access to nearly every document passing through Nehru’s personal secretariat. Although Nehru publicly criticized U.S. policies, he recognized the importance of discreet security ties and permitted limited intelligence cooperation. Yet he resisted U.S. dominance, lashing out at Washington’s positions on colonialism, racism, and China.
Relations were further strained by rogue CIA actions that overstepped authority, sparking diplomatic friction. Investigative journalism and leaks—such as those highlighted in The Ugly American—fueled Indian suspicions that the U.S. was conspiring against its democracy. Leftist and communist media in India amplified this, portraying the CIA as a hidden foreign enemy operating inside the country.
Thus, while India officially adhered to a policy of non-alignment, the reality was different beneath the surface: a fragile, mistrust-ridden intelligence partnership with Washington. Tensions persisted due to U.S. support for Pakistan, and India’s outspoken criticism of Western policies, especially under Eisenhower and Nixon, embarrassed Washington.
McGarr argues that the CIA often misunderstood India’s political nature, exaggerating the communist threat. This backfired, fostering elite suspicion, widening the rift between Nehru and Washington, and reinforcing the perception of America as a new colonial power.
Moscow Exploits Anti-Western Sentiment
The author analyzes the role of the Soviet KGB in Cold War India. Unlike the cautious CIA, the KGB considered India a vital battleground to counter U.S. and Chinese influence. Soviet operatives became deeply involved in Indian media, politics, economics, culture, and even aspects of daily life.
One of their main strategies was information warfare. Moscow poured resources into leftist newspapers, planted pro-Soviet propaganda articles, and spread disinformation about the CIA’s alleged activities, successfully portraying the USSR as India’s ally against “Anglo-American espionage.”
The KGB used advanced disinformation tactics, such as forging documents implicating the CIA in assassinations or conspiracies. Many of these fakes reached the Indian press and shaped public opinion. The Soviet embassy in New Delhi became a major intelligence hub, staffed with KGB operatives under diplomatic, cultural, and commercial cover. Some of the USSR’s top spies operated out of India.
Yet despite its wide and sustained presence, the Indo-Soviet relationship remained one of “cautious closeness.” India sought to preserve autonomy, while Moscow tried to mold it into a flexible strategic partner against the West.
Indira Gandhi and the “Foreign Hand”
The book details how Prime Minister Indira Gandhi deployed the narrative of the “Foreign Hand” as a political tool to tighten her grip on power, justify extraordinary measures, attack opponents, and foster public suspicion of Western influence, especially the CIA.
By the 1970s, Britain had largely scaled down its intelligence role in India—especially after the IRD’s failure. During the Emergency (1975–1977), Gandhi jailed opponents under the pretext of external subversion. The “Foreign Hand” became a catch-all justification for domestic repression. The IB expanded its surveillance of politicians, unions, and dissidents, often at the expense of real national security concerns.
During this period, repeated accusations were leveled at the CIA for election interference, support for separatist groups, and spying on politicians. Relations with Washington soured, worsened by U.S. support for Pakistan in the 1971 war, India’s growing alignment with the USSR, and Western media criticism of Gandhi’s rule. The Soviets, meanwhile, quietly encouraged the framing of the CIA as an internal enemy. This eroded U.S. influence and deepened anti-American sentiment.
Even after the Emergency ended, the legacy of the “Foreign Hand” lingered in Indian politics for decades. It became routine to accuse critics of “serving foreign agendas,” linking political dissent with questions of loyalty.
Indian Intelligence and the End of the Cold War
McGarr also examines how Indian intelligence adapted to global shifts after the Soviet collapse. With the end of bipolar rivalry, India had to reposition itself internationally. The IB and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) faced a new reality without Moscow’s protective umbrella.
Despite a history of mistrust, India cautiously drew closer to the U.S. Intelligence ties that had long been covert became more open, particularly around issues like nuclear proliferation and international terrorism. Economic liberalization in the 1990s also pushed India toward Western partnerships.
Yet the mindset of the “Foreign Hand” never disappeared. It was re-framed in new contexts, with NGOs accused of taking foreign funding and protests linked to external influence. This intelligence culture shaped the state’s response to domestic challenges, from insurgencies in the northeast to unrest in Kashmir.
Thus, even as the global order shifted, espionage, covert alliances, and information manipulation remained central. India was no longer just an arena for great-power rivalry—it emerged as an active, independent intelligence player. McGarr emphasizes that India was always an actor in its own right, not merely a passive stage. It leveraged intelligence tools to manage foreign support, balance competing powers, and control information flows.
The book concludes by stressing that Western intelligence influence in India often backfired. London and Washington failed to win New Delhi’s trust and sometimes even strengthened anti-Western sentiment. The lessons drawn from India, McGarr argues, help explain later Western failures in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Source:
Paul M. McGarr, Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India’s Secret Cold War, Cambridge University Press, 2024.
