On March 13, 2025, Richard Grenell, the special envoy of U.S. President Donald Trump, announced that the government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro would resume deportation flights for its citizens who are illegally in the United States starting on March 14. The Venezuelan government confirmed reaching this agreement.
These developments come after reports published by The Wall Street Journal on March 8, indicating that President Maduro’s government had “specifically” warned Trump’s administration that it would not coordinate new operations to repatriate Venezuelan migrants to their homeland after the U.S. Treasury Department revoked a license allowing American oil company Chevron to operate in Venezuela. These developments reflect the current state of complexity in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, which experience periods of convergence and tension, influenced by numerous interconnected factors.
Thorny Issues
There are several key issues and files that revolve around U.S.-Venezuelan relations, including:
1- Migration and Organized Crime: Combating illegal migration is a central issue for Trump, who has already linked the presence of undocumented Venezuelans to an alleged increase in crime in the United States during his election campaign. Trump stated on May 31, 2024: “In Venezuela, they emptied their prisons into the United States. They took their criminals and drug smugglers out of the cities and brought them here, and that’s true with many other countries as well.” However, there is no evidence of prisons being emptied to send criminals to the United States. Moreover, the proportion of suspected criminals among the hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan migrants is marginal. Figures cited by NBC News from the Department of Homeland Security indicate that 600 individuals have been identified in the United States as suspected members of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang, which Trump recently classified as a “terrorist organization.”
Nevertheless, the number of Venezuelans in the United States has doubled in recent years, and they have been among the main beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and parole granted by the administration of former President Joe Biden. According to data from the Migration Policy Institute, a Washington-based research center, by the beginning of January 2025, there were approximately 607,000 Venezuelans with TPS and around 117,000 with parole. This massive increase in the number of migrants, along with reports of the presence of members of the criminal gang “Tren de Aragua” in the United States, has made undocumented Venezuelan migrants a focal point for the Trump administration, which seeks to return them to their country, especially since approximately 300,000 Venezuelans may be subject to deportation from the United States starting in April, with Trump’s revocation of the TPS granted to them.
2- Political Transition in Venezuela: Nicolas Maduro declared himself the winner of the presidential elections held in July 2024. In contrast, the opposition argued that their candidate, Edmundo Gonzalez, won the elections with an overwhelming majority. Within Trump’s administration, many considered the elections to be fraudulent, which led them to take a hardline stance against Maduro.
Washington has always stated that it supports democratic elections verified by observers in Venezuela, and the administration of Joe Biden rejected the results announced by the electoral council in July 2024, recognizing the opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez as the elected president. Since then, Venezuelan opposition leaders have called on American officials to increase pressure on Maduro for a political transition.
3- The Impact of Oil on Bilateral Relations: Oil is a central issue for Venezuela, and to a lesser extent for the United States. At the end of last January, Maduro linked the migration crisis to the oil sanctions imposed on his country, demanding that the American administration lift all sanctions, asserting that if that happened, “no more Venezuelans would leave Venezuela, and those already there would return.” Oil is the main source of foreign currency for Venezuela, which has experienced a decline in oil production to historically low levels in recent years, and despite a partial recovery recently, analysts agree that the only way for Venezuela to regain its oil production is through billions of dollars in investments, but for that to happen, it is necessary – among other things – for the White House to lift the sanctions imposed on the country.
Despite President Trump’s comment on January 20, 2025, that the United States could do without Venezuelan oil exports, saying, “We don’t need to buy their oil. We have plenty of oil for ourselves”; however, Trump may actually be interested in maintaining production in this country. The presence of Venezuelan oil in the international market can help lower energy prices. Additionally, this could provide opportunities for American companies and some of Trump’s allies who are interested in doing business and investing in Venezuela’s oil sector, not to mention that a further deterioration of the economic situation in Venezuela would exacerbate the problem of Venezuelan migration out of the country.
4- American Prisoners in Venezuela: It is unclear how many Americans or dual nationals are detained in Venezuela, but Venezuelan officials have released at least nine Americans and 150 “mercenaries” of 25 nationalities. In late 2023, the Venezuelan government released dozens of prisoners, including ten Americans, after months of negotiations, while the United States released one of Maduro’s close associates, Alex Saab.
On March 7, 2025, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State stated that Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged the existence of nine Americans unjustly detained in Venezuela, calling for their immediate release. The spokesperson said, “It is unacceptable for the Maduro regime to detain and imprison Americans under suspicious circumstances and without respect for their rights.” He added, “All Americans unjustly detained by the Maduro regime must be immediately released. The United States continues its efforts to secure the release of the remaining Americans unjustly detained by the regime in Venezuela.” The Maduro government regularly accuses the opposition and foreigners of conspiring with the United States to harm Venezuela, allegations that the opposition and Washington consistently deny.
Determinants of the Future
The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations is likely to be determined by several factors, including:
1- Pressure from influential members within the Trump administration: Trump appointed many individuals who have long criticized Maduro, including his National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, and Mauricio Claver-Carone as the special envoy to Latin America. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in particular, has been a long-standing critic of any settlement with Venezuela. He spoke to opposition leaders, describing Gonzalez as the legitimate president of the South American country, and opposed any easing of sanctions imposed on it. During his confirmation hearing in the Senate on January 15, he described the Maduro government as a “drug trafficking organization.”
While Trump’s special envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell, shook hands with Maduro in Caracas on January 31, 2025, the U.S. Secretary of State personally oversaw the seizure of the Venezuelan president’s plane during his visit to the Dominican Republic on February 6, 2025, where it had been held since last year. Meanwhile, some media reports indicate that three American congressmen of Cuban descent hinted that they would not vote in favor of Trump’s proposed budget in the House of Representatives unless he revoked Chevron’s oil license in Venezuela. It is also likely that hawks within the American administration will pressure to end the licenses granted to some French, Italian, and Spanish companies to operate in the Venezuelan oil sector.
2- Orientations of Trump’s supporting voter base: The path that Trump chooses regarding relations with Venezuela will be conditioned by the orientations of political forces and the influence of the electoral circles that support the American president. In this context, there is a strong base of anti-communist Venezuelans in Florida, one of the decisive states in American presidential elections, who want the Trump administration to take a hardline stance against Maduro’s government, which is allied with Cuba. The new American administration’s deportation policy has already raised concerns among some within Trump’s strong voting base. They may consider any additional attempt at rapprochement with Maduro as another “betrayal.”
3- Policies of Venezuelan President Maduro: The Venezuelan president is well aware that the continuation of his rule may be linked to the economic situation of his country, so he congratulated Trump on his election victory in November last year and expressed hope that Trump’s second administration would be a “new beginning for us to bet on winning, so that things go well for the United States, and things go well for Venezuela.” Regardless of the ideological differences between the two men, the Venezuelan president was initially open to cooperation with the American administration regarding prisoners and migration, hoping to keep President Trump’s company Chevron operating in Venezuela, especially since the country has been severely affected by American sanctions imposed since 2017.
The poverty rate in the country is estimated at around 80% of the population. This economic situation is improving slowly but is still hampered by the slowdown in oil production despite the country’s vast reserves. Additionally, the isolation and renewed international legitimacy crisis that Maduro faced after the presidential elections on July 28, 2024, explain why the Venezuelan leader is interested in obtaining a “new beginning” with the Trump government. However, Maduro increased his hardline rhetoric towards the United States after the revocation of the exemption granted to Chevron, announcing that deportation flights for Venezuelan migrants from the United States were affected by Trump’s administration’s decision to revoke Chevron’s operating license in Venezuela. He had previously threatened that Venezuela might “liberate” Puerto Rico if the United States continued to interfere in his country’s affairs. Regardless of the seriousness of these threats or not, Maduro’s policies will largely be a reaction and response to the positions of the American administration.
4- Continued Chinese support for the Venezuelan regime: During his first term, Trump failed in his efforts to overthrow Maduro. The Venezuelan government under Maduro, like Hugo Chavez before him, has shown its ability to withstand American pressure, largely due to the role played by China in the country and the growing convergence between Maduro and Beijing. Unlike Western leaders, Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Maduro after the latter announced his victory in the 2024 presidential elections. China is the main importer of Venezuelan crude oil and has signed a series of bilateral trade and tourism agreements that have provided Maduro with an economic lifeline. If Beijing, along with its allies Russia and Iran, continues to support Venezuela, which is likely to happen, it will bolster Maduro’s position and partially alleviate the American pressure he may face.
For some hardliners in the American administration, China’s strong influence within Venezuela represents a threat to the United States’ long-term vision of regional hegemony, as articulated in the Monroe Doctrine, reinforcing their positions calling for a hardline stance against the Venezuelan regime. However, there are other voices within the American administration that do not hold the same negative view towards Beijing.
Divergent Scenarios
U.S.-Venezuela relations under Trump’s second term will be subject to intertwined factors and dynamics, including the American president’s desire to make deals and fulfill his election campaign promise to deport migrants to Latin America. At the same time, Trump needs to balance satisfying the anti-Maduro voices within his coalition and not pushing Venezuela further towards China, a country fully ready to exercise greater influence in parts of Latin America. The future of relations between the two countries is likely to revolve around several scenarios, including:
1- Washington’s continued adherence to an anti-Maduro regime stance: Under this scenario, it is likely that the Trump administration will maintain its current stance, which is based on not formally recognizing Maduro’s legitimacy and working towards his removal from office. The likelihood of this scenario occurring is reinforced by the Trump administration’s continued imposition of sanctions on Venezuela, as well as its continued recognition of Maduro’s opponent, Edmundo Gonzalez, as the legitimate elected president of the country. Other indicators suggesting that this approach will be dominant in future relations between the two countries include the rollback of some exemptions granted by the Biden administration in 2022 to oil companies to operate in Venezuela, which helped the struggling export industry regain some of its lost productivity.
On February 26, 2025, Trump announced that he would revoke the license granted by Joe Biden to Nicolas Maduro in November 2022, which allowed the American oil giant Chevron to operate on Venezuelan soil. He stated that his decision was due to Caracas not complying with the electoral guarantees stipulated in the agreement, and that the Maduro government was not accepting Venezuelan migrants with American deportation orders quickly enough, describing them as “violent criminals.” Trump said he had ordered the termination of the deal “effective March 1.” However, under the terms of the current license, Chevron is allowed to operate in Venezuela until the end of next July, six months after the last renewal in February. Such a move would be a severe blow to Venezuela’s economy. Since the end of 2022, 80% of the increase in oil production in Venezuela has occurred due to Chevron’s investments, which currently produce about 25% of the one million barrels per day produced by the Caribbean country, so estimates indicate that oil revenues will decrease by 40%, and oil production will decrease by 25%.
2- The Trump administration adopting a pragmatic approach towards Venezuela: The chances of this scenario occurring are strengthened by Trump’s desire to fulfill his election promises, exemplified by deporting undocumented migrants from the United States, and Maduro’s efforts to overcome the economic challenges facing his country. Indicators pointing to this include the visit of Trump’s envoy, Richard Grenell, to Caracas, which was the first time in many years that an American diplomat was photographed with the Venezuelan president. The visit succeeded in securing the release of six Americans accused by Venezuela of conspiring to destabilize the country. Trump later announced that Maduro would accept the deportation of Venezuelans back to the United States. On February 10, two Venezuelan planes returned home from the United States with nearly 200 deported Venezuelan citizens, and Maduro welcomed them as part of the return to the homeland program.
However, this shift in the American stance towards Venezuela surprised some Republicans and Democrats alike. Concerns increased that Grenell’s visit would grant the Maduro regime some legitimacy. However, as long as Trump feels that Venezuela under Maduro is useful for his goals of deportation, the other American issues with the government in Caracas, such as democratic transition, will likely remain secondary. In this context, Grenell recently stated in an interview that he had been talking to Maduro about establishing a different relationship with Venezuela. He said, “We have a lot of clarity about the Venezuelan government and Maduro, but Donald Trump is a person who doesn’t want to make changes in the regime.”
Some argue that Trump’s termination of Chevron’s exemption to operate in Venezuela is nothing but a bargaining chip, aiming to negotiate a new deal in the coming six months, before the license is completely terminated. What may support this view are the statements of Chevron’s CEO Mike Wirth in a recent interview with the British newspaper “Financial Times,” where he argued that the American oil company’s exit from the Venezuelan market would allow Chinese and Russian companies to increase their presence and influence in the country. He also warned that Venezuela’s economy would be affected, which could lead to a larger wave of migration to the United States.
3- Pushing for the option of American military intervention: The third, more aggressive scenario is American military intervention. While none of the top officials in Trump’s government publicly support this idea, it remains popular in American policy circles. With all peaceful means exhausted, the only alternative is to overthrow Maduro and his allies by force. However, supporters of military action in Venezuela have not presented any realistic proposals, leaving more questions than answers about how to do so in practice. Most importantly, it seems unlikely that the Trump administration would act militarily against the Maduro regime. During the election campaign and now as president, Trump has repeatedly promised “not to start new wars.” As he said in his inauguration speech: “We will measure our success not just by the battles we win, but also by the wars we prevent, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never fight. My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”
From what has been mentioned, it can be said that the Trump administration has not yet developed a cohesive strategy towards Venezuela, but it is likely to be less focused on the idea of regime change there and will primarily focus on promoting American interests, i.e., facilitating the deportation of migrants, stopping irregular migration to the United States, and preventing the rise of energy prices. However, this strategy will reflect, in some aspects, the demands and orientations of some influential parties within the Trump administration and a significant part of his electoral base, represented by broad sectors of American citizens of Latin descent, who demand a tougher stance towards the Maduro regime.
