This article examines the realities of Islamic and political movements in Iraq and their role in shaping both the present and future of the country. It draws on the intellectual and political visions of these movements, their declared goals, and their practices both on the ground and in political corridors. The aim is to redefine and reframe these forces in their new roles while shedding light on their influence on Iraq’s future.
Introduction
The new Iraqi system was formed following the fall of Baghdad in 2003 by an international American alliance that removed President Saddam Hussein from power. This system evolved in the context of two distinct “Islamic” cases. The first pertains to the “Shia” groups and movements that are structurally connected to Iran, while the second involves “Sunni” movements and groups that have a predominantly Islamic character, varying from moderate to extremist. Although some of these forces have diminished or undergone significant transformations, the broader trend associated with “Islamists” remains a prominent part of the Iraqi political scene and continues to play a vital role in managing or influencing the system.
Shia Islamic movements are characterized by a pronounced sectarian agenda, and in several instances, some have exhibited “militia-like” behaviors. This necessitates a reevaluation and study of their roles in a context that continues to solidify. Additionally, there are ideologically and sectarian-driven Sunni jihadist movements that exert influence both locally and regionally, as well as internationally. Among the most radical is the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” which has seen its territorial state collapse, yet political and security conditions remain unstable in its aftermath.
Despite the emergence of many parties predominantly characterized by political agendas, they are largely Islamic. This underscores the essential role of the Islamist component in Iraq and its political management.
This paper aims to delve into the current state of Islamic and political movements in Iraq and their implications for shaping the present and future realities of the country, based on their ideological and political perspectives, their stated objectives, and their practices in both political arenas and on the ground. It seeks to redefine these powers in their new roles and illuminate their influence on Iraq’s future.
The Current Iraqi Political Scene and the Present Role of Islamists
Iraq currently experiences a fragile security stability amid relative shifts in political and economic conditions since October 2022, particularly following the ascent of Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to the Prime Minister’s office. In general, the Iraqi political landscape is marked by complex and intertwined relationships where ethnic and sectarian identities overshadow national identity across various sects, ethnicities, and factions, with considerable influence from regional powers such as the United States, Iran, the Gulf States, and Turkey. Islamists represent the largest and most influential part of this scene.
Overall, the current political landscape in Iraq is based on ethnic and sectarian balances between Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. This triangular division serves as the foundational system for the current Iraqi political order.
Shia parties are among the most prominent actors, dominating the parliament and successive Iraqi governments since 2005. These parties are primarily Islamic, including notable groups like the Islamic Dawa Party, the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, the Sadrist Movement, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. They possess a broad base of popular support and receive substantial backing from Iran. Additionally, a military entity was formed from these parties known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which emerged in mid-2014 in response to a fatwa from Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani, calling for the fight against ISIS after it took control of four provinces in northern and northwestern Iraq and approached the borders of Baghdad at that time. It’s worth noting that the PMF now includes numerous armed factions, some of which are deemed “loyalists,” indicating their doctrinal allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader, while others (though fewer) follow local sectarian religious figures.
On the other hand, Sunni Islamic parties, while playing a significant role in Sunni-majority areas, have weak national presence and influence within the current political framework, especially after the decline of the Iraqi Islamic Party. The role of these parties is shaped by sectarian and political balances within the country, and their main focus has become obtaining more representation and rights in both the parliament and Iraqi ministries. Currently, notable Sunni parties include “Taqaddum,” led by Mohammed Al-Halbousi, and “Siyada,” led by Khamis Al-Khanjar, alongside parties directly linked to the demands of Sunni-majority provinces, such as “Anbar Our Identity” and “Diyala Our Identity.”
Kurdish political forces maintain autonomy in the Kurdistan Region and include significant political parties such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Islamic Union of Kurdistan. Despite their substantial influence on the political process in Iraq, these forces remain primarily focused on regional concerns, ensuring they vote in the Iraqi parliament for those who promise to secure greater political and economic gains. Relations between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are often tense, especially regarding resource allocation, oil exportation, border management, and other political issues, most notably the application of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution concerning disputed territories.
Additional forces have emerged in the Iraqi political landscape that transcend sectarian and ethnic lines, particularly those that led and participated in the popular protests of 2019 calling for reform, combatting corruption, and improving services. These protests shook the political system in Iraq, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, adjustments to policies, and promises of reform. Some of these movements later became part of the political efforts by other factions—including Islamic political movements—to engage in the political process and participate in local and legislative elections.
Key Islamic Actors and Their Transformations
The main active movements in the Iraqi scene can be categorized based on their influential presence into jihadist movements, armed Shia factions, and political entities.
Jihadist Movements:
The most prominent among these is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which is an armed ideological organization that does not prioritize any political activity that would qualify it to be present in the Iraqi political scene. Its military operations are closely monitored by the United States and its allies. According to reports delivered to the current Iraqi government, due to the lack of ongoing deterrence, ISIS may take advantage of the deteriorating security situation in previously controlled areas. Therefore, Washington is keen, during its negotiations with the Iraqi government regarding troop withdrawal, to “ensure that the organization does not return,” emphasizing that it is erroneous to perceive that the only challenge posed by ISIS is military. The mechanisms through which the organization emerged originally stem from social factors associated with grievances arising from tension among vital components within Iraqi society.
The organization is present in complex terrains in both Iraq and Syria, with estimates indicating that between 400 and 500 fighters operate across borders. Predicting the precise future of this organization is challenging, especially as it relates to various Iraqi, regional, and international factors. Key influencing elements include:
Security Situation: Improvements in security and the capacity to track ISIS elements significantly impact its ability to reorganize and operate in Iraq. The Iraqi forces have utilized their military and intelligence systems to enhance border monitoring—especially with Syria—keeping the organization’s activities restricted.
Political Conditions: Political stability in Iraq minimizes the security space available to ISIS and any deterioration in political conditions might lead to increased tensions, thereby benefiting the organization and other militias in exploiting the security vacuum. The relatively stable political environment in Iraq recently, particularly the reconstruction efforts in regions like Mosul, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, has led the local populace to reject any ideological or security discourse framed within sectarian rhetoric, resulting in social and political cohesion against these organizations.
Regional Influences and International Efforts: The fragility of political processes coupled with regional interventions in Iraq is among the crucial factors that contribute to the fears about ISIS’s resurgence, accentuated by sectarian tensions instigated by militias aiming at demographic changes in various Sunni-majority provinces, especially in areas lacking robust state security agencies.
In a broad sense, the opportunities and capacities of ISIS to recruit new members and establish popular bases have diminished amid ongoing regional balances and international efforts to combat the organization, as well as the relative political stability in Iraq. This decline in influence is also connected to the representation of Sunni provinces within a collaborative framework with the governing Shia forces, alongside economic improvements in primary Sunni provinces. It is further supported by the improved military performance of Iraqi security forces in pursuing ISIS groups in western Iraq. Despite calls from Iranian-aligned political factions in Iraq for the expulsion of foreign troops, particularly U.S. forces, military operations by these troops remain crucial in defeating the organization.
The Iraqi government acknowledges the ongoing need for international support, particularly in intelligence sharing and precise airstrikes against ISIS locations, training, and logistics. However, several armed militias supported by Iran have renewed calls for the exit of foreign forces in 2023, coinciding with military operations involving drone attacks and Katyusha missiles targeting American bases.
Despite enduring a leadership drain due to targeted military actions and diminished financial capacities, ISIS retains the capability for limited attacks and planning for future threats in Iraq, raising concerns about a potential resurgence. The “Coalition of Nations” led by the U.S. takes these concerns seriously, emphasizing the continued necessity of its presence alongside Iraqi forces to monitor and curb ISIS activities while limiting operational stretches. This scenario contrasts with Iranian-aligned Iraqi political factions’ demands to terminate U.S. presence and diminish engagement in combating ISIS.
Armed Shia Factions:
The phenomenon of armed Shia factions in Iraq represents one of the key elements of political and security instability in the country. Current data from the official website of the “Popular Mobilization Authority” confirms the existence of 67 registered armed Shia factions. While some factions operate under this authority, they enjoy special status regarding armaments and command structures, functioning independently not only of the PMF but also of Iraqi governmental directives and command. These factions consider the Iranian “Wilayat al-Faqih” as their political and military reference, effectively acting as Iran’s operational arms in Iraq.
These factions form a part of the “Islamic Resistance Axis” against Israel while adopting an anti-U.S. stance. Simultaneously, many of these Iran-aligned factions appear on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. Notable among them are groups such as Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Saraya al-Salam, Hezbollah in Iraq, Saraya al-Jihad wal-Binaa, Saraya al-Khurasani, and the Martyrs’ Brigades. Analyst Michael Knights argues that Iraq today exemplifies the rule of armed Shia factions, asserting that these militias constitute the core of the ruling coalition known as the “Coordination Framework.” Their goal is ostensibly to protect the Islamic revolution initiated in Iran in 1979 and to safeguard current Iranian influence extensions in the region.
Among the most prominent factions in Iraq, based on their current roles and activities, are:
Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq: This organization comprises factions founded on sectarian doctrine, including the Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade, Karrar Brigades, Zaid ibn Ali Brigade, Ali Akbar Brigade, and Al-Sajjad Brigade. Its operating methodology resembles that of Hezbollah in Lebanon, aspiring to disrupt the “U.S.-Israeli project in the Middle East.” They possess a political arm named “Hak Rights Movement,” led by MP Hussein Mouness. The brigade receives support from Iran’s Quds Force and Hezbollah in Lebanon, particularly for its active role during the recent Israeli conflict in Gaza. The spokesperson for the brigade announced on October 19, 2023, that “the Americans are principal partners in the killing of Gaza’s people, and therefore must bear the consequences,” effectively positioning “the Iraqi resistance” within the broader conflict against U.S. bases.
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq: Emerging from the Sadrist Movement, its founders were formerly affiliated with this current before splitting to form their own organization in 2006. Asa’ib’s declared aim was “to resist U.S. occupation,” and they claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on U.S. forces prior to the official withdrawal in December 2011. Since its inception, the group has been regarded as receiving support and training from Iran’s Quds Force. Asa’ib successfully shaped a political path by securing one parliamentary seat in 2014 under the name “Sadiqoun Block,” which later increased to 15 seats in the 2018 elections, establishing itself as a significant political and security force within Iraq’s ruling Coordination Framework. Predictions indicate that Asa’ib’s coalition, led by Qais Al-Khazali, alongside Badr and its leader Hadi Al-Ameri, will secure 24 parliamentary seats in 2025.
Saraya al-Salam: This Sadrist militia, known as “Peace Brigades,” represents the military wing of the Sadrist Movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. It is integrated within the PMF structure across three brigades (313, 314, and 315), granting it significant logistical weight in the balance of power. However, its political significance is undermined by the instability of decisions from its leader, who tends to fluctuate the group’s role, evidenced by his urging of his sizeable parliamentary block (73 MPs) to resign just eight months post-elections. Consequently, its political influence is currently marginalized.
Al-Nujabaa Movement: Often regarded as the most “hostile” militia towards U.S. forces, its leader, Akram al-Kaabi, identifies himself as the “face of armed resistance” against U.S. presence in Iraq and enjoys special attention from Iran. Unlike some groups categorized as terrorist organizations by the U.S., Al-Nujabaa has not established a distinct political party. Estimates suggest that Al-Nujabaa is responsible for many attacks against American bases in northern Syria and the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Martyrs’ Brigades: This organization goes by several names, including Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade and Karrar Brigades. It originated from the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades and collaborates directly with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, focusing on a transnational agenda aligned with Iran’s “Resistance Axis.” The U.S. has designated this organization as a terrorist entity. The Martyrs’ Brigades concentrate on cross-border military operations and are led by Abu Alaa Al-Walayi. Although structurally part of the PMF, they frequently operate independently of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s commands. The Brigades aim to expand their political presence through provincial councils and the Iraqi parliament, underpinned by significant media efforts.
Other armed Shia factions typically do not operate independently but represent various marginal factions of larger groups such as Hezbollah in Iraq and Al-Nujabaa. These factions have received funding and training from Iraqi authorities while also maintaining independence in structure and leadership closely linked to Iran.
Political Islamic Parties:
The majority of Shia Islamic parties align closely with Iranian presence in Iraq across political, security, and economic lines, many of which also have armed military wings. Several Islamic and political parties, some Shia and others Sunni, do not wield substantial military roles but participate within the political process with varying degrees of influence. The focus will now shift to some of the most notable of these movements:
Sadrist Movement: Led by Muqtada al-Sadr, son of cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, the movement enjoys substantial popularity, boasting 73 MPs in the last parliamentary elections of 2021. However, in June 2022, they resigned from parliament at his insistence. The movement emerged as a significant political and military force immediately post the 2003 invasion through its armed wing, the Mahdi Army, which later suspended its activities in 2008. Since 2005, the Sadrist Movement has created parliamentary representatives and cabinet ministers. Its support is especially pronounced among youth and impoverished communities due to its anti-corruption stance and calls for political and economic reforms.
In 2024, Muqtada al-Sadr decided to rename the movement from “Sadrist Movement” to “National Shia Movement” to overcome challenges and potentially strengthen its presence in the political arena, appealing to the Shia base in Iraq. However, such a decision could reduce its voter base, particularly among non-Shia constituents who viewed him as a national leader transcending sectarian lines. Expectations suggest that the Sadrist Movement may not secure more than 60 seats in the upcoming 2025 elections.
However, the movement faces numerous challenges, including internal divisions, tensions with other political forces, particularly those aligned with Iran, and the instability of its leader’s decisions, which have frequently altered, including a previous announcement urging his MPs to resign.
Islamic Party: The “Islamic Party of Iraq,” which is considered the political face of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, has engaged in the political process since its inception in 2003, presenting itself as the representative of Sunni Arabs. However, this portrayal has been contested by Sunni factions, accusing it of acting as a tool of American occupation to convince their community to accept the conditions imposed. The current Secretary-General is Rashid Al-Izawi, who reached the Iraqi parliament representing Babil province, running on the “Victory” List headed by Haider al-Abadi. His close relations with Shia leaders, including militia leader Hadi Al-Ameri, have drawn attention. The Islamic Party’s popularity has significantly declined from the parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2021, participating alongside independent candidates in coalitions, but faced severe defeat in 2021 amidst coordinated efforts to eliminate its candidates from the political landscape.
Even with this serious decline, the Islamic Party seeks a role in political life, focusing on essential positions, notably leading the Sunni Endowment. Former leader Mishaan Al-Hazergi took over the position in 2022. This party faces a decision point: either to join or form a potent alliance or to entirely withdraw from politics to rebrand and solidify its influence.
Dawa Party: Secretary-General Nouri al-Maliki led the party to gain 38 deputies in the 2021 elections. Established in 1957 by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Dawa Party evolved from a secret movement embracing the Islamic revolution into a principal player in Iraq’s “pluralistic” governmental framework. Throughout challenges faced since its establishment, with many leaders seeking refuge in Iran, the party experienced substantial ideological shifts. Since 2003, it aimed to become part of the ruling Shia Islamic establishment with Iranian backing, maintaining its influence in governance.
The primary issue facing the Dawa Party is its struggle to balance its religious goals with the new “democratic” system in Iraq. The lack of a coherent ideological narrative after 2003 has led some party leaders and followers to view it as a departure from its original principles. Despite Maliki’s stewardship during two terms (2006-2014), he is seen to yield power to the Sadrist Movement with financial resources not employed as effectively as by the Supreme Islamic Council.
Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq: Founded in 1982 under the leadership of Muhammad Baqar al-Hakim, this political party emerged under Iranian supervision during the Iraq-Iran war. It had a military branch known as Badr Brigade, which fought alongside Iran before splitting for electoral purposes in 2012. Over the past two decades, the Council has served as a crucial component within Shia political dynamics but has faced a decline in parliamentary representation, currently holding 11 seats in the National State Forces Alliance. It maintains presence in regions such as Najaf, Diwaniya, Nasiriyah, Samawa, Babel, Kut, and Baghdad.
Notably, Ammar al-Hakim, who previously led the council, announced his withdrawal in 2017 to establish the “Wisdom Movement,” intending it to adopt a more centrist approach with new slogans focusing on “national partnership” and “a just civil state” rather than the council’s earlier rhetoric supporting theocratic rule.
The Council’s influence has diminished recently alongside shifts in public sentiment in traditional bases amongst youth, especially as they gravitate towards newer parties formed in the wake of the October 2019 protests. The sentiment towards Iranian influence represents a significant potential obstacle for the Council due to prevalent concerns among Iraqi youth regarding foreign meddling.
Islamic Union of Kurdistan: Established in 1994, this party represents the Kurdish version of the Muslim Brotherhood, advocating for Islamic values within the Kurdish community. It enjoys strong support in Dahuk province and is led by Salahuddin Bahauddin. In the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections, it won four seats in Baghdad and five in the Kurdistan Parliament. Actively participating in the political process within the Kurdistan Region, it plays a vital role in mediating and resolving disputes within the region’s political factions and with the Iraqi government in Baghdad based on its alliances with major Kurdish parties.
Virtue Party: A Shia Islamic political party, led by Abdul Husseini Al-Moussawi, with its religious reference being Mohamed Al-Yaqoubi, the party is mainly based in Shia-majority provinces like Basra, Thi-Qar, Najaf, and Maysan. Its focus is on augmenting Islamic values in Iraq’s political, social, and religious landscape and it secured one seat in the 2021 elections under the name “National Path Coalition.” Its strategy is centered on raising political and religious awareness through educational centers while advocating for Shia rights and ensuring fair representation in state institutions. Recently, the party has struggled to gain parliamentary presence but aims to increase its representation in provincial councils.
Future of Islamic Movements in Iraq
The political scene in Iraq is complex, rife with local, regional, and international contradictions that all Iraqi Islamic and non-Islamic movements face.
Regarding non-Islamic forces, the current Sudanese coalition dominates the Iraqi scene. Projections for the 2025 elections suggest that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s influence is set to strengthen, despite his modest representation of just three MPs in parliament, supported by three influential governors in Basra, Kut, and Karbala. Al-Sudani aspires to form a cross-sectarian alliance, potentially partnering with the Sadrist Movement in the upcoming parliamentary elections, under the banner of fighting corruption and controlling rogue arms and militias outside state authority.
For Sunni Arabs, the “Taqaddum” Party, established in Anbar province by Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi, positions itself as representing Sunni interests in Iraq. Although it lacks traditional political attributes, it has become part of alliances that led it to the Iraqi parliament, gaining popularity following infrastructure, security, and economic reforms in Sunni provinces. Facing competition from other Sunni parties, it maintains robust ties with influential forces, including Kurdish parties, while its interest lies in promoting a comprehensive national discourse rather than a sectarian one.
Kurdish forces, including Islamic factions, tend to focus on bolstering their presence regionally, with their role in broader political mechanisms becoming contingent on the extent of the alliances they foster with other Iraqi powers.
The future of Islamic movements themselves may be shaped by several political, social, economic, and security factors, including:
Political Alliances and Sectarian Balances: Alliances among Islamic parties and other political actors can play a crucial role in bolstering their strength and influence. The internal political balances particularly between Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish factions base their collaborative potential toward realizing their agenda.
Internal Changes and Divisions: Ongoing internal schisms and tensions among major Islamic factions, notably within the Shia spectrum characterized by the Sadrist Movement, Badr Organization, Supreme Islamic Council, and Dawa Party, could lead to weakening in influence. This may bring forth new leadership with distinct visions, reshaping the Islamic political landscape.
Protest Movements and Reforms: Persistent political and economic crises in Iraq will likely lead to the evolution of reformative protest movements as seen in 2019. Such demonstrations could pose substantial challenges to the ruling coalition, particularly the Islamic parties, which face public accusations of complicity in the prevailing deterioration. A failure to enact genuine reforms would substantially impact their political future.
Regional and International Influences: Changes in regional and international policies could reshape power dynamics in Iraq, as regional actors continuously influence Iraqi forces, particularly Iranian effects on Shia factions.
Security and Stability: Security stability remains a cornerstone for the continuity of Iraq’s political processes, or else failing to secure the political situation exposes it to threats, including ISIS and heightened sectarian and security disputes among Shia factions.
Economic and Social Developments: Iraq’s economic and social conditions, encompassing unemployment, poverty, and essential service provision, will be critical in charting the future of Islamic movements and their influence. Their ability to improve these realities will significantly impact their popularity and sustainability in power.
In light of these factors, three potential scenarios regarding the future of Iraq and its Islamic movements can be outlined:
First Scenario – Continuity and Reinforcement: The current situation persists with minor adjustments aimed at gradually improving matters, thereby enhancing economic, service, and security conditions without radical changes to the political system. This scenario will convey a relative stability amid ongoing security threats from groups like ISIS, with the Iraqi government maintaining security and stability. Nevertheless, economic conditions remain a decisive factor in realizing gradual changes that contribute to political stability, notably under the oversight of regional and international forces.
Second Scenario – Retreat and Decline: Should political Islamic movements fail to address internal and external challenges, they may witness a decline in popularity and influence, creating space for new political powers to emerge while further isolating sectarian Islamic movements, particularly Shiite factions. Continued failure among these parties poses a real threat of political disintegration through heightened sectarian and political divisions.
Third Scenario – Change and Transformation: This scenario highlights political transformations driven by economic collapse and rampant corruption, giving rise to new political forces in the regional milieu. Alternatively, a dramatic shift might occur with the resurgence of protest movements demanding systemic changes and a replacement of corrupt leadership, leading to profound alterations in Iraq’s political framework.
Conclusion
Despite two decades since the political transformation in Iraq and the emergence of a sectarian Islamic model steering the new political landscape, the nature of events and the political, economic, and social realities indicate an inability of Islamic parties to effectively govern and enhance their state management. Instead, these developments have birthed perilous phenomena characterized by sectarian quotas, corruption, and security lapses.
Islamic movements, both jihadist and political, have dominated Iraq’s political scene since 2003 and are directly accountable for sectarian and racial divisions, facilitating international and regional interventions that have rendered Iraq vulnerable in military, security, political, and economic realms, resulting in a backdrop where jihadist movements such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS were emboldened. Such environments contributed to internal conflicts and waves of violence that manifested as sectarian dimensions adversely affecting demographics and leading to the enforced disappearance of thousands of Iraqis, especially in Sunni-majority regions where these jihadist movements have emerged.
The rise of violent Sunni jihadist organizations and territorial domination between 2014-2017 provided justification for the establishment of the PMF in accordance with the fatwa for “jihad”, touted by Shiite clerics. Although this initiative has almost eradicated the ISIS threat in Iraq, the risk of sectarian conflict remains high. The PMF, legally sanctioned by the Iraqi government, has developed into a formal entity comprising 67 fully-armed Shiite factions, many of which are closely tied to Iran, while the Iraqi government lacks direct influence over the PMF’s operations. The presence of these factions has expanded nationwide, including major Sunni areas such as Anbar, Mosul, Salah al-Din, and Diyala, creating precarious relations with local populations prone to erupting into violence.
The strength of Iranian influence in Iraq seems unlikely to experience fundamental changes in the near future, especially given the stability of sectarian dynamics and the strength of Iran’s allied military organizations.
Conversely, the emergence of non-sectarian political entities, such as the Taqaddum Party, led by Mohammed Al-Halbousi, and the current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s coalition, could gradually reduce the dominance of armed Shia Islamic parties in Iraq, contingent on the success in securing alliances with major Kurdish parties.
Under this reality, the future of Islamic movements in Iraq appears to be increasingly ambiguous, with the likelihood of continued development and competition among military factions associated with these movements, potentially engaging in armed confrontations to guarantee their survival or augmentation within the unstable backdrop of Iraqi politics.
References
Books
- “Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein” by Graham Fuller
This report examines major Islamist trends among Iraq’s Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds after the fall of Saddam Hussein. - “The Future of Political Islam” by Graham Fuller
While not exclusively about Iraq, this book likely covers Islamic political movements in the country. - “The Arab Shia: The Forgotten Muslims” co-authored by Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke
This book provides insights into Shia Islamic movements in Iraq and other Arab countries. - “The Shiite Movement in Iraq” by Faleh Abdul-Jabar
Focuses specifically on Shia Islamic movements in Iraq. - “Ayatollahs, Sufis, and Ideologues: State, Religion, and Social Movements in Iraq” edited by Faleh Abdul-Jabar
Covers various religious and ideological movements in Iraq, including Islamic ones. - “Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq” by Samuel Helfont
Investigates the roots of religious insurgencies in Iraq using Ba’thist archives.
