In recent years, private security companies have garnered global attention. While discussions about their activities are prominent in the Middle East and Africa, where regional and international powers, notably the United States, Russia, the UAE, and Turkey, utilize these firms to extend their influence, the growing presence of security companies, particularly Chinese ones, in the often-overlooked region of Central Asia raises several questions. These include: Will the five republics become a new arena for Chinese security companies? Will China negotiate with Russia for security penetration in Central Asia in exchange for Russian presence through Wagner and African Legions in Africa? How can one predict the future of security companies’ activities in Central Asia given the scarcity of information regarding their clandestine operations and objectives?
Context of the Emergence of Chinese Security Companies in Central Asia:
China’s foreign policy has evolved since 2015, shifting from purely economic interests to security concerns, as emphasized by President Xi Jinping’s assertion that military diplomacy is a tool of foreign policy. This shift propelled Beijing to enhance its military influence in Central Asia through various means, including conducting military exercises, providing training for military personnel, increasing aid and arms exports, bolstering military infrastructure development, and intensifying military maneuvers in Central Asia, including bilateral and multilateral trainings within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
From this perspective, China has invested in the long-term capacity-building of military forces in Central Asia through military education programs, where Chinese universities offer specialized training for regional military officers. While the immediate impact of these educational initiatives may not be evident, they represent a strategic investment in China’s influence in the region over the long term.
A significant tool in China’s strategy towards the five republics has been the establishment of specialized security companies. China’s rising influence in Central Asia has moved beyond military infrastructure development to include a range of military and security services, especially advanced technologies, security assistance, bilateral military training, and police training programs.
China’s Motivations for Establishing Security Companies in Central Asia:
Recently, China’s strategic approach to security in Central Asia has shifted to address unconventional security threats in the region, necessitating specialized responses beyond conventional military capabilities. Hence, China has leaned on private security companies among other Chinese agencies, forming part of a newly established framework under the “National Security Intelligence System for the Belt and Road Initiative.”
China’s deployment of security companies in Central Asia has been motivated by several factors, including the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, leading to the Afghan issue being placed on the agenda of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This has positioned Beijing not only as a peace maker but also as a guarantor of security for Central Asian states. Moreover, security interests related to Xinjiang (formerly East Turkestan) have been pivotal in shaping China’s security perspective towards the five republics.
In this context, China has exploited private security companies to protect its economic sites and infrastructure in Central Asia. These firms effectively act as armed guards while also seeking to provide military training to the armies of these states. Xinjiang Shamo Tewei was the first Chinese security company to engage in Central Asia, specifically in Kazakhstan, since 2013.
Operational Analysis of Security Companies in Central Asia:
Chinese security companies are increasingly expanding their operations in Central Asia, providing a variety of services including the protection of armed and unarmed sites, security consulting, safety training, insurance provision, and logistical support. The nature of their work can be broken down by the five republics as follows:
- Kyrgyzstan: There has been a rising demand for security services in response to the unstable security environment, starting from the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek in 2016, and numerous incidents involving Chinese workers alongside anti-China protests. Additionally, Kyrgyz law permits foreign private security companies, unlike in some neighboring countries, fostering the presence of Chinese security firms within Kyrgyz borders. The Zhongjun Junhong Group and the Chinese Security and Protection Group, established and managed by former Chinese military officers, have opened branches in Kyrgyzstan. Reports indicate that in 2016, Zhongjun Junhong collaborated with a local Kyrgyz security firm to establish Huawei Security, which received an arms license from the Kyrgyz government, enabling it to provide armed protection. Similarly, in 2017, the Chinese Security and Protection Group acquired a local Kyrgyz security company and founded Security Associated, which offers various security services including armed protection and security guard training.
- Kazakhstan: Due to Kazakh law prohibiting foreign private security companies or those with foreign involvement from operating within its borders, the activities of Chinese security companies are limited to non-direct security services. For instance, in 2018, the Chinese security firm Frontier Services Group opened an office in Almaty, providing air transport and emergency rescue for Belt and Road Initiative projects via Maleth Aero. Starting in 2021, the company’s operational presence has been limited to providing online safety and security training. Other Chinese private security firms have sought to enter the Kazakh market; in 2018, China Shield Security Group entered a framework agreement for strategic cooperation with Kazakhstan’s PSC Kuzet to engage in joint security operations concerning Belt and Road Initiative projects and production capacity in Kazakhstan. Political unrest since January 2022, which resulted in over 200 casualties, has increased demand for Chinese security services, although no Chinese citizens or assets were harmed. In response, Chinese company HXZA signed a memorandum of cooperation with PSC KMG-Security, a subsidiary of the state-owned Kazakh oil and gas company responsible for securing the oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and China, entailing cooperative efforts to secure key pipelines and critical infrastructure in Kazakhstan against security threats and terrorist activities.
- Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan’s legislation regarding security services allows exclusively national enforcement agencies to provide these services, explicitly prohibiting the operation of private security companies in any form. This poses significant obstacles for Chinese private security firms in the country. While there are some indications that Chinese security companies still operate in Uzbekistan, actions taken by the Chinese Security Technology Group, for example, are limited to insurance offerings facilitated through arrangements with a third party in the country.
- Turkmenistan: There are no laws regulating the operation of foreign private security companies in Turkmenistan. However, only twenty-two Chinese companies operate there, and there is no accurate evidence that any of them provide security services.
- Tajikistan: Chinese security companies have shown interest in entering the Tajik market despite the lack of a legal framework regulating their activities. Recently, China Shield Security formed a strategic partnership through its subsidiary Three Lions International with Tajik security firm Red Line to offer limited security services. The lack of demand for security from Chinese firms in Tajikistan may be related to the presence of the Armed Police of China in quasi-military facilities in the country, potentially assisting in the protection of Chinese investments and interests.
Future of Chinese Security Companies in Central Asia:
The official stance of the Chinese government stems from the evident importance of protecting Beijing’s external interests, as revealed in recent Chinese security documents, including the National Security Law of 2015, the 2019 Defense Strategy White Paper, and the 2022 Global Security Initiative. Thus, predicting the fate of Chinese private security companies in the region is fraught with uncertainty due to potential confusion between these entities and other Chinese firms. Often, the activities of private security firms in Central Asia resemble those of companies in other industries offering some security-related services. Furthermore, Beijing remains wary of these companies’ activities in Central Asia conflicting with its proclaimed non-interference policy and commitment to peaceful rise.
This raises several scenarios regarding the future engagement of Chinese security companies in the five republics. The first scenario involves Beijing resorting to employing unarmed security companies to ensure the safety of Belt and Road infrastructure facilities, a scenario that appears most plausible given current conditions. Activities may be coordinated through mechanisms of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and agreements via the Collective Security Treaty Organization or local security agencies may allow the capabilities of national defense and security forces in the region to operate as proxies for China.
The second scenario involves China testing the capabilities of its private security firms in Central Asia by providing security for embassies and consulates in the region. This is a probable scenario as it would permit the necessary foreign experience development and testing options for the collective presence of private security companies outside China, while possibly avoiding criticism from Central Asian governments regarding the military and security activities of these companies. The third scenario entails Beijing potentially deploying armed security companies in Central Asia. However, this scenario is challenging due to the likely violent backlash from regional and international powers, particularly Russia and Turkey, due to their diminishing roles as guarantors of security in the region. Such actions could also stir discontent among local populations, who remain cautious of Beijing.
Conclusion
The presence of private Chinese security companies in Central Asia reflects China’s multifaceted strategic approach to counter unconventional security threats. This aligns with modern security diplomacy in China, cooperation between police and paramilitary forces, and the recent adoption of the Global Security Initiative by China. From this perspective, these entities serve as an appealing tool to advance Beijing’s geopolitical agenda. As China’s influence in the region continues to grow, the role of these silent guards will remain critically important.
Thus, it can be said that China’s expansion in the military and security landscape in Central Asia underscores the strategic significance of the region for China’s geopolitical aspirations. While this may provide short-term security benefits linked to enhancing regional defense capabilities and security services for the five republics, its long-term effects threaten political stability, governance, and sovereignty in Central Asia, raising concerns about the potential entrenchment of authoritarian regimes in the region. Some governments may exploit Chinese support to bolster their coercive apparatus and suppress dissenting voices under the pretext of maintaining national security.
