The Decline of “Non-State Armed Actors” in the Region: Tactical or Strategic?

The post-World War II era witnessed the rise of the phenomenon known as “non-state actors.” This term was meant to indicate that influence in international relations was no longer exclusive to states, but that other entities, which do not possess the attributes of statehood (population, territory, government), or may even transcend them—as in the case of international organizations with authority above that of member states—also exert influence.

This phenomenon thus encompassed a wide range of entities such as national liberation movements, giant multinational corporations, and others. The presence of this phenomenon has always been notable in our region, due to the fact that much of it was subjected to European colonialism, which in turn led to the outbreak of many national liberation movements. Later, the emergence of regional power projects further sustained and exacerbated the phenomenon. The rise of these entities no longer stemmed solely from local causes such as anti-colonial struggles, but specific regional powers began playing a key role in creating them as tools to implement their regional agendas. Consequently, these entities gained significant influence in regional dynamics until the current war on the Gaza Strip erupted, spreading its repercussions across the entire region due to the involvement of some of these entities and their supporters in the conflict.

These developments had important effects on all parties involved and underwent clear transformations by the end of the first year of the war, after which a noticeable decline in the power of these so-called “non-state actors” and their backers became evident.

This article explores whether this decline is temporary or whether the phenomenon has strategically lost its sources of strength. To achieve this, the concept of “non-state actors” must first be clearly defined, as lack of clarity could lead to analytical confusion, especially given the widespread ambiguity surrounding the term. The second part of the article analyzes the dimensions of the observed decline among these entities and concludes with an attempt to forecast the nature of this retreat: is it a temporary tactical adjustment, or have the developments since the war on Gaza began on October 7, 2023, indicated a long-term strategic shift?

Reflections on the Concept

At its core, the concept of “non-state actors” refers to an entity that does not meet the definition of a state—i.e., lacking population, territory, or a sovereign government—either because it is below the level of a state or because it surpasses it, as in the case of international organizations that wield authority above member states, or transnational terrorist groups and multinational corporations. To be classified as a non-state actor, such an entity must exert influence on international interactions. Successful national liberation movements, for example, diminish the international standing of colonial powers and give rise to new states that shape these interactions. International organizations influence member states’ foreign behavior, and multinational corporations may even bring down a regime pursuing independent policies that harm their interests.

Several important clarifications further refine the concept:

1. The mere possession of arms does not make a group a “non-state actor.” If its goals are confined to domestic matters and its actions begin and end internally, it is simply an armed opposition group. A new regime replacing the existing one might maintain the same foreign policy as its predecessor.
2. Impact on international interactions alone does not qualify a group as a “non-state actor.” Its influence must contradict the foreign policy of the state it operates within. For example, Wagner Group was primarily a tool of Russian foreign policy and thus not a non-state actor. Even when its leader clashed with the Russian General Staff over the Ukraine war, he acted more like a political pressure group within the Russian defense apparatus than as a non-state actor. Conversely, Hezbollah in Lebanon qualifies as a non-state actor despite being represented in the country’s official institutions, because it pursues an independent policy, such as supporting the Assad regime after 2011 or intervening in the Gaza war since October 2023.
3. Some of these actors may occasionally resemble a “quasi-state.” Hamas, for instance, ruled the Gaza Strip independently yet does not officially meet the criteria of statehood. Even if Palestine were considered a state, Hamas pursues a different policy from the Palestinian Authority, making it possible to categorize it as a non-state actor. This also applies to the Houthi movement in Yemen.
4. The classification of an entity as a “non-state actor” is not static—it changes with circumstances. ISIS, for example, temporarily became a “state” after proclaiming the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014, which collapsed in 2017, reverting ISIS back to a non-state actor. The Taliban transitioned from a non-state actor to a state after regaining control of Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. These examples highlight the complexity of the concept, requiring caution in its application.

Dimensions of the Retreat

It is undeniable that some entities classified as non-state actors in our region have suffered specific setbacks in the war that erupted in Gaza on October 7, 2023. Hamas triggered the war on that day, and Hezbollah quickly joined from the Lebanese front the next day. The Houthis in Yemen joined later by blocking ships headed to the port of Eilat and later attempted missile and drone attacks on Israeli territory.

Throughout nearly the first year of the war, Israel seemed to be in crisis, despite the immense destruction it caused, especially in Gaza. It failed to achieve either of its two main objectives: freeing the hostages held by Hamas and eradicating the group in Gaza. It also struggled to neutralize the Lebanese and Yemeni fronts and suffered economic and military losses, as well as internal divisions—especially between the security/military institutions and the cabinet—and witnessed declining international support, including in the U.S.

However, beginning in September 2024, developments on the Lebanese front saw Israel inflict serious blows on Hezbollah, including sabotaging its communications networks and conducting targeted assassinations of senior officials, culminating in the assassination of its Secretary-General. This was followed by a ceasefire agreement on the Lebanese front in November 2024. Less than two weeks later, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was toppled, depriving Hezbollah of the only land corridor through which Iranian support was funneled, tightening the noose around it and reviving discussions about disarming the group. Lebanon also elected a new president and formed a new government, completing the picture of Hezbollah’s decline.

In Gaza, a ceasefire was reached on January 19, 2025. Palestinian factions appeared cohesive during the prisoner exchange phase. However, Israel violated the agreement in March by resuming attacks, imposing a full blockade, and initiating a starvation campaign against Gaza’s residents.

As for the Houthis in Yemen, they faced multiple strikes—Israeli air raids, attacks by the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” coalition, and separate U.S. assaults. Yet, on May 6, former President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire agreement with the Houthis, surprising many. Prior to this, many assumed the continued U.S. bombing would eventually eliminate them from Yemen’s equation.

Among the three actors discussed—Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—Hezbollah seems the most affected. Its role in Lebanon’s security equation has ceased, and as of mid-May 2025, it faces serious disarmament efforts. If this situation persists, serious questions about its future will arise, and no definitive answers are available yet.

In Gaza, Israel violated the ceasefire in March but has pursued a cautious strategy to avoid direct confrontations. Palestinian factions, despite heavy losses, remain resilient and continue operations. While Hamas is still considered the ruling authority in Gaza, it accepted Egypt’s proposal to form a non-factional support committee to govern the Strip—a solution to the problem of Hamas’s presence in power, which Israel and its allies reject.

The Houthis also suffered significant losses, both from coalition and unilateral operations. Yet, the way Trump announced the ceasefire may suggest that their removal from the Yemeni equation remains unlikely. This raises the central question: is this retreat tactical and temporary, or is it a true strategic decline that will endure? The next section attempts to answer this.

Future Conditions

Two key observations must be considered when answering this question:

In the short term, the conflict between Israel and some non-state actors remains unresolved. These groups have suffered heavy human and material losses but have not yet surrendered. Hezbollah may be the most damaged and least capable of continuing its previous strategies, but it still refuses to disarm and retains enough power to resist disarmament or return to combat if circumstances change.

Hamas continues its hit-and-run operations against Israeli forces. While the damage may seem limited, its relative impact could be substantial, particularly given Israel’s growing political divisions. Although little is known about Hamas’s current capabilities or plans, its survival for more than a year and a half makes it unwise to dismiss it, despite claims that “the game is over.”

Regarding the Houthis, their situation represents the biggest surprise. The expected outcome of U.S. and Israeli strikes was their removal from Yemen’s dynamics or at least a push in that direction. Yet Trump’s ceasefire announcement proved otherwise—especially since the agreement does not include a halt to their occasional attacks on Israel. They remain, like Hamas, part of the regional equation for now, regardless of their relative influence.

In the medium term, the second observation is that continued retreat of these actors depends on whether balanced resolutions to regional conflicts—especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—can be achieved. As long as such conflicts remain unresolved, the incentives to resist and correct these imbalances will persist. One avenue for resistance may continue to be the formation of armed groups, which can easily be supported by regional or global powers. These powers may not necessarily endorse the groups’ goals but can use them to advance their own interests. Recent history in the region provides strong evidence of this dynamic.

Thus, the most solid guarantee for the sustained retreat—or even disappearance—of armed non-state actors in the region lies in pursuing fair and balanced resolutions to its conflicts.