International Competition in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges

This paper aims to trace the manifestations and levels of international competition in Africa, identifying the key players in this competition and the dynamics of their relationships, conflicts, and interactions. It also addresses the major challenges arising from this competition at the state and regional levels, as well as within the overarching continental framework, attempting to highlight the latent opportunities within these challenges or those that could potentially arise. The analysis relies on comparative and deductive methodologies, thereby opening avenues for further research on the same topic or related themes.

Introduction

Africa is often portrayed in most reports and studies as a continent characterized by fragility, with many of its countries described as underdeveloped and impoverished. Undoubtedly, this fragility and underdevelopment are enticing to colonial powers and entities seeking influence and control. Furthermore, when considering the rich and abundant resources that Africa possesses, alongside its youthful and promising demographics—contrasted with continents that have either aged or reached their developmental peaks—it becomes clear why international powers are drawn to Africa.

Researchers summarize the significance of Africa in several points, including:

• It represents 20% of the world’s land mass.
• It accounts for approximately 15% of the global population.
• It serves as the world’s strategic reservoir of natural resources, raw materials, and precious stones.
• It holds 10% of the world’s oil reserves and around 8% of gas reserves, with potential for significant increases due to ongoing and future discoveries.
• It contains 90% of the world’s chromium and platinum.
• It comprises more than a quarter of the United Nations (54 countries).
• It is strategically positioned among major continents (America to the west, Europe to the north, and Asia to the east).
• It has 65% of the world’s arable land and about 10% of renewable fresh water sources.

It is natural that a continent described as fragile and underdeveloped, yet increasingly significant, would attract the attention of competing international powers. The dominant and rising powers, as Dr. Mohamed Mukhtar Al-Shanqeeti describes, are eager to establish or maintain a presence in Africa. The scale and diversity of summits involving Africa are evident:

The French-African summit, the Chinese-African summit, the US-African summit, the Russian-African summit, the European-African summit, the British-African summit, the Indian-African summit, the Turkish-African summit, the Japanese-African summit, the Arab-African summit, the Korean-African summit, and the Brazilian-African summit.

Additionally, there are summits with Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Israel has made numerous attempts to organize a summit or meeting of this nature. Indeed, understanding the nature of international powers when dealing with them is crucial, as Mr. Amr Moussa pointed out after his rich experience in an important country and an institution situated at the intersection of interests: “Dealing within the international system requires intelligence and tact; these powers have no mercy and do not value friendship in pursuit of their interests.”

Does Africa, as a continent, region, and individual nations, recognize this nature of international powers? Does it monitor shifts in the balance of power and influence among these powers? Is it aware of the cards it possesses that can be leveraged? Does it understand the overlapping interests and interactions among these powers? Most importantly, does it grasp the magnitude of the challenges posed by engaging with these powers and the various types of these challenges and their effects? Can it convert these challenges, or at least a significant portion of them, into opportunities for greater and more important benefits?

The former Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, raised the unifying question as an entry point for achieving a more significant and prominent international standing for Africa in the global economy: “Africa’s path to development is more critical to the global economy than several small countries that are perpetually injected.”

Is African unity, and its handling of the challenges posed by international competition within and outside its framework, the most effective way to turn challenges into opportunities? Let us first examine this competition, its levels, manifestations, and directions, before delving into the challenges and opportunities.

International Competition in Africa First: European Presence in Africa

Discussing international competition in and over Africa is a broad and complex topic; a researcher could easily become lost unless boundaries are established and focus is maintained. I have decided to divide the circles of this competition and the pursuit of presence and influence in this vital continent into three levels: the level of traditional colonial powers, the level of major international powers, and the level of new rising powers.

In “How France Lost Africa,” authors Antoine Clazier and Stephen Smith examined the French missteps of neglect, exploitation, and intervention that led to a decline in France’s influence in a continent that was widely considered its backyard and a broad space for its language and interests. Nevertheless, France still retains a role and a presence, particularly with the intensifying and expanding international competition on the continent. Against this backdrop, countries such as China, Russia, and Turkey have emerged as competitors.

Some trace the French presence in Africa back to the 17th century, specifically to 1624, but its influence became evident with the occupation of Algeria in 1830, after which French expansion continued northward, westward, central, and even southward.

As France divided its influence with Britain and several other European countries in Africa, it concentrated its efforts in this continent, seeking to link it economically, culturally, militarily, and even legally. Former Senegalese President Macky Sall summarized the relationship between France and Africa by stating, “France needs Africa, and Africa needs France.”

Despite the decline noted by the aforementioned authors and France’s issues in the Sahel and surrounding areas—like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Gabon, and even Congo-Brazzaville—French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna stated in an interview in the French National Assembly at the end of 2023 that relations with Africa are evolving and expanding, and that French presence is extending into African countries that were not traditionally on France’s priority list, such as Nigeria, where French investments have doubled over the past decade. She remarked that France remains the top destination for African students, with 95,000 choosing French universities. Colonna viewed the establishment of offices in the French Foreign Ministry operating in local languages as a sign of increased interest and presence.

France is Africa’s primary European partner with a trade volume reaching $100 billion and has maintained six military bases across the continent, with significant ones in Djibouti and three operational bases in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon, while maintaining limited military presence in other African nations. Over 1,100 major French companies and more than 2,200 small enterprises are active in Africa.

Numbers of African leaders no longer hide their reservations about France’s role, viewing it as poorly suited to a continent that aspires to be a partner rather than a dependent, and a respectable actor rather than a former colonizer. Veteran Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso expressed this sentiment regarding African summits with China, Russia, the United States, Italy, and Turkey as important and fruitful, stating that his response regarding relations with France reflects both highs and lows.

While President Abdoulaye Wade viewed France as a significant player alongside the United States, saying, “Two countries can play a crucial and key role in Africa’s development: the United States and France,” many leaders and opinion-makers in Africa believe France must reevaluate its approach, reduce its influence, and adapt to the shifting dynamics of the continent and the world to maintain a reasonable standing in a world that once comprised its colonies. Consequently, terms like “anti-French sentiment” have gained traction, with African leaders asked about it in media interviews.

Alongside France, Britain also colonized several key African nations, but its decline and shift towards Asia and closer ties with the United States have led it to neglect Africa, typically ceding it to France. Nevertheless, Brexit and Britain’s efforts to regain some of its former stature, along with Western interests in Africa following China’s, Russia’s, and Turkey’s stronger presence, have prompted the British to revive their presence and strengthen their influence. British ministers, especially from the Foreign and Defense ministries, have made trips to sensitive regions of the continent (the Sahel and the Horn of Africa), and the UK appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa in the person of the seasoned diplomat Sarah Montgomery in June 2022. Prior to this, in February of the same year, London hosted a security partnership dialogue with Nigeria and held an African-British summit. The UK maintains the “Batuk” base in Kenya and a military presence in Djibouti and Somalia, and on the trade front, it has signed agreements with twelve African nations.

Joining France and Britain, the circle of traditional colonial powers includes Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, all of which have increasingly shown interest in Africa. Spain launched the Africa 3 initiative in 2019, prioritizing Africa in its foreign policy and programming 250 activities across the continent within two years. The Spanish Prime Minister declared in 2021: “We will make the next decade Spain’s decade in Africa.” Spain has also worked to promote its language, with statistics indicating nearly one million people currently studying Spanish in Ivory Coast, Benin, and Senegal.

Italy, which colonized four African nations, has also engaged in this race and, although its trade with Africa amounted to thirty billion in 2022, it has developed significant ambitions with an Italian-African summit scheduled for January 2024, committing an initial support exceeding €5.5 billion in resources, grants, and guarantees. Italy places particular emphasis on the Horn of Africa, likely due to its colonial history.

Germany, one of the earliest colonial powers among its European counterparts, has somewhat detached itself from its colonial legacy, focusing instead on economic engagement and levels of technical and military cooperation. In January 2023, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development revealed its African strategy, centered on six areas: sustainable economic development, poverty and hunger alleviation, social protection, health and epidemic prevention, women’s development and gender equality, rule of law, democracy, human rights, and issues of peace and security.

As an indication of the scale of trade with the continent, cooperation with South Africa alone reached 24 billion euros, and the German Chancellor announced plans to invest 20 billion euros annually in Africa, while also contributing to several peacekeeping missions across the continent.

Belgium’s presence is largely tied to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, stemming from the colonial relationship. Switzerland, meanwhile, has actively engaged with Africa, with eighteen sub-Saharan African countries benefiting from Swiss cooperation programs, and it operates through fifteen embassies and nine cooperation offices in Africa. The Netherlands, Portugal, and other European nations also maintain roles in Africa.

In this context, the European Union adopts a partnership policy with Africa, which made it, until recently, Africa’s top external partner. The European-African summit aims to broaden this partnership and influence, especially with the increasing presence of China and Russia on the continent, with Europeans pledging to invest €150 billion in Africa over seven years.

Influence of Non-European Powers

Alongside traditional colonial powers, major international forces have sought to re-engage Africa, emphasizing economic development (like China), security and political interests (like the United States), or military and security expansion (like Russia).

China has been present in Africa, notably politically during liberation movements and for independence demands, also providing some developmental support visible in African capitals that show gratitude to Africa for its earlier assistance in support of the Chinese cause.

It is noteworthy that 26 out of 76 votes that initiated China’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council came from Africa. However, what concerns us here is the second phase of Chinese engagement framed by opening and tremendous development under Deng Xiaoping. Former Senegalese President Macky Sall stated, “A decade ago, China recognized the demographic and economic potential of Africa.” A comment attributed to Serge Monpoli in “Chinafrica” encapsulates the growing positive sentiment towards Chinese involvement, suggesting that “the Chinese provide tangible benefits, while Westerners speak of intangible values that don’t help when people lack electricity or jobs; democracy does not feed you.”

There is no disagreement about China’s strong entry into Africa, where it prioritizes economic and developmental investment, which has made it somewhat acceptable, prompting former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to address Chinese President Hu Jintao in Lagos in April 2006, stating, “We want China to lead the world, and when that happens, we wish to support you.”

Trade between China and Africa reached

Trade reached 282 billion in 2023, surging to 167 billion within the first seven months of 2024—evidence of its growing trajectory. China has built tens of thousands of paved roads, around a thousand bridges, as well as numerous hospitals, educational institutions, and sports facilities. Chinese nationals are present across all regions of the continent, guided by a proverb that states: ‘When a tree leaves its place, it dies, but if a person moves about the land, he creates wealth.’

A former Foreign Minister from Guinea noted, “The Chinese are on the verge of overtaking the Europeans in Africa,” a sentiment echoed by many observers adopting a more moderate viewpoint, stating they are outpacing them.

Even the former Algerian Public Works Minister considered the demand for Chinese engagement genuine due to their apparent work ethic: “The Chinese are different, and we need their culture of diligent work.”

As of now, China has worked hard to conceal its overarching political goals, although its strategy—not just in Africa—seems to be gradual, cumulative, and centered on building a powerful balance that may allow it to clarify its agenda.

The United States has not prioritized Africa—particularly sub-Saharan Africa—in its strategic calculus, although it has remained present and engaged. However, attacks on the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, combined with the prevalent focus on counter-terrorism strategies that gained traction post-September 11, pushed Africa to the forefront of U.S. planning. This led to the establishment of the permanent military base in Djibouti in 2002, alongside launching the “Pan Sahel Initiative” to support border control efforts in the Sahel. The establishment of AFRICOM in 2007 (a military structure), AGOA for trade and investment, and the fact that by 2001-2008, African oil accounted for a quarter of U.S. imports marked a shift.

U.S. support for Africa surged from 2.5 billion in 2000 to 7.5 billion by 2007, with a focus on three sensitive and strategically important regions: the Horn of Africa (notably Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya), North Africa (notably Libya), and the Sahel (especially Cameroon, Chad, and Niger).

Since 2009, the United States has spent 892 million dollars to support peacekeeping capabilities and institutions across Africa. Countries such as Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda have benefited from a program aimed at strengthening African military capacities, with an annual allocation of 110 million dollars.

Russia represents the third entry into Africa among major international powers seeking a foothold, as President Vladimir Putin pursues a strategic direction aimed at restoring a Soviet presence. Although hindered by formidable economic challenges, the security and military dimensions present a path for this endeavor.

The activities of Wagner, a military organization executing difficult tasks for Russia that the official military does not want directly engaged in, have become prominent in Africa. Its presence in some countries, particularly the Sahel, is best exemplified by events in Mali, where on November 15, 2023, they led the extraction of fighters from Kidal, raising the Wagner flag in the city on November 22, 2023. Some reports suggest Wagner has 40,000 fighters who may recruit local armed individuals.

In Djibouti, where various powers vie for influence, Russia has been training helicopter pilots without gaining approval for establishing a military base like others have done. Additionally, Russia is working to develop and expand its military security relationships with several African nations.

Additionally, the Russian-African summit held in October 2019 marked a significant step in partnership, resulting in 50 agreements backed by financial commitments estimated at 800 billion rubles ($12.5 billion), yet the recent summit lacked the same momentum and caliber.

Influence of Rising Powers in Africa

In addition to traditional colonial powers and major international powers, several rising forces—some advanced in military and economic standings, while others boast successful and enticing experiences—are turning their attention to Africa as competitors. These include Japan, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and others.

Japan was the first country to organize an economic meeting with Africa known as “TICAD” in 1993. This likely inspired other countries’ ideas for economic summits with Africa, the latest iteration (TICAD 8) occurring in August 2022 in Tunisia, where Japan announced a significant three-year investment plan of $30 billion in Africa. Currently, 796 Japanese companies operate across the continent.

The Indian-African partnership is characterized by diversity and inclusivity, with the three joint summits to date focusing on agriculture, food security, health, education, information technology, climate change, and the blue economy. India’s investments in Africa were estimated at around $63 billion in 2018, with 21% of its foreign investments allocated to the continent. Moreover, the number of Indian embassies increased from 29 to 47.

India is also boosting military cooperation, exemplified by Indian-African naval exercises in March 2023 involving forces from 23 African countries. A notable distinction for India is its growing human presence in the continent, with about 1.5 million Indians in South Africa, 855,000 in Mauritius, and significant populations in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Turkey has made significant strides in engaging with Africa and its markets. The French magazine “Jeune Afrique” reported that Turkey established a network of entities to serve this partnership, such as Turkish-African summits, business forums, and parliamentary friendship groups in fifty African nations, compared to thirty-nine in Asia and thirty-six in Europe. Turkey maintains forty-four embassies in Africa, up from twelve in 2009.

Turkish Airlines flight services extend to sixty African cities, and the Turkish cooperation agency (TİKA) has established 22 offices, with 1,800 projects implemented between 2017 and 2022, achieving a trade volume of $40.7 billion in 2022. Turkey also launched a dedicated African channel through TRT, airing in French, English, Swahili, and Hausa languages. Moreover, Turkey has a notable presence in African arms trade, particularly in drones.

Following the return of President Lula da Silva to leadership in Brazil, relations with Africa have been revitalized, recovering from a period of stagnation during his predecessor’s term. Trade between Brazil and Africa grew significantly, reaching 16 billion in 2021 and increasing to 22.4 billion by 2022.

The Brazilian-African forum held in 2023 in São Paulo provided a chance to enhance partnerships and investments, where Brazil announced Africa as its priority for 2024.

During the Korea-Africa summit held in June 2024, attendees raised the banner of “The Future We Create Together: Shared Growth, Continuity, and Solidarity.”

South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Chang Byung-won summarized Korea’s policy by stating, “Our government is committed to doubling development support for Africa by 2030.”

The Koreans formed a council for agriculture ministers and another for customs officials, while numerous Korean institutions are undertaking significant investments in various African nations.

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Africa is not new. During the Saudi-African Summit held in Riyadh in November 2023, the Saudi Crown Prince noted that the Kingdom had previously provided 45 billion in support for developmental and humanitarian projects across Africa, while King Salman’s Relief Center contributed 450 million to 46 African nations. The Riyadh Summit also pledged over 25 billion in investments across various sectors on the continent, with plans to increase the number of Saudi embassies in Africa to more than forty.

This competitive landscape extends beyond these five nations; Israel has continuously sought to influence Africa and expand relationships with its countries, even striving to gain observer status in the African Union—a goal nearly achieved if not for strong opposition from several African nations, led by Algeria and South Africa.

Israel has established relations with forty African countries, 36 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. It has currently opened fifteen embassies and welcomed several African presidents.

Canada, Pakistan, Iran, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait all have a presence and activities in Africa as well.

Challenges and Opportunities

The previous overview indicates that the challenges arising from this broad competition over and in Africa are numerous and varied. While many of these challenges contain latent opportunities, some are more difficult to unearth:

The first challenge centers on military and security issues; we refer to a significant number of countries, their security apparatuses, military bases, and cyber and intelligence cooperation programs, all concerning a continent concluded to be fragile, labeled by poverty and underdevelopment. The risks remain, and the capacities of most African nations are insufficiently endowed to convert military and security cooperation into opportunities for training, qualifying, and forming relations that would reduce vulnerabilities.

The various competing entities, alongside their expanding presence, may turn Africa into a battleground for friction and conflict. Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh candidly noted how the Chinese base occupies 40 hectares, the American base occupies 150 hectares, while the French base requires 450 hectares. What about the other bases in Djibouti? What are the manifestations of military presence and security entrenchment across different African nations? This concern warrants caution that seems absent among many of the continent’s leaders.

The second challenge encompasses economic and developmental issues; while partnerships and cooperation programs with most competing forces offer support and advancement for development in the continent and its countries, these powers continue to focus on Africa’s resources, both actual and potential. They will ensure that through various agreements, they maximize the exploitation of these resources both now and in the future. Typically, some partners exploit the weaknesses of African rulers and issues of legitimacy to their advantage. President Abdoulaye Wade encapsulated this need, emphasizing Africa’s role as a partner: “African intellectuals must depict Africa as an equal and partner, rather than as a dependent.”

Here, it is crucial to remain vigilant regarding the so-called Chinese debt trap, the conditionalities of U.S. engagement, the threats of European annexations, and the ambiguity of Russian commitments.

The third challenge emerges in cultural and social domains. Discussions around social issues and cultural matters are often reignited, particularly with Europeans who fail to grasp the unique characteristics of these societies and insist on globalizing their values. Americans often exhibit a similar push, while the cultural challenges posed by China and Russia are typically less overt. President Macky Sall addressed this in his book “Senegal at Heart,” noting, “The difference with Europe is that China only engages with us economically; we sometimes disagree with the West on societal issues.”

Rwandan President Paul Kagame expressed this sentiment more clearly, asserting, “I regret the West, but we are not concerned about what these Western nations think.”

The fourth challenge revolves around unity; Africa faces internal conflicts, and each region has its own specific issues, even each country possesses specific interests and challenges. However, the continent’s relative development in establishing the African Union and the recognition among many leaders and elites of the importance of African unity—especially when dealing with outsiders—has moderated disagreements and created avenues for the African Union to play a more significant role in continental issues.

Nonetheless, international competition and conflict between some of its players will limit collective efforts towards unity, potentially leading to alignments influenced by these competitions. Thus, wise leaders in the continent have recognized that success in engaging with partners and rivals hinges on the continent’s unity, coordination, and integration. “We must continue in this direction (partnership and cooperation), but we need to change the rules of the game swiftly, with Africa’s unity as the key.”

The fifth challenge pertains to the temptation and diminished equality; the multitude of competitors, the abundance of cooperation programs, and the varied forms of support discourage self-reliance and limit aspirations for self-development. Faced with what is offered or exported to the continent and this diversity of supporters and investors, Africa is likely to struggle in developing its industries—especially in specialized sectors—and to lag in services like education and healthcare, failing to ensure genuine independence that would position Africa as a peer and competitor.

When Africa acknowledges its valuable contributions, it must also realize that the others do not come for charitable purposes, but rather for mutual exchange and interests. An age-old Chinese sage, Sun Tzu, stated: “To take, you must first give.”

In this regard, Africa must recognize the value of its resources, the significance of its geographical position, the youthfulness of its population, the opportunities ahead, and its voting bloc in international organizations.

The sixth challenge can be characterized as the challenge of the absence of a dream, a sentiment expressed by Senegalese historian Mamadou Diouf from Columbia University, who remarked on the economic obstacles facing African nations, stating: “Beyond the economic hardships our countries face, what is intolerable is this chronic absence of a dream.”

The seventh challenge is one of balance and equilibrium. Ngosi Okonjo-Iweala, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, illustrated it succinctly by stating: “We must remind the major powers that they can combine strategic cooperation (with Africa) with strategic competition over it.” Regarding dealing with the U.S.-China-European conflict, she emphasized that Africa could be in a favorable position, without endorsing one party over another; Africans have experienced the outcomes of siding with one during the Cold War and saw no benefit, urging leaders to observe how each party assists in resolving their problems.

This challenge is central to opportunities; how can Africa extract benefits from every engagement and bring everyone to the table for its interests and growth while ensuring all emerge as winners? Alternatively, how can it mitigate the adverse effects of competing partners and supporters? Chiefly, what aids this is unity, the legitimacy of leaders, popular oversight, and the efficiency of those representing Africa in dealings with outsiders.

In Conclusion:

The competing nations for Africa exhibit varying levels of focus; China leads in economic and developmental engagement, followed by Europeans, while Russia spearheads arms exports to Africa through its military arm, Wagner.

The lines and interests of these competing forces overlap in Africa, and some of them may approach each other through the sometimes discordant U.S.-European understanding or the careful rapprochement of Russia and China.

Africa may not overcome the challenges from this international competition, but it can alleviate some of them and transform others into opportunities, paving the way for a strong Africa that partners seriously with major and rising powers.

A serious research undertaking examining the positions of eight significant African nations and discussing their internal logic in relation to competing entities and the continent’s unifying question could illuminate the African strategy for navigating interactions with competing forces in Africa, particularly concerning South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Angola, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt.

1- International Variables and their Impact on the Regional Reality of the African Continent, International Association of Political Experts and Analysts, April 29, 2025 (accessed April 20, 2025), https://apa-inter.com/post.php?id=3522
2- His two books: Book One: Origin and Years of Diplomacy, Amr Moussa, Third Edition, 2017, Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, Egypt, p. 475.

3- Un destin pour l’Afrique/ Aboulaye wade/ edition michel lafon 2005 7-13 boulevard paul-emile victor-ile de la jatte/92521 Neuilly-Sur-Seine cedex/ imprimé en france/ août 2005.

4- Comment la france a perdu l’Afrique? Antoine Glaser – Stephen Smith / editions autrement, paris 2005 / calmann – lévy, 2005

5- Dr. Badr Hassan Shafei, French influence in Africa: from a trading center to looted colonies, Al Jazeera Net, September 3, 2023 (accessed April 25, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/2s4zf5u3 
6. Ibid.

7-  Jeune Afrique Economie / TALLA, Blaise Pascal . N° 3113, Interview Macky Sall: “mon travail est loin d’être achevé”, Paru le: 16/06/2022, p.46

8- Relations entre la France et l’Afrique : débat à l’Assemblée nationale – 21/11/2023 (vu le 12 Avril 2025): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fuqexDO1Pi0

9- Dr. Badr Hassan Al-Shafei, previous reference.

10- Jeune Afrique, N° 3140, Denis Sassou Nguesso : Interview, Publié le 29 juin 2009, p: 27-28

11- Op. cit.

12 – Un destin pour l’Afrique/ Aboulaye wade p: 237 (Op. cit.).

13- Implications of the growing British presence on the African continent, Future Research website, July 18, 2022 (accessed April 5, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/4vbhsmmr
14- Ibid.

15- Jeune Afrique, N° 3138/ 7-2024 / focus afrique 2023 p: 116 

16- Op. cit.

17- Op. cit.

18- Op. cit.

19. Location of the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Italy and a South Round to Africa, Bouhania Gui, March 6, 2024 (accessed April 3, 2025), https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5867
20. Ibid.
21- What are the dimensions of Germany’s role in Africa?, Dr. Mahmoud Zakaria, International Association of Political Experts and Analysts, October 8, 2024 (accessed April 6, 2025), https://apa-inter.com/post.php?id=6039 
22. Ibid.

 23- Jeune Afrique, N° 3124 – Jeudi 27 – Avril 2023, p:100 

24- Maky sall, Le Sénégal au coeur, imprimerie floch 11/2018 / imprimé en france p: 148 25 – 25- La Chinafrique: pekin à la conquête du continent noir / Serge michel – Michel beuret Bernard grasset – Paris 2008 – p: 23-24

26- Op. cit.

27- China-Africa trade volume on the rise, Al Jazeera Net, August 23, 2024 (accessed April 22, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/y9z78t2f
28- Dr. Al-Khair Omar Suleiman, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The struggle for influence and control, Al Jazeera Net, September 6, 2024, (accessed April 22, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/53t4ry9b
29- La Chinafrique: pekin à la conquête du continent noir, p: 79 (Op. Cit.).
30- La Chinafrique: pekin à la conquête du continent noir, p: 24 (Op. Cit.).
31- La Chinafrique: pekin à la conquête du continent noir, p: 71159 (Op. Cit.).

32- Annual Report 2024, Policy Center for the New South, March 28, 2025 (accessed April 7, 205): https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/annual-report-2024

33- Op. cit.

34- Jeune Afrique, N° 3132 – Mardi 02 janvier 2024, p 24.
35- Jeune Afrique, N° 3123, Jeudi 30 mars 2023, intrview pt Ismail Omar guelleh / p: 49
36- Dr. Hamdi Abdel Rahman, Drivers of Japan’s Geostrategic Shift Towards Africa, Future for Advanced Research and Studies, September 7, 2022 (accessed April 22, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/4u58sast
37- Nihad Mahmoud, India’s Orientation to Africa: Origin – Motives – Drawbacks, African Readings, November 30, 2023 (accessed: April 18, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/yc6vtdcy
38. Ibid.

39- Jeune Afrique, N° 3129 – 10/ 2023 p: 73.

40- Op. cit.

41- Jeune Afrique, N° 3136 du 5/2024 p: 95

42- Op. cit. p: 96

43- Saudi Press Agency, Riyadh Declaration. Saudi-African Summit, November 10, 2023 (accessed April 22, 2025), https://www.spa.gov.sa/N1995044 

44- Jeune Afrique, N° 3108 janvier 2022 p164

45- Jeune Afrique, N° 3114 juillet 2022 p 45

46- Un destin pour l’Afrique/ Aboulaye wade p: 234 (Op. Cit.).

47- Maky sall, Le Sénégal au coeur, p 148 (Op. cit.).

48- Jeune Afrique, N° 3129 October 2023, p: 59

49- Maky sall, Le Sénégal au coeur, p 148 (Op. cit.).

50- La Chinafrique: pekin à la conquête du continent noir, p: 19 (Op. Cit.).

51- Jeune Afrique, N° 3132 janvier 2024 p 55.

52- Jeune Afrique, N° 3110 March 2022 p 38.

53- Op. cit.