Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is seeking to calm tensions with the Kurds and achieve a historic political reconciliation with them, alongside his ally, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, who is part of the governing coalition with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and is known for his nationalist views.
This situation raises numerous questions about the potential success of this prospective reconciliation, as well as the obstacles hindering its completion, especially given the rapidly changing dynamics both within Turkey and abroad, along with the possible future scenarios surrounding this potential reconciliation.
Interconnected Dimensions:
Efforts for reconciliation between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) coincide with several complex dimensions, the most notable of which are as follows:
Bahçeli’s Initiative: Devlet Bahçeli has renewed his call for an opening towards reconciliation with the Kurds by inviting PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned for life for the past quarter-century, to speak in the Turkish Parliament and announce the end of the banned party’s presence in Turkey and to lay down arms in exchange for an end to his isolation and consideration of legal amendments for his release. Some expect that this initiative could lead Turkey towards a comprehensive resolution of the Kurdish issue. This call follows a surprising handshake between Bahçeli and Kurdish deputies during the opening session of the new legislative year of the Turkish Parliament on October 1, 2024. Bahçeli’s efforts towards the Kurds are described as “historic” and “unprecedented,” indicating clear and prior coordination between Erdoğan and Bahçeli regarding their desire to resolve the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
Kurdistan’s Attack on TUSAS: The reconciliation process coincided with a terrorist attack on the Turkish state-owned aerospace and defense company, TUSAS, in Ankara on October 23, 2024, resulting in five deaths and 22 injuries. Two days later, PKK militants claimed responsibility for the attack, prompting the Turkish government to respond strongly against the group. Turkish air forces launched airstrikes on 47 PKK and YPG targets in northern Iraq and Syria, and police arrested 176 individuals affiliated with the PKK.
Isolation of Kurdish Mayors: After the arrest of the mayor of Esenyurt, Ahmed Ozer, a member of the Republican People’s Party in Istanbul, on October 30, 2024, the Turkish government dismissed pro-Kurdish mayors in three southeastern cities on November 4, 2024, on charges of their alleged ties to the banned PKK. This move garnered significant attention in the international press and sparked large protests in Turkish streets, especially since Kurds constitute about one-fifth of Turkey’s population of 85 million.
Ankara’s Goals:
Erdoğan seeks reconciliation with the Kurds in Turkey to achieve several objectives, the most prominent of which are:
Undermining Terrorist Activities: The Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation might represent a historic opportunity for Erdoğan to undermine terrorism in Turkey and along its borders. Erdoğan emphasized in a speech to AKP deputies on October 30, 2024, that Turkish unity with the Kurds is key to eliminating PKK terrorism, a sentiment echoed by Bahçeli, who affirmed that the MHP supports national unity and brotherhood in Turkey to put an end to terrorism, viewing it as a national rather than electoral goal.
Completing Normalization with Damascus: Erdoğan may also aim to finalize the stalled normalization process with Damascus. Should Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation be achieved and U.S. support for the Kurds in Syria cease, Turkey’s security concerns in Syria might be alleviated, potentially leading to Turkey’s withdrawal from Syria or at least the presentation of a clear timeline for withdrawal, accepted by the Syrian side, which considers the removal of Turkish forces from its territory a prerequisite for normalization between the two countries.
Passing a New Constitution: One of the challenges Erdoğan currently faces is that the Turkish constitution does not allow him to run for re-election in 2028. Without a sufficiently large parliamentary majority to change that, he needs support from the pro-Kurdish party to remain in power. To this end, calls for reconciliation with the Kurds have emerged; some believe the Turkish government may offer concessions to the pro-Kurdish party to gain its support in passing a new constitution that enables Erdoğan to run in the 2028 elections, especially since Bahçeli has announced that the goal of the new constitution will be to allow Erdoğan to run for the presidency again.
Avoiding European Pressure: The reconciliation might also aim to evade European pressure on Turkey regarding its declining human rights record. On November 9, 2024, the “Freedom for Öcalan” campaign, a British trade union initiative launched in 2016 with support from the Trade Union Congress, called on Turkey to end its “systematic repression” against Kurdish communities and to respect local democracy.
Opportunities for Reconciliation:
There are several promising opportunities for Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation, including:
Overcoming the Terrorist Attack: The government’s management of the TUSAS attack, claimed by PKK militants, could provide a significant opportunity for completing the reconciliation with the Kurds. Erdoğan noted that the attack would not interrupt the peace dialogue with the Kurds, which he views as a “historic chance” to end the internal conflict with the Kurds in Turkey.
Missed Economic Opportunities: Reconciliation could present a considerable economic opportunity for Turkey. Experts at the Dicle Center for Social Research (DITAM) in the predominantly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir estimated that Ankara’s economic loss due to the Kurdish conflict amounts to approximately $4.2 trillion. The crisis with the Kurds has forced Turkey to prioritize security spending in Kurdish areas, funds that could have been utilized in other economic sectors had the Kurdish conflict not existed.
Opposition Support: Efforts for reconciliation have received Kurdish support, as expressed by co-leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Tulay Hatimoglu, who welcomed Bahçeli’s initiative. The reconciliation was also endorsed by the opposition, with the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Özgür Özal, supporting Bahçeli’s initiative, asserting that any step aimed at ending violence against the Kurds and uniting Turkey “is valuable.” He also emphasized that denying the Kurdish cause would set the country back 50 years.
U.S. Elections: The U.S. elections present a significant concern for the Kurds. It is unlikely that these elections will change Turkey’s ambitions regarding the Kurds; thus, the Kurds might yield to Erdoğan and his allies’ calls for reconciliation, especially since Erdoğan’s first request to elected President Donald Trump during their initial phone call on November 8, 2024, following his victory in the U.S. presidential elections, was to permanently halt U.S. support for the Kurds. Trump’s first presidency was regarded as a catastrophe for the Kurdish movement, as Washington abandoned the self-administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (Rojava), controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), allowing Turkey the freedom to act in the region.
Existing Challenges:
Despite Erdoğan’s goals for reconciliation with the Kurds and the opportunities that lie ahead, several challenges remain in the way of achieving this reconciliation, including:
Diminished Influence of Öcalan: The declining influence of Abdullah Öcalan within the PKK could pose a significant hurdle to Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation, given that his control over the party and its branches is no longer as predominant as it once was, even though his historical leadership is acknowledged. His imprisonment means he lacks the full capacity and authority to make strategic decisions for the party.
Continued Repression: The ongoing repression still practiced by the Turkish government represents a major challenge for the anticipated reconciliation. On November 7, 2024, Turkish authorities opened an investigation against the leader of the Kurdish Democratic and Equality Party, Tunçer Bakırhan, while imposing a new penalty on Öcalan. Some believe that had Erdoğan’s true goal been to complete the reconciliation with the Kurds, he would not have imposed a new penalty on Öcalan.
The Terrorist Attack: Despite the government’s navigation of the terrorist attack issue, some analysts believe that the Kurdish attack in Ankara could obstruct peace negotiations. The attack suggests that a faction within the Kurds still rejects reconciliation with the government or, at the very least, harbors significant doubts about the government’s sincerity regarding reconciliation, and that faction may actively work to sabotage the reconciliation process.
In conclusion, considering the current state of affairs regarding Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation, alongside the opportunities that may motivate both sides to complete the reconciliation, there are also specific goals and interests that Turkish President Erdoğan aims to achieve through this reconciliation. Therefore, it is likely that the coming period will witness movements from Erdoğan and his allies to publicly coordinate efforts with the Kurds to facilitate reconciliation, or at the very least, the Turkish government may offer temporary concessions to the Kurds in order to reap the benefits of completing the reconciliation process.
