Israel and the Support Fronts: The Struggle for a New Deterrence Balance
Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are preparing to retaliate against Israel following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, in Tehran, and the killing of Hezbollah’s military commander, Fuad Shukr, in southern Beirut, as well as the bombing of the Hodeidah port. However, these groups have not yet announced whether their military operations will be coordinated or if each front will act independently based on its capabilities and the expected effectiveness of its response. Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis have all confirmed that retaliation is inevitable, asserting that it will be severe and break existing rules of engagement because, according to Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Israel has crossed the red lines. Conversely, Israel has vowed to respond to any attacks, with warnings from its Western allies that this new cycle of attack and counterattack could escalate into a regional war.
These developments have shaken the foundations of the engagement rules that had been in place since the October 7th attacks. The primary battlefield was Gaza, where Palestinian resistance factions clashed with Israeli forces. The factions affiliated with what is known as the Resistance Axis (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi armed factions) played a supporting role to the Palestinian resistance, engaging Israeli forces or bombing their positions in the north, east, and south. Israel focused on fighting Hezbollah, while the United States and its allies combated the Houthis and Iraqi factions. On these three fronts, the fighting was governed by implicit rules: avoiding harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure, and limiting actions to airstrikes without ground invasions. These rules were clear in the mutual bombardments between Israel and Hezbollah, the fiercest of the support fronts, but were less defined in the case of the Houthis and Iraqi armed factions. Meanwhile, despite escalating tensions, Iran was not directly involved in the fighting.
These rules were disrupted on April 1, 2024, when Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Iran viewed this attack as aggression on its territory and vowed to respond. Despite warnings of the risk of a regional war, Iran retaliated on April 13th with around 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles against Israel. Israel responded with a drone strike inside Iranian territory, stopping just short of triggering a full-scale regional war.
The Israeli assassinations have once again brought the situation to the brink, perhaps more so than before. Haniyeh was killed in Tehran, in a highly secure area overseen by the Revolutionary Guards, marking a humiliation for the Iranian leadership, which appeared incapable of protecting its capital, let alone its most secure areas. Failure to respond could encourage Israel to continue its assassinations, potentially targeting Iranian leaders in the future. Similarly, Fuad Shukr’s assassination is significant; he was one of Hezbollah’s highest-ranking military leaders, and his killing in Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut resulted in the deaths of several civilians. On July 30th, Nasrallah deemed this a violation of red lines and a disruption of the existing deterrence equation. If Hezbollah fails to retaliate, Israel may continue its strikes within Lebanon, or even escalate them, feeling secure from retaliation. Israel’s bombing of the Hodeidah port on July 20, 2024, which destroyed a power plant, an oil refinery, and fuel tanks supplying the capital, resulted in six deaths and 80 injuries. The Houthis viewed this attack as a breach of the implicit rules of engagement and an assault on civilian infrastructure.
In light of this escalation, the question arises as to why Israeli leadership, particularly Netanyahu, has chosen to break the established rules of engagement, risking a full-scale regional war. Is this a reckless move by Netanyahu to prolong the conflict and remain in power, or are the stakes of these attacks greater than that? Will these attacks stop, or are they part of a broader trend that could drag the region into a comprehensive war?
Breaking the Rules of Engagement
These developments suggest that the party seeking to change the existing rules of engagement is Netanyahu, as he perceives that the current stability does not serve his goals. The current balance forces him to consider a political settlement after the failure of military options, which would involve retrieving prisoners from Gaza and halting the military support operations by factions within the Resistance Axis. However, Netanyahu does not want to pay the price of this political settlement or accept the resulting arrangements, as they would lead to the withdrawal of his far-right allies, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, from the government, causing its collapse. In that scenario, Netanyahu would be held accountable for his failure to prevent the October 7th attacks and face corruption charges that could lead to his imprisonment and the end of his political career. As for Israel’s position, Hamas would continue its resistance in Gaza, Hezbollah would keep fighting in southern Lebanon and northern occupied Palestine, and the Houthis would continue to disrupt maritime traffic to Israel via the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Iran would continue to develop its missile capabilities and move closer to obtaining enough enriched uranium to surpass the nuclear threshold.
The current stability also does not favor Israel’s relations with its Western allies. The United States has repeatedly asked Netanyahu to prioritize a settlement with Hamas that would free the hostages and end the war in Gaza, as well as stop the support attacks carried out by Iran-allied armed factions against Israel. The Biden administration’s pressure on Netanyahu has increased, especially after Biden withdrew from the presidential race, freeing him from the need for support from the Jewish lobby for re-election. He also wants to resolve this issue before the elections so it does not detract from his administration’s or party’s standing or burden his successor, Kamala Harris, if she wins the next presidential election. Indicators of this pressure emerged during Netanyahu’s visit to Washington and his address to Congress on July 24th. Harris refused to preside over the joint congressional session, which was boycotted by more than 100 Democratic
members. Meanwhile, former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi met with the families of those held in Gaza during Netanyahu’s speech, later commenting that it was “the worst performance ever by a foreign guest honored with addressing Congress.” During their meeting, both Biden and Harris emphasized the need to pursue a deal with Hamas.
In the long term, a political settlement puts Israel in an unprecedented strategic dilemma. The country no longer has options that guarantee its security; it cannot subdue its enemies by force, nor can it offer economic incentives for them to accept apartheid, and it refuses to recognize their right to an independent state, as stipulated in the Oslo Accords. The Knesset has overwhelmingly voted against the establishment of a Palestinian state. This leaves Israel with only one remaining option: betting once again on the use of overwhelming force to compel Palestinians to either emigrate or accept living under an apartheid system. However, this bet is hindered by the continued presence of Hamas as an armed force and the growing strength of factions allied with Iran that support Palestinian resistance. Over time, these factions could pose a serious threat to Israel’s security, deterring it from considering another war aimed at subduing the Palestinians.
Given these considerations, Netanyahu seems to believe that a successful military strategy requires breaking the link between Gaza and the other support fronts, whether they are directly engaged in combat or providing financial and material aid. He has therefore initiated military strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as targeting Iran itself, to pressure these fronts into choosing between ceasing their support for the resistance in Gaza or risking a full-scale war that they might not be willing to endure due to the high costs. Additionally, the increased likelihood of a broader confrontation could prolong the war, allowing the government coalition to remain intact, keeping Netanyahu in power and shielding him from accountability and prosecution. In this scenario, the issue of the Gaza hostages would fall to the bottom of the priority list, forcing the United States to resume supplying weapons to Israel that had previously been suspended, and potentially restoring the bipartisan consensus that Netanyahu had lost. He might also be able to halt or reverse the isolation measures implemented by several countries in line with International Court of Justice rulings, such as stopping arms sales to Israel, or even turning them into renewed support. Some of Netanyahu’s calculations have already been proven correct; on August 10th, the United States approved $3.5 billion in aid to Israel for purchasing American-made weapons.
On the other side, Iran and the support fronts want to establish a new balance of deterrence, with the connection between Palestinian resistance and the support fronts being the new standard. Therefore, they have decided to respond to Israeli attacks with similar strikes, hoping that the high cost and the risks of an expanded war will compel Netanyahu, his government, and the broader Israeli political landscape to accept this new reality in the rules of engagement. In a speech detailing the rationale behind retaliating for Shukr’s death, Nasrallah emphasized that Israel’s success in eliminating the Palestinian resistance would threaten Lebanese national security and regional security. He vowed to prevent this from happening.
These dynamics suggest that Israel’s costly attacks on the support fronts are not a temporary measure or a short-term tactic specific to Netanyahu, but rather part of a long-term strategy by the Israeli leadership to sever the operational links between Palestinian resistance factions and the support fronts. This is a key component of Israel’s bet on subduing the Palestinians and imposing its terms by force. Meanwhile, the support fronts are determined to maintain this new balance of deterrence, aiming to deny Israel its goal of relying on military force.
Long-term, Wide-scale Attrition
Given this anticipation and the complex calculations of the various parties, several scenarios emerge:
Delayed Deal Scenario: Iran and the support fronts retaliate against Israeli attacks, causing significant damage, exposing the inadequacies of the U.S. and allied defense systems in protecting Israel. Israel then seeks to escalate its response, but its allies refuse to participate in offensive operations and pressure Israel to de-escalate. The Democrats, who control the White House, are focused on winning the upcoming presidential election and are wary of exposing their troops in Iraq and Syria to lethal attacks or their bases in the region to retaliatory strikes. They also want to avoid involving the U.S. in a new, costly war that would face widespread public opposition. Israel would then be forced to de-escalate and succumb to the ongoing war of attrition, eventually agreeing to a deal with the Palestinian resistance, which would result in Netanyahu losing his position and a deterioration of Israel’s strategic situation. This scenario is possible but unlikely.
Comprehensive Regional War Scenario: The situation could escalate into this scenario if the support fronts launch widespread attacks that cause severe damage, shocking Israeli and American public opinion and embarrassing Israeli leadership. Israel would then respond with devastating attacks, supported by the U.S. and the West, and the support fronts would retaliate in kind. The situation could escalate into a full-scale war, spiraling out of control and causing widespread devastation in the warring countries and those hosting American bases. In this case, the effects of the war would extend to the U.S. itself, impacting the election process and voter opinions, potentially drawing in major powers like Russia to support Iran against other forces such as Britain, France, and the U.S., which would undoubtedly side with Israel. If events unfold in this direction, the energy market would suffer a massive shock, and supply chains could be disrupted or even halted through the Strait of Hormuz, driving up prices globally. This scenario is the least likely due to the majority of parties’ interest in avoiding widespread damage.
Wide-scale Attrition War Scenario: Netanyahu might persist in launching attacks after each response from the support fronts, but his responses would likely be spaced out, limited in scope, and with controlled costs. This development could lead to a new pattern of attrition warfare, a gray zone between full-scale war and complete calm. This scenario seems more likely, as it aligns with Netanyahu’s agenda by creating a war-like atmosphere that justifies his continued hold on power and breaks the connection between Palestinian resistance and the support fronts. It also ensures the continued flow of American support on all levels. With the threat remaining on all fronts, the issue of the Gaza hostages would take a back seat, removing the need for Netanyahu to negotiate a deal with the resistance to stop the fighting, which would expose his defeat.
The support fronts’ calculations and their shared and publicized desire to avoid a full-scale war may contribute to the success of this scenario. Across their respective positions, they are committed to responding appropriately to Israeli attacks, almost as if Netanyahu is determining their responses based on the type of attack he plans to carry out next. Therefore, this scenario appears to be the most likely.
