Discussions about the potential use of nuclear weapons have become increasingly frequent and intense. This topic is no longer limited to the countries that possess nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it has expanded to include those that have acquired them in violation of this treaty.
This development is occurring alongside conflicts, some of which are long-standing and flare up from time to time, while others are already active. Furthermore, amid the growing discourse on the potential use of nuclear weapons, there is a strong emphasis on the development of nuclear arsenals and the modernization of nuclear doctrines, facilitating the possibility of using nuclear weapons in scenarios that were previously unconsidered.
Interestingly, even those countries where discussions about using nuclear weapons are increasing emphasize acting responsibly. What kind of responsibility do these nations refer to? What are the implications of the contradictory nuclear rhetoric? Even in nuclear powers where there isn’t a cacophony regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons, they continue to develop their nuclear arsenals, and their nuclear doctrines do not rule out the use of these weapons, even if some avoid initiating their use. In this context, could more nuclear-armed states modify their nuclear doctrines to make initiating their use a primary option?
Discussions about nuclear war and its scenarios, along with the devastation it might cause to humanity, are no longer confined to research centers or even to decision-making bodies in intelligence agencies. Instead, the topic is being addressed by senior officials in countries involved in wars and conflicts. Are these discussions primarily aimed at deterrence rather than reflecting genuine intentions for actual use? If a country were to reach a decisive decision to use such weapons, what type would it employ? Would this be a unilateral use, as occurred at the end of World War II? What can be done to diminish the likelihood of a nuclear war arising?
Characteristics of the Discourse
The global nuclear discourse refers here to all statements and documents concerning nuclear weapons, whether aimed at preventing their proliferation and leading to their abandonment, or, conversely, reinforcing the status quo or even advocating for more nuclear armament and the actual use of nuclear weapons.
In general, this article is concerned with the second aspect of nuclear discourse, which is more threatening than calming, making it sharper. Additionally, there is a significant reliance on such rhetoric. The scope of this discourse has widened, blending words with actions.
The menacing tendency prevalent in this type of discourse can be observed in the cases of Russia, North Korea, and Israel. In the first case, since the war in Ukraine commenced—which Russia still refers to as a special military operation—Russian officials have frequently warned against Western intervention and its support for Ukraine, including supplying weapons that could strike Russian territory, alongside efforts to integrate Ukraine into NATO. Often, this warning is accompanied by statements indicating that, due to its dangers to Russian national security, such support could lead to a serious consideration within Russia of using nuclear weapons. A prominent figure in this discourse has been former Russian president and current Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, who explicitly stated that Russia’s patience regarding nuclear escalation would not last forever after the entry of Ukrainian forces into Russian territory in Kursk Oblast.
This development in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has been accompanied by a Russian push to amend its nuclear doctrine, with President Vladimir Putin meeting with the permanent committee on nuclear deterrence at the Russian Security Council on September 25, 2024. Putin outlined three scenarios in which Russia might resort to using nuclear weapons: the first involves aggression from a non-nuclear state against Russia, supported by nuclear countries. The second pertains to a large-scale aerial attack employing “strategic or tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic weapons, and other flying objects.” The third scenario concerns aggression against Belarus, even if this aggression involves conventional weapons.
Here, two observations can be made about the outcomes of this meeting: first, the three scenarios mentioned are connected to using conventional rather than unconventional weapons, including nuclear ones, since the latter is seen as a given not only for Russia but also for other nuclear powers. These powers would not remain passive once struck by nuclear weapons, as long as they possess the capability to retaliate. This formulation has produced the concept of nuclear deterrence, or what is called the nuclear balance of terror. However, Russia is discussing scenarios for aggression using conventional weapons, which comes in the context of military operations on Ukrainian territory and the expansion of those operations within Russian territory. As is well-known, Ukraine is seeking approvals for greater use of Western weapons to strike deep into Russia.
Second, the matter is no longer confined to the territory of the Russian Federation in the case of a conventional weapons attack but now also encompasses the Republic of Belarus. Here, three things arise: first, Russia has made a decision to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus about a month after the war in Ukraine began, which has been implemented, resulting in the presence of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. Second, Belarus is not distant from what is happening between Russia and Ukraine. From time to time, discussions arise regarding preparations due to threats to Belarus’s national security from Ukraine. Third, there is a federal format between Russia and Belarus. Putin has been clear in affirming this when he spoke about the scenarios of using Russian nuclear weapons, knowing that when the decision was made to transfer Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, Moscow stated that control over these weapons would remain solely with Russia. More importantly, it emphasized that this decision “will not violate the agreements on nuclear non-proliferation.”
The situation is not limited to Russia; it is even more acute in North Korea, which has not only abandoned the idea of denuclearization entirely but has enshrined in its constitution its status as a nuclear state, and continually announces its intention to increase both the quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal and develop its delivery mechanisms. A recent manifestation of this was the reveal of images from a facility for nuclear centrifuges related to enriching uranium necessary for producing nuclear weapons. There is a consensus among experts and concerned nations that Pyongyang could conduct a new nuclear explosion at any time, adding to its six previous nuclear detonations, each of which was followed by stringent sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.
In addition to all this, Pyongyang openly talks about the possibility of actually using its nuclear arsenal as long as it continues to be threatened and its system is under siege. The dilemma is that it perceives every American action in the surrounding region, whether unilateral or in collaboration with other countries, including South Korea and Japan, as a direct threat.
This occurs amid the failure of all dialogue and de-escalation efforts in the Korean Peninsula, with the situation deteriorating into a high level of tension as communication has been cut off and agreements aimed at reducing tensions have been annulled. Hostile atmospheres have returned, both in word and action, escalating to the point of sending balloons laden with garbage from the North to the South in response to the South resuming the distribution of leaflets and propaganda across the border.
Not far from this are some Israeli officials’ statements regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons in Gaza, which have been repeated amid the ongoing war nearing its one-year mark and the expansion of the conflict. These Israeli statements come despite Israel’s efforts over decades to fortify discussions about its nuclear capabilities in relevant international forums, notably the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
While the United States assists Israel in bolstering its nuclear capabilities internationally, it persistently raises suspicions and questions about China’s nuclear capabilities, arguing that they are undergoing increases, modernization, and development in an atmosphere of ambiguity. It is as if the United States is not also modernizing its own nuclear arsenal.
In what can be seen as one aspect of strategic wrangling between Washington and Beijing, the nuclear issue emerges, not only in terms of bilateral accusations concerning each other’s nuclear capabilities but also regarding the broader issue of nuclear proliferation. Beijing asserts that the nuclear fuel transfer undertaken by Washington and London to operate Australian nuclear submarines under their AUKUS partnership violates the international non-proliferation regime and would contribute to increased nuclear proliferation. It is very logical for Moscow to share Beijing’s perspective on this issue, and indeed, both are raising this matter in international forums.
It is clear that the threatening nuclear discourse is broadening, increasing in intensity, becoming sharper, and blending words with actions. Furthermore, it can be characterized as a deceptive discourse that is also selective. While all five nuclear powers talk about the necessity of respecting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its imposed obligations, their discourse and actions take the aforementioned form.
Is Nuclear War Approaching or Receding Amid This Discourse?
Perhaps the first question that arises here is: can the aforementioned nuclear discourse be described as uncontrollable? This must not be taken abstractly; rather, it should be viewed in a historical context, and in a strategic one as well. How has the scenario looked in the years following the Cold War up until five or ten years ago? How have strategic contexts changed regionally and internationally?
Things have changed significantly, and the gap between nuclear powers has widened. Agreements and arrangements regarding the regulation of nuclear armament have been abandoned. No alternatives to these have been found, and the current atmosphere does not appear to encourage entering serious negotiations on this front. Tensions are on the rise in regions that were believed to be on the verge of settlement after diplomatic breakthroughs. Is this what has led the global nuclear discourse to take on an uncontrollable tone compared to before? It may well be, but the matter is no longer about whether the nuclear discourse is out of control or to what extent; it connects to genuine concerns regarding the actual use of such weapons even against non-nuclear states.
It could be argued that this described discourse is merely a form of extortion or deterrence aimed at other parties to prevent them from pursuing their targeting of the parties responsible for this discourse. Here, it can be said that the Russian nuclear discourse has been crucial in preventing Ukraine’s NATO membership thus far and has obstructed Western countries’ alignment with Ukraine in all its demands concerning strikes against Russian territory. More fundamentally, such discourse could expedite the end of hostilities.
However, regardless of Russia’s claims that Ukraine is merely a Western spearhead targeting it, the situation faced by Ukraine in this conflict has led voices to rise lamenting the abandonment of the nuclear arsenal it possessed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ironically, Russia was among the countries assuring the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for its relinquishing of nuclear arms.
This sentiment may not remain limited to lamentation. Voices may emerge calling for Ukraine to once again pursue acquiring nuclear weapons. Such voices could evolve into future programs and plans. This doesn’t only apply to Ukraine. When threatened countries observe North Korea’s example—how its possession of nuclear weapons has secured it against external aggression—other nations might follow suit. This scenario could plunge the world into a state of nuclear chaos, where extant calls and agreements prove ineffective and reaching new agreements may become impossible.
Even before reaching such an environment of nuclear chaos, warnings are escalating regarding the possibility of a nuclear war. What kind of nuclear war could erupt? Is there such a thing as a limited nuclear war versus an unlimited one?
Any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. This catastrophe cannot be guaranteed to be contained and could potentially lead to the destruction of the entire world. The situation is not akin to that of 1945, when nuclear weapons were used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite numerous analyses suggesting that the war had effectively ended and that there was no justification for their use, could it be that American nuclear monopoly was the greater justification for this use? It should not be forgotten that a scenario for a different American use in the Korean War was proposed by some military leaders in the early 1950s, but was ultimately dismissed. Certainly, the end of nuclear monopoly was a key reason for excluding this option.
Would the global nuclear discourse regain its rationality if Washington and its allies abandoned the goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia? Would a return to reconciliation efforts in the Korean Peninsula ease the Korean nuclear rhetoric? Would improved U.S.-China relations reduce or eliminate the wrangling over nuclear capabilities?
The answer to these questions could very well be affirmative. Moreover, the world may witness a different discourse concerning the dangers of nuclear weapons and the necessity of seeking to eliminate them in order to spare humanity from their catastrophes. However, this does not depend merely on a sweet-talking discourse but rather on specific actions, clear timelines, and oversight by an independent and neutral international entity to render the world entirely free of nuclear weapons, including the five nuclear powers under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Most importantly, it must ensure that there is no return to the possession of these weapons. It is not enough for these five nuclear powers to demand compliance from non-signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to relinquish their nuclear arsenals and not return to acquiring them. They themselves must also start applying their commitments under the treaty, including their own abandonment of nuclear weapons.
Thus, the demand is to eliminate any exceptionalism in nuclear possession, whether legal or illegal. Without eliminating this exceptionalism, the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation remains open. Increased nuclear proliferation does not necessarily imply enhanced nuclear deterrence; rather, it may present greater opportunities for a potential nuclear war, perhaps arising from error or miscalculation. Hence, responsibility needs to be called for not only in nuclear discourse but also in policies, procedures, and strategies. It is crucial for the world to reach a state where there are no nuclear strategies or doctrines. This will only occur when the world is devoid of such weaponry. Everything else merely reinforces a skewed nuclear status, even if nuclear states claim otherwise.
