The Russian presence in Africa declined after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several Russian diplomatic missions and cultural centers in Africa were closed, and aid and economic grant programs were terminated; however, this decline did not last long. Following President Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power, significant transformations occurred in foreign policy to restore Russia’s status and influence among major powers in international politics.
The Russian-African Summit in Sochi in September 2019 was held under the slogan “For Peace, Security, and Development,” marking the new Russian presence in the international system and the revival of Russia’s role in Africa. What are the manifestations and determinants of this return? To answer this question, we will first examine the Russian role in South Africa, and second, the Russian role in Central Africa, as follows.
First: The Russian Role in South Africa:
Russian relations with the outside world underwent a new transformation starting from 2000 with Putin’s leadership. His foreign policy was characterized by a realistic view of international relations and Russia’s sovereign interests. At that moment, Russia presented a political case attracting the attention of politicians and observers worldwide, labeled in various ways, perhaps most notably as the “Awakening of the Russian Bear,” symbolizing Russia’s return to the ranks of influential powers in international decision-making. Putin aimed to restore Russia’s international status and safeguard its national security, announcing, at the beginning of his presidency, what became known as the “Putin Doctrine,” calling for a multipolar world not dominated by a single superpower, with Russia playing a pivotal role in it. Africa was not excluded from this strategy; Putin began to make Russia present in every region of the world, particularly Africa. In 2000, Putin hosted leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Guinea, and Gabon. That same year, the Russian Foreign Minister visited Angola, Namibia, the Union of South Africa, and Tanzania. In 2002, the Russian Foreign Minister visited Morocco and Tunisia. These visits had a significant impact on the development of Russo-African relations, serving as an important indicator of how these relations evolved. However, the turning point in this relationship occurred in 2006 with Putin’s historic visits to South Africa and Morocco, which were part of the Kremlin’s new “multipolar” diplomacy. Political scholar Evgeny Volk expressed that “Russia is attempting to reshape the traditional image that it previously established internationally as a conventional power present in international construction by developing its relations with the entire world, especially Africa.” With the arrival of President Dmitry Medvedev, it saw a continuation of Putin’s efforts to restore Russia’s status in Africa, following the same foreign policy orientation towards the continent. This was quite evident during Medvedev’s historic visit in 2009 to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola, accompanied by 400 businessmen, resulting in the signing of several important trade agreements. Thus, Russia’s strong determination to play a significant role in Africa is clear as it seeks to bolster its relations with African nations. The issue of African debts to Russia was strategically essential in this regard. The debt cancellation policy pursued by both Putin and Medvedev was contingent on two options: either to swap these debts for new agreements in the military or fisheries sectors or to recover these debts through the conversion of shares in some indebted African national companies into licenses for the exploitation of top-grade minerals for the benefit of Russian firms. Consequently, major Russian companies engaged in mining and resource extraction are actively involved. For instance, the Russian company ROSNEFT signed a memorandum of understanding with Mozambique’s national oil company concerning the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas fields, marking its first investment in this region. In Angola, the GAZPROM company is involved in the oil sector, while ROSATOM is engaged in uranium; moreover, in the diamond sector, ALROSA has established a joint project with ENDIAMA. In Namibia, RENOVA operates in the uranium field and is also active in South Africa, a member of the BRICS grouping, with significant investments totaling around 350millioninmanganeseextractionand350millioninmanganeseextractionand250 million in revamping iron alloy factories. In this context, the BRICS group (India, Brazil, China, South Africa, and Russia) plays a pivotal role in assisting these companies in obtaining mutual concessions in Africa, positively reflecting on Russo-African relations. A number of researchers and analysts considered the fifth summit of this group held in South Africa in March 2013 as providing new momentum for these relations.
In the military aspect, Russia has begun to regain its position in Africa as an arms trader, capitalizing on African nations’ desire to modernize their military arsenals acquired during the Soviet era. Consequently, the Russian state agency responsible for arms exports, Rosoboronexport, collaborates with 15 sub-Saharan African countries. However, this cooperation represents only 2% of all Russian military exports worldwide, even though this region ranks ninth globally in military spending. In summary, Russia’s policy in Africa has a “geoeconomic” dimension rather than a “geopolitical” one; what attracts Russia to Africa is the same as what attracts other countries, leading to a Russian presence in Africa built on two principles. The first is the African-Russian negotiations concerning debt, which have enabled Russian companies to enter African economies. The second is the arms trade and military technology.
While “Vladimir Putin” may instill fear in some countries, Russia elicits a warm and nostalgic sentiment for many South Africans. They remember Russia’s support during past decades. During the apartheid era, the Soviet Union provided the African National Congress (ANC) with military training and arms, alongside support for other liberation movements on the continent. Astonishingly, some South African citizens bear first names like “Soviet,” “Moscow,” and “Lenin” as a living tribute to those historical ties. “Sputnik Ratao,” born shortly after the launch of the first satellite, holds the position of spokesperson for the Department of Water and Sanitation. Furthermore, there is a high school in the KwaZulu-Natal province named after “Eric Matshela,” a staunch supporter of the struggle who spent decades in exile and was known by the nickname “Stalin.”
Recently, both Russia and South Africa have been exploring ways to restore relations to their Cold War stature and reduce visa requirements. In 2014, the President of South Africa and the Minister of Home Affairs visited Russia for a 6-day vacation following the end of his election campaign. Additionally, South Africa signed an agreement in 2017 with “Rosatom,” a Russian state-owned nuclear energy company, to purchase several nuclear power plants valued at one trillion rand (equivalent to $76 billion). In intelligence and defense, Russia has deployed forces to train South African spies and air force pilots. As the thirtieth anniversary of relations between Russia and South Africa approached in March 2022, both presidents reaffirmed their commitment to developing a strategic partnership between their nations, the necessity for expanding cooperation in commercial, economic, and humanitarian fields, and emphasizing the importance of ongoing collaboration within the BRICS framework. Both countries have become closer within the BRICS aggregation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), evolving into an economic club that has developed into a more expansive and politically oriented alliance. Russia, affected by sanctions, views Africa as a political ally and a promising opportunity for trade.
According to “Jerry Olivier,” a former South African ambassador to Russia, visa-free travel symbolizes this special relationship; however, he doubts this will enhance travel between them, citing few South African-Russian trade agreements and no direct airline routes. He considers cultural variation to be a problem as well. The secret to the ongoing friendship between the two countries could lie in the rarity of personal interactions. Russian foreign policy interests remain focused on nearby regions that constitute its periphery and backyard—countries that were part of the Soviet Union, along with Asia and the Middle East. Nevertheless, this interest does not exclude other regions from its strategic perspective. From this standpoint, Russia has made its return to the African continent a core focus of its foreign policy since the beginning of the 21st century. However, a closer examination of the Russian role in Africa reveals that this return is governed by several factors. The least significant being ideological, while the most important are the economic and military factors evident in the intensification of trade exchanges and increased arms deals and security cooperation in combating terrorism. The political dimension is present but not significantly influencing Russia’s geopolitics in the region, as Russia has opted for a policy of neutrality in African conflicts.
Second: The Russian Role in Central Africa:
Certain African nations have military ties with Russia through arms contracts, as well as training, consulting, and security and intelligence cooperation agreements. Africa ranks second as the largest importer of Russian arms after Asia. Key countries include Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Cameroon, Senegal, and Mozambique. For Russia, Africa is notably significant as it represents an important source of natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, timber, and livestock.
The Russian presence in Central Africa began in 2017 when President Faustin Archange requested the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed on his country, enabling the government to import weapons and military equipment for self-defense and civilian protection. Faustin was betting on France, which proposed sending 1,400 AK-47 rifles seized by the French navy during an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. However, Russia vetoed the French proposal on the grounds that seizing arms during an embargo cannot be repurposed for other uses. Instead, Moscow offered to donate light arms to the Central African Republic, a proposal approved by all UN Security Council members. What began as a limited Russian donation of light arms quickly morphed into an effective security presence, as Moscow sent 170 civilian trainers and five military personnel on a false pretext of guarding construction materials and hospitals being established by Russia there. It later became clear that the civilians were a select group of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group and Sera Security Services managed by businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is close to President Vladimir Putin.
In a short period, Russians had taken control of all critical security missions in the Central African Republic, including the protection of President Faustin Archange. Reflecting the extent of cooperation between Moscow and Bangui, the Russian Valery Zakharov, a former intelligence officer, was appointed as national security advisor to President Faustin Archange. The relationship culminated in August 2018; the two countries signed a military cooperation agreement that allowed the opening of a Russian Ministry of Defense representation office in Bangui. The President of the Central African Republic announced that his country was considering permitting the establishment of a military base on its territory, alongside Russia’s control over extensive areas containing diamond, gold, and uranium mines.
The Central African Republic is a significant lever in the French economy, as many French companies engage in investments across various fields, especially in mining (diamond, gold, copper), and also work on transporting uranium from the southern part of the country to France. However, Russia has been successful in undermining French influence; in a short period, the Central African Republic has become a model for resource extraction, seizing French advantages in military training, presidential guard support, institutional security, and gold, diamond, platinum, and chrome mining, in exchange for a share of the income and economic benefits. Russian military cooperation is not limited to the formal and systematic realm; units of Wagner mercenaries have been revealed to operate by covert means to deliver military arms and equipment, away from the scrutiny of human rights organizations, employing cyber warfare techniques. Russia relies on Wagner to extend its influence in Central Africa while avoiding direct accountability or obligations regarding Wagner’s actions, continually enhancing its influence across various fields within the Central African Republic, intervening in enacting legislation that serves its interests and strategic aims conflicting with international donor requirements and international institutions.
Politically, Russia has also played a crucial role in formulating a new approach and framework to reach a peace agreement between the Bangui government led by Faustin Archange and rebel groups. The Russians were able to persuade the Central African government and the rebel factions to negotiate and sign the Khartoum peace agreement in February 2019, aimed at resolving conflicts. Key outcomes of the discussions included a ceasefire and freedom of movement for individuals and commercial goods throughout the country. Subsequently, a national unity government was formed, including all rebellious and armed factions, and efforts were made to reintegrate armed groups into the national army. The government has begun to implement the Khartoum peace agreement and consult with the signatory groups regarding the potential for elections to occur as scheduled. Conversely, the groups not signing the peace agreement engaged in preparing an alternative plan to overthrow the government and seize the capital; however, these plots quickly failed.
In 2020, the country entered a severe crisis, with political forces split into two factions: one led by President Faustin Archange, emphasizing the necessity of holding the elections to avoid a constitutional vacuum, and another led by the Speaker of Parliament, calling for a postponement due to security concerns. The legislative elections in the Central African Republic occurred on December 27, 2020, allowing Faustin Archange, whose government controlled one-third of the country’s territory, to win a second presidential term with 53% of the votes. Following this, the dynamics changed rapidly, with the new government, supported by Russia, regaining control over most of the national territory while the presence of armed opposition diminished to limited and small areas near the borders with Sudan, Chad, and South Sudan.
Conclusion
It can be said that Russia’s dealings with African countries differ significantly from Western engagements. Russia does not impose conditions related to human rights, the achievement of democracy, or the establishment of freedoms in exchange for obtaining arms and military cooperation. This openness has paved the way for further strategic partnerships between Moscow and other African nations. Additionally, Russia’s strategy relies on multifaceted arrangements, including an official presence from the Russian Ministry of Defense that vaguely adheres to international law and conventions, supplemented by a semi-official presence represented by the Wagner Group, which is responsible for military decisiveness. The model that Russia has provided in the Central African Republic is likely to inspire many African regimes to collaborate with the Russians, particularly through the semi-official path of the Wagner Group.
The nature of political systems in African countries, along with regional and international transformations and international competition for the African continent, will all contribute to the growth of Russian influence in Africa. The Russian Federation is a significant player in international politics, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council that regularly uses its veto power in favor of its allies. This attribute renders Russia relevant for certain African countries, especially those under Western sanctions like “Sudan and Eritrea,” or those needing political and diplomatic support to counter French influence in Francophone countries such as “Central Africa, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Congo,” or those requiring military and security support to address the rising activities of jihadist movements like “Mozambique, Mali, Congo, and Burkina Faso.”
