President Donald Trump’s latest wave of tariffs has sent shockwaves through Washington’s Asian partnerships. Countries once considered pivotal to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy—particularly India and members of the ASEAN bloc—are now facing some of the harshest trade penalties. While Washington views these nations as counterweights to China’s growing influence, the punitive tariff measures risk undermining years of strategic relationship-building. More importantly, they may accelerate a shift toward multipolarity in Asia, with partners like India and ASEAN weighing closer cooperation with Beijing, Tokyo, and other regional players.
Tariffs That Rattle Key U.S. Partners
The revised tariff rates have landed hardest on India and ASEAN economies. India, penalized for its significant imports of Russian crude oil, faces a 25% initial tariff with an additional 25% increase as a punitive measure. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries—heavily reliant on exports—have been hit unevenly, with rates ranging from 19% for the Philippines and Indonesia to 40% for Laos and Myanmar.
Despite Indonesia and the Philippines signing bilateral trade agreements with Washington, the terms have proven highly imbalanced, raising long-term concerns for key industries like textiles and rubber. Indonesia’s hope for tariff exemptions went unmet, prompting its trade minister, Santoso, to announce renegotiation plans. India responded even more forcefully, denouncing the Trump tariff doctrine as “unfair, unjustified, and unreasonable,” while vowing to safeguard its energy security and pursue its own trade interests—even as bilateral trade negotiations with the U.S. continue.
A Gamble for Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
Trump’s tariff policy represents a high-risk gamble for the United States. With U.S.-China competition intensifying, alienating India and ASEAN could weaken Washington’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Critics, including former presidential candidate Nikki Haley, argue that repairing U.S.-India ties is essential to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.
Yet, recent diplomatic moves suggest Washington’s Asian partners are not waiting for reconciliation. China has been quick to fill the gap—Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi promised new border trade arrangements, while Premier Li Qiang’s trip to Indonesia underscored Beijing’s desire to revive the “Bandung spirit” of cooperation. These developments hint at growing openness toward China, even if a full pivot remains unlikely.
Why a Full ‘China Pivot’ Is Unlikely
Despite Washington’s fears, Asia is not poised to swing decisively into China’s orbit. India’s doctrine of “multi-alignment,” its historic distrust of alliances, and ongoing border disputes with Beijing make a complete China pivot improbable. Similarly, ASEAN states maintain complicated ties with China—while Beijing is an essential economic partner, its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea directly threaten the sovereignty of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
Moreover, ASEAN and India’s extensive trade ties with Japan and South Korea, as well as their reliance on secure shipping lanes through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, ensure that no single power can dominate the region without sparking pushback.
Deepening India-ASEAN Cooperation
In recent years, India and ASEAN have expanded their economic and strategic ties. Singapore remains India’s largest source of foreign direct investment, while Indonesia has become a crucial supplier of palm oil and rubber to India. Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have also increased trade and sought diversified partnerships across Asia.
However, China maintains a strong foothold through foreign investment, with over US$10 billion annually flowing into ASEAN compared to India’s US$2 billion pre-pandemic. To address imbalances, India has launched a review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), seeking greater market access and more balanced tariff structures. For ASEAN economies like Vietnam—already struggling with heavy trade deficits with China—strengthening ties with India could help reduce over-reliance on Beijing.
The Push Toward Multipolarity
While China’s economic outreach and role in global supply chains give it undeniable influence, India still holds key cards. Its defense partnerships with ASEAN are expanding—highlighted by the Philippines’ BrahMos missile deal, Vietnam’s interest in similar purchases, and Indonesia’s cooperation on maritime security. India’s demographic advantage and labor force also position it as a critical partner for countries with aging populations, such as Japan and Taiwan.
For ASEAN states like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, excessive reliance on China risks forcing concessions on sovereignty in the South China Sea. Similarly, India’s strategic mistrust of China makes a pivot unlikely, reinforcing the appeal of a multipolar framework where no single power dominates.
Conclusion
Trump’s tariff doctrine may secure short-term leverage for Washington, but its long-term impact could weaken U.S. influence in Asia. By straining relations with India and ASEAN, the U.S. risks driving them to diversify partnerships—not solely with China, but with Japan, South Korea, the EU, and each other. Instead of reinforcing America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, tariffs could accelerate the rise of a more multipolar Asia, where Washington’s role is diluted rather than strengthened.
For the U.S., the lesson is clear: tariffs may win tactical victories, but trust, dialogue, and equitable partnerships remain the most effective tools to secure lasting influence in the Indo-Pacific.
