There is broad consensus among experts in the United States regarding the importance of prioritizing Asian affairs in American foreign policy. This approach emerged when former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the “Asian Pivot” initiative in a piece published by Foreign Policy magazine. The initiative was further reinforced by former President Barack Obama in a speech delivered before the Australian parliament on November 17, 2011. In his speech, Obama stressed the need to redeploy a significant portion of U.S. forces abroad to the Asia-Pacific region, shifting focus away from the Middle East and Europe. This marked a significant departure from the traditional “Europe First” strategy to a new “Asia First” focus.
However, Washington struggled to adhere to this shift in focus. There was no concerted effort among U.S. agencies responsible for policymaking to translate Clinton’s article into actionable steps. Furthermore, European countries reacted negatively to the possibility of the U.S. redirecting its attention toward Asia, while some Asian nations were wary of being forced to choose between China and the U.S. As a result, the term “Asian Pivot” was softened to “Rebalancing” in official U.S. discourse to avoid backlash. Nevertheless, the term “pivot” continued to be used in media outlets.
In this context, Robert D. Blackwill, former U.S. Ambassador to India, and Richard Fontaine, President of the Center for a New American Security, evaluate the “Asian Pivot” initiative in their book Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power, published in 2024. They examine the historical role of Asia in U.S. foreign policy, assess the efforts made so far, and analyze the implications for other regions, particularly Europe and the Middle East. The book also offers future recommendations regarding U.S. policy in Asia.
The Importance of the “Asian Pivot”
The authors argue that focusing on Asia is essential for U.S. foreign policy in order to maintain a strategic balance with China’s growing power and to capitalize on Asia’s economic dynamism. This is evident in China’s policy of drawing closer to its Asian neighbors militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Beijing has become the leading trade partner for most Asian countries, making them increasingly vulnerable to potential economic coercion.
The authors note that U.S. influence in the region in 2021 was significantly weaker than it had been in 2011. They describe this period, which spanned the administrations of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump, as a “lost decade.” The failure of successive U.S. administrations to prioritize the Asian Pivot is considered one of the three greatest foreign policy mistakes since the end of World War II. The other two, according to the authors, were President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to escalate the Vietnam War in 1965 and President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
Decision-Maker Disagreements
According to the book, U.S. leaders were either unable or unwilling to take the necessary risks to ensure the success of the Asian Pivot over the past decade. These leaders often focused too much on their personal goals, such as re-election, which led them to maintain the status quo with regard to Asia in general, and China in particular. U.S. administrations also tended to concentrate their diplomatic efforts on the developed world rather than poorer countries, leaving a vacuum for Beijing to fill.
For example, the United States closed its embassy in the Solomon Islands between 1993 and 2023, allowing China to make inroads in one of the poorest nations in the Pacific. In 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a security agreement that, according to a leaked draft, would allow Chinese naval ships to resupply on the islands, raising concerns in the U.S. and among its allies. Furthermore, China built artificial islands in the South China Sea and militarized them, contrary to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s assurances to U.S. President Joe Biden, weakening U.S. deterrence in the region.
The authors also highlight internal disagreements among U.S. policymakers regarding the nature and timing of the Chinese threat and how to respond. Hawks, who advocate for a more aggressive military approach, believe a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is imminent and favor a proactive defense of the island. In contrast, doves, who prefer peaceful solutions, downplay this possibility and fear that a strong U.S. military presence could hasten the very war they seek to prevent.
Even U.S. officials in the Departments of State and Defense who agree that China poses a military threat disagree on whether the U.S. should prioritize short-term or long-term preparedness. For instance, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was highly engaged with Asia, while her successor John Kerry focused more on issues in the Middle East and Russia.
The book also mentions the 2013 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which was intended to be the economic cornerstone of the Asian Pivot. Negotiations on the agreement were delayed, and it was not finalized before the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Both presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, opposed the agreement during the campaign. After Trump’s election victory, he withdrew from the agreement entirely. The authors describe this withdrawal as a disaster, arguing that it exemplified the inconsistent U.S. diplomacy in Asia.
China’s Reaction
China, with its massive military and economic power, was the primary target of the Asian Pivot. As expected, Beijing launched a rhetorical campaign against the initiative, despite knowing that Washington had not yet implemented it. In this context, China took advantage of the opportunity to significantly expand its military power in Asia, tipping the balance of military power in the South China Sea and Taiwan in its favor.
The authors argue that the U.S. continued to underestimate the Chinese challenge until the late 2010s. It was not until former President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy that the idea of China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the global order was abandoned. China was then classified as a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power.” Yet, Trump’s administration made no significant changes to counter the Chinese threat.
Biden’s Administration Policy
The book acknowledges some efforts by President Joe Biden’s administration to launch a “partial pivot” through several initiatives. These include the 2021 AUKUS security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which is expected to involve an increasing number of participants. Additionally, the U.S. has strengthened relations with several Asian countries, including hosting the first-ever ASEAN summit in Washington in 2022, bolstering its alliance with Japan, and fostering trilateral partnerships, such as the U.S.-Japan-Korea and U.S.-Japan-Philippines alliances. These efforts demonstrate that the Biden administration recognizes that the U.S. cannot compete with China in Asia without the help of its allies and partners. However, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have diverted the Biden administration’s attention away from Asia for the time being.
Despite these challenges, the authors do not question the value of the Asian Pivot in U.S. foreign policy. They recommend increasing military spending, particularly in Asia, adopting a U.S. trade policy with Asian nations, continuing to strengthen American alliances in the Indo-Pacific, joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and “de-risking” economic relations with China by enhancing bilateral diplomacy under the “One China” policy. This policy recognizes the Chinese belief that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of it.
Moreover, the authors stress the importance of maintaining open communication channels with Beijing, shifting U.S. military assets and personnel from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, and securing greater European support in competing with China. This could be done by encouraging allies to establish common standards on technology, cybersecurity, and human rights. The U.S. should also build alliances around specific issues, such as preventing economic coercion and intellectual property theft, and defending democratic values and institutions.
In conclusion, the U.S. needs a more cohesive approach to the Indo-Pacific. With the increasing instability of the international order, it is vital for policymakers to fully understand the objectives, outcomes, and limitations of the Asian Pivot in order to mobilize resources and alliances to preserve the existing global order, especially in Asia. The authors assert that crafting an effective foreign policy for the Asian region is crucial for maintaining security, prosperity, and the protection of American democratic values.
The book concludes that the Asian Pivot in U.S. policy is critical to ensuring that China cannot or will not overturn the existing international order. Yet, despite the strategic importance of this pivot, there are few American successes to speak of, as the U.S. presence in Asia remains weak. Moreover, Washington is unprepared for any unforeseen consequences following the next U.S. presidential election, while American policymakers face a fundamental challenge: domestic public skepticism about the U.S.’s continued role in leading the international order.
Source:
Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power (Oxford University Press, 2024).
