Why Understanding Qatari Politics Is Essential for Russia on Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Levels?

The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the largest research organization in Russia, published a new article by the editor-in-chief of the Center for Eurasian Arab Studies on February 2, 2010, titled: “Why Understanding Qatari Politics Is Essential for Russia on Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Levels?” The “Monitoring and Translation Unit” of the center provides a full translation of the article from Russian to Arabic.

On April 17, last year, Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani arrived in Moscow for an official visit during which he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Despite its small area of only 11,581 km² and a total population of 3,119,589 citizens and residents, Qatar is considered an important regional player and plays vital roles in Middle Eastern issues. This importance is not due solely to its financial wealth (with a reported GDP of $213,002,809.33 in 2023) but also to its hybrid policies, which grant it considerable maneuverability, allowing it to navigate various contradictions adeptly.

Additionally, Qatar is one of the world’s largest gas producers (with gas production reaching 206.02 billion cubic meters in 2014), making it significant for Russian interests on both geopolitical and geoeconomic levels. Given the scarcity of studies addressing Qatar and explaining its policies in the Russian political library, I seized the opportunity of this visit to provide an overview.

Syria: The Start of the Crisis

Diplomatic relations between Doha and Moscow were first established on August 1, 1988. On December 6, 1991, Qatar officially recognized the Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations between the two countries saw significant development in 2007, when President Putin visited Qatar, followed by two official visits from Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa to Russia (in December 2001 and November 2010), along with two visits from former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim in 2007 and 2010, during which several agreements covering various economic, technical, and cultural aspects were signed, along with Qatari promises of substantial investments within Russia.

Almost all forms of cooperation between Qatar and Russia deteriorated due to sharp disagreements over the stance on the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad, culminating in the incident where former Russian ambassador Vladimir Titov was assaulted by Qatari customs officers in December 2011, leading to a downgrade in diplomatic relations and a cooling of ties.

With Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad assuming power in June 2013, relations began to normalize, culminating in a decree in November of the same year to restore relations and appoint an extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Russia to Qatar, with the first meeting between President Putin and Emir Tamim occurring in Sochi on February 5, 2014. This marked a renewed effort to restore cooperation leading up to the latest visit.

Qatari investments in Russia exceed $13 billion, focusing on significant and vital projects across various sectors, such as oil, banking, infrastructure, and retail.

According to Qatari Ambassador to Moscow Sheikh Ahmad bin Nasser Al Thani, investments include:

• 9% in Russian oil company Rosneft.
• 99% in the high-speed train project of West Saint Petersburg.
• 25% in Pulkovo Airport in Saint Petersburg.
• 25% in Vnukovo Airport in Moscow.
• Additionally in VTB Bank and retail chains Magnit and Lenta.

Finally, the Qatar Investment Authority collaborates with the Russian Direct Investment Fund on projects valued at approximately $1 billion, with plans for larger projects in the near future.

Thus, Emir Tamim bin Hamad has restored relations with Russia to their previous state and intends to expand them further, following the resolution of the main cause of previous disagreements. The visit resulted in signing cooperation agreements in various fields, including:

• Healthcare.
• Creation of a new investment platform with an initial value of $2 billion.
• Cooperation in sports.
• A financial cooperation memorandum.

How Did Qatar Become an Influential Force in Shaping Arab Public Opinion?

Former Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, father of Emir Tamim (now referred to as the “father emir”), assumed power in the country on June 27, 1995, after ousting his father in a peaceful transition driven by his dissatisfaction with the state of the country and his perception that Qatar deserved a better position. He was determined to undertake comprehensive development to transform Qatar from a marginal nation almost unknown outside the Arab world into a prominent force with a global presence.

In February 1996, some factions within the military and the Emir’s Guard attempted a coup, claiming to be supporters of the deposed emir and seeking his return to power.

However, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa successfully thwarted this coup, with Qatari officials later claiming it was supported by external forces. This narrative was later used to justify Qatar’s media policies, which many Arab regimes described as “aggressive,” while Qatar considered it a necessary response to those regimes that had shown hostility toward it.

Qatar recognized what its rivals may not have understood: that ideology cannot die merely because one or more political systems decide that it should, and the Arab peoples cannot live without a guiding intellectual doctrine. It is no coincidence that Judaism, Christianity, and subsequently Islam emerged in this part of the world, along with their sacred texts: the Tanakh, the Gospel, and the Quran.

On this basis, Qatar dealt with reality pragmatically, drawing from the two dominant ideological political currents with considerable appeal across the Arab world:

Arab Nationalism: Qatar utilized distinguished intellectual figures from the Arab Ba’ath Party (Syrian and Iraqi), who opposed the policies of the Assad and Saddam families, alongside some Nasserists and independent Arab nationalists, reshaping them under new central ideas different from past slogans, while remaining within the general context. For example, instead of adopting the totalitarian idea of “Arab unity,” this new assembly embraced the slogan of “Arab solidarity,” replacing the flexible “freedom”—which fundamentally referred to liberation from colonialism—with the concept of “democracy,” thus branding themselves as “democratic Arab nationalists.” Instead of “socialism,” they preferred the phrase “social justice” within a market framework.

Islamic Political Groups: These groups advocate that Islam is both a “religion and state,” asserting that religion should not be separated from public political life.

The Muslim Brotherhood, banned in Russia, represented the most significant force in this direction. Qatar provided its members a safe haven, job opportunities across various fields, media platforms to promote their ideas, and channels to connect with Western entities.

The media narrative aligned with Qatari policies and those of the Brotherhood during that time focused on promoting the term “democracy.” The rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in 2002 supported the claim that Islamic political groups, particularly the Brotherhood, aimed to replicate this experience in the Arab world, aspiring to establish systems based on peaceful power transfer through democratic mechanisms.

Preceding this effort was the launch of Al Jazeera in November 1996, which represented a pioneering experience in introducing talk-show formats to Arab media and adopting an unprecedented bold discourse, making it the favored channel for a majority of Arab populations from the Atlantic to the Arabian Gulf.

Palestinian-born professor Azmi Bishara became a prominent figure in renewing the concept of Arab nationalism, overseeing the selection of national intellectual leaders from various Arab countries, urging them to reside and work in Doha. He led a rebuilding process for ideological frameworks, presenting them within a modern context premised on Arab solidarity, democracy, social justice, while keeping the Palestinian cause at the forefront. Bishara not only renewed these ideas and garnered support from influential Arab nationalist figures but also sought to engage new youth to create a national youth current committed to these new principles, capable of addressing the broader Arab youth with a language they understand, institutionalizing it through a large research center resembling a “university” to train new researchers for placement in other regional and international research hubs, thereby providing them with experience through collaboration with international experts from diverse backgrounds. Furthermore, he spearheaded the intellectual reconciliation process with Islamic political ideology, framing the historical conflict between Arab nationalists and Islamists as a power struggle rather than an ideological one.

The credit for renewing Islamic political thought and re-presenting it in a seemingly modern and acceptable form is attributed to Egyptian religious scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who had resided in Qatar since acquiring its citizenship in 1960 and passed away in 2022. He provided new perspectives on the necessity of accepting the “other” as an integral part of Islamic doctrine, reflecting the historical practices of Islamic political authority, asserting that democracy does not contradict Islam; rather, it constitutes a renewal of a foundational Islamic principle, as God commands consultation (Shura) in the Quran, where rulers must consult with elites and citizens before making significant decisions.

Many “renewalist” Islamic thinkers, like Qaradawi, propagated the idea that there is no contradiction between Arab nationalism and Islam, benefitting from the works of numerous Islamic intellectuals, notably Dr. Muhammad Imara, in his book “Islam and Arabism.” Thus, Qatar brought together the two most powerful intellectual currents in the Arab world under its umbrella.

Every Arab—whether committed to Arab nationalism in the ideological sense or not—has an innate tendency toward Arab solidarity, considering anyone who speaks Arabic in their vicinity as a brother. Despite all disputes and conflicts—both political and societal—this emotional bond prevails.

The shared language unites them collectively, much like the bonds of language and culture among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, where shared identity drives emotional ties, and nostalgia lingers for a time of unity when all Slavic brotherhoods existed under one state, be it socialist or imperial. Furthermore, Islam represents a profound emotion that cannot be extinguished under any circumstances without eradicating Islam itself. Thus, Qatar succeeded in possessing the largest intellectual forces in the Arab world along with some factions of the “new left,” which, according to critics, were tamed and transformed into advocates for the Islamic current’s political rights, coupled with the prioritization of democracy and the Palestinian cause. Supported by an expansive media empire, diverse research centers, and a broad margin of freedom granted to all these ideologies and their thinkers, Qatar’s strategy has long-term investment projects while its competitors are constrained by “short-term policies.”

In this manner, Qatar was able to influence the course of events in the Arab street, placing considerable pressure on other Arab political systems, clearly evident during the so-called “Arab Spring,” leading to multiple disagreements between Qatar and Arab regimes, peaking in the crisis of Qatar’s boycott from 2017 to 2021.

Qatar and Hybrid Policies

Qatar maintains strategic relations with the United States, designated as a “major non-NATO ally” by Biden in March 2022, due to the presence of two major American bases on its territory (Al Udeid and As-Saliyah). Nonetheless, it aims to build strong relationships across all domains with Russia and China, cementing a partnership with Turkey that peaked with the opening of the Al Udeid base, a Turkish military facility on Qatari soil, marking Turkey’s return to the Arabian Gulf for the first time since its exit in 1918.

Qatar was the first Gulf state to establish public relations with Israel and the initial Gulf capital to openly host Israeli officials, while Al Jazeera—owned by Qatar—was the first Arabic channel to break the ban on the presence of Israeli political and military figures addressing the Arab public. In contrast, it hosts leaders of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad on its territory, providing them extensive financial and media support.

Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has experienced prolonged tensions with Iran, yet it has maintained strong relations with the Iranian side, cooperating in various fields, including the North Field, or South Pars gas field shared by both countries.

Qatar supports the Muslim Brotherhood and has served as the primary media platform for the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, through which Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other leaders delivered messages to the outside world. It also opened an office for the Afghan Taliban, providing a platform for leaders of terrorist movements in the North Caucasus, such as Khabarovsk, Abu al-Walid al-Ghamdi, and Shamil Basayev, and hosted Selim Khan Yandarbiev on its territory.

Doha gathers thinkers from all ideological currents in the Arab world, from far-right to far-left, and despite seeming contradictions in Qatar’s regional and international relations and its embrace of various ideological currents, with preference always given to the Islamic current, especially those aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, it has managed to uphold its media image through this network of hybrid alliances, connecting the interests of these different ideological leaders with its own. This is further enhanced by a broad media network addressing all audiences across diverse platforms, especially alternative media on social media and podcasts, allowing a degree of freedom for all these parties to capitalize on their capacities. However, this freedom, ultimately, is constrained and linked—as mentioned—to the means rather than the ultimate goals, which all parties adhere to under Doha’s policies.

Through this approach, Qatar presents itself as beneficial to all parties, capable of offering what others cannot; its lack of a public opinion that could threaten governmental stability, like in major Arab nations, along with a very high standard of living for its citizens—who maintain deep loyalty and gratitude towards the Qatari leadership—means there is no historical depth that could sometimes pose a burden on foreign policy-making. Consequently, Qatar distinguishes itself with its lightweight nature and agility compared to others.

For example, Qatar promotes its relations with Israel to its Islamic allies as a necessity, using these relations to mitigate the impact of the blockade on the Gaza Strip and provide financial support for the Hamas government controlling the sector before the events of October 7, 2023. Through these relations, it also maintains the representation of the Islamic voice in any negotiations with Israel, ensuring that their adversaries do not solely engage in negotiations with Israel. Qatar thus propagates this relationship, supported by a massive media machine, activists, and beneficiaries, some of whom genuinely believe this narrative; hence it does not face backlash for its relationships and coordination with Israel, unlike other Arab nations would if they engaged similarly.

Conversely, it presents itself to Israel as capable of quelling the spirit of extremism within Palestinian Islamic movements, maintaining tranquility with them, and serving as a back channel for Israel to reach understandings and agreements. It justifies its seemingly anti-Israeli media discourse as a means to absorb Arab anger, channeling it through loud media coverage and heated discussions reaching the point of shouting and physical altercations, thus containing Arab frustration. As the majority of Arab populations are emotional, all they need is high-energy rhetoric to release the pent-up anger within, which, if left unchecked, could lead to practical actions on the ground causing harm to Israel. Thus, Qatar effectively manages its media policies.

Qatar has promoted its relations with jihadist factions as beneficial to the United States; on one hand, Qatar acts as a back channel for conveying messages between the two sides where Washington cannot undertake such a task. On the other hand, it provides a media window to prevent these factions from establishing independent and uncontrolled media outlets. If Washington aims to negotiate with these factions, Qatar can provide a platform for those negotiations, which occurred with the Taliban prior to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Qatar justifies its military bases’ existence to its Islamic groups and their public as not being contradictory to Islam, nor a betrayal of it, as these groups promote against other Arab nations hosting foreign military bases. They assert that Qatar is the “only” Arab state harnessing its resources and financial capabilities to “serve” Islam and Muslim causes, leading to alienation from its neighbors; thus, it requires foreign protection to continue enhancing its role in empowering Muslims. Once it has acquired sufficient strength, it can forgo reliance on American bases; to emphasize this theory, it inaugurated a Turkish military base.

Finally, regarding Qatar’s foreign relations, it primarily seeks to protect itself, ensuring its independence and full sovereignty over its land and policies. Amid the rapid collapse of republican Arab regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, followed by the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Qatar recognized an historic opportunity to achieve more than mere self-protection by creating regional influence, leading it into a state of conflict similar to the “Arab Cold War” from 1956 to 1970, which peaked in 2017 and concluded through Kuwaiti mediation, culminating in the “Al-Ula Statement” in January 2021.

Qatar learned through this crisis that geography cannot be challenged, even if it seemed possible for some time. Conversely, its opponents realized that Qatar returning to its status before June 27, 1995, seems impossible, if not outright untenable. Thus, the reconciliation occurred, wherein Qatar attained recognition of its full independence and right to practice its own policies and acknowledgment of its influence in several countries in the region, without completely monopolizing that influence, committing to a political and media approach that is neither provocative nor inciting. Since then, Qatari relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain have steadily advanced toward cooperation across various fields.

There is no guarantee against Qatar reverting to its previous policies should weaknesses, shocks, or popular uprisings occur in Arab nations, as the nature of politics abhors a vacuum and relies on exploiting opportunities. This returns to the strength of the internal front in Arab nations first; it seems that Qatar has absorbed the experience, as evidenced by its different dealings following the fall of the Syrian regime.

Why Is Qatar Important for Russia?

Based on the aforementioned, Qatar possesses a robust media machine capable of shaping Arab public opinion, significantly contributing to distorting Russia’s image and promoting the existence of “Russian animosity” toward Islam and Muslims, accusing it of “bombing civilians” in Syria, according to claims, and reinterpreting historical events to serve this narrative. For instance, alleging that the so-called “massacres” committed by the Serbs against Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo were supported by Moscow, in addition to evoking historical conflicts from Russian-Ottoman wars and Russian wars in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Al Jazeera served as the primary propaganda outlet promoting the narratives of Chechen separatists during the first and second wars, vilifying Ramzan Kadyrov as a “traitor” to Muslims.

Since Emir Tamim took power in 2013, such propaganda has receded to the point of nonexistence, and with recent developments in relations between the two countries, Qatari propaganda may reintroduce the true image of Russia and Muslims enjoying unparalleled freedoms, thereby enhancing the atmosphere of internal unity within Russia. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has affirmed the positive impact of this visit on the Chechen Republic, praising Qatari policy, Emir Tamim’s leadership, and Qatar’s role in Russian politics. Additionally, Saad Khalaf, the director of Al Arabi’s office in Moscow, plays a crucial role in conveying accurate information regarding events in Ukraine and Russian perspectives.

Qatar is one of the major producers of natural gas, featuring the world’s latest liquefaction technology and a significant transport fleet. Former Russian Ambassador Vladimir Titov previously stated in an interview with RT Arabic that Moscow and Doha “agreed since 2007 that neither party would infringe upon the other’s traditional gas export markets,” a commitment the Doha maintained even amidst sharp disagreements between the two countries. Following the special military operation, Germany sought rapid supplies of LNG from Qatar, but the latter hesitated, imposing stringent conditions on the German side regarding quantity and contract duration, insisting on a minimum of 15 years and beginning deliveries in 2026.

The total deal would constitute less than 3% of Germany’s needs, and if completed, it would not impact Russia; rather, it would derail Germany’s agenda regarding the transition to alternative energy. Qatar also threatened the European Union that it would halt gas shipments if any member state imposed new labor or environmental regulations, which aligns with Russia’s stance against imposing dictates on energy-producing nations. Moreover, both Russia and Qatar are founding members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), allowing coordination among gas producers benefiting both producers and consumers, similar to the Saudi-Russian understanding through the OPEC+ framework.

Syria holds significant geopolitical value for Russia, housing its only naval base in the Mediterranean, allowing the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol to navigate freely in the Mediterranean and create a balance with the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Additionally, Russia has invested heavily in the country without reaping returns. Qatar maintains strong alliance relationships with the current Syrian regime and its allies, making it a crucial player in negotiations between President Putin and Emir Tamim. Given the lack of prospects for lifting Western sanctions on Syria and the pressures facing President Ahmed al-Shara’s administration, coupled with Israel’s occupation of additional territories in Syria, Qatar could contribute to crafting an understanding leading to a new format for Russian-Syrian relations that preserves Russia’s geopolitical gains while yielding economic benefits.

Qatar’s robust relations with Islamic organizations and its ability to influence or establish communication channels with armed movements in Afghanistan and Central Asia, alongside hosting many leaders of these groups in Doha, could help in creating calm in the region through Russian-Qatari understanding. Qatar, a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) since 2022, could use its engagement to encourage Russia toward a more significant role for Qatar in the organization’s efforts to combat terrorism and extremism.

Conclusion

Qatar presents a unique opportunity for Russia in the realm of investments, especially in the energy sector, crafting a back channel for some Western companies whose technologies Russia requires, fostering integration between the two nations, forming a network of interests that could guarantee against diplomatic deterioration under any future circumstances. Qatar holds particular significance for Russia on both geopolitical and geoeconomic levels, with implications for the security of post-Soviet states and its reflection on Russia’s internal security. The strong Russian-Qatari relations are vital for Russia, serving as a bulwark against any Western attempts to exploit Qatar’s influential capabilities against Moscow. Current Qatari policy perceives that more unites it with Russia than divides it; however, reinforcing this condition with robust economic partnership relations may serve as a guarantee for the continuation and development of these important relations for both parties.