In my book Future Studies in International Relations, published in Morocco in 1992 (second edition, p. 139), I wrote the following verbatim: “A set of ongoing and future transformations will weaken the importance of the American military umbrella over Europe, which may lead, within the next twenty years, to the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance.” I reiterated this point verbatim (p. 23) in my study on The Future of the International Status of the United States, published in International Politics Journal (Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, Egypt, 1996), stressing that developments within the European Union “will place NATO’s role up for debate, in light of Article Five of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which provides for the formulation of a common European defense policy that would, over time, lead to collective defense and to addressing defense issues within a European body separate from NATO.”
A historical look at the alliance prior to Trump’s rise to power (2016 and 2024) indicates that NATO managed to overcome numerous crises among its member states. However, most of these occurred during the Cold War or in the aftermath of some of its consequences. NATO appeared close to collapse during the fierce debate over the rearmament of West Germany in the 1950s, and again during the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Washington refused to support the Franco-British attempt to seize the Suez Canal. The alliance also seemed on the brink of collapse when tensions between the United States and France escalated to the point that France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 and insisted on the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from its territory. Monetary and financial disputes in the 1960s and 1970s further shook transatlantic relations, as did debates over the arms race and arms control in the 1980s, which rattled NATO’s foundations. Added to this were the bitter disagreements between the main European powers—Britain excepted—and the United States over the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
All of this points to NATO’s high adaptive capacity. The crucial point, however, is that all previous phases of adaptation took place within a single overarching framework: the emergence of the socialist bloc centered in Moscow and the escalation of the Cold War. Europe—divided into a “socialist bloc” and a “capitalist bloc,” with the creation of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet interventions in several countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.)—was the focal point of U.S. concern. Europe was the main theater of confrontation, which led the alliance to fortify itself within Europe. NATO membership expanded from 12 to 32 states, with Finland and Sweden being the most recent additions—moves that were not disconnected from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent outbreak of the war in Ukraine.
At the present stage, there is a strategic shift in the American outlook that does not erase the remnants of the previous phase but relegates them to a lower priority. China’s rise has shifted the perceived security threat in the American view toward the Taiwan Strait, rather than the former border between East and West Germany or Soviet penetration of Eastern Europe. Since the 1980s, an increasing number of American thinkers have argued that a strategic transformation of the international system is underway, marked by a shift of gravity from West to East, particularly toward China. These U.S. geostrategic anxieties have been reinforced by several factors:
Chinese economic growth rates: Since the “Four Modernizations” and the structural transformation in governance beginning in 1978, China has consistently ranked first globally for a long period. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, China’s economy has surpassed that of the United States, making it the world’s largest. By 2025, China reached approximately $41 trillion, compared to $30.6 trillion for the United States—meaning China’s GDP equals the combined GDP of the United States, Germany, and France. Comparatively, China multiplied its GDP (PPP) roughly twentyfold between 2000 and 2025, while the U.S. figure merely tripled. China’s average growth rate during that period was about 8%, compared to 2.1% for the United States. It suffices to note that China’s share of global GDP now equals that of the entire European continent combined. Here, the American strategic mind sensed that the rival was no longer the “ideological-military competitor adjacent to Europe,” but had shifted elsewhere. The Taiwan Strait became more important than the Ukrainian borders or the Berlin Wall once was. Trump pursues China everywhere, while allowing Russia to “devour Ukraine” and occupy nearly 22% of its territory. Indeed, U.S. abandonment of Ukraine has become a clear conviction for Zelensky. NATO finds itself unable to adapt to this shift, especially as partners like Japan—along with Taiwan and sometimes the Philippines—continually call on Washington whenever Chinese aircraft fly over Taiwan or its surrounding maritime corridors.
The Chinese strategic axiom regarding Taiwan: One of the core principles of Chinese strategy is that Taiwan must return to the “motherland.” According to most Chinese studies and party publications, 2027 appears to be the decisive year on this issue—something the United States does not take lightly. This parallels the European perception of the danger posed by Russian intervention in Ukraine.
The Greenland crisis: Most of NATO’s previous crises revolved around issues outside Europe (Suez, Iraq, or the legacies of U.S. positions—especially regarding the replacement of European colonialism, as was evident during the Algerian War of Independence), without excluding some European issues. Today, however, the dispute concerns matters that strike at the core of European security strategy. It suffices to note the following: a. The clear U.S. insistence on controlling Greenland, under the pretext of Russian and Chinese ambitions toward the island. This rationale was acceptable during the Cold War and after World War II, when the United States maintained 14 bases in Greenland. Today, however, all European strategic studies indicate that the real objective is the island’s ten valuable minerals. Greenland’s area exceeds six times that of Germany, and its resources could help reduce the competitive capacity of China’s dominance in rare minerals. Hence, Europe no longer sees a difference between the alleged “Russian or Chinese threat” and the American threat openly articulated by Trump when he stated he would take the island “peacefully or by force.” It is worth noting that Article 5 of the NATO Charter speaks of collective defense against an external enemy but does not define a position regarding an “enemy within the alliance.” Will NATO’s stance on Greenland resemble its position during Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, when both Greece and Turkey were alliance members? Notably, the 1941 agreement between Denmark and the United States stipulates the defense of Greenland against “any non-American power.” What is the legal interpretation if the aggressor is the United States itself? Even the Franco-German-British statement troublingly told Denmark that Greenland’s future is “a Danish and Greenlandic matter.” b. The dispatch of European military forces, even symbolic ones so far, from France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Finland indicates that matters are moving only toward escalation. Greenland’s Deputy Prime Minister expects further troop increases. c. Deep divisions within the European bloc inside NATO: Of the EU’s 27 member states, only six have expressed clear support for Denmark. Poland appears the most concerned, given its 232-kilometer border with Russia and the ever-present lesson of Ukraine. France under Macron seems least sympathetic to Trump’s arguments, followed by Germany, while Britain remains tied to its Anglo-Saxon heritage. d. European disagreement over the use of Russian foreign reserves to rebuild Ukraine. Trump has inflamed this issue to the point of urging Europe to purchase U.S. weapons using Russian reserves held in Europe and transfer them to Ukraine—something several European states fear the consequences of. e. Trump’s policies toward Europe appear far from conciliatory: He imposed 15% tariffs on European trade, to which Europe has not responded, alongside pressures to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP for each NATO member—something many Europeans seek to avoid.
Conclusion:
Denmark, through its officials and leading writers, argues that “an American seizure of Greenland would mean the end of NATO.” Trump’s decision in June 2025 to transfer responsibility for the U.S. base in Greenland (with around 200 personnel) from U.S. European Command to U.S. Northern Command has heightened Danish and broader European concerns. Poland’s Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, described the matter as a “political catastrophe,” while much of the European media insists that the pretext of Russian and Chinese risks is little more than a flimsy excuse.
Putin seems well aware of what is unfolding. Are Trump’s policies toward NATO a response to a Russian “hidden hand,” or is Trump’s narrow outlook being exploited by the former KGB man? Perhaps, perhaps not—the fate now lies in the hands of a man whom most of the world’s scholars agree is fundamentally unpredictable.
