Partnership between the United States and Central Asia in Critical Minerals

The new U.S. administration has issued an executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals, reflecting the recognition of security risks posed by China’s dominance over critical mineral supply chains during Trump’s presidency. This administration, along with previous ones, has sought partnerships with multiple suppliers of critical minerals to diversify U.S. supply chains. Attention is now also shifting to the five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—a region rich in essential minerals necessary for energy and defense technologies.

The United States has begun exploring Central Asia’s untapped wealth of critical minerals through the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, and bilateral memoranda of understanding signed with the region. However, political ambitions do not necessarily reflect the logistical challenges inherent in supply chains originating from Central Asia. In this context, authors Haley Nelson and Natalia Storz published an analysis at the Atlantic Council titled “Central Asia’s Geography Inhibits a US Critical Minerals Partnership.”

Untapped Potential:

Much has recently been written about Central Asia’s position as a new frontier in the global competition for critical minerals. The region is indeed rich in lithium, copper, aluminum, and uranium, but merely having a wealth of minerals does not guarantee that the United States can access them easily.

A closer examination of the region, its infrastructure, governance, topography, and geopolitical complexities reveals numerous challenges for U.S. companies seeking to exploit its mineral wealth. Regional electricity networks are not well-equipped to handle the additional energy demands of mineral production, and Central Asia’s power system already struggles with balancing generation and distribution, suffering high transmission losses and frequent blackouts.

To enhance the electric grid and ensure that reliable power is provided to mines and processing facilities, modern power plants and upgraded high-voltage transmission lines are needed, with estimated costs between 25billionand25billionand49 billion. Moreover, poor resource governance hampers Central Asia’s mineral potential, requiring stronger regulatory protections to ensure investor confidence.

Alongside these challenges, newcomers to this emerging market face established Chinese and Russian influence over regional supply chains. Initially, Soviet-era pipelines, highways, and railways facilitated northward trade after the USSR’s collapse. However, since 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has redirected trade eastward through infrastructure projects like the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

Through partnerships with regional transit operators and investments in locomotive production and Caspian ports, Beijing has taken over regional transit infrastructure, meaning that U.S. companies may struggle to secure contracts in a region where critical infrastructure is controlled by Chinese and Russian entities.

China holds the majority of mining permits in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Russia monopolizes uranium enrichment in the region. In contrast, the United States has imposed sanctions on several mining companies in Central Asia due to their close ties with Russia. These geopolitical and regulatory barriers limit Western access to critical mineral resources and reinforce Chinese and Russian control over strategic industries in the region.

Additionally, the main bottleneck in the critical minerals supply chain is processing, not actual mining. While Kazakhstan can refine copper, zinc, and lead, the region lacks the capacity to process energy minerals like lithium, uranium, nickel, and cobalt. Most of these raw materials end up in China or Russia for further refining.

Opportunities and Risks of the Middle Corridor:

For Central Asia’s critical minerals to reach Western markets on a large scale, new export routes must be established, energy infrastructure issues must be addressed, geological survey maps need updating, and local processing facilities must be developed.

While raw minerals can be shipped to processors in the West, the routes heading there remain largely underdeveloped. The Middle Corridor—a multimodal transport route connecting Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus—is currently the only secure, sanction-free export pathway. However, inefficiencies in regional infrastructure, erratic contracting practices, and evolving environmental challenges have slowed Western investors’ development of this route. These infrastructure issues have resulted in low container capacity along the corridor, unpredictable shipping times, frequent delays, and volatile pricing.

Furthermore, Northeast Caspian ports may become unusable if the region’s water levels continue to decline due to climate change. The ability of Central Asian countries to mitigate the drop in water levels in the Caspian Sea has been widely debated, necessitating investment in innovative water-saving technologies to prevent deterioration that could threaten the feasibility of the Middle Corridor.

Overcoming Obstacles:

As it currently stands, the Middle Corridor cannot meet the U.S. critical mineral demands. Its limited capacity and above-average shipping costs won’t provide significant strategic benefits to U.S. companies while exposing investors to considerable financial and geopolitical risks.

To enable investors to reap benefits from the mineral market in Central Asia, transport routes must be improved. Standardized tariffs, shipping regulations, and digitalization of regional transport could help reduce delays along the Middle Corridor, paving the way for additional investments in infrastructure.

Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have already begun working towards a unified customs system following a trilateral agreement in 2023 to establish a joint logistics company. However, the entry of China’s Railway Container Transport Company (CRTC) into the joint venture at the end of 2024 has cast the Middle Corridor as yet another project within the Belt and Road Initiative.

China’s formal involvement in the Middle Corridor project, its agreement with Kazakhstan to construct the “Tacheng-Iyaguz Railway”, and its development and management of the Anaklia deep-water port in Georgia underline the route’s significance to China. Any increase in the corridor’s capacity would enhance China’s export potential in Western markets.

While the United States has strategic benefits from collaborating with Central Asia and is moving towards a partnership with an alternative, investing billions of dollars in regional transport routes may lead to unintended negative consequences. Major investments in infrastructure and regulatory improvements will benefit Western markets but, from a U.S. national security perspective, they will likely facilitate Chinese trade routes westward.

Partnership with America:

Accelerating partnerships in critical minerals is vital for U.S. efforts to reduce dependence on China. However, the U.S. should be cautious of unrealistic expectations regarding what Central Asia can offer. Political will alone is insufficient to transport billions of dollars’ worth of minerals across oceans, given the complexities related to infrastructure, logistics, environmental issues, and legal frameworks. Given the urgency of the U.S. critical mineral needs at this time, efforts to diversify American supply chains must be based on standards of capacity, reliability, and economic viability instead of political illusions.

Source: Nelson, H., & Storz, N. (2025, April 15). Central Asia’s geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/central-asias-geography-inhibits-a-us-critical-minerals-partnership/