Islamic Movements in the Libyan Crisis: Role and Future

Mohamed SAKHRI October 8, 2024

0 74 20 minutes read

The political landscape in Libya is characterized by a variety of political trends, which stem from both pure political perspectives as well as ideological and intellectual viewpoints. This multiplicity has given rise to several factions and trends that play significant roles in Libyan affairs, including various Islamic movements, which continue to have a dynamic and proactive presence in the Libyan political scene. Their involvement often fluctuates in accordance with the political circumstances the country faces, intertwining with other political parties and movements, whether in agreement or disagreement on political and ideological issues.

Recently, after nearly thirteen years of turmoil, numerous local, regional, and international factors have influenced the positioning of Islamic movements within Libya’s internal political arenas during the various crises that have occurred. This is evident both in terms of their engagement in political roles and their direct or indirect involvement in the realm of pure religious affairs, which often serve political objectives or lay the groundwork for potential future political roles.

From this standpoint, this paper seeks to examine the roles of diverse Islamic movements in the current political landscape, their future aspirations, and the transformations they have undergone. It aims to elucidate the surrounding environment and local and regional contexts influencing these movements, as well as the interactions that have shaped their journey—factors that are destined to impact their future.

The study will focus comprehensively on the Islamists, clarifying their status and standing in the Libyan political context. It will systematically progress into the internal divisions that facilitate a better understanding of the various movements in the country, which can be limited to three active currents in the Libyan arena: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi movement, and independent Islamic figures.

It is important to note that, in this paper, the term “Islamic movements” within Libya refers to any Islamic faction that plays a political role in public affairs, positively or negatively, either directly or indirectly, whether by cooperating with various governmental authorities or adopting an opposition stance in pursuit of power through various intertwined mechanisms within the Libyan context.

Islamists and the Libyan Crisis

The Islamists represent one of the most essential actors in the current Libyan scene, embodying various factions with noticeable divisions. Discrepancies among these factions exacerbate the complexities of the Libyan crisis. The current Islamic forces have primarily been shaped through three key historical events in Libya.

February Revolution and the Counter-movement:

During the events of the Libyan revolution that began on February 17, 2011, various Islamic movements played prominent roles. Whether as military fighters participating in the revolution or through varying political participation since then, their positions have often been conflicted. They made significant contributions to both the revolutionary efforts and electoral processes, as well as to the political and security crises, playing a pivotal role in overthrowing the previous regime. Several Islamic groups and factions were also active in the electoral processes, establishing a notable presence in the current and future political landscape of Libya and becoming a crucial component of it. It is imperative to understand the Libyan political scene and to anticipate its future without examining the nature and impact of these movements on political decision-making processes. The past decade has seen numerous fluctuations and crises in the Libyan political landscape, with the interests of these “revolutionary forces” caught in a continuous tug-of-war with both domestic and external factors, amid a turbulent political reality that rarely settles. Conversely, a counter-current has emerged, aiming to revert the country to a “military rule,” engaging in confrontations with other forces, garnering support from internal groups and external powers.

Thus, the current Libyan political scene can primarily be described as oscillating between two main spectra: the “revolutionary” spectrum, represented predominantly by most Islamists in the current landscape, including independent figures and political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Justice and Construction Party, and the Ya Baladi Movement, among others, primarily based in western Libya. The other spectrum is the “counter-revolution” one, represented by the “Operation Dignity,” alongside parties labeled as “secular,” and primarily the Salafi trend, especially in the eastern part of the country.

This divergence in Libya was influenced by regional confrontations between the Arab Spring and the revolutions on one side, and the states opposing those revolutions on the other, thus shaping the internal political scene and the events that gave rise to the current political forces.

Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn:

Operation Dignity commenced on May 16, 2014, in Benghazi, aiming to seize power in Tripoli, which resulted in heightened bloody conflict and political division across the nation. Its forces attacked multiple revolutionary bases and Islamic brigades in Benghazi before extending their reach toward the capital. In response, the “revolutionary brigades” and segments of the Libyan army in Tripoli and Benghazi launched “Operation Libya Dawn,” initiated on July 13, 2014, just two months after Operation Dignity began against revolutionaries in Benghazi. These forces viewed Operation Dignity as a counter-revolutionary movement intent on abolishing the gains of the February 17 Revolution, constituting a rebellion against the legitimacy represented by the “General National Congress,” which succeeded the first legislative elections in Libya’s history. Operation Libya Dawn garnered widespread support from revolution advocates and various Islamic parties and movements.

Skhirat Agreement: The Skhirat Agreement, or the Libyan Political Agreement, involved various conflict parties in Libya and was signed under the auspices of the United Nations in the city of Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17, 2015, overseen by UN envoy Martin Kobler to end the conflict that erupted in 2014. The agreement commenced on April 6, 2016, with most parties approving it.

This agreement followed the Supreme Court’s ruling against the February Committee, nullifying all resulting legislation, including the parliamentary elections of 2014 that established the current parliament, thus plunging the country into a legitimacy crisis between the General National Congress and the current parliament.

According to the Skhirat Agreement, power was shared between the parliament and the High Council of State, an advisory body emanating from the General National Congress. It is worth noting that members of the General National Congress were divided over this agreement, with some supporting it while others opposed it, viewing it as international and regional interference and a violation of the Supreme Court ruling nullifying the 2014 parliamentary elections.

Islamists in the Political Scene

The presence of Islamists in the Libyan political scene, if we exclude the “Salafi movement,” throughout the different phases the nation has undergone, represents a change and a resistance to military rule. Most of this trend aligned with “Operation Libya Dawn” and opposed “Operation Dignity,” particularly during the 2019 assault on the capital. However, their role in political agreements, especially those facilitated by the UN mission in the country, has been characterized by confusion and a lack of consensus, as evident in the “Skhirat Agreement” of 2015, where Islamists were divided between supporters and opposers, albeit they all ultimately adhered to it when it became a reality.

Conversely, it is inaccurate to treat Islamic factions as a monolithic entity, as fundamental differences exist in their visions, strategies, tactics, and organizational structures. This pluralism has become a tangible reality, extending even within single organizations, including those that previously played roles in the Libyan political landscape but no longer hold a significant presence, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Scientific Salafism, the Islamic Liberation Party, and the Tablighi Jamaat, as well as “extremist” organizations that have been forcibly eliminated, like Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS, for various reasons, the most notable being Operation “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous.”

The National Unity Government led Operation “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous” against ISIS, especially in the city of Sirte, where it previously established a stronghold. This organization emerged due to the developments during the absence of state authority in Libya, lacking roots within Libyan society. However, its presence and that of similar entities enabled other forces to impose a new political landscape, as witnessed during Operation Dignity, which claimed its existence was aimed at fighting ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia, though its true intentions extended beyond that. This was notably highlighted after “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous” operations, which led to the elimination of this organization in Sirte with international support, allowing the UN-backed Government of National Accord to claim a costly victory over ISIS, while Operation Dignity did not combat the terrorist organization in Sirte despite it being one of its strongholds.

Regarding the roots of Islamic movements, their diversity has significantly influenced the inception and composition of Libyan society, typically shaded by the Maliki school of thought and Islamic Sufism due to the historical continuation of the Senussi movement in the country. However, this continuum did not prevent the emergence of other Islamic movements, both political and militant, over successive years, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Scientific Salafism, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, as well as armed factions post-revolution, like Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS, along with ideologically driven brigades in both eastern and western Libya.

Islamists currently maintain a significant role in certain state institutions, with the Salafi movement represented, for example, in the religious endowments. The Muslim Brotherhood and some independent figures also have a substantial presence in the High Council of State. Overall, Islamists possess an active presence in both the internal and external political landscape, as evidenced by their participation in all the dialogues initiated by the UN mission aimed at resolving various crises in the country, whether independently or collectively representing their factions.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is considered one of the most influential Islamic movements in the internal political landscape, actively seeking power to fulfill its objectives of establishing a civilian democratic state referencing Islamic principles, governed by Sharia law, and adhering to the peaceful transfer of authority.

During the Libyan revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood played a prominent role, through organized collective action or individual involvement from its members, starting with the formation of the “National Transitional Council,” the first entity to govern the country following the revolution’s success, and continuing with the establishment of the “General National Congress,” the first elected legislative body from the popular base of society, culminating with their involvement in the political agreement of the “Skhirat Agreement” and the bodies born from it, such as the “High Council of State,” the Government of National Accord, and the presidential council.

However, the Brotherhood’s power in government later diminished, and its presence in the current political system is considered less effective than it once was. For instance, in western Libya, its strength is concentrated in the High Council of State, where its members occupy a significant proportion; however, it has little real influence within the executive government. Over the past decade, the Brotherhood has faced various turning points and trajectories, which can be summarized in three key developments:

Foundation of a Political Party: In November 2011, the Brotherhood held a gathering conference in Benghazi for its members, marking its first comprehensive assembly in Libya, encompassing many members from both inside and abroad. They decided to establish a national party independent of the Muslim Brotherhood. This party was indeed founded in 2012 under the name “Justice and Construction Party,” becoming the most prominent political actor among other Islamic and non-Islamic political blocs in the nation’s political arena. This step was vital for the Brotherhood and contributed to its strengthening.

Engagement in Governance: The Brotherhood has played a notable role in the political arena, particularly in the first legislative assembly, the General National Congress, where it adopted various political stances and actions, such as selecting the Prime Minister and engaging in different issues raised within the legislative body. This positioned the Brotherhood to take on significant political roles during that time. However, with the arrival of the “Skhirat Agreement,” the party’s members became divided over the agreement, even though they all eventually accepted it.

Division: The Brotherhood split after endorsing the Skhirat Agreement, between proponents and opponents. This disagreement was not incidental but reflected two coexisting approaches within the organization, especially between 2014 and 2021, notably leading to the party’s division into two factions: one advocating for a traditionally quietist approach, avoiding political conflicts with other forces while focusing on da’wah (Islamic preaching) and community building, and the other emphasizing active political participation and prioritizing the party’s role in political transformations, both locally and internationally.

This rift culminated in the party’s general conference on June 19, 2021, with resignations from senior positions within the party. Imad al-Banani was elected as the new head of the Justice and Construction Party, while the dissenting members went on to create a new party called the “Democratic Party,” which was officially launched in October 2021.

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood announced its organizational dissolution in May 2021, transitioning into a da’wah organization known as the “Revival and Renewal Association,” which became the new face of the Justice and Construction Party. Consequently, the party’s general discourse did not differ significantly from the previous narrative of the Brotherhood; it still holds an Islamic reference and engages politically in all its programs, with political strategy taking precedence over merely da’wah activities, which has become the association’s specialized role. This trajectory led to a clear separation between the political party and the da’wah organization within the Libyan context, unable to maintain its previously active presence in the Libyan political arena as it had begun.

The transformations the Brotherhood underwent were primarily politically motivated, representing a shift within the political trajectory. The “Democratic Party” adopted a different approach than that of the conservative faction within the Brotherhood, now represented by the Justice and Construction Party under Imad al-Banani. The discrepancies deepened between the two factions as the newly established “Democratic Party” aligned with the eastern Libyan Parliament supporting Operation Dignity, which conservatives viewed as a violation of foundational principles opposing military rule and a regression to authoritarianism, given that Operation Dignity is perceived as a “coup” against the legislative process in the country.

The Salafi Movement

The term Salafi is broad and encompasses a variety of different ideological and methodological perspectives, including jihadist Salafism, political reformist Salafism, and non-political scientific Salafism. Scholarly literature, particularly after the works of Quentin Victorovich, tends to adopt this categorization. In Libya, this movement is commonly known as “the Madkhali trend,” which represents a blend of scientific Salafism and political reformist Salafism armed not for regime change but rather to safeguard its interests and ideology. This trend is characterized as a “hardline Salafi” group that relies on two principles: absolute loyalty to the ruling authority and complete submission to the rulers, defending their political stances and policies regardless of context, as well as continuously attacking dissenters, particularly from other Islamic movements.

Conversely, there is also a faction of “scientific Salafism” that participates in official state political institutions and usually focuses primarily on da’wah and the necessity of obeying the leader, refraining from resorting to violence against the “usurping” ruler and not participating in institutional politics.

In general, the majority of the Salafi trend in Libya does not seek to formulate a theory of the state or delve deeply into the mechanisms of governance and executive powers. Instead, they aim to align with the “ruling authority” and “follow the ruler.” Accordingly, this has led to a form of adaptation to successive authorities and an interconnectedness with them, creating a conducive environment for carrying out their activities and ideologies.

This trend has benefited from the gains of the February 2011 Revolution, particularly in terms of increased freedoms and the end of absolute individual rule, having established many private schools and religious institutes that support its ideology, thereby creating a new religious environment in the Libyan context, historically dominated by Maliki jurisprudence and Sufism. It has managed to penetrate into remote areas where education and economic levels are low, establishing a robust base. Additionally, it has reinforced its organized presence within state institutions, especially in security sectors, even reaching a later stage where it founded colleges for religious education under the umbrella of the state’s official universities, alongside its own private educational institutions in Tripoli.

In the last decade of the Libyan state, this trend has witnessed growth both politically and security-wise, through its involvement in armed brigades in both eastern and western Libya, albeit with each characterized by different political and security orientations. This enabled them to exert political influence within the state, both during internal conflicts and in various political alignments and polarizations, thereby bolstering their presence within formal state institutions as they aligned with these institutions and rejected transformative changes. Initially, the trend’s presence was limited to purely religious affairs within the state and society, but this equation did not last long, especially with the security and political fluctuations affecting the country, leading this trend to support “Operation Dignity” in the east and oppose its detractors in the west.

In the first electoral endeavor in the country in 2012 for members of the “General National Congress,” many active players from this trend advocated for participation in political elections to prevent other Islamic trends from attaining power. For them, this transformed from merely obstructing other forces from opposing or objecting to the ruling authority to the necessity of political participation aimed at undermining other factions, especially Islamists, and preventing their ascension to power. Conversely, this trend shifted from opposing and prohibiting political engagement within the state to becoming one of its strongest supporters against the Muslim Brotherhood and those aligned with their ideology in the electoral processes following the February 17 Revolution.

Today, Salafi groups appear closer to network-style movements rather than traditional organizational forms, granting them greater flexibility in dealing with political division. For instance, they did not become preoccupied with governmental conflicts and existing divisions; instead, they focused on solidifying their political and security standing within the country to facilitate the growth of their religious model.

Before “Operation Dignity” in 2014, various currents, including the Islamic movement, particularly the Salafi faction, were competing politically across four fronts: the media front, the political institutional front, the constitutional front, and the hard military front.

However, post-operation, this Salafi faction aligned itself in eastern Libya with “Operation Dignity,” fighting alongside it and defending its agenda, which resulted in blending its ideological perspectives with military logic. In this context, “Operation Dignity” found fertile ground in this ideology and approach, gaining support from the Salafi faction in exchange for its backing during the combat while denouncing any opposition to it.

Several terminologies emerged during this phase to describe dissenters from this trend, notably labeling opponents of Operation Dignity as “kharijites.” The leaders of this operation, along with regional and international powers supportive of it, found in this trend a strong local religious ally, providing them with support while strategically using them as a counterforce against other existing Islamic movements in Libya.

The presence of Libyan Salafis has bolstered their position within the institutional religious discourse represented by the Endowments and Islamic Affairs Authority. This organization is supported by one of the key military powers in Tripoli, “the Special Deterrence Force.” Notably, this group did not declare its affiliation with the “Dignity” forces; rather, it participated to some extent in repelling the offensive on Tripoli in 2019, which was conducted by Operation Dignity and ultimately failed.

In conclusion, this Salafi trend is practically divided, albeit not ideologically, into two factions: one in eastern Libya that follows Operation Dignity, mingling security and political agendas through a bureaucratic collaborative relationship, with both parties recognizing their interests alongside the other. The Salafi faction regards Operation Dignity as a protector on one side and an ally against other Islamic movements on the other.

The second faction operates in western Libya, with unclear signs of support for a specific political position yet displays behavior indicating such inclinations, typically aligning itself with any emerging political operation or new government in the country. However, this is not absolute, as it has, until now, often adapted to any existing or emerging authority.

Moreover, the conduct of this trend has revealed that the relationship between Salafis and politics is more complex and ambiguous. They tend to act “non-politically” in a “political world” on many occasions, lacking unified leadership and organizational frameworks. Ideologically, they do not rule out specific political behaviors; for instance, the political actions and responses of those from the East differ from those emerging from the western part of Libya, without leading to outright denial from either side.

Independent Islamic Figures

Many independent Islamic figures in Libya are playing prominent roles in the country’s political process, especially given that the Libyan society, predominantly conservative in its behavior, has historically responded to religious scholars in various public political issues. Many citizens in both eastern and western Libya actively participated in the February 17 Revolution based upon the fatwas of local religious scholars who are respected in Libyan society. One prominent figure among them is Sheikh Dr. Sadiq al-Ghiriani, who issued a fatwa obligating men and women to participate against the previous regime “and to wage jihad against the tyranny of its brigades.” He later became the Grand Mufti of Libya and played a significant role in numerous political matters, serving as a reliable umbrella for many Islamists both within and outside the country.

Another notable Islamic leader that emerged following the revolution is Nouri Abu Sahmain, the former head of the General National Congress. He established the “Ya Bladi” movement, essentially a gathering for independent Islamists that allied with many other parties. Abu Sahmain’s movement focused on domestic issues, justifying its formation in response to external threats and refusing to violate national sovereignty, while simultaneously addressing the issues of corruption and rebellion.

It is noticeable that most independent figures share a common demand for the independence of the state, free from regional and international interventions. They contend that the Skhirat Agreement should not have taken place, arguing that it has contributed to the deterioration of the state and caused the abandonment of the Libyan file to international and regional interests.

Included among the independents in the current Libyan political context are individuals who were previously involved in Islamic movements before the revolution, such as Abd al-Hakim Belhaj, the former leader of the “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group”. After the revolution, his group’s influence shifted towards partisan political activity under the name “The Homeland Party,” relying on Belhaj’s role rather than any organizational or institutional party efforts, achieving minimal representation in the National Congress through individual candidate lists in the 2012 elections.

This party, consisting of individuals rather than a formal organizational entity, often aligned its stances with those of the Justice and Construction Party on several decisions made by the General National Congress. Additionally, both parties supported Operation Libya Dawn following the political divisions that surfaced during the transitional phase, while opposing Operation Dignity and the “coup” against the constitutional declaration in February 2014. From this perspective, the “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group” underwent a transition from armed political action to peaceful political involvement, then evolved from party politics toward independent individual actions, with these independents currently participating prominently in the nation’s political landscape, Belhaj being one of the most notable.

Belhaj played a role in the Libyan revolution of 2011, eventually founding “The Homeland Party” in April 2012, which served as a platform for his political activities. Throughout Libya’s various developments, he influenced events in a “personal and independent” manner, distinct from partisan affiliations or even the representation of any faction such as the former “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.”

Overall, the prominent independent Islamic figures have established firm bases and clear perspectives that unite them around local and political issues significantly impacting today’s political landscape in Libya. This includes their support for and endorsement of the political isolation law following the revolution and backing Operation Libya Dawn against the attempt at “coup” orchestrated by Operation Dignity in 2014. While there may have been variations regarding acceptance of the “Skhirat Agreement,” they accepted the results of the latest Geneva dialogue in February 2021 as well as the new presidential council and the current Government of National Unity that emerged from it.

Future of the Islamic Movements

The prolonged period of political division in the country has revealed many capabilities among Islamic movements in political actions, as well as their formation, emergence, and evolution, starting from pure religious work up to their substantial intermingling and competition for political power.

It is evident that the Salafi trend will largely continue along the lines it previously endorsed, maintaining its existence as much as possible within the paths it has adopted in eastern and western Libya. However, this is not absolute; it could adapt to future scenarios where it may take a side in any forthcoming political conflict, due to its flexibility to acclimatize with any current or emerging authority in the country.

As for the Muslim Brotherhood and its supportive forces from independent figures and political parties, often referred to as the “revolutionary” spectrum, it is these groups that find themselves in a precarious position regarding their capacity to endure and influence the future of Libya. The potential scenarios for these forces can be categorized into:

Scenario of the Revolutionary Powers’ Continuity: The Islamic movements in Libya, particularly those organized politically—such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the pro-revolution groups, and independent Islamic figures—possess the capability to endure and influence Libya’s future political landscape for several reasons. Firstly, they rely on “armed strength” on the ground alongside political action. They view armed support as a means to secure their political rights and ensure their political survival, not solely counting on the constitution, institutions, or even the rule of law, nor merely on voters’ voices. They consider this necessity for their existence not an expression of violence but a defense of the revolution and a shield against plotted “coups.” Ultimately, significant military force will secure a position for this spectrum in the current political system unless the rules of the political game in Libya dramatically alter. Secondly, these forces exhibit exceptional political flexibility despite being ideologically Islamic. Some have embraced absolute political engagement, forming alliances with all political spectrums to strengthen their presence in the internal political arena and remain part of the influential forces that regional and international powers must consider, thereby preventing any marginalization or exclusion. To reinforce its political strength, the Muslim Brotherhood separated its political work from da’wah, enabling it to forge high levels of flexibility in forming alliances.

Scenario of Exclusion for the Revolutionary Forces: This would involve forcibly excluding all these movements, possibly with the support of some politically silent factions, such as the Salafi trend, reminiscent of actions taken in eastern Libya, which could become a sweeping model across the entire country, paralleling experiences in neighboring countries. However, this scenario currently appears unrealistic due to numerous factors, primarily the balance of military power among the conflicting sides in Libya, including the “revolutionary” forces. Thus, any movements that may be enlisted in this scenario are likely to remain unchanged and have minimal tangible impacts on political processes in the near term.

Conclusion

The roles currently played by Islamic movements, along with their future prospects, are diverse and shaped by their varying existences and transformations. The Muslim Brotherhood is expected to remain an active Islamic trend in the internal political landscape, albeit subject to certain changes. The Justice and Construction Party will likely pursue a quiet approach to political work, avoiding political conflicts as much as possible, while the Democratic Party aims to build new political alliances that will not be limited to the Islamic trend but may extend to other parties and movements.

Moreover, it is certain that the Salafi trend in the east will support the continued agenda of Operation Dignity, while in western Libya, it will strive to maintain its present approach—negotiate with any ruling government and amplify its influence within official institutions. Furthermore, continued tensions will likely persist between the Salafi trend and other Islamic movements within the country, including the Muslim Brotherhood and certain independent Islamic figures, potentially extending beyond political disagreements into sectarian divides, particularly with regards to the Ibadi sector within the country due to the alternative project it represents.

For the parties supporting the revolution, despite the various contradictions and shifts among them, they generally converge on a unified front in response to changing circumstances within the country. However, this dynamic could lead to a scenario where the influence of most of these movements may serve the interests of new actors aligned with transitional governments.

As for independent figures, they are likely to assume more significant and effective roles in any forthcoming political scene due to the relative ease of consensus surrounding them amidst extensive schisms within party frameworks.

The three trends—Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, and independents—will shape future dynamics regarding the actions of Islamists within Libya, reflecting on the country’s political situation going forward.

References