Some might wonder how the ongoing war in Gaza, which has persisted since October 7, 2023, could lead to nuclear developments, especially since nuclear weapons have not been utilized in this conflict. Others may argue that the intention is to compare the destructive power of bombs, missiles, and shells dropped on Gaza during the Israeli aggression with the destructive force of the two atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, or even to compare both instances.
Indeed, nuclear weapons were not used in the Gaza conflict, and there are those who have compared the events in Gaza with what transpired in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, employing various indicators. However, neither of these comparisons is what is being addressed here. Thus, the relevant question becomes: what exactly is being referred to?
What is meant here pertains to the repercussions that the Gaza War has had on nuclear proliferation issues in the Middle East, particularly regarding Israel’s exceptional status concerning its obligations under the global non-proliferation regime. This is true despite numerous international resolutions calling for Israel to comply with the comprehensive safeguards system that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies, as well as the ongoing efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
The issue was highlighted by the complicated and somewhat murky remarks made by Israeli Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu on November 5, in which he stated that “dropping a nuclear bomb on Gaza is a possible solution,” adding that “Gaza should not exist on the face of the Earth.”
This statement provoked reactions even within Israel itself. Externally, the responses were widespread. Arab reactions were reflected in the resolutions of the Arab Islamic summit in Riyadh. Consequently, both the Arab and Islamic groups at the IAEA took action. South Africa also referenced the Israeli minister’s remarks while attempting to prove Israel’s commission of genocide against Palestinians before the International Court of Justice.
Revisiting the Israeli Nuclear Exception
Israel constitutes an exceptional case, not only in the Middle East but also regarding its nuclear policy. Israel is the only non-signatory state to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) among Middle Eastern countries—a treaty that forms the backbone of the international non-proliferation regime.
Regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities, a policy of ambiguity has been maintained for decades. However, many experts assert that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal. The American Association for the Advancement of Science estimates that Israel has around ninety nuclear bombs, while the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute suggests there are about fifty launch-ready warheads. Other estimates claim that Israel may possess between 200 to 300 nuclear warheads, and some reports even suggest numbers as high as 500.
Despite all this, Israel neither confirms nor denies these allegations, leaving the matter open to speculation. This is intentional and serves strategic goals. Furthermore, it has not faced sufficient international pressure to clarify this issue, either willingly or forcefully. Notably, similar pressures have been applied to countries with far less evidence than that of Israel. More importantly, in at least one case, coercion was based on misleading information, as seen in the case of Iraq. Notably, Iraq’s civilian nuclear facilities were subjected to Israeli aggression in 1981, for which the UN Security Council condemned Israel in the strongest terms through Resolution 487 on June 19, 1981, recognizing Israel’s actions as a “serious threat to the entire guarantees system of the IAEA.” Simultaneously, the resolution demanded that Israel place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA’s oversight, which has yet to occur.
Israeli overreach regarding the nuclear capabilities of regional states has not been limited to Iraq; there are continuous threats against Iran despite ongoing international efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful means, noting that Iran is a signatory to the NPT and officially claims not to seek nuclear weapons.
Statements by Israeli Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu regarding the option of using nuclear weapons against Gaza have reignited numerous questions that had diminished in frequency. Among these questions is the policy of nuclear ambiguity. Here is a senior Israeli official openly discussing the use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of other considerations that may be raised, the most critical aspect is that an Israeli official cannot discuss the use of a weapon that does not exist. From this perspective, one could interpret Israeli criticisms of the minister’s comments as being rooted not in concern for Palestinians, but rather as a deterrent to the official Israeli position, suggesting that they could provoke more significant backlash. All evidence points to the opposite. In this context, internal criticisms peaked when Yair Lapid, the leader of the Israeli opposition, characterized Eliyahu’s statement as “shocking, insane, and coming from an irresponsible minister.”
While these words may be severe in their condemnation of the Israeli minister’s statements, they may be interpreted in various ways. For instance, the shock arises from the boldness of expressing what ought not to be publicized, and the description of being “insane” follows from the harm caused to Israel by such statements outweighing any potential benefit, thereby leading to the assertion that the minister is “irresponsible.” Perhaps Defense Minister Yoav Galant’s remarks clarify this trajectory, as he stated, “It’s good that these people are not responsible for Israel’s security.” It is noteworthy that Galant is the one who ordered the complete deprivation of Gaza from all means of survival, explicitly stating: “I gave the order: Gaza will be under total siege. No electricity, no food, no fuel—everything is closed.” As a result of his position, he made all decisions regarding continuous killing, destruction, and devastation.
This leads to the consideration that had Israel not possessed nuclear weapons or the desire to acquire them, it would have joined the NPT and adhered to all international resolutions demanding that all of its facilities be subjected to the IAEA safeguards system. Israel would also have welcomed the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. However, Israeli behavior consistently contradicts these three trajectories; it has neither joined the treaty nor expressed any intention to do so. Additionally, the safeguards system is not applied to all of its nuclear facilities, not to mention its obstruction of efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Moreover, it rejects any discussion of its nuclear file even within the institutions responsible for global nuclear affairs, represented by the IAEA. A recent example of this was just a few months before its aggression against Gaza, specifically in July 2023, when Israel officially opposed discussing its nuclear capabilities during the 67th General Conference of the IAEA. It claimed that such discussions were a “burden on the General Conference and hindered its proceedings and distracted its attention.” Furthermore, it asserted that excluding discussions of its nuclear file would “allow the agency and its member states to focus the necessary attention and resources on the global challenges facing the agency.” This suggests that Israel and its nuclear capabilities are not among these challenges. Additionally, it called on the agency to concentrate on other non-proliferation issues in the region, claiming that some regional countries are “in a state of continuous violation of their international duties and commitments, and continue to acquire prohibited weapons of mass destruction while obstructing the agency’s efforts in this regard.” Israel’s arguments against merely including a dedicated agenda item to discuss its nuclear capabilities did not stop there; it went on to characterize the Arab group within the IAEA as adopting a “controversial, biased, and fundamentally flawed” approach. Moreover, it stated that the Arab request was “entirely outside the agency’s statutes and mandate, unrelated to the General Conference agenda, and undermined the agency’s credibility as a professional organization.”
Clearly, Israel seeks to protect its nuclear file from mere discussion, and yet an Israeli minister boldly states that the use of nuclear weapons is an available option. Therefore, such remarks could be a means to undermine the entire Israeli perspective on what may be labeled the “nuclear cave” under the current policy of ambiguity.
Israeli Minister Eliyahu’s comments came just days before the fourth conference aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, scheduled for November 13-17, 2023. Thus, the reaffirmation by UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu at the opening of the conference that “any threat to use nuclear weapons is unacceptable” seemed to be a direct response to the Israeli remarks. Contrary to Israeli logic, the UN official considered that facilitating the establishment of a nuclear-free Middle East, along with the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, would “contribute significantly, not only to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts but also to peace and security in the Middle East and beyond.” This raises the question of whether Israel truly desires peace and security while simultaneously seeking to expel and exterminate Palestinians, even if it comes to using nuclear weapons according to one of its officials? It is no wonder, then, that South Africa included the Israeli comments on this matter among the statements of Israeli officials that cannot reflect peace, security, or stability in the region, but could, as South Africa stated, lead to committing genocide against Palestinians.
New International Momentum for the Initiative to Create a Nuclear-Free Middle East
Israel’s statements and the surrounding regional and international circumstances have generated increased world attention regarding the dangers of the Israeli nuclear exception, as indicated by numerous countries, particularly in the Middle East. This was reflected not only in the remarks of senior officials but also in resolution clauses issued by summits, such as the Arab Islamic summit in Riyadh. The 23rd clause of the final communiqué from the summit, which convened on November 11, 2023, condemned “the actions and extreme hate speech of ministers in the Israeli occupying government, including the threat made by one of these ministers to use nuclear weapons against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, considering it a threat to international peace and security, warranting support for the conference to establish a nuclear-free zone and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations and its objectives to counter this threat.”
This content was communicated in two separate letters, one in the name of the Arab group and the other in the name of member states of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to the IAEA. On November 21, 2023, the United Arab Emirates, on behalf of the Arab group, sent a letter to the IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi concerning “the risks posed by Israeli nuclear capabilities, particularly in light of recent related developments.”
The letter contained seven points, the first describing Israeli behavior and its connection to the role of the agency, where the Arab group deemed it “extremely serious regarding the jurisdiction of the IAEA.”
The second point noted that the Arab group, in its condemnation of the Israeli remarks, was not an exception among international reactions, as these statements were seen as “extremely grave, shocking, and unprecedented,” highlighting that “any use or threat of using nuclear weapons by any party under any circumstances is a serious threat to regional and international peace and security, a blatant violation of international law, and a systematic dismantling of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.”
The third point comprised two aspects. The first vehemently condemned the Israeli statements, describing them as “aggressive and criminal,” and also condemned the use or threatened use of this type of weapon “by any party under any circumstances.” The second emphasized that “the only way to address the dangers of nuclear weapons use is to eliminate them completely in a manner subject to international verification and irreversibility.”
The fourth point included clear Arab demands regarding the implementation of related international resolutions, including Resolution 487, which called for Israel “to immediately place its nuclear facilities under the supervision of the IAEA.” It is important to note that this was in 1981, alongside Resolution 687 issued in April 1991, which reinforced the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
The Arab group also called for the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolutions relating to both nuclear-free zones and nuclear proliferation risks in the region.
The Arab group stressed in the fifth point that “the current situation, where Israel remains outside the NPT, cannot continue.” Therefore, the Arab states reject Israel’s insistence “not to subject all of its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.”
In the sixth point, the Arab group demanded that the Director-General of the agency and its policymaking bodies take two specific actions: the first is to “take a practical and clear position on this concerning development,” and the second pertains to necessary practical measures to ensure the implementation of relevant international resolutions—including those from the IAEA regarding the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and the Israeli nuclear capabilities.
The letter from the Arab group concluded in its seventh point by affirming the Arab states’ “right to take all necessary actions to address the threat posed by Israeli nuclear capabilities through various decision-making bodies within the agency.” Moreover, the matter should remain “under ongoing review within the IAEA’s policymaking bodies.”
Three weeks following the Arab group’s letter, Saudi Arabia sent a memorandum to the agency on December 15, 2023, on behalf of member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League. In its letter, Saudi Arabia regarded the Israeli minister’s comments as a “threat and incitement to commit the heinous crime of using nuclear weapons against innocent civilian populations,” adding that it “constitutes a barrier against the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, as it embodies Israel’s complete disregard for the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.”
This Israeli disregard represents a continuation of a policy based on “complete disregard for international law,” which has reached its peak in the tragedy occurring in Gaza. What the Israeli official stated “should motivate the international community, particularly the IAEA, to take the necessary steps to correct this situation.”
The letter concluded with specific demands addressed to the Director-General of the agency, including urging Israel to urgently join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state and subject all its nuclear facilities to the agency’s safeguards. The member states of the OIC and the Arab League also pointed out relevant international resolutions.
On the international front, China’s stance was particularly noteworthy, expressing shock and concern regarding the Israeli statements. Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Qin Yu, stated that “such statements warrant global condemnation. They are irresponsible and deeply concerning. Such remarks contradict the international consensus that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought, and they are opposed to robust international calls for de-escalation, cessation of hostilities, and protection of civilians.” China echoed the Arab states’ call for Israel to join the NPT while ensuring all its nuclear facilities are under the agency’s safeguards, and it supports establishing a nuclear-free zone for all weapons of mass destruction, believing this could “help curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maintain the authority and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime, and reduce the risks of an arms race and conflict, thus providing an essential mechanism for sustaining long-term regional peace and security.”
What’s Next?
The post-war scenario cannot be separated from the pre-war context in this issue. If this matter has resurfaced amid the ongoing war in Gaza, punctuated by successive statements from Israeli officials, including those related to nuclear aspects, there is no guarantee that this issue will maintain its prominence unless concerned states regarding the security and stability of the Middle East, as well as the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and global security, place the matter on their agendas. Therefore, the issue is fundamentally global before being Arab, Islamic, or Palestinian. It is Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic before being global.
This issue has remained a top priority for Arab states, which have pushed it onto the agendas of relevant international organizations. However, there was a period when it was overlooked and another when the tone in addressing the issue softened, perhaps in the belief of the “good intentions” accompanying the Madrid Peace Conference. For example, in 1992, Arab states did not propose the resolution they usually brought forward titled “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and the Israeli Nuclear Threat.” Additionally, in 2008, they even altered the title to simply “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities” instead of “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Their Risks.” Yet, even so, Israel rejects any discussion on the matter.
It is clear that goodwill and compromises do not serve in issues pertaining to existential national security. Not only that, but they also lead to further audacity from the other party, especially under international protection—or even silence—particularly from the U.S. and Western nations, under the banner of self-defense.
Such audacity escalates to the extent of demanding the annulment of long-standing international resolutions, as was the case with the UN General Assembly resolution declaring Zionism as a form of racism. Moreover, the situation does not merely end with international resolutions; it also extends to pinning blame on Arab parties regarding what the Palestinian people endure, despite the entire world witnessing these events. An example includes Israel’s arguments before the International Court of Justice when it attempted to absolve itself of responsibility for delaying or preventing humanitarian aid from entering Gaza.
The issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities and their risks can only top discussions in any future negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral. Moreover, any developments on other issues ought to be tied to this matter. Relying on promises could lead to an impasse, as evidenced by the current state of the peace process. Israel has long ceased to accept merely discussing a two-state solution. This approach has been revealed through numerous indicators, including the Israeli pushback against any attempts to affirm Palestinian presence in international organizations, including the IAEA, where Israel objects to including an agenda item related to Palestine in the agency. During the recent General Conference, Israel opposed the Arab request to include this point, contending that Arab states “are importing non-material issues into professional discussions.” Not only that, but it also considers any decision taken by the General Conference related to this subject as “merely declarative in nature and having no substantive effects.”
Clearly, Israel seeks to deter the IAEA from discussing its nuclear program while simultaneously preventing any discourse about Palestinian existence within that international organization. Israel sends a straightforward message to Arab states: cease this matter in both its facets.
If Gaza is today threatened by Israeli nuclear weapons, then tomorrow there may be threats extending beyond Gaza. What is now a threat can transform into reality, especially given the current international conditions are waning regarding nuclear proliferation, whether concerning the policies of nuclear superpowers or even among states that have obtained nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT.
References:
- Does Israel possess nuclear weapons? Sputnik Arabic, November 5, 2023, available at: https://sputnikarabic.ae/20231105/
- Israeli Nuclear Capabilities: Facts and Fallacies, Jordanian Al-Rai Newspaper, September 4, 2005, available at: https://alrai.com/article/30264/
- See the text of UN Security Council Resolution 487 dated June 19, 1981, available on the United Nations website: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/418/74/PDF/NR041874.pdf?OpenElement
- Remarks by Eliyahu and the Hypothetical Israeli Nuclear Program… A Controversy with History, Al Hurra, November 6, 2023, available at: https://www.alhurra.com/israel/2023/11/05/
- Ibid.
- “No food, no electricity, no water, no fuel”… Israel announces a “total siege” on Gaza, CNN Arabic, October 9, 2023, available at: https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2023/10/09/israel-complete-siege-gaza-strip
- For more details, see the 67th session documents of the IAEA General Conference held from September 25-29, 2023: Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel regarding the request to include an item titled “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities” on the conference agenda, July 11, 2023. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc67-15_ar.pdf
- Secretary-General welcomes the success of the fourth conference to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, UN News, November 21, 2023, available at: https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/11/1126282
- UN official warns of the “increasing danger” of the conflict in Gaza and calls for diplomacy to prevail, UN News, November 13, 2023, available at: https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/11/1125962
- Israeli Heritage Minister’s comments are included on pages 61 and 62 of the application document filed by South Africa. For more details, see: The Republic of South Africa institutes proceeding against the State of Israel and requests the Court to indicate provisional measures. International Court of Justice, December 29, 2023. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231229-pre-01-00-en.pdf
- “Al-Ain News” publishes the text of the concluding statement of the “Arab Islamic Summit,” Al Ain News, November 11, 2023, available at: https://al-ain.com/article/text-statement-riyadh-summit
- Letter from the United Arab Emirates to the agency. International Atomic Energy Agency, News Bulletin. November 23, 2023, available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2023/infcirc1158_ar.pdf
- Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the agency. International Atomic Energy Agency, News Bulletin. December 21, 2023, available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2023/infcirc1165_ar.pdf
- China urges enhancement of efforts to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, People’s Daily, November 14, 2023, available at: http://arabic.peopledaily.com.cn/n3/2023/1114/c31664-20096909.html
- See the explanatory memorandum submitted by the member states of the Arab League regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities submitted to the IAEA in June 2022, included in the documents of the 66th Ordinary Session of the IAEA General Conference: Tentative Agenda: Additional Item Required to be Included in the Tentative Agenda, International Atomic Energy Agency, News Bulletin, July 5, 2022, available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc66-1-add-1_ar.pdf
- Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel regarding the request to include an agenda item titled “The Status of Palestine in the IAEA,” International Atomic Energy Agency, News Bulletin, September 12, 2023, available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc67_22_ar.pdf
