The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Hemedti, succeeded in seizing El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, on 26 October 2025, after an 18-month siege. The Sudanese army had withdrawn from the city a day earlier. This development increased the likelihood of the emergence of an independent political entity hostile to the Khartoum government, which could use its new regional base as a launching pad to tighten the squeeze on the Sudanese government in Khartoum.
Two Sides of One Coin: Success and Failure
The Sudanese army’s failure to hold El Fasher may paradoxically be linked to a previous success: in March 2025 the army regained control of Khartoum. At that time it launched a large-scale offensive against RSF forces in the city and surrounding areas, using its air superiority—the air force. The battle lasted weeks and was marked by heavy bombardment of RSF positions until the army managed to push them definitively out of the capital.
That achievement enhanced the Sudanese army’s legitimacy after recapturing the country’s political capital, a symbol of sovereignty and the main administrative hub. It increased its popularity and its ability to recruit more fighters willing to join the fight against the RSF.
But the victory altered the distribution of military forces on the ground. The army had to concentrate forces in eastern and central Sudan—specifically three main cities: Khartoum (the symbol of sovereignty), Port Sudan (the country’s commercial port that handles some 90% of external trade), and Al-Gadarif (the breadbasket). These areas are strategic nodes, so the government allocated most of its military to protect them from RSF forces and established new air bases in Port Sudan. Consequently, comparatively few troops remained to defend Darfur, an area that represents a quarter of Sudan’s territory and faces the bulk of RSF forces.
The RSF seized the opportunity presented by the army’s focus on those three cities and concentrated operations in the far west—Darfur—especially El Fasher. The city is the RSF’s traditional base, particularly since Hemedti hails from Darfur and enjoys a significant tribal base there. He also benefits from supply and retreat lines in neighboring countries—such as southern Libya (areas controlled by Khalifa Haftar), the Central African Republic, and Chad. This enabled him to bolster the number of forces that attacked El Fasher. In addition, the RSF benefits from revenues from gold at Jebel Amir in Darfur to finance its operations and to procure more external support, including additional drones it used to tighten the siege on El Fasher and wear down Sudanese forces and allied defenders of the city.
Shifting Calculations
Hemedti’s capture of El Fasher and most of Darfur—covering roughly a quarter of Sudan’s area—strengthens the geographic base of the rival administration he declared in April 2025, which he named the Government of Peace and Unity. It intends to administer four states in Darfur and West Kordofan, plans to print a currency, issue passports, and establish a civil registry.
This government has not received international recognition, but control over an entire region could transform it into a de facto authority that imposes facts on the ground and could later prompt states to recognize it or deal with it in practice without formal recognition. That situation complicates the Khartoum government’s claim to be the exclusive representative of all Sudan and hampers its future efforts to deal with Darfur without Hemedti’s consent.
Hemedti’s campaign to seize El Fasher also altered the city’s demographic composition: components loyal to him were favored as a secure base, while other groups perceived as hostile were displaced. Human-rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab have documented ethnic cleansing campaigns in El Fasher, mass executions of ethnic and tribal groups deemed opposed to Hemedti—such as the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit—and the replacement of those communities with other ethnic and tribal groups. Tens of thousands fled El Fasher; thousands remained besieged and starved; and tens of thousands were internally displaced. Some states, including the United States, have confirmed these violations.
Hemedti’s control of El Fasher will make it easier for him to attract more external backing because the takeover demonstrates the payoff of betting on him. The territory under his control will be a base for sending supplies, coordinating operations, establishing training camps, conducting signals intelligence, and deploying reconnaissance drones. This reduces the embarrassment of neighboring states that had previously provided him bases under humanitarian pretexts and exposes them to accusations of complicity in the RSF’s alleged war crimes.
Likewise, Hemedti’s capture of El Fasher will change the Khartoum government’s calculations: it will be keen to retake the city so that his military feat does not become a political achievement that challenges its representation of Sudan internationally; to prevent growing doubts about relying on it; to stop Sudanese forces from choosing neutrality or joining the RSF; and to prevent the RSF from consolidating control over Darfur and mounting a future campaign into Kordofan.
In response, the RSF will accelerate moves to seize Kordofan—starting by taking Al-Ubayyid, the regional capital—riding the momentum of El Fasher’s capture, and thereby diverting the Sudanese army away from Darfur. Controlling Kordofan is strategically required to secure Darfur and to make another step toward challenging the Sudanese government’s claim to national control.
If Hemedti fails to take Kordofan, he will remain vulnerable to a counterattack by the Sudanese army and stuck with a region that lacks critical resources—power, agriculture, water—and limited international leverage because it has no seaport. Therefore, he will likely aim to take Al-Ubayyid (Al-Obeid), the capital of Kordofan, whose territory accounts for about 20% of Sudan’s area. Kordofan opens the route to Port Sudan for exporting gold abroad, contains the Heglig oil field in its south, is a food basket, and is the only land bridge that opens the RSF’s route toward access to the Nile.
The Key to Controlling the Country
The balance of gains and risks will determine scenarios for both the Sudanese army and the RSF. The army views the coming battle for Kordofan as a mortal danger and will treat it as a line of defense for Khartoum and for the capacities that sustain its war effort and consolidate its control over the country; therefore, it will intensify its defense there. For the RSF, Kordofan represents a strategic addition that would increase its forces and consolidate its gains; the two sides thus differ in how they appraise its importance and will build their strategies accordingly.
- Scenario 1 — Army retains Kordofan (the most likely): The RSF will not be able to impose a long siege there because its forces would be exposed to the Sudanese air force and would need large numbers to sustain a siege—numbers it does not have. The RSF will not risk weakening the security of El Fasher to seize Al-Ubayyid because Kordofan complements Darfur in its calculus rather than replacing it. The Sudanese army could reinforce Kordofan with troops withdrawn from El Fasher and additional forces from other regions under its control. Logistically, Sudanese forces are advantaged in Kordofan because they have several airports in the region, including Al-Ubayyid’s airport, which are vital for supplies and air strikes—unlike the RSF, which would face long supply lines and limited ability to retreat rapidly.
If the army keeps Kordofan, the result will be either exposure of Darfur to renewed army offensives to retake El Fasher, or a freezing of front lines that consolidates Hemedti’s rule over Darfur—an outcome similar to Haftar’s consolidation in eastern Libya.
- Scenario 2 — Hemedti succeeds in taking Kordofan (unlikely): This would be costly: he would need to massively expand and field forces and risk losing El Fasher. If he gambles and fails, the army will not hesitate to escalate because losing Kordofan would open the door to losing control over the country’s key nodes.
- Scenario 3 — Army reclaims Darfur before the Kordofan battle (least likely): This is less likely because the army faces logistical difficulties in supplying and supporting the Darfur front. During defense of El Fasher it showed it lacked reinforcements to aid its besieged forces there; the number of troops it could not provide during defense was smaller than what would be required for a recapture operation. Thus the army may instead fortify Kordofan—as the key to its control of the country—and use it as a base to attack RSF forces in El Fasher in the future. Kordofan could become the platform for the army to recover Darfur later.
