China is an important actor in Arctic affairs, particularly as it is geographically one of the countries closest to the Arctic Circle, which directly affects China’s climate system and ecological environment, and therefore its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, the maritime industry, and other sectors. China has participated in Arctic affairs for nearly a century, expanding its activities, gaining more experience, and deepening cooperation with other stakeholders.
The increase in China’s presence in the Arctic has raised U.S. concerns that China’s scientific, informational, and commercial activities in the region may contribute to Beijing’s broader security objectives, by enabling intelligence gathering, granting access to critical infrastructure, or providing other military advantages. China’s approach to strategic competition—integrating public and private capabilities and combining civilian and military domains—has heightened fears that China may be on its way to becoming a security and military actor in the Arctic, with Russia’s support paving the way.
In this context, the RAND Corporation published a report in 2025 entitled “China’s Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda?” The report seeks to analyze China’s economic, scientific, and informational activities in the Arctic, focusing on the potential risks that may arise from these activities—especially in relation to intelligence gathering and military risks. Its purpose is to help the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency identify activities and trends that may pose threats to U.S. national security and that of its allies, in addition to monitoring warning signals that may foreshadow dangerous developments.
Dimensions of China’s Presence
The report notes that China’s interest in the Arctic dates back to 1920, when it signed the Svalbard Treaty. After decades of disengagement, China’s interest in the region was renewed during the 1990s, when it became a member of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1996. In 2004, it established the Yellow River research station in Svalbard, Norway, which strengthened its scientific presence in the Arctic. In 2013, after years of diplomatic lobbying, China obtained “observer state” status in the Arctic Council, and in 2018 it issued its first official Arctic policy, describing itself as a “near-Arctic state,” reflecting its ambition to play a major role in the region.
China sees the Arctic as a major strategic opportunity because of its vast natural resources such as oil, gas, and rare minerals, in addition to new trade routes like the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which could become a faster and cheaper alternative to the Suez Canal due to melting ice. Finally, the Arctic’s scientific value—as a natural laboratory for studying climate change and polar technology—is another driver. Thus, China seeks to secure a strong presence in the Arctic across several main areas: economic and commercial activities, scientific research and environmental monitoring, political and diplomatic influence, and communications and data collection.
Economic Ambition or Strategic Game?
Although China presents its Arctic activities as purely economic and scientific projects, there are concerns that they serve a long-term strategic agenda. These concerns include:
- Using scientific research as a cover for intelligence gathering: Chinese research stations and satellites could be used to monitor Western military activity in the Arctic. Weather and ice data collected by China may also provide strategic advantages for future naval operations.
- Economic influence as political leverage: Through large-scale investments in infrastructure and energy, China could impose influence on local governments in Arctic states. There are also fears that countries dependent on Chinese financing may become more receptive to Beijing’s policies in the region.
- Chinese-Russian military cooperation in the Arctic: In 2022 and 2023, Chinese and Russian naval vessels conducted joint operations near Alaska, raising concerns about strengthening military cooperation in the region. In April 2023, Russia and China signed a coast guard cooperation agreement, which could enhance their ability to monitor Western activities in the Arctic.
To monitor potential risks associated with China’s Arctic activities, the report suggests tracking several warning indicators, such as: increased Chinese investment in oil, gas, and mining projects in the Arctic; a rise in the number of Chinese research stations in the region, particularly near Western military bases; an increase in Chinese fishing vessels in the Arctic, possibly foreshadowing a larger naval presence; expansion of Chinese fiber-optic cable and telecommunications projects in the Arctic; and growing Chinese-Russian military cooperation in the region.
To limit potential threats, the report recommends that the United States and its allies take measures such as: imposing restrictions on Chinese investments in sensitive sectors like energy and telecommunications in the Arctic; strengthening cooperation among Western states to counter China’s growing influence by providing reliable investment alternatives; monitoring Chinese scientific activities in the Arctic to ensure they are not being used as fronts for intelligence gathering; and developing defensive and security policies to protect Western interests in the Arctic, particularly against China’s economic and military expansion in the region.
Developing Understanding and Knowledge
The report also addresses China’s surveillance and data-gathering activities in the Arctic, which aim to deepen China’s knowledge of the region and enhance its understanding of environmental and geopolitical changes there. These activities include scientific research, establishing monitoring stations, academic cooperation, and investment in satellite and artificial intelligence technologies.
Although research and scientific activities may appear harmless on the surface, Chinese research stations and monitoring satellites could be used to track Western military activities in the Arctic. China can also analyze weather and ice data to improve its naval and military capabilities in the region. Moreover, China may seek to develop dual-use (civilian-military) technology through geophysical data collection, which could help it build advanced navigation systems and improve its ability to operate submarines and military vessels in the Arctic.
On the political level, China could strengthen its influence through academic cooperation, using scientific partnerships and academic exchanges to gain access to sensitive research on natural resources and infrastructure in Western countries, or by using research institutions as a cover to collect strategic information about the Arctic. Given Beijing’s close ties with Moscow, Russia may provide China with access to intelligence on the Arctic, especially in the context of their cooperation in energy and infrastructure.
To monitor risks associated with these activities, the report suggests observing several warning indicators, including: increased Chinese investment in Arctic-focused surveillance and satellite systems; expansion of Chinese academic and scientific cooperation with Arctic states, particularly in geological, climate, and magnetic research; establishment of new Chinese research stations at strategic sites near Western military centers; and heightened Chinese-Russian military cooperation, including the sharing of geographic and climate data.
To mitigate potential threats, the United States should identify areas of scientific cooperation that may pose intelligence risks, restrict Chinese researchers’ access to sensitive data, strengthen monitoring of Chinese research stations in the Arctic to ensure they are not used for intelligence activities, closely track developments in Chinese satellite programs—especially those monitoring the Arctic’s geographic and climate environment—and finally, enhance U.S. cooperation with its Arctic allies to safeguard infrastructure and resources from increasing Chinese influence.
Risk Assessment
It can be said that China seeks to advance its national interests in the Arctic through a variety of economic, scientific, and informational activities, amid growing Western concerns about their military and intelligence dimensions. While many activities remain purely economic and scientific, the potential for them to become tools of political or military influence makes close monitoring essential. The report’s analysis of China’s activities in the region found the following:
- These activities rarely entail risks of direct U.S.-China confrontation, except in two cases, neither of which poses an immediate threat: the possible future presence of Chinese oceangoing vessels that have previously engaged in aggressive behavior elsewhere, and China’s attempts to jam or deceive global military GPS systems using the electromagnetic spectrum.
- Risks of financial dependence and political pressure are limited for all Arctic stakeholders, except Russia, given the large scale of Chinese investments in the Russian Arctic.
- Data and information transfer activities present the most obvious risks, as they could enable intelligence collection, support military applications, or threaten critical infrastructure. Some activities related to facilitating access also carry risks, but these would affect the U.S. and its Arctic allies only if they relax their restrictive policies limiting Chinese influence in these areas.
- Chinese investments in infrastructure and construction could provide pathways for intelligence collection on U.S. and allied military activities, depending on their location (e.g., proximity to sensitive sites) and function.
- Activities related to science, data transfer, and infrastructure investment are the main areas China could exploit for intelligence gathering.
Since the U.S. government must determine what resources—and how much—should be allocated to monitor whether China’s Arctic activities will shift from benign to concerning, the report advises that Washington consider the following:
- Not all Chinese activities in the Arctic pose the same level of risk, and thus do not require the same degree of oversight.
- Some specific threats could materialize more quickly than others. For example, a sudden change in legislation could open the door to increased Chinese data and information transfer, whereas mining and fishing activities would take longer to develop.
- The evolution of China’s Arctic efforts (such as mining, infrastructure building, and scientific activities) may reflect the importance of the Arctic in China’s overall national strategy.
- While China’s aggressive behavior and use of economic, scientific, and informational activities in other regions cannot necessarily be generalized to the Arctic due to the region’s unique characteristics, China’s behavior near its own borders could indicate the kinds of actions it may take when it feels the stakes are high and it has the ability to act more aggressively.
Source:
Stephanie Pezard, Irina A. Chindea, Naoko Aoki, Domenique Lumpkin, & Yuliya Shokh, “China’s Economic, Scientific, and Information Activities in the Arctic: Benign Activities or Hidden Agenda?” RAND Corporation, 2025.
