In 1986, the U.S. Department of Defense Reorganization Act was issued, requiring the President to submit a report to Congress outlining the national security strategy his administration would pursue. Accordingly, the first report to bear this title was released during the administration of former President Ronald Reagan in 1987. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, this practice evolved from a technical report focused on defense and warfare into a strategic political declaration in which the U.S. President sets out his vision of the world, the risks facing U.S. national security, priority areas, and messages to allies and adversaries regarding Washington’s stance on international issues.
In this context, on December 4, 2025, the White House announced the new U.S. National Security Strategy document. It defined the principles and objectives the United States seeks to achieve, the means of implementation through military, economic, diplomatic, and soft-power tools, and then outlined its regional orientations in the following order: the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. This article focuses on the status of the Middle East within that strategy and U.S. policy toward the region under President Donald Trump’s administration.
Pillars of the Strategy
It is not possible to analyze the U.S. vision of the Middle East without a broader understanding of the principles of U.S. national security and the means of achieving it. The principles set out in the new strategy can be summarized in five main points:
- Priority of U.S. national interests above all else.
The strategy considers any infringement on these interests a threat to national security. Foreign policy is thus placed in the service of domestic economic and social policies, in line with the “America First” principle within a framework of “flexible realism” that combines protecting U.S. sovereignty with dealing with evolving threats from a purely national perspective. Globalization no longer has a place in this strategy; it is described as a “hollow concept” designed to serve large multinational corporations rather than states and peoples, and the era of globalization is deemed to be over in favor of nations and nation-states. - Respect for state sovereignty and the right of countries to choose their own systems of governance based on their history, traditions, and culture, and therefore a commitment to non-interference aimed at spreading liberalism and democracy in other countries, as practiced by previous U.S. administrations.
- Reordering international relations and alliances, with the United States shifting from leading a multilateral liberal international order to forming alliances based on realistic U.S. interests, focusing on bilateral relations and expecting greater defense burden-sharing from partners in Europe and Asia.
- Linking national security to economic and technological security by ensuring dominance in the energy sector, protecting critical supply chains, and reducing dependence on adversaries for sensitive technologies.
- Peace through strength, meaning strengthening U.S. power as a means of achieving and sustaining peace, encompassing military, economic, and technological power to deter threats and safeguard stability.
Beyond polished diplomatic language, the strategy leaves little doubt that its ultimate objective is to preserve U.S. global leadership by remaining the wealthiest, most technologically advanced, and most militarily powerful state. The White House statement accompanying its release described it as a roadmap to ensure that the United States remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history.
The Declining Centrality of the Middle East
The new U.S. National Security Strategy criticizes its predecessors for addressing every issue and conflict across all regions of the world, describing this approach as “unrealistic.” It emphasizes the importance of prioritization, clarifying that the goal of foreign policy is to protect vital or core national interests rather than manage every global issue.
In the section on the Middle East, titled “Shifting Burdens and Building Peace,” the strategy notes the declining priority of the region in U.S. thinking, stating that the Middle East’s daily dominance of the U.S. policy agenda has “ended once and for all.” The region no longer holds the same importance it once did due to changing circumstances: it is no longer a direct source of threat to U.S. national security and has become a venue for trade and investment partnerships between the United States and regional countries.
According to the strategy, the historical reasons that once drove Washington’s focus on the Middle East no longer exist. U.S. dependence on the region’s oil has ended; the region is no longer the primary arena of great-power competition; nor is it a theater of conflicts threatening to escalate globally “all the way to us.” Conversely, opportunities for cooperation and commercial and technological partnerships have increased, including investments in nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, defense technologies, supply chain security, and more.
The document states that this decline has supported a shift in U.S. attention toward other issues, most notably competition with China and combating cartels, smuggling networks, and drug trafficking in the Americas—an area the strategy places ahead of Europe in its priority ranking.
The strategy also affirms U.S. acceptance of the political realities of the region, explicitly abandoning what it calls “failed attempts” to change political systems from the outside. It argues that the key to a successful relationship is “accepting the region, its leaders, and its peoples as they are, while focusing on shared interests.”
At the same time, it emphasizes cooperation to develop shared interests in trade and investment, and reiterates Washington’s commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea as part of global supply chain stability. It also stresses that the region must not become a haven or source of terrorism against U.S. interests or territory, underscores the protection of Israel’s security, and calls for expanding the Abraham Accords to include additional Arab and Islamic countries. Simultaneously, the document affirms U.S. commitment to preventing any other power from dominating the region—without becoming embroiled in long or costly military operations.
According to the strategy, the United States remains the strongest power in the region, bolstered by President Trump’s success in revitalizing alliances in the Gulf, with other Arab partners, and with Israel. While conflicts persist and are a defining feature of the region, they are now considered “far less dangerous than newspaper headlines suggest.” Iran—the actor most capable of destabilizing regional security—has been significantly weakened by military operations against it in 2025, according to the strategy’s assessment.
Although the Palestinian–Israeli conflict remains “a complex issue,” the strategy claims that progress has been made toward a more sustainable peace thanks to the ceasefire and hostage release negotiated by President Trump. As for Syria, the strategy describes it as a “potential problem,” but one that “could stabilize and regain its natural role as a positive and essential regional actor,” with U.S., Arab, Israeli, and Turkish support. Cooperation among regional states in countering extremism is also increasing with encouragement from Washington.
What Can Be Understood from the Strategy?
The new U.S. National Security Strategy suggests that the United States prioritizes trade and investment relations in its engagement with the region and, while seeking to resolve conflicts, is unwilling to resort to military intervention—thus prioritizing political and diplomatic approaches.
The U.S. view of the Middle East is taking shape as that of an important region, but one that is “no longer a constant source of irritation and potential catastrophe,” due to the success of U.S. diplomacy under Trump’s second administration in weakening adversaries and reducing threats to U.S. interests emanating from the region. As a result, the Middle East no longer occupies its former central position in U.S. strategic focus. Attention has shifted to major competition with China, the Indo-Pacific region, and geographically closer threats in the Western Hemisphere such as illegal migration, smuggling, and drugs—prompting the strategy to call for an active policy likened to the doctrine of former President James Monroe (1817–1825).
According to the strategy, the era in which the Middle East dominated U.S. foreign policy—both in long-term planning and daily execution—has ended. The Middle East, as seen by the strategy, is not a battlefield requiring constant intervention but rather an opportunity for partnership and investment. Some Middle Eastern countries are envisioned as potential sources of investment in the United States, particularly in artificial intelligence and advanced military technologies.
While the picture painted by the strategy may appear logical and coherent, real-world developments—with all their complexity and entanglements—may render it unworkable. Iran has not accepted U.S. regional arrangements, and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict still has a long road ahead before confidence can be placed in the durability of the “fragile” ceasefire, which Israel violates periodically, and in the implementation of the second phase of Trump’s Gaza plan. Without acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination, talk of lasting regional stability may be premature. Conflicts and crises in countries such as Libya, Sudan, and Yemen also continue to be sources of instability.
There is also U.S. silence regarding Israeli military violations of the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, as well as daily infringements on Syrian sovereignty, including incursions, checkpoints, home searches, interrogations, arrests, and the transfer of detainees into Israel.
Another factor is that President Trump’s decisions could undermine the strategy’s objectives. His emphasis on bilateral relations and deal-driven priorities may destabilize long-term alliances and potentially produce outcomes contrary to the strategy’s goals.
In conclusion, while the United States has the right to pursue a policy that maximizes its national interests and security, and to employ its hard, soft, and smart power to achieve these objectives, Arab states also have the right—and the duty—to examine how the U.S. National Security Strategy will be applied in practice and to seek their own national interests. This may include diversifying and developing relations with other powers such as China, the European Union, and Russia—an approach the United States would not welcome.
