The Zangezur Corridor lies at the heart of a complex geopolitical struggle involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and other global powers, centered on the strategically vital South Caucasus region. This proposed transport route connects Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan (an autonomous region of Azerbaijan) via the Armenian Syunik region, carrying significant implications for regional stability, international relations, and economic dynamics.
Rooted in the long-standing conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, where ethnic and territorial tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis have led to wars and shifts in control, the Zangezur Corridor represents a new chapter in geopolitical competition. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia gained control over Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding areas during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). However, in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan, with robust support from Turkey, reclaimed much of that territorial dominance, thereby altering the regional balance of power. The subsequent ceasefire agreement, mediated by Russia, included plans to reopen the corridor, rekindling tensions between Iran and its ally Russia.
For Azerbaijan and Turkey, the corridor is a strategic asset that enhances regional connectivity and economic integration, potentially extending Turkish influence throughout the South Caucasus and into Central Asia. This aligns with Turkey’s broader ambitions to unify the Turkish-speaking world and boost international trade.
Conversely, Armenia sees the Zangezur Corridor as a direct threat to its sovereignty and regional stability. Fears of potential isolation for its southern regions compel Armenia to view the corridor as a cornerstone for Azerbaijan’s expanded regional ambitions, possibly backed by Turkey. Such developments could undermine Armenia’s geopolitical standing and exacerbate its vulnerabilities in an already volatile region.
This paper posits that Iran’s opposition to the Zangezur Corridor is not merely a concern regarding territorial changes or lost transit revenues from access to Europe via Armenia but a reaction to what it perceives as a coordinated strategy to isolate and strangle its geopolitical influence on multiple fronts. Iran views emerging global trade routes — including, but not limited to, a Silk Road connecting China to Europe via Zangezur, trade routes linking Russia to Turkey and then onto Europe, and initiatives to unite Arab states with Turkey through Iraq’s Al-Faw port — as part of a broader pattern of regional integration that sidelines its strategic interests. The potential exclusion from these new trade routes threatens not only Iran’s economic opportunities but also its wider geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Should these trade paths bypass Iran, they could lay the groundwork for new political and economic alliances that diminish Iran’s capacity to influence regional politics, posing significant risks to its status as a regional power. Additionally, Iran is deeply concerned about nationalist sentiments within its borders, particularly should connections between Azerbaijan and Turkey deepen.
Russia’s Interests in the Zangezur Corridor Exceed Its Relationship with Iran
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a pivotal moment that reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus, leading to the emergence of newly independent states and reigniting ethnic and regional conflicts suppressed under Soviet rule. Since then, Russia, as the successor state, has played a crucial role in the region’s geopolitics. As part of its “near abroad” strategy and a strategic buffer against NATO expansion, Russia has sought to maintain its influence in the area.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia positioned itself as a mediator and peacekeeper in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, successfully navigating a complex balance between Armenia — a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — and Azerbaijan, which is a key energy partner. Under the 2020 ceasefire agreement mediated by Russia, its peacekeeping forces were deployed along the Lachin Corridor to ensure the safety of Armenians traveling between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
Prior to the onset of the Ukrainian war, Russia maintained a steadfast stance regarding the Caucasus region and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, aligning closely with Iran’s position to prevent Turkish or NATO influence from penetrating the Caucasus and extending into the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, which Russia and Iran consider strategic and traditional spheres of influence.
The war in Ukraine has significantly altered international relations, reshaping factors that Russia once perceived as threats to its influence, with the Turkish-Russian relations standing out as a major change.
Russia sees the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union not as temporary measures tied to the conflict in Ukraine but as permanent restrictions. Chief among these sanctions is the inability to export its gas and goods via shared overland routes with Eastern and Western European countries. Consequently, it is now seeking to circumvent these sanctions by establishing international trade corridors that connect it to the Caucasian countries and Turkey, eventually reaching Europe. Russia views Turkey as a key player in this context, as Turkey is striving to position itself as a global hub for energy and goods exchange, acting as a bridge between Asia and Europe. Therefore, Russia’s position regarding the Zangezur Corridor has become more flexible, as it presents an opportunity to export Russian energy and goods to Turkey through Azerbaijan and then to the EU without revealing their origin. This evolution is precisely what has brought Iranian-Russian tensions into the public eye.
A Public Russian-Iranian Dispute Erupts
Despite the historically deep relations between Iran and Armenia, Iran asserted through its leader, Ali Khamenei, during the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the necessity for Armenia to return all Azerbaijani territories it occupied.
However, Tehran’s stance on the Zangezur Corridor has remained consistent; it insists that it must remain under Armenian control, denying any other state influence at the Armenia-Iran border. Khamenei reiterated this position during meetings with both the Russian and Turkish presidents in 2022.
The visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan and subsequent statements from the Russian Foreign Ministry marked the beginning of heightened tensions between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor. Shortly after this visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced Moscow’s support for expediting a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan and opening communication routes in the region. This statement was interpreted by Iran as Russian support for establishing the Zangezur Corridor, which Tehran viewed as undermining its regional influence.
The situation intensified when Maria Zakharova, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, commented on Iranian concerns about the Zangezur Corridor, stating that Moscow’s position on this matter remains firm and aligns with finding an acceptable resolution for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other regional neighbors. Her remark that “we will clarify this to Iran until it accepts this” was interpreted as Russia’s push for Iran to align with its viewpoint on regional transport and geopolitical routes.
These Russian statements came less than a month after Khamenei told Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan that the opening of the Zangezur Corridor contradicts Armenia’s interests while asserting Iran’s steadfast position on this issue.
In response to the Russian statements, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi clarified on social media that Iran vehemently rejects any changes to the borders of its neighboring countries. This stance reflects Iran’s long-standing policy against any geopolitical shifts that might threaten its access to regional trade routes or diminish its influence.
Following these developments, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador in Tehran to express its concerns. However, this was described as a “meeting,” a term used by Iran when summoning ambassadors of allied countries to record formal objections without overtly escalating bilateral tensions. During this meeting, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister reiterated Iran’s opposition to any alterations to recognized international borders and geopolitical changes in the area.
Meanwhile, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme Council for Economic Coordination of the three powers, remarked that the behavior of Russian politicians concerning the Zangezur Corridor and the three Iranian islands is unacceptable and that this ambiguity must be resolved.
The Iranian news agency Tasnim, closely aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that the Russian Foreign Ministry is delusional, believing that resolving its issues with Armenia through a so-called Zangezur Corridor, which will never be created in opposition to Iran. According to the concept of “strategic relationship” sought by Iran and Russia, taking such tactical steps contradicts the fundamentals of the strategic relationship. Meanwhile, the Iranian newspaper Khorasan headlined its front page: “Russia’s Conspiracy via the Illusory Corridor.”
Although Russian National Security Council Chief Sergey Shoigu subsequently denied any plans to open the Zangezur Corridor and reiterated respect for Iranian territories, all the aforementioned indicates that Iranian leaders are compelled to reassess their relationship with Moscow, which they have often classified as a strategic alliance — a classification that appears increasingly inaccurate.
Reasons for Iran’s Opposition to the Opening of the Zangezur Corridor
Indirect Underlying Reasons
Tehran presents several indirect reasons to justify its anxiety and rejection of the Zangezur Corridor.
Changing Historical Borders
Officially, Iran cites the reduction of its neighboring countries from 15 to 14 as a primary concern regarding the opening of the Zangezur Corridor. However, this perspective oversimplifies the issue, as the cooperation between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey over the corridor largely pertains to logistical management instead of military control or redrawing borders.
Loss of Transit Revenues
Another main argument from Iran is the potential disruption of its route through Armenia to international markets or to the Russian market. However, Iranian customs data reveals that only a tiny fraction — approximately one percent — of Iranian exports to Russia passes through Armenia, while over 40% of Iranian exports to Russia transit through Azerbaijan and the remainder via the Caspian Sea. This suggests that the economic impact of the Zangezur Corridor on Iran’s trade might be overstated in its rhetoric.
The current situation highlights Iran’s marginal position in the regional and international economic landscape, where mutual benefits remain critically underutilized. For example, Iran’s total exports to Russia amounted to approximately $851 million at a weight of 1.984 million tons over the 11 months of 2023, reflecting modest economic engagement with its key ally to the east, Russia.
NATO Presence Near Iran’s Borders
One of Iran’s pressing concerns is the presence of NATO, particularly through Turkey, in the Caucasus region. While Turkey is a NATO member, its maneuvers in foreign policy, particularly amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine, demonstrate considerable independence towards both the Eastern and Western camps. Turkey is primarily driven by its ambition to position itself as a central hub for global trade, particularly between Russia and China on one hand and Europe on the other. Turkey’s strategy to bolster economic ties with Russia, reflected in a trade volume exceeding $65 billion in 2022, adopts a pragmatic approach that transcends traditional geopolitical alliances.
Direct and Primary Reasons
A) Strategic Suffocation
Iran’s vehement opposition to the Zangezur Corridor stems from its profound fears of marginalization and economic and strategic suffocation. With the emergence of new global trade routes, Iran finds its historical trade paths increasingly sidelined, threatening its economic stability and reducing its influence in critical regions such as the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Such marginalization could lead to the reshaping of regional dynamics, potentially giving rise to new economic and political blocs that exclude Iran, imposing challenges to its foreign policy objectives and diminishing its role as a regional power.
In contrast, the Zangezur Corridor offers an enticing alternative to major global players, including China, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the European Union. For China, this corridor represents a stable and efficient route, reducing reliance on politically and security-volatile paths through either Russia or Iran, both of which are subject to ongoing international sanctions. For Turkey and Azerbaijan, it aligns with their respective ambitions to serve as central trade hubs between East and West, enhancing their geopolitical influence and economic ties with Europe and Asia. EU backing of this corridor supports its objective to diversify supply chains.
Consequently, the most significant global trade corridors that Iran fears could bypass its territory include:
Zangezur: The Link Connecting Russia to Turkey and Europe Without Iran
From Iran’s perspective, the slow progress Russia has made in investing in the North-South trade corridor across its territory, intended to connect Russian goods to India via Iranian territory, represents a strategic delay rather than merely a logistical or financial challenge. The North-South transport corridor is vital for Iran to become a central hub in Eurasian trade, encompassing the construction and rehabilitation of rail lines, such as linking Azerbaijan’s Astara port with Iran’s Rasht, with a relatively modest investment of around $400 million. Iran interprets this delay by Russia in advancing such a strategically economic project as a possible signal that Moscow may have altered its priorities or may not fully commit to national and border security corridors, potentially portending serious impacts on Iran’s economic future.
In the same vein, Iran perceives the opening of the Zangezur Corridor as an alternative global economic corridor to the North-South route that could redirect regional trade flows away from it, exacerbating its economic isolation. This corridor could provide a direct link between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, circumventing Iran and potentially diminishing the volume of trade and transit benefits that Iran currently enjoys. Such a development would not only impact Iran’s economy but also diminish its geopolitical influence in the region and reduce its strategic importance in its historical sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Exclusion from China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Iran’s concerns surrounding the Zangezur Corridor stem from its potential to significantly alter the dynamics of the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby reducing Iran’s role as a key transit point. If the Zangezur Corridor becomes a principal conduit for transporting goods from China to Europe, bypassing Iran entirely, it would severely impact Iran’s economic prospects of serving as a Silk Road hub. Tehran has consistently sought to leverage its strategic position to become a vital nexus within global trade networks. However, continuous sanctions, alongside outdated infrastructure related to land routes and railways, coupled with effective ports, as well as its ongoing strained relations with the West, undermine its capacity to function as a reliable route for the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, the Zangezur Corridor poses a direct challenge to Iran’s strategic ambitions, redirecting valuable trade flows away from it.
From China’s perspective, the Zangezur Corridor offers a more efficient and politically reliable alternative to the current northern route through Russia or the southern route through Iran. The corridor, which runs through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey before reaching Europe, is approximately 3,000 kilometers shorter than the northern route through Russia.
Moreover, the geopolitical climate, characterized by ongoing Western sanctions against both Iran and Russia, makes these routes increasingly unpredictable and fraught with risks. The Zangezur Corridor aligns with China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative strategy to diversify trade routes, minimizing reliance on any single pathway and reducing potential disruptions. Not only does this corridor offer a shorter transit route, but it also benefits from relatively stable political and economic cooperation among South Caucasian states and Turkey.
Marginalization of Iran Through Biden’s Initiative to Connect India to Europe via the Middle East
President Joe Biden’s plan, unveiled at the 2023 G20 summit, proposes a new trade route linking India to Europe via the Middle East, completely bypassing Iranian territory. By connecting India with Gulf countries and Europe through a network of ports, railways, and infrastructure, the initiative effectively diminishes Iran’s role as a principal transit hub. Importantly, this corridor runs through Israeli ports — Iran’s historical adversary — exacerbating Tehran’s concerns. This new route allows for the efficient movement of goods and energy, providing an alternative to existing pathways that involve Iran or the Suez Canal, thereby undermining Iran’s economic influence in the region.
By excluding Iran from this network, the Biden administration aims to create a cooperative framework that not only accelerates trade but also reduces the geopolitical risks associated with relying on Iranian routes. As a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, this corridor enhances the infrastructure and trade connections in a strategically vital region, positioning other nations as key transit points while diminishing Tehran’s influence in regional and global trade.
Exclusion from the Development Route Through Iraq
Iran’s strategic concerns are further exacerbated by Iraq’s lack of cooperation in establishing a land route via the Shalamjah railway linking Iran to Basra in Iraq, traversing Syria to the Mediterranean Sea and then onto Europe. This Development Road project aims to connect Gulf countries to Turkey and, subsequently, Europe via Iraq.
The project excludes Iran from the commercial route, indicating strategic changes in trade and transport balances in the region.
B) Nationalism
The establishment of the Zangezur Corridor is intrinsically linked to Iran’s historical rivalries and security concerns regarding its national identity. Tehran views the corridor not merely as an economic conduit but as a strategic tool for expanding Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and beyond.
Iran’s historical memory of conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s ancestor, significantly influences its interpretation of contemporary Turkish geopolitical maneuvering. Iran perceives the notion of Turkish nationalism, which envisions greater cultural and political integration among Turkic-speaking peoples, as a potential threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Iran’s concerns are further compounded by its diverse demographic makeup, particularly its large population of Azerbaijani Turks, who share deep cultural, linguistic, and historical ties with the wider Turkish world. The opening of the Zangezur Corridor is likely to enhance interactions among these ethnic groups, fostering a sense of shared identity that transcends national borders, given the proximity of Iranian provinces with a Turkish majority to both the Azerbaijani and Turkish borders.
This concern also raises fears of potential separatist movements or aspirations for regional autonomy among its Turkish citizens. The prospect of establishing stronger bonds between Iranian Turks and nearby Turkish-speaking nations could shift loyalty dynamics within Iran, posing a strategic dilemma for a nation already sensitive to issues of national unity and cohesion amidst its ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian diversity.
Furthermore, Iran regards the corridor as a direct challenge to its broader geopolitical strategy in the South Caucasus. Historically, Iran has positioned itself as a balancing power in the region, mediating relationships between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The opening of the Zangezur Corridor could tilt the regional balance of power in favor of Turkey, enhancing Turkish strategic influence and deepening military and intelligence collaboration among Turkic states.
Scenarios and Alternative Iranian Options
Iranian Aras Corridor as an Alternative to Zangezur
Iran has proposed the Aras corridor, a strategic route traversing its territory, as an alternative to the Zangezur Corridor in order to maintain a balanced position in the South Caucasus. This corridor would facilitate communication between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Iranian territory, functioning as a significant transit route. Tehran seeks to connect the Aras corridor with the international North-South corridor and the Black Sea-Gulf corridor, enhancing regional connectivity and expanding Iran’s influence in both Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Russia might support this plan due to the involvement of Russian railways in Armenia. By creating a railway line from Yerevan to Astara-Rasht, Iran could secure direct railway access to Europe and Russia via Armenia and Azerbaijan, representing a “less mutually beneficial” solution for regional players. Should Iran continue to reject the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, Turkey might also, after normalizing relations with Armenia, incline toward joining this initiative by reviving the Kars-Gyumri railway line; the reopening of this line could promote trade and regional connectivity, acting as a bridge between Europe and Asia, while restoring ties between Turkey and the South Caucasus via Armenia.
Nonetheless, Iranians view Azerbaijan’s interest in the Aras corridor as temporary, primarily aimed at pressuring Armenia to accept the Zangezur Corridor. Additionally, Azerbaijan and Turkey may abandon the Aras route once they secure direct land and rail connections through Armenia, diminishing the relevance of the Aras corridor in the long term. Furthermore, the Aras corridor requires renovation and expansion to convert it into a transit thoroughfare, which it currently lacks.
Moreover, activating this route would likely face Armenian opposition as it marginalizes Armenia in the transit corridor. Such an initiative might also encounter resistance from Western powers, particularly the United States, due to its potential impact on regional dynamics.
Zangezur Corridor Under Armenian Control
From Iran’s standpoint, the persuasive alternative to Azerbaijan’s control over the Zangezur Corridor lies in supporting the establishment of the corridor under complete Armenian control. Iran firmly believes that Armenian forces should oversee and manage transit through this corridor, a position reiterated multiple times by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
While this approach may not provide Iran with immediate economic advantages from routes passing through its territory, it does offer a strategic benefit by reducing geopolitical disruptions and potential military clashes. By advocating for Armenian control, Iran reinforces its role as a stable regional mediator, safeguarding its interests in the South Caucasus and ensuring access to critical transportation links without external influence. Moreover, endorsing this position could serve as a tactical step to deter or delay potential Turkish-Azerbaijani military initiatives aimed at forcefully establishing the corridor through Armenia.
A Solution Through Diplomatic Negotiation
Iran supports the “3+3” dialogue formula, a strategic framework that gathers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. This initiative aims to bolster regional cooperation and limit Western influence, particularly concerning the Zangezur Corridor. For Tehran, securing a seat at the negotiation table regarding discussions about the corridor is crucial for protecting its strategic interests and preventing marginalization.
Iran’s position aligns with that of Armenia and Georgia, both of which share concerns regarding the Zangezur Corridor. Georgia, in particular, opposes the opening of the corridor as it is the only country in the Caucasus with direct access to the Black Sea. Georgia proposes an alternative solution for Azerbaijan by developing an international transit corridor through the Caspian Sea across its territory. This proposal is part of a broader strategy to enhance east-west communications, circumventing both Russian and Iranian territories, connecting Europe to Azerbaijan via Turkey and Georgia, and extending to China.
In conclusion, the future of the Zangezur Corridor remains uncertain and heavily relies on the evolving relationships between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, and Russia. The actions and decisions of these actors will determine whether the corridor will become a bridge fostering cooperation and interconnectedness or a flashpoint for renewed conflict, shaping the stability, security, and economic development of the region for years to come.
References
Books
- “The New Geopolitics of the South Caucasus: Prospects for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Resolution” edited by Shireen T. Hunter (2017)
- “The South Caucasus: Security, Energy and Europeanization” edited by Meliha B. Altunışık and Oktay F. Tanrisever (2018)
- “Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe” by Margarita Assenova (2020)
- “The South Caucasus – Security, Energy and Europeanization” by Meliha B. Altunisik and Oktay F. Tanrisever (2018)
Reports and Articles
- “The Zangezur corridor as part of the global transport route (against the backdrop of the changing geopolitical situation)” by Esmira Jafarova in Security and Defence Quarterly (2022)
- “Unveiling Geopolitical Dynamics Around ‘Zangezur Corridor'” by Caucasus Watch (2023)
- “Zangezur Corridor: Economic Potential and Political Constraints” by Russia in Global Affairs (2023)
- “The Economic Importance of the South Caucasus Zangazur Corridor” by Vusal Gasimli (2023)
- “Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War” by Chr. Michelsen Institute (2022)
- “The Zangazur Corridor as the new haulage hub for integration and cooperation in the South Caucasus” by Vusal Gasimli (2023)
- “Contestation over Corridors in the South Caucasus” by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2023)