The Palestinian Authority After the Gaza War: Between International Recognition and Israeli Right-Wing Hardline
Following the latest war on the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian scene is witnessing rapid transformations, many of which have profound effects on the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its role. On October 23, 2025, under Egyptian sponsorship, Palestinian factions met in Cairo to agree on political and administrative steps requiring national consensus concerning Gaza’s future.
The participants recommended consolidating the ceasefire, ensuring the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation army from the Strip, lifting the blockade, reopening crossings, allowing the entry of humanitarian aid, and launching a reconstruction process under the supervision of an international committee. They also suggested appointing a temporary, non-factional technocratic committee composed of Gaza residents to manage the territory during the transitional phase.
Although the PA did not officially participate in this meeting, the initiative aimed to create internal Palestinian consensus and seize the initiative to propose a unified Palestinian vision regarding Gaza’s future — including the PA’s potential role in governing the Strip.
Meanwhile, Israel’s right-wing government seeks to thwart the “two-state solution,” despite persistent international and Arab efforts to revive it. These efforts coincide with increasing international recognitions of Palestine, which enhance the PA’s diplomatic and legal legitimacy. Some states have also called for “rehabilitating” the PA to make it acceptable to Israel and its allies — particularly the United States — as a viable governing authority for Gaza.
Israel, however, rejects any return of the PA to the Strip, continuing policies that undermine its authority in the West Bank. The PA, for its part, insists on full control and responsibility for Gaza, backed by Arab and European support, while Hamas calls for “national consensus” as a prerequisite for the PA’s return.
This paper seeks to reassess the current reality and future role of the Palestinian Authority after the Gaza war, raising questions about the potential geopolitical shifts toward realizing the “two-state solution,” and examining the PA’s own future amid these developments.
I. The PA and the Negotiation Process During the War
Since the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and the outbreak of the Israeli war on Gaza, the PA has called for an end to hostilities, publicly condemned Israel’s displacement plans, and moved diplomatically at the UN and international bodies to denounce Israeli actions. At the same time, it criticized Hamas, with several PA officials holding the movement responsible for the war’s continuation and its consequences.
This stance is consistent with the PA’s previous positions regarding earlier Gaza-Israel escalations, which it viewed as “costly wars without positive results.”
From the outset of the war, the PA proposed a vision for post-war governance based on its complete return to administrative and security control over Gaza — rejecting any plurality of weapons or authorities. It insisted on full empowerment before any partnership and that any future Gaza administration must be part of the State of Palestine, not a parallel or temporary entity. This reflects its longstanding commitment to the “two-state solution” as the internationally recognized political and legal framework.
The PA and the PLO leadership rejected several factional proposals to manage Gaza after the war — including ideas for a national unity government or a community-support committee appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas. Instead, it stuck to its demand for full control over Gaza’s administration and security.
Before the first truce in January 2025, the PA submitted a plan to the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and the EU outlining temporary governance arrangements for Gaza in cooperation with Arab and international partners. It called for a complete Israeli withdrawal and affirmed that the State of Palestine holds legal and political sovereignty over the Strip. It also sought management of the Rafah crossing as part of the ceasefire agreement.
The reasons for the PA’s absence from direct Hamas-Israel negotiations during the war include:
- Israeli rejection: Netanyahu’s right-wing government explicitly refused PA participation in any Gaza-related file. Netanyahu and his ministers also labeled the “two-state solution” an “existential threat” to Israel and withheld the PA’s tax revenues, citing alleged transfers to Gaza.
- Political constraints: Bound by agreements with Israel and the “peace process,” the PA feared international isolation early in the war and thus distanced itself from Gaza.
- Hamas–PA rivalry: The split since 2007 and repeated reconciliation failures widened the divide between their political programs.
- Legitimacy claims: The PLO insists it alone represents Palestinians in negotiations. Abbas has conditioned Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s participation in future elections or the PLO on accepting its political program — including recognition of Israel and renouncing armed resistance — and demanded Hamas hand over its weapons and allow PA governance in Gaza.
- Functional absence: The PA has had no presence or control in Gaza for 18 years, rendering it unable to influence field or security matters.
- Doctrinal divergence: The PA rejects armed resistance, preferring diplomacy and “peaceful popular resistance,” and sought to maintain its image before international donors, even calling for the release of Israeli hostages.
II. The PA and the Negotiation Process After the Ceasefire Agreement
The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit and the “Trump Declaration for Peace and Prosperity” were signed on October 13, 2025, after Hamas and Gaza factions accepted the initiative. The United States, Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar co-signed the agreement to end Israel’s war on Gaza.
In its first phase, the plan focused on a ceasefire, partial Israeli withdrawal, and prisoner exchanges. Governance in Gaza would be assigned to a temporary technocratic committee responsible for public services and municipalities, overseen by an international body — the “Peace Council” — chaired by Donald Trump alongside other world leaders.
A “Stabilization Force” under U.S. leadership and with Arab and international partners would handle Gaza’s security. The PA’s eventual takeover was made conditional on completing “reforms,” referencing both Trump’s 2020 “Deal of the Century” and the 2025 Saudi-French proposal.
Although some international parties advocated PA participation in reconstruction and border management, the PA has so far remained excluded. Negotiations on final arrangements continue under U.S., Arab, and Turkish mediation — without direct PA involvement.
The PA cautiously welcomed the “Trump Declaration,” viewing it as an opportunity to reopen the political horizon while emphasizing readiness to assume full responsibility in Gaza — including civil administration, return of displaced persons, service provision, and management of crossings and infrastructure.
Still, the PA faces a dilemma: the international recognition of Hamas as Gaza’s de facto negotiator shifts Palestinian representation dynamics, raising existential concerns for the PA’s legitimacy.
During follow-up factional talks on Gaza’s post-war administration, PA Vice President Hussein al-Sheikh and intelligence chief Majed Faraj held a bilateral meeting with Hamas, attended by Egypt’s intelligence head Hassan Rashad. However, neither Fatah nor official PA or PLO representatives joined the general factional meeting of October 24, 2025, which agreed to hand Gaza’s administration to a temporary technocratic committee.
The “Trump Declaration” thus places the PA in a new bind: a limited administrative role in Gaza, contingent upon undefined reforms — effectively reducing its political significance and aligning with a model of “autonomy without sovereignty.” While international discourse continues to mention a “two-state solution,” no meaningful initiative supports it, raising doubts about whether the PA is being positioned merely as a bureaucratic façade for security arrangements devoid of genuine authority.
III. The Burden of International Recognition
As of late 2025, about 158 of 193 UN member states recognize Palestine. Yet Israel continues to reject the two-state solution and expand settlements — underpinned by the Netanyahu government’s nationalist ideology, viewing the West Bank as part of “historic Israel.”
While international recognition enhances the PA’s legitimacy, its practical effect remains limited in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. Israel continues to impose colonial facts on the ground — fragmenting the West Bank with checkpoints, settler roads, and annexation plans.
This contradiction — broad diplomatic recognition versus on-the-ground dispossession — leaves the PA with a growing legitimacy gap: strong on paper, weak in practice. It holds symbolic sovereignty internationally but is losing real authority within Palestinian territory.
As a result, international recognition risks becoming a political burden if unaccompanied by concrete measures to confront Israeli encroachments and the erosion of PA control.
IV. Divergent International Positions Toward the PA
U.S. policy toward the PA shifted over the course of the Gaza war. The Biden administration nominally upheld the “two-state solution” but tied any renewed political track to “internal reform,” under the concept of a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” — one seen as efficient, transparent, and capable of administering Gaza post-war without Hamas involvement.
This reduced the PA to an administrative and security body under U.S.-Arab supervision, not a sovereign political entity. Despite rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood, Biden’s administration avoided defining borders or sovereignty and opposed UN moves toward Palestinian recognition.
By contrast, the Trump administration (2025–) has doubled down on support for Israel’s right-wing agenda — including settlement expansion and annexation — with senior officials closely aligned to Israeli hardliners. The new Trump peace framework emphasizes “stability for security,” substituting political sovereignty with economic and humanitarian management under Israeli oversight.
This effectively turns the PA into a limited self-government authority, maintaining the occupation’s structure rather than ending it.
In contrast, Arab summits (Riyadh, Cairo, Manama, Baghdad, Doha) and the “New York Declaration” (July 2025, Saudi-French initiative) reaffirmed the 1967 borders, supported PA return to Gaza under the principle of “one government, one law, one weapon,” and called for ending settlements and division.
Despite broad international endorsement (142 UN members), these positions remain diplomatically symbolic, lacking the leverage to alter realities on the ground, while the “Trump Declaration” remains the dominant framework shaping Gaza’s future.
V. Scenarios for the PA in Gaza
Despite welcoming the Trump plan, the PA’s future in Gaza depends on the next phase of ceasefire negotiations, from which it remains largely excluded. Two main scenarios emerge:
Scenario 1: Partial or Full PA Return to Gaza
A gradual reintegration of the PA into Gaza’s governance — possibly starting with partial administrative roles such as border management — would depend on:
- International and regional consensus (especially from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey);
- U.S. and Israeli approval under pressure from global recognition of Palestine;
- Domestic Palestinian consensus and guarantees to prevent internal conflict.
However, this scenario requires the PA to accept incremental control and implement extensive “reforms,” including elections, a new constitution mandating party adherence to the PLO program and recognition of Israel, revising educational curricula, and restructuring stipends for prisoners and martyrs.
Given Israel’s firm rejection of any PA return, this scenario seems conditional and long-term, dependent on future political shifts.
Scenario 2: Complete Exclusion of the PA
Here, Israel succeeds in blocking any PA role, establishing instead an international or regional administrative framework in Gaza — cementing its separation from the West Bank. This would entrench political and geographic division and gradually erode the PA’s legitimacy and national project, aligning with the Israeli right’s goal of eliminating the two-state vision.
Gaza would thus become a fragile, externally supervised enclave with no real sovereignty.
Conclusion
The Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023, marked a turning point in Palestinian and regional politics. It redefined the debate on the Palestinian Authority’s role — either as a legitimate representative body or a limited administrative entity.
The PA now faces two stark options:
- Accept a symbolic administrative role in Gaza under foreign supervision — sacrificing sovereignty for survival; or
- Remain excluded — risking total marginalization and the loss of its representational legitimacy.
Both outcomes reflect an ongoing international tendency to reduce the Palestinian issue to security and administrative dimensions, sidelining its political essence.
Unless the PA regains agency and internal legitimacy while aligning its strategy with the realities of a fragmented post-war order, it risks becoming an authority in name only — stripped of both territory and political purpose.
