Citizenship, at its core, is a pattern of reciprocal relations between the citizen and the homeland to which they belong. Within this interactive relationship, both parties are entitled to and obligated to observe a set of rights and duties defined by the constitution and law. Therefore, citizenship is not a static concept but rather a dynamic one that has historically undergone profound transformations in its content. While this concept has roots extending back to Greek and Roman origins, the contemporary understanding of citizenship fundamentally emerged with the rise of the modern nation-state in Europe under the Westphalia Treaty of Sovereign States in 1648, which serves as its main incubator. Since that time, the spectrum of rights associated with this citizenship has evolved from civil rights in the 18th century, to political rights in the 19th century, and then to economic and social rights in the first half of the 20th century, and finally, cultural rights in the second half of the 20th century, although this progression has not occurred uniformly across all societies. In Germany, for instance, social citizenship developed prior to political citizenship. Furthermore, these citizenship rights have been, and continue to be, a source of debate, both in the North and South, and within Western societies themselves, as differing political and intellectual currents have varying perspectives on them. In contrast to the consensus surrounding civil and political rights in these Western societies, there remains ongoing debate regarding the recognition of economic and social rights as citizenship rights, and this debate becomes more pronounced concerning the rights of cultural plurality for citizens of immigrant backgrounds.
This study aims to analyze the positions of the right-wing currents—especially the new right comprising conservatives and neo-liberals—and social democrats regarding the issue of citizenship, as both are among the most significant political and intellectual trends that have contributed—and continue to contribute—to shaping the concept of citizenship in Western countries. Their perspectives on the concept of citizenship have had profound implications for many other countries around the world.
Study Problem and Questions:
The core problem of the study lies in viewing the concept of citizenship as not a fixed concept, but one that has been redefined multiple times in light of the nature and evolution of societies, particularly Western societies, where this concept closely aligns with the rise of the nation-state since the latter half of the 17th century. Like all human inventions—as some researchers suggest—the concept of citizenship is inherently fragile, constantly threatened, and in a continuous need for protection, unless societies manage to achieve a certain degree of relative balance among its diverse components: civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, where citizens feel a sense of belonging, justice, and are not marginalized or excluded. Therefore, the process of building citizenship should be ongoing, allowing the concept to accommodate internal and external transformations within society. Without a sense of belonging, which represents the essence of citizenship from the individual’s side towards the rest of society, it would be impossible for society to collectively address the challenges it faces. The issue of immigration in European countries exemplifies this, as it has become the most significant challenge facing these nations in forging a comprehensive conception of citizenship, particularly regarding whether they will recognize the rights of cultural plurality for their citizens of immigrant origins.
The main question of the study is: What is the perspective of both the new right and social democrats on the concept and substance of citizenship rights? What are the areas of agreement and disagreement between them in this regard? How have both currents interacted with the new phenomena affecting citizenship in Western countries, such as immigration, global economic and pandemic crises, particularly the COVID-19 crisis? To what extent will this reflect on the Western concept of citizenship in the future?
The Concept of Citizenship between the New Right and Social Democrats:
The concept of citizenship initially refers to the relationship between the individual and the state, a relationship that binds the two parties to a set of mutual rights and obligations. In this sense, citizenship is not merely about legal equality among individuals in terms of rights or duties; rather, its essence lies in the ability of individuals to enjoy the rights stipulated in legal and constitutional documents. This may explain why some segments of many societies still feel marginalized and alienated, viewing themselves as second-class citizens due to their lack of real-world access to the same citizenship rights as other societal groups, despite the legal equality between them—an inequality arising from various factors, be they ethnic, religious, or even due to the policies and orientations of the ruling regime itself.
Achieving citizenship in this sense is not an easy feat for any society, requiring a high degree of political, economic, and social development within the state. This is evident in the Western countries themselves, where the emergence of the modern concept of citizenship coincided with the rise of the nation-state. Despite the significant advancements they have made in building citizenship, the political and intellectual debate continues about the nature of citizenship rights, particularly whether they should be limited to civil and political rights or extended to include economic, social, and cultural rights as well. This debate became particularly prominent with the publication of T.H. Marshall’s 1963 work “Citizenship and Social Class,” which perceived citizenship as a social status that requires the liberation of citizens from poverty, ignorance, and despair to fully participate in the affairs of the society to which they belong. In this regard, socialists and social democrats argue that citizenship should not be restricted to civil and political rights but should also include the second generation of rights: economic and social rights, as they form the real foundation for a civilized life by reinforcing citizens’ rights to work, healthcare, education, and more, thereby fostering a sense of significant share in the wealth of society.
In contrast, the new right, comprising neo-liberals and conservatives, argues for the exclusion of these economic and social rights from the set of citizenship rights, to avoid creating an unrealistic vision of the government’s capacities in citizens’ minds and to prevent undermining individual initiative and freedom of enterprise. They propose what they call the concept of “active citizenship.”
From their perspective, the concept of active citizenship is a reaffirmation of traditional liberals’ notions regarding individual freedom, asserting that such freedom cannot prevail under state intervention or its dependencies in individuals’ economic and social lives but rather through individuals liberating themselves from state intervention by relying on themselves to meet their needs for work, health, education, and so on. This supports the idea of hard work, risk-taking, and free enterprise. Andrew Heywood posits that this notion of active citizenship emphasizes civil obligations rather than rights in the citizen-state relationship. Despite the momentum garnered by the concept of active citizenship, especially following the ascent of this new conservative right to power in the U.S. and Britain since the early 1980s (Reagan – Thatcher), it has faced numerous criticisms, notably for potentially exacerbating existing inequalities within society.
This political and intellectual discourse within Western societies surrounding economic and social rights for citizenship has raised the issue of social citizenship or the relationship between citizenship and the welfare state or social security.
Citizenship and the Welfare State between the Right and Social Democrats:
The early roots of the welfare state emerged from the ideas of traditional conservative thought, particularly in Britain from Edmund Burke, the founding father of that thought in the late 18th century. Although he opposed the French Revolution and its principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, he attributed the responsibility for the events in France to the monarchy’s rigidity and refusal to change to survive. Burke stated, “A state that lacks the means of change, lacks the means of preserving itself.” His views represented a cautious natural change aimed at preserving the essential existence interpreted by British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in 1867 to adopt some forms of social welfare related to improving housing and public health conditions for the working class, to avoid the perceived dangers of dividing Britain into two nations, one rich and the other poor. He believed that inequality in wealth or social status inevitably implied inequality in responsibilities, which meant that the aristocracy was obliged to bear the social responsibility burden towards the poor in society through what was then known as the “noblesse oblige” principle.
The most significant shift towards a welfare state in Western societies occurred with the unification of Germany in 1871. Under Chancellor Bismarck, the first health insurance system in the world was implemented in 1883, followed by accident insurance in 1884, and disability insurance and pensions for the elderly in 1889. These pioneering social programs at that time were viewed by the German government as a means—not only to counteract socialism or what Bismarck termed “the red threat”—but also to enhance the construction of a unified German state, bringing together its various regions and states of extensive self-governance into one nation within a constitutional monarchy framework. From Bismarck’s perspective, the state was not established solely to serve and protect the privileged classes but also to serve and protect the needs and interests of lower-income and less-educated working classes. Instilling this idea among these working classes that the state belongs to everyone was seen as essential.
Paul Krugman argues that the significance of the welfare state model established by Bismarck in Germany lies in its demonstration that the existence of a more compassionate government is indeed possible in reality. Many European countries, particularly Britain, recognized that adopting such social welfare programs was no longer just a moral and social necessity but also a security imperative to support their comprehensive capabilities in the long term, especially in light of findings revealed by the Boer War (1899-1902) regarding the significant number of conscripted working-class individuals deemed unfit for military service.
This trend manifested in the endorsement of some welfare programs, even if limited in nature at that time, such as the social security system in 1908 and health insurance in 1911. Following the issuance of the Beveridge Report in 1942, which described social security as the war to be fought to protect citizens from five evils: want, ignorance, disease, squalor, and unemployment, Britain transitioned into a full model of the welfare state after World War II. This model was similarly embraced by the majority of Western European countries post-war.
In contrast, the United States, throughout this period until the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, lacked any serious federal policies for social welfare. Only a few state governments, since 1911, implemented some preliminary welfare programs, which ranged from worker’s compensation to providing basic assistance to widowed mothers and children, or some form of pensions for the elderly. Paul Krugman attributes this to two factors: one pertains to the predominance of a free enterprise mindset among American political elites, both Republican and Democrat, making them largely indifferent to advancements in social welfare programs seen in some European countries like Germany and Britain. The other factor relates to racial or ethnic animosities within American society, due significantly to the white southern rejection of any social policies that might redistribute income in favor of other ethnic groups, such as African Americans and Latinos, or abolish the existing racial segregation between blacks and whites in the South.
A significant shift in this welfare state stance in the United States did not occur until President Roosevelt took office after winning the 1932 election and adopted what became known as the New Deal, which included a wide array of welfare programs such as social security, unemployment benefits, rural electrification, and others. By the end of World War II, the welfare state had become a tangible reality in the United States and Western countries at large, to the extent that President Eisenhower in 1954 referred to opponents of such programs among some industry and oil magnates as foolish. He pointed out that any party that sought to abolish the welfare programs that had been established would not survive in American political history.
Thus, during this period in the first half of the 20th century, the slogan “compassionate conservatism” prevailed in the conservative right, while social liberals emerged among traditional liberal currents—such as John Rawls—who were supporters of the welfare state. This led Anthony Giddens to state that the welfare state in most Western countries was a product of right-wing policies as much as it was born from leftist policies, highlighting the broad acceptance it enjoyed across various political currents in those countries.
When adding to this Western welfare state model the comprehensive model existing from cradle to grave in the former Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, followed by many third-world nations adopting some form of welfare programs for their citizens after their independence, the welfare state model witnessed a growing international acceptance in the post-World War II era, even if its applications varied in effectiveness based on the level of economic and social development among these nations. For instance, in Latin America, despite nearly two centuries since its nations gained independence from Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonial powers in the 19th century, 50% of the working-age population remains outside social security or welfare networks.
The Rise of the New Right and the Reversal of Social Citizenship Principles:
It was mentioned earlier that the welfare state and the various programs it included regarding social citizenship were outcomes of the combined policies of both left and right. However, this accord did not last long due to the emergence of a new conservative current in the early 1960s, which openly rejected the New Deal policies that laid the foundation for the welfare state in the United States under President Roosevelt. Nevertheless, this current remained relatively limited in influence until the mid-1970s, both in the U.S. and Western countries, evidenced by President Nixon’s rejection of their proposals, as he adhered to the welfare state principles enacted by Roosevelt. He even stated in 1974 that the time had come for implementing universal health insurance, although his proposal failed to materialize due to his resignation following the Watergate scandal.
However, the opportunity arose for the new right and neo-liberals to promote their influence as the welfare state in the U.S. and several European countries faced severe crises starting in the mid-1970s due to their economies suffering from numerous difficulties, such as rising inflation and unemployment.
Some researchers attribute this welfare state crisis in Western societies, particularly, to changing circumstances or foundations upon which it was established. Initially designed based on the existence of a relatively homogeneous and growing society, of which most individuals worked on a permanent basis, these foundations changed somewhat with the economic crisis and the shift from an industrial economy to one based on knowledge and globalization in production processes. This resulted in an increasing number of unemployed individuals, as well as single-parent mothers lacking any social ties, such as the homeless, and others not paying taxes and relying more heavily on local authorities or charitable acts, alongside an influx of refugees and escalating immigration from different parts of the world to Western countries.
Thus, the acknowledgment of the need to address this welfare state crisis was not confined solely to new liberals and conservatives. In a speech before the European Parliament in 2005, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserted that social welfare systems in Europe needed fundamental reforms, a viewpoint acknowledged by Anthony Giddens himself, a leading figure among social democrats, stating that this traditional model of the welfare state had outlived its time or at least required rethinking.
Yet, the disagreements among these currents remain—both then and now—regarding their approaches to tackling it, with one right-wing current fiercely opposing it or insisting that it be minimized at least, while another supports its continuation with enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, encompassing not only social democrats but also members of the liberal current itself, namely social liberals.
Supporters of this new conservative right and neo-liberals argue that the state’s redistribution of wealth, allocating a portion of resources from the rich to needy poor individuals, fosters a mentality of dependency that significantly enslaves them. American philosopher Robert Nozick stands as a staunch critic of the welfare state and social citizenship. According to him, private property is entirely the product of individual labor, not the social framework in which one exists, making it morally unjustifiable for the state to compel an individual to relinquish part of the benefits gained from their work to support the poor. Instead, the new conservatives and neo-liberals advocate replacing tax-funded subsidies with voluntary personal donations.
Against this perspective, support for the continuation of the welfare state came not only from social democrats but also from within the liberal camp, represented by social liberals, as expressed by John Rawls in his famous work “A Theory of Justice.” In defending the welfare state, Rawls emphasized that the community represents a cooperative project for the common good. He argued that the wealth individuals gain is a result of their membership within that community and not solely due to their own efforts, thus negating any automatic exclusive claim to this wealth. He posits that distributing benefits among all members of society, within a framework of justice principles, is essential for social equity. He maintained that economic and social inequalities within the community could only be justified provided they adhered to the following principles:
A fair equality of opportunity for available government positions, free from any consideration—such as social status or family ties—that might undermine this principle. Rawls indicated that achieving such an equality of opportunity would require state support for the poorest regions in education services, educational grants, and nurturing their brightest students.
The principle of maximizing the benefits for the poorest members of society. He argued that the high earnings of affluent individuals are only acceptable or justifiable to the degree that taxing them helps improve conditions for these poorer groups, even if those fortunes were acquired within a framework of fair opportunity.
The social democratic approach to welfare state reform, represented by Anthony Giddens—viewed as the spiritual father of Tony Blair—advocates a “third way” solution that reconciles views of traditional social democrats, liberals, and new conservatives, expressed in the slogan “No rights without responsibilities.” This implies that the state’s provision of unemployment benefits should be accompanied by the obligation of recipients to seek employment, to prevent a culture of dependency from forming among those who receive social welfare assistance. Consequently, the primary objective of social welfare programs should aim at helping individuals help themselves rather than enabling them to continue receiving these benefits indefinitely. To achieve such efficiency and effectiveness in government intervention in the social realm, Giddens proposed a shift from what he termed traditional passive welfare policies—primarily relying on a dominant role of the state—to positive welfare where individuals and government bodies, both public and private, would contribute.
In this regard, Giddens emphasized two crucial points for reforming the welfare state and enhancing the principle of social citizenship in society:
- Transitioning into a positive welfare society rather than a traditional welfare state. From his perspective, this can be achieved by increasing reliance on non-profit organizations, such as charitable and voluntary associations, to deliver welfare services in their local communities, as opposed to depending on top-down government redistribution systems.
- Investing in human capital: This involves focusing on training programs, psychological rehabilitation, and lifelong education. He views this investment as the most crucial avenue on which the state should emphasize whenever possible, rather than providing direct economic assistance to individuals. Giddens highlighted the importance of offering psychological support to individuals, arguing that welfare is not solely an economic concept but also a psychological one related to quality of life, where sometimes advice could prove more beneficial than purely economic aid.
According to studies addressing the welfare state in Western societies, both the new right and social democrats, during their periods in power over recent decades since the early 1980s, have sought to impose their respective visions outlined above. If President Obama succeeded where Clinton had previously failed in 1993 to enact comprehensive healthcare legislation, colloquially known as “Obamacare,” in 2010, which came into effect in 2013, President Trump, following his election victory in 2016, repeatedly expressed his objection to this law and his intention to repeal it, supported by those neo-liberals and conservatives, or what is called the Freedom Caucus in Congress. Indeed, only a few months into his presidency, in March 2017, he introduced a bill to Congress aimed at replacing Obamacare with a new plan he called the Trump Health Care System. Although this effort by Trump ultimately failed due to the Senate’s rejection, the House of Representatives, dominated by a Republican majority, did repeal the penalty enforced under the Obamacare law for individuals refusing to enroll, which was what Trump relied upon in requesting the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2020 to repeal the Obamacare law by arguing that it is impossible to separate the individual mandate from the rest of the law. It is expected that the court will rule on this matter by the end of 2020.
This significant contrast revealed by the electoral campaign between Trump and Biden regarding this issue may represent a turning point for the future of the propositions reflected by these two currents, rising and falling, not only in the United States but also in many other Western countries. The new right, especially after Trump’s loss and Biden’s victory, is likely to reshape its propositions concerning the welfare state and the principle of active citizenship to align more closely with the concept of social citizenship espoused by social democrats, akin to the adjustments made by traditional conservatives following the loss of their candidate Thomas Dewey to President Truman in the 1948 elections. This alignment can be attributed to various reasons, some of which stem from recent economic studies by prominent Harvard University scholars revealing counterarguments against the new right’s claims concerning social welfare programs and the relationship between economic growth and equality within society. Contrary to the new right’s assertion that social welfare programs, such as food stamps and unemployment benefits, engender negativity, dependency, and a reluctance to work among the poor recipients, these studies conducted in 2013 and 2019 demonstrated that feelings of insecurity among the poor, stemming from their consistent struggle with poverty, induce stress that hinders their cognitive functions and deepens their feelings of helplessness and loss of hope in escaping their dire conditions, potentially leading to a reproduction of poverty and diminished motivation to work.
Noah Smith argues that adopting this theory linking the behavior of the poor with stress would necessitate a change in how governments address poverty reduction efforts within their communities. Such that welfare assistance for the poor becomes unconditional, diminishing their stress and allowing them to focus more on ways of escaping poverty rather than on merely ensuring their survival from day to day. Other studies have revealed that the prevalence of social inequality within countries renders them vulnerable to social discontent and limits their rates of economic growth, meaning that enhancing social citizenship within the community supports both social peace and economic prosperity.
Meanwhile, other reasons relate to what the COVID-19 crisis has revealed as its lessons regarding the role of the state and the economic and social rights of citizenship, which will be discussed in the next point.
The COVID-19 Crisis and the Importance of the Role of the State and Economic and Social Rights of Citizenship:
The lessons learned regarding this matter include the following:
A. Reaffirming the Role of the State: The responses of countries worldwide to the COVID-19 pandemic have established that the state is the center of public action in confronting epidemics and protecting its citizens. These states, regardless of their governance systems and political and economic ideologies, implemented comprehensive measures for lockdowns and closures of schools and universities, air travel, and many economic activities to contain and limit the spread of the virus. Many of them also adopted financial stimulus packages to support their citizens and sectors most affected by these lockdowns, particularly the tourism and aviation sectors. For example, the United States rolled out a $1.8 trillion economic rescue plan to aid unemployed individuals, affected families, and businesses to prevent bankruptcy or shutting their doors to their employees. Hence, the role of the state during the COVID-19 crisis and in its aftermath will not resemble what it was prior to that crisis, especially given its emphasis—according to Mahmoud Mohieldin—on the importance of localizing development and reducing states’ dependency on foreign sectors for essential goods. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that demands within Western societies to localize vital industries for community health and security arose due to the experiences of medical resource shortages, such as masks, ventilators, and medications, particularly during the early phases of the virus’s spread, and not relying on southern countries for supplies through what were known as global supply chains, especially from China and India.
Thus, the responses by states during this crisis have demonstrated that government is the solution, not the problem, as proponents of the new right assert.
B. Championing the Concept of Social Citizenship: When COVID-19 struck the world, the prevailing conditions of inequality characterized many Western and non-Western nations alike. According to a study by economic researchers like Stiglitz, Zuckerman, and Tucker, the share of the top 1% of the U.S. population in national wealth increased from 22% in 1979 to 37% in 2018, while the share of the bottom 90% decreased during the same period from 40% to 27%. Meanwhile, the middle class saw an income decline for about 50% of its members not only in the United States but across many Western countries, as highlighted by Fukuyama. This situation prompted Jerome Powell, chair of the American Federal Reserve, to repeatedly warn during 2019 and 2020 about the steady decline of the middle class and the sluggish social mobility in the U.S. since the late 1970s, indicating that income disparity had become a critical and alarming issue for American society.
If such are the conditions of inequality and social disparity in Western communities, it is expected to be even worse in other Southern societies. In a UN Economic Commission for Latin America study, 70% of citizens in the region stated that their governments serve the interests of a minority, arguing that, except for Uruguay, they failed to establish economic policies and development programs that reduce glaring social disparities and meet basic social rights for citizens in terms of education, health, adequate wages, and so forth. Social protests against these inequalities have swept through many parts of the world across Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa, with significant manifestations such as the Yellow Vest protests in France and many European nations.
These conditions of inequality and income disparities have given rise to the emergence of a new class, comprising millions, particularly in Western and Eastern Asian countries, referred to as “the Precariat,” which designates individuals working under temporary contracts, hourly/daily, or weekly contracts, lacking the rights tied to formal employment identities, like insurance and social welfare. Researchers examining this class and the risks of its rise—most notably Guy Standing and Alex Pootie—argue that its members are largely disenchanted with both traditional labor unions and the ruling elites. This class could pose the greatest threat to the continuity of these elites in the future due to its members possessing better education and access to real-time happenings through the internet, enabling them to devise unconventional methods of resistance against existing governance systems, as evidenced by the actions of the Yellow Vests in France.
The impact of COVID-19 on Western societies and Southern countries reflected citizens’ responses to the virus and their adaptation to its varied economic, social, and psychological effects. One of the most alarming results is that the virus, having starkly exposed the severe vulnerabilities of the poor in its face compared to the more affluent in society, heightened feelings of social differentiation and marginalization among poorer groups, which could harbor risks of suppressed feelings within these vulnerable populations transforming into radical movements against their societies.
Thus, COVID-19 serves as a wake-up call for governments in many Western societies and Southern nations regarding the need to address issues of inequality and glaring income disparities within their communities. This translates into a victory for the logic of social citizenship and the welfare state, not the active citizenship promoted by the new right.
The New Right, Social Democrats, and Cultural Rights:
This category of rights, according to the leading scholar on multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka, encompasses three types. The first type pertains to the rights of indigenous peoples to recognition of their local languages, land ownership rights, self-governance rights, and the practice of hunting and fishing, among others, preserving their distinct communities. The second type concerns the rights of national minorities to recognition of their official languages and self-governance rights, even up to the right of independence itself. The final type concerns the rights of immigrant and ethnic groups to express their cultural identities and religious symbols, such as rituals, attire, and nourishment, which align with their religious beliefs, as seen among Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, and others. Kymlicka argues that, contrary to the latter type of rights for immigrants and ethnic groups—which sees vast variances in perspectives and efforts among Western countries, leading to the lack of significant international legislative attention—greater advancements have been made concerning the recognition of rights for indigenous peoples and national minorities, along with encouraging international support for these rights.
Cultural rights pertinent to citizenship, especially for groups of immigrant origins, remain one of the weaker pillars in efforts to establish a comprehensive framework for citizenship in Western countries. Recognition of these rights has largely occurred mainly in immigrant countries within the New World, such as Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand. Notably, Canada stands as the first country worldwide to officially adopt recognition of multicultural rights since its parliamentary statement on multiculturalism in 1971 and the Multiculturalism Act of 1988, viewing it as an integral part of the human rights revolution and a continuum of civil rights liberalism, not a hindrance to it. This acknowledgment entails equality among races and the respect for individuals’ rights to choose the lifestyle they wish to live. From Canada, the recognition of these cultural rights of citizenship transitioned to Australia, led by social democratic and left-liberal parties.
Will Kymlicka explains the disparity in the status of citizenship multicultural rights between immigrant countries and European nations based on how these countries perceive the status of immigrants. While immigrant nations had clear immigration policies, legally recognizing immigrants as permanent residents and future citizens, European nations lacked such clear policies since the aftermath of World War II, failing to view immigrants as permanent residents and future citizens. Their prevailing conception of immigrants, especially Arabs and Muslims, viewed them as temporary sojourners who would return to their homelands once their labor was no longer required—a perception proven flawed due to the realities these migrants have created concerning lasting settlement, familial unions, and more.
Giddens posits that this new reality imposed by these immigrants in European countries, particularly Muslims, has incited issues previously considered resolved, such as freedom of expression. However, these issues have resurfaced onto the European political and societal discourse agenda, due to the return of religious sanctity, coupled with the threat or actual resort to violence whenever a claim of desecration arises against a religious belief or symbol, such as the derogatory caricatures of Prophet Muhammad in some European media outlets. The actions against these caricatures were not limited to Muslims within European societies but extended to Arab and Islamic countries, resulting in the deaths of many individuals. Thus, Giddens believes that exercising the right to free expression should take place within a framework of balance between rights and responsibilities, asserting that it is unwise to disseminate or republish those disrespectful caricatures, which offend the religious sentiments of Muslims.
Disparity in views exists between the new right and social democrats regarding the acknowledgment of cultural plurality rights in relation to citizenship. As previously mentioned, Kymlicka indicated that social democratic parties bore the burden of recognizing these rights in immigrant countries, especially in Canada and Australia during the 1970s and 1980s. In Europe, this supportive stance towards these cultural citizenship rights can be evidenced from Anthony Giddens’ writings, where he elaborated on this theme in his book “Europe in the Age of Globalization.” His analysis reveals the radical transformation in both the perception of immigrant generations, particularly Muslims, regarding their status in European nations and the way public opinion in Europe views these immigrants. In stark contrast with the first generation of these immigrants, who saw themselves merely as residents without full allegiance to the countries they inhabited, the second generation—born or raised in those nations—possesses a strong sense of citizenship and perceives any hostile acts toward them from the far-right as violations of their rights as citizens, not attacks on their identity as Arabs or Asians. The slogan adopted by this generation is “We are citizens.”
However, alongside this, a radical transformation also occurred in the European public opinion regarding these immigrants, shifting from viewing them as economic necessities arising from post-World War II labor shortages to perceiving them as burdens and competitors in the labor market, contesting the benefits of the welfare state. Giddens concluded that the most appropriate approach to address this dilemma should not involve rejecting the acknowledgment of cultural plurality rights for these immigrants but rather necessitate affirming these rights by European governments and raising public awareness to make these citizens of immigrant origins more accepted within European societies. Otherwise, polarization and mutual distrust will likely persist as defining characteristics between these immigrant citizens and European citizens.
The new right of neo-liberals and conservatives, while aligning with social democrats in accepting cultural plurality rights pertaining to self-governance and representation rights for national minorities and indigenous peoples, firmly opposes recognizing the rights of immigrant ethnic and racial groups to express their cultural uniqueness. This opposition primarily arises from certain cultural practices of these racial groups contradicting or failing to align with prevailing liberal values within European societies—where, for instance, practices like female genital mutilation, forced marriages, and honor killings cannot be tolerated. Moreover, recognizing the cultural distinctiveness of these immigrant groups inevitably necessitates legal adjustments to align with their beliefs concerning matters like inheritance among men and women, headscarves, and animal slaughter, particularly among Muslims, leading to a potential entrenchment of their sense of self-identity and elevating their initial affiliations at the expense of the unified civil and political value system in European societies.
Dominique Schnapper and Christian Baudelot argue, in their book “What is Citizenship?” that this perspective could lead to viewing immigrant groups as eternal entities rather than products of a historical structural context, thereby denying their members the freedom to withdraw from such affiliations without constraints, which would ultimately fragment society and threaten its unity and the creative interaction among its diverse components. While these arguments presented by the new right regarding their objection to recognizing the cultural rights of immigrants bear merit—given the risks of insularity surrounding narrow identities threatening political and social peace and stability—Will Kymlicka refutes these justifications, pointing out that the primary reason for the new right’s rejection of multiculturalism among immigrants stems from the fact that the main beneficiaries are primarily Muslim immigrants. Notably, what supports Kymlicka’s argument is the increasing prevalence of extreme right wing and populist movements against immigrants, particularly Muslims in Western societies.
In France, the 2011 theory of the “Great Replacement” by Renaud Camus posits that what is happening in France is a replacement of native French by immigrants, whom he portrays as invading warriors with the sole goal of destroying the French people and their culture, instilling Islam in its place. This perceived threat extends across all European nations. In the United States, the “alt-right” movement emerged in 2008 with the slogan “Race is the basis of our identity.” This movement represented a significant backer for Trump in the 2016 elections, expressing its ideology opposing equality and multiculturalism within American society, stating, “America, until the last generation, was a white land designed for us and our future generations. Let’s make America white again.”
Results from parliamentary elections over the past decade in many European countries, such as the Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Germany, and France, reveal the growing acceptance of these populist and far-right movements among significant segments of society. Indeed, they have ascended to power in Austria, Hungary, and Italy after winning elections in those countries in 2018, while others, such as the Freedom Party in the Netherlands in the 2017 parliamentary elections, or Alternative for Germany in the 2018 elections, finished second and third, respectively. The campaign against what these right-wing movements termed the Islamization of Europe and protecting European cultural and religious values against the organized Islamic infiltration via immigration became a common theme in the election campaigns of all these parties. None of these campaigns was free from slogans advocating the banning of headscarves, prohibiting the circulation of the Quran, closing or preventing the construction of mosques, and other slogans opposing multiculturalism and full citizenship rights for Muslims in Europe.
According to studies conducted by specialists and prestigious Western research centers, numerous political and economic factors interact in paving the way for the rise of these populist and extreme right movements, such as:
A. A decline in citizen trust in the performance of democratic institutions in Western societies since the end of the Cold War in 1991 in particular, reaching 57% by 2020, as indicated by a study from the Cambridge University Centre for the Future of Democracy, compared to 39% in 1995. Roberto Foa, who oversaw this study, asserts that restoring trust in Western democracy necessitates a change in the performance of politicians and democratic institutions.
B. Citizens perceive the financial crises as outcomes of failed policies and decisions by the ruling elites. According to a 2016 study by a group of German economic experts on the political implications of financial crises—which relied on gathering and analyzing data primarily from 800 elections across 20 advanced economies between 1870 and 2014—it found that extreme right parties witnessed a 30% increase in voter support in the elections held during the five years following a financial crisis. This manifested following the 2008 global financial crisis, wherein the share of votes garnered by these parties doubled in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and Portugal. The study also concluded that since 1950, parliaments in the mentioned countries have consistently seen the entry of at least one new extreme right party during the five years following a financial crisis.
However, despite the validity of the aforementioned explanations, they do not, from the researcher’s perspective, offer sufficient reasoning, as they perhaps intentionally or unintentionally overlook the cultural factor in explaining the persistence of the tide of these currents. The revival of democratic vitality and economic prosperity in Western societies does not inherently equate to the eradication of these movements from their soil—historical experiences reveal this truth. This situation arises from the rejection of multiculturalism and full citizenship rights for citizens of immigrant origins in Western societies reflecting, in some aspects, not merely the prejudice of these populist and extreme right movements toward white supremacy but, more importantly and dangerously, the enduring deep-seated belief in a historically long-standing notion of the “complete human” within the European mentality.
From the prior analysis of the views of the new right and social democrats regarding different facets of the concept of citizenship and citizenship rights, we conclude the following:
- The welfare state and the support for social citizenship were outcomes of policies from both traditional right and social democrats, even if the new right—comprised of both traditional and new factions—still considers economic and social citizenship rights as goals or aims rather than asserting them as inherent rights. As this study has shown, matters of national security, support for political stability, and social peace were the primary motivations for this alignment between traditional conservative right, especially in the U.S., with social democrats in establishing the welfare state in the post-Great Depression era defined by President Roosevelt’s New Deal, which became a reality difficult to overlook in Western countries since the end of World War II.
- Cultural pluralism rights regarding citizenship continue to remain the most vulnerable aspect of efforts to foster a comprehensive structure for citizenship in European countries, due to rising hostility toward immigrants, especially Muslims. Coupled with the persistent deep-seated belief among some that white supremacy prevails over other ethnicities. The study underscored that the most suitable approach for overcoming this issue is for these countries to adopt a serious commitment towards integrating citizens of immigrant origins into their societal fabric while raising public awareness to respect the cultural rights of these immigrants, similar to what Canada has achieved as a pioneer in this domain.
Finally, concerning the future of the Western concept of citizenship, it is likely that the new right, especially following Trump’s defeat and Biden’s victory in the presidency of the United States, will amend its propositions regarding the welfare state and the principle of active citizenship to align more closely with social democrats’ vision of the welfare state and social citizenship. This adjustment will arise from various reasons akin to those that prompted this previous accord, following the loss of their traditional candidate Thomas Dewey to President Truman in the 1948 elections. The COVID-19 crisis served as a revealing mirror of conditions of inequality and stark income disparities, leading to the emergence of a precarious class or temporary labor demographic lacking representation in the ruling Western elites, posing a real future threat to political and societal stability. Recent economic studies from prominent Harvard University scholars have confirmed that supporting the psychological security of the poor and pursuing equality within society will strengthen both social peace and economic growth; conversely, the absence of such support would lead to deteriorating conditions. As for the cultural pluralism rights pertaining to ethnic and racial identities of citizens of immigrant origin, the disparity between the two currents is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. This is due to considerations regarding its political significance, continues to be an issue the extreme right parties leverage to rally popular support during European parliamentary elections, especially amid increasing societal hostility towards these immigrants, who may pose a future threat to their Christian European identity and demographic structure.
