It’s no secret that Russia has been seeking a foothold in the resource-rich Horn of Africa for years, to bolster its growing presence in the west of the continent as part of a comprehensive strategy to revive the Soviet military and economic presence in Africa, which ended with the collapse of the Union in 1991.
In fact, this return to the Horn of Africa gives Russia a significant strategic presence in the Red Sea, which it has lacked since 1991, and enhances its growing presence on the African continent.
Returning via Sudan
The announcement by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Sudanese army, General Yasser Al-Atta, about the imminent signing of the final agreement to establish a Russian base in Port Sudan was relatively surprising given the bloody civil war tearing the country apart for two years, raising fears of a renewed split, as the country has not yet fully recovered from the secession of the south in 2011.
However, negotiations between Sudan and Russia regarding the naval base have been ongoing for nearly a decade. In 2015, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. In 2017, this understanding was reaffirmed, and two years later, they signed a 7-year security and military cooperation agreement, followed by a 25-year military agreement in 2020. Early last year, a Sudanese delegation led by the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Hemedti, visited Moscow and agreed with the Russian government to proceed with the construction of the base, but the outbreak of the civil war in the spring of that year hindered the progress of negotiations.
According to Yasser Al-Atta, the Russian presence on Sudan’s coast will be limited to a support and logistics center rather than a base. In return, Russia will establish security and military cooperation programs with Sudan, and engage in economic fields such as agriculture and mining. However, global media confirms that Russia will provide the Sudanese army with weapons, ammunition, spare parts for military aircraft, and combat drones supplied by Iran. This military support is crucial in the fight against the Rapid Support Forces, which the army has been battling for over a year.
Al-Atta revealed that a military delegation will soon head to Moscow to discuss the final details of the agreement, followed by a ministerial delegation led by Malik Agar, the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, to discuss and sign the political aspects of the agreement.
The agreement grants the Russian army the right to use Sudanese ports and airports to transport the necessary equipment to operate the base.
Regardless, the strategic and symbolic value of this return is significant, raising questions about why Russia chose Sudan, whose coast is relatively far from Bab-el-Mandeb, rather than Somalia or Eritrea, which are opposite the strait and host several Western and Chinese military bases, making them focal points for global and regional powers seeking a presence in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.
Western media confirms that Russia, parallel to its negotiations with Sudan, also contacted Eritrea about establishing a base, but it’s unclear whether Port Sudan is an alternative or if Moscow aims for a second base. However, sources indicate that negotiations with Eritrea were not fruitful.
Operational Advantages and Linking the Middle East with Africa
The initial agreement between Sudan and Russia stipulates that the Port Sudan base will host 300 personnel, both military and civilian, for 25 years, renewable for an additional ten years. The base can simultaneously dock four ships or submarines, including nuclear ones.
Operationally, the base will provide the Russian army with a presence in a highly strategic area, evidenced by the presence of twelve Western and other bases in Djibouti opposite the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, one of the seven most crucial straits for global trade, enabling it to monitor 12% of international trade traffic through the Red Sea.
The base will also offer Russia an open space on the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, Asia, and the entire eastern coast of Africa. It is poised to become an important supply, maintenance, and support center for the Russian navy during exercises or missions in the Indian Ocean.
The Port Sudan base will be a vital stopover for Russian military cargo planes en route to and from Africa, due to its relatively central location between the Khmeimim and Tartus bases in Syria, and Russia’s landlocked areas of influence in Africa. So far, Russia has not secured a foothold in the coastal African countries in the west, perhaps explaining its previous reliance on the Wagner Group for limited deployments and lightly armed forces.
Although significant strategic gains have been made, Wagner’s achievements are unlikely to suffice in the long term. To date, Wagner has primarily provided security services to protect political regimes, with limited roles in establishing broader security. However, this role will not suffice in the medium term, as most of these countries face chronic security issues, a major criticism of France—the former colonial power and strategic influencer—and a key reason for new regimes’ rapprochement with Russia.
Three Decades of Absence
The Port Sudan base will be the first Russian military base in the Horn of Africa since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, which saw the closure of the Soviet naval base in the Ethiopian Dahlak Archipelago. This small base was established to replace the Berbera base in Somalia, which Moscow had to close in 1977 following disagreements with the Somali government over Moscow’s support for Ethiopia in the armed conflict with Somalia over the Ogaden region.
The closure of the Russian base in the Dahlak Archipelago came after Ethiopia completely lost its sea access following the victory of Eritrean rebels in their war of independence against Ethiopia, establishing their independent state.
As part of its efforts to return to the international stage since 2014, Russia signed an agreement with the authorities of Mozambique allowing Russian military ships to use the ports of this country in southern Africa on the Indian Ocean. A similar agreement was signed with the government of Madagascar, and joint military exercises were conducted in the Indian Ocean with Iran, South Africa, and China. This focus on the Indian Ocean helps understand the role the Port Sudan base is expected to play in logistics, support, and maintenance, potentially becoming a springboard for any possible Russian intervention in East Africa. The logistical challenges faced by Russian military intervention in Africa, concentrated in the west so far, have been exacerbated by Western flight bans on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
A Strategic Leap Needing Ground Presence
The rapid and dynamic Russian presence in Africa, militarily, politically, and economically, reveals a strategic leap to return to the international stage, particularly in resource-rich Africa, where international competition is intensifying, leading to the saying that the future of the world is being played out on African soil.
However, despite achieving significant strategic, diplomatic, and media presence in parts of Africa with its current tools, Russia does not appear capable of firmly establishing and expanding its influence in the coming phases.
So far, Russia’s military presence in Africa has been limited to the Wagner Group, representing this presence on the ground, supported by military cooperation and aid programs between Russian authorities and the governments concerned. However, this intervention has remained functionally limited to ensuring the survival of military regimes and protecting them from their armies and any foreign intervention, especially from Western powers.
Despite the rapid economic, political, and media benefits Russia has achieved in Africa through Wagner, accusations of crimes against humanity and serious human rights violations against Wagner, and the mysterious death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, following events that strained his relationship with the Kremlin, have prompted Russian leadership to develop its strategy in Africa. This shift aims to move from unofficial to official presence governed by agreements with specific obligations and responsibilities for the Russian state.
This transition is reflected in the Kremlin’s policy of converting Wagner into a unit of the Russian army named “Africa Division,” reflecting two things:
First, Russia has achieved its initial goal of returning to Africa and securing a presence against traditionally present global powers, particularly France, and to a lesser extent, the United States. The military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, followed by the cancellation of these countries’ cooperation agreements with Paris and Washington, reveal the effectiveness of Russia’s strategy, which combines extensive media propaganda promising liberation from colonial legacy and limited military intervention to secure the new regimes. This approach has proved effective so far and seems desirable to the new military regimes wary of historical colonial powers.
Second, the Kremlin aspires to expand and solidify its influence in the continent to levels requiring substantial military presence, which necessitates large forces and massive equipment difficult to transport by air.
Integration with Central and Western Africa
Alongside the progress of negotiations for the Port Sudan base, Russia continues to strengthen its presence in West and Central Africa through security and military cooperation agreements with regimes that have shifted away from Western influence, especially in the western part of the African coast and to a lesser extent in Central Africa. Within this framework, security and military cooperation agreements have been reached with the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and finally Niger. These agreements are contingent upon the African countries involved cancelling defense and security cooperation agreements with Western powers, especially France, which terminated agreements with the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger signed at the end of the colonial era in the 1960s. In the case of Niger, the authorities also cancelled a security cooperation agreement with the United States, under which Washington deployed over a thousand military personnel to a drone base in Agadez in the north of the country (8).
However, Russian military presence in the region has remained limited, partly due to Moscow’s failure to establish a foothold on the West African coast, which prevents the regular and long-term transport of large quantities of equipment.
Russia is undoubtedly making efforts in this direction, as evidenced by reports from Western newspapers revealing a request made by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Mauritanian authorities during his African tour in February 2023 to establish a military base on the Mauritanian coast of the Atlantic Ocean, a claim later denied by Moscow (9).
Unable to establish a naval base on the Atlantic Ocean, Moscow appears to be hastening to compensate for this setback by strengthening its presence in Central Africa, making it a key hub for expanding its presence along the coast and beyond.
Reports have indicated that the government of the Central African Republic has designated a site in the “Biringo” area, eighty kilometers from the capital Bangui, to host a Russian military base, which would be the first in Africa and accommodate ten thousand troops (10).
This base would crown seven years of military cooperation between Moscow and Bangui, during which Wagner Group protected President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s regime and ensured its continuity. However, its success in establishing security and ending the civil war that has ravaged the country since 2013 has been extremely limited.
Geographically, the Central African Republic’s location allows Russian forces to monitor the continent evenly and intervene more rapidly if situations demand.
If the Port Sudan base becomes operational, it would serve as a crucial support point. It would enable the air transport of ship cargoes berthed there to East Africa and the Indian Ocean region within hours, to Bangui in less than four hours, and then overland to the African coast in less than two days (11).
Beyond its operational role at the continental level, the Port Sudan base would provide Russia with a significant foothold in Sudan, a country rich in mineral resources, water resources, and agricultural land, and currently embroiled in a devastating civil war since spring 2023.
Russia has had a presence in Sudan for years, with Russian companies obtaining licenses to exploit some gold mines since 2018. Among these companies, the prominent one is “Meroe Gold,” a subsidiary of Wagner Group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin and currently managed by one of his close associates, Mikhail Potepkin. Elements of Wagner Group secure these sites located in the Nile region, Nuba, and other areas (12).
Western investigations have linked Russian companies’ gold mining activities to Moscow’s provision of security and military support to Sudanese authorities, including specialized equipment and weapons for security forces and the Rapid Support Forces. This cooperation has accelerated in recent years.
A comprehensive overview of Russian military presence across Africa reveals Moscow’s efforts spanning almost every corner of the continent, aiming to consolidate and expand its historical presence beyond the levels achieved by the Soviet Union in Africa during the 1970s.
The timing of Sudanese authorities’ announcement nearing the signing of an agreement to establish a Russian military base in Port Sudan, along with the disclosure of another designated site near Bangui, and reports of a third request for a base on the Mauritanian coast, signals that Russia’s strategy in the continent has entered a new phase marked by deeper rootedness, proactivity, and less restraint. In the near or medium term, we may witness broader and more transparent Russian military interventions, signaling the end of the era of “advancing behind the scenes” and the commencement of overt power struggles in Africa.
1)- Au Soudan, bientôt une base navale russe, Vidéo publié par TV5 Monde le 01 juin. 2024 (Vu le 3 juin 2024): https://shorturl.at/USG9V
Voir aussi: Soudan: accord en vue avec la Russie pour l’installation d’un centre de support naval en mer Rouge, RFI le 30 mai 2024, (Vu le 3 juin 2024): https://shorturl.at/kqUgE
3)- Les Russes assurent leur présence militaire en mer Rouge, Middle East Eye du 3 Dec 2020 (Vu le 2 juin 2024) https://shorturl.at/fIxC9
Voir aussi: Ethiopie-Russie, une relation spéciale dans les échanges culturels et la formation des élites? Publié par HAL Open Science en 2014 (Vu le 2 juin 2024): https://inalco.hal.science/hal-01292595/documentو HAL Id: hal-01292595
4)- Les Russes assurent leur présence militaire en mer Rouge, Middle East Eye du 3 Dec 2020 (Vu le 4 juin 2024) https://shorturl.at/fIxC9
Voir aussi: n Afrique du Sud, l’arrivée d’une frégate russe pour des entraînements crée des remous, Jeune Afrique du 14 Fevrier 2023 (Vu le 4 juin 2024): https://shorturl.at/IblhM
5)- Accords de défense militaire: pourquoi le Mali rompt avec la France et l’Europe et quels sont ces accords? BBC Afrique, 3 mai 2022, (Vu le 4 juin 2024): https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-61313497
6)- Où se trouvent les principales activités de Wagner en Afrique? TV% Monde du 27 juin 2023, (Vu le 1 juin 2023): https://shorturl.at/zqW8v
Voir aussi: LA STRATEGIE ECONOMICO-SECURITAIRE RUSSE AU MOZAMBIQUE, IFRI No 9 2020, (Vu le 1 juin 2023): https://shorturl.at/biCgF
7)- JULIA STANYARD | THIERRY VIRCOULON | JULIAN RADEMEYER: LA ZONE GRISE: L’engagement militaire, mercenaire et criminel de la Russie en Afrique, Global Initiative, FÉVRIER 2023, (Vu le 2 juin 2023): https://shorturl.at/e1fJm
