The Mauritanian-Malian Crisis: Does the Demarcation of Russian-American Borders Hasten in the Sahel?
With each renewed conflict on the Mauritanian-Malian borders, stretching over more than two thousand kilometers, the astute observer needs to scrutinize maps to determine definitively whether clashes occur on Mauritanian or Malian territories. Often, there is no quick or decisive answer, as border demarcation in the desert is akin to capturing images in water.
This is purely a geographical perspective. When we move beyond discussions of shifting terrains, influenced by the force of late winter and early spring storms, to examining regional soil and its fertilizing winds, and the storms of major battles whose dust clouds begin to obscure the coastal horizon, the process approaches the bounds of the impossible. However, it remains essential to avoid getting lost in the desert as summer approaches. All indications suggest it will be exceedingly harsh.
Mauritania and Mali and the Crisis on the Verge
The relationship between Mauritania and Mali is highly complex, shaped by historical accumulations, geographic realities, and shared interests.
Both countries, known today as Mauritania and Mali, were historically part or parcel of various empires or unified regimes, from the Ghana Empire to the Malian Kingdoms and through the colonial periods (1). These two countries are linked by vast borders in the expansive Sahara, spanning over 2400 kilometers, across six Mauritanian states and five Malian states. Despite the length of their shared borders, they have not been formally demarcated to this day. Determination of these boundaries has relied on local customs and traditions inherited by the local populations. Despite multiple meetings between committees from both countries to demarcate them, their meetings have consistently concluded without results (2).
The demographic composition of both countries includes significant overlap, with speakers of Hassaniya (an Arabic dialect spoken in several countries in West and North Africa) and Fulani (a language spoken in over twenty countries across Africa) present in both. This complexity exacerbates tensions along borders that are often viewed with disdain as colonial constructs.
Each country hosts communities from the other numbering in the tens of thousands. Despite varying reasons for their presence in the other country, these communities wield considerable influence (Mauritanians in Mali are active in trade and industry, and historically, many residents of areas adjacent to Mali have relied on Malian vegetation cover for livestock development. They rely primarily on animal husbandry. In Mauritania, Malians are active in professions, crafts, and domestic labor, and Mauritania hosts the largest camp for Malian refugees abroad, housing more than one hundred thousand Malian refugees)(3). Mali also relies on the port of Nouakchott to import its necessities from abroad; Nouakchott is the vital maritime lifeline for the landlocked Malian Republic.
Despite this longstanding and intricate interconnection through time and geography, reinforced by solid shared interests, Mauritanian-Malian relations have faced intermittent tremors since independence to this day. However, they have not evolved into comprehensive confrontation, perhaps due to previous complications. Nevertheless, a review of recent years reveals an escalation in incidents and tensions to a degree where fears of confrontation are serious, and talk of the brink is not exaggerated. The Malian army has been supported by Wagner Group Russian forces in recent weeks in extensive military operations and pursuits of fugitives near and sometimes within Mauritanian borders. In the first week of May 2024, Mauritania conducted military maneuvers on the border with Mali, and ministers in the government have repeatedly stated readiness to protect the country and its citizens from any assaults (4).
Most border areas witnessing demographic overlap are inflamed zones, where war rages between the Bamako government supported by Wagner militias and a complex situation involving armed groups gathering local formations seeking independence from the central Malian state, along with groups described as jihadist with various affiliations like Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the Islamic State and its derivatives, and desert groups with their masked fighters and defenders.
As both countries strive through their respective means to avoid altering the nature of their confrontation, their fires periodically reach the Mauritanian side. Over the past decade, joint investigation committees and border surveillance patrols have failed to reduce this phenomenon viewed in Mauritania as a sovereignty violation that can no longer be tolerated or endured. Bamako considers it a necessity among “operational necessities” due to what it describes as a war against violence and extremism, accusing Mauritania of harboring and sheltering activists and participants in violent operations, especially from the Azawad movements.
With the Military Council taking power in Mali in recent years and utilizing Wagner militias, especially after the withdrawal of French and UN forces and the consolidation of the government of Assimi Goïta (commander of the Military Council ruling in Bamako), control over most areas of the north and central regions where Arabs and Fulani have a significant or substantial presence, the clashes along the border have intensified, and incidents of fighting and the flames of confrontation and the rhetoric have made the situation between the two countries almost uncontrollable (5).
Self-control and rhythm control
It was noticeable that the military authorities in Mali, who managed previous crises with France and Algeria with tension, and the Mauritanian authorities, despite successive strikes that left dozens of victims and led to harsh criticism, have prioritized self-control and have so far succeeded in controlling the rhythm of tension. Although it is considered by some to be short-lived, it draws strength from several factors, including that both countries live in internal conditions that make them exempt from further crises:
In Bamako, a multidimensional crisis is evident, with political headlines having reached a freezing point in the work of organizations and political forces following the rise of voices demanding a specific date for the elections, and thus the end of the transition period, which has boosted this demand after the results of the elections in Senegal, a country with a significant impact on the two neighbors, Mauritania and Mali.
In Nouakchott, on the brink of presidential elections for a second term that will be determined after the outlines and chances of the competitors in it, and the current system, representing “the speech of calm” as a hint of its governance, fears that the situation on the borders with Mali may be an entry point from the sources of tension that may strengthen the transition trends of “Senegalese infection” by heavy voting to impose a change that aligns with the “budgets and traditional accounts” with its local, regional, and international dimensions and certainly international.
Linkage and separation between local and international accounts
In contrast to what appears to be the awareness of Bamako and Nouakchott of the need for self-control, it appears that the major players in the Sahel have different accounts, which may make it possible to confront reality in search of a logical answer to the question: Does time and space narrow also on small accounts?
The current crisis between Mauritania and Mali comes at a moment when the distance is shrinking in the face of a zero confrontation between Moscow and Washington over the Sahara and the coast. There are important points to be highlighted:
First: Moscow has restored its fighting militias in the Sahel after last year’s crisis when militias rebelled and advanced on the Russian capital, Moscow, then its leader was assassinated or died in mysterious circumstances. The vanguard of the African Legion has already arrived, meaning that combat readiness is better (6).
Second: Moscow presents itself today in the Sahel and the desert as a partner that can be “relied upon” in arming and in eliminating opponents of allied regimes through the application of scorched-earth wars without regard to the human and human rights costs of its present and future of these homelands.
Third: Moscow is a declared ally of the Sahel coalition (7), which openly declares its hostility to the West, follows policies and propaganda that strengthen its presence and prospects in the eyes of dissatisfied sectors that tend to revolt against decades – or perhaps centuries – of moving within the Western camp, either hate or consent.
In contrast to the “emerging Russian pole,” Washington has not spared its warning to match its power with Paris. Here, it is necessary to continue the resistance in Ukraine on the borders now; the main and direct source of the conflict was expressed.
Firstly, Niamey gave Washington a short deadline to withdraw approximately 1,500 Special Forces soldiers from Niger, despite showing flexibility in dealing with the coup. Niamey refused to align with France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in considering the ousting of Bazoum in late 2023 as a military coup.
Secondly, Washington reached a threshold in N’Djamena (Chad), on the eve of presidential elections where the son of the assassinated general, Idriss Déby, showed wavering between following his father’s path, his Western French-leaning inclination, and the surrounding mood favoring “new lords” in Moscow. This compelled Washington to declare an undisclosed bias toward Chad, playing a mystery game that extended beyond the moment, interpreted by some as a temporary move until the ballots speak in May.
Are boundaries being redrawn? Where and on what grounds? The apparent scene suggests Moscow gains ground daily, while America and previously France lose traction. Yet scrutinizing the complexities of power and weakness, opportunities and challenges, exposes the many details that make talking about gains a risky venture—risk-laden operations in the desert.
The essence of the conflict revolves around energy and resources—a struggle whose parties rarely concede. It’s important here to recall the two energy mines on Earth currently contested at their borders, notably Mauritania.
Firstly, natural gas and its extensive fields, mostly shared with Senegal, where the West and America desire not only geographical proximity but political closeness, facilitating “affordable” acquisition, countered by Russia’s efforts to obstruct. Their ongoing war on Ukraine’s borders necessitates resistance for control of Europe’s gas needs. Losing strategic stature, the West might augment its encroachment in Ukrainian flanks with renewed dominance over Western and North African energy sources.
Secondly, renewable energy, specifically green hydrogen, draws dozens of Western companies keenly interested in Mauritania and Morocco for a strategic advantage that reinforces policies of reducing dependence on Russian energy. Thus, stripping Moscow of one of its vital strengths in its journey back to the “first-class club” among world powers.
Mauritania’s recent importance has made it an exceptional focus of Europe, NATO, and the United States:
A significant European delegation visited in early March 2024, concluding with direct support and a partnership project in migration that the Mauritanian government quietly ignored despite public uproar.
The U.S. lifted restrictions stemming from withdrawal from the AGOA agreement after four years, opening doors for cooperation in various fields, though criticized for its human rights record that led to the swift and smooth reentry.
A NATO military committee delegation led by its chairman visited Mauritania on May 5, 2024, praising its role in a press interview, reinforcing consecutive statements from various NATO leaders, hailing Nouakchott as a democratic example and vital element for regional stability.
Further bolstering Western adherence to the Mauritanian regime were strategic implications from recent Senegalese elections, elevating Paseru Fay and Sonko to Dakar’s helm, carrying a liberation discourse and sovereignty that intersects with coup-affected Bamako, Niamey, Ouagadougou, and Conakry.
Finally, does the geographic fact commonly overlooked deserve a reminder? The United States neighbors the Sahel region, especially Mauritania, separated only by the Atlantic Ocean. This very ocean is where Russian strategic focus intensifies, aiming for a foothold in its warm waters, lifting the burden of landlocked allies and strategically positioning against New York’s perspective for grand strategic benefits.
