The decision to postpone the Arab summit concerning Gaza and its repercussions is a bad omen for Arab and international diplomatic trends. The justification for the postponement based on logistical excuses is bitterly ironic; it is clear that the agenda of the conference is the real reason for the delay. I am certain that the Arab strategy that will be proposed—if the summit is held—will align closely in essence (though not in rhetoric) with the American-Israeli strategy in the following aspects:
First: General Rules:
- A. Maximum Arab and international pressure on the Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories through all possible political, military, financial, and media means.
- B. Undermining the resistant Ikhwani model in favor of the compromising Ikhwani model (according to recommendations from studies by the Rand Corporation, as well as President Sisi’s graduation thesis at the U.S. military academy).
- C. Exploiting the sharp decline in the weight of the resistance axis, especially in Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria.
- D. Attempting to absorb the momentum of President Trump’s initiative by increasing investments, particularly from the Gulf, in the U.S. economy, coordinating in oil (price and production levels) and trade volume with the United States at the expense of trade with other countries, especially China, or increasing Gulf purchases of American weaponry.
- E. Ensuring that normalization agreements are not touched in any way, nor allowing the subject to be raised, noting that some republican Arab countries have begun to circle around this issue.
- F. Attempting to entice Yemen’s (Ansar Allah) to reconsider its stance or work secretly to penetrate this front through cooperation between Arab, American, and Israeli security agencies.
Second: Exploiting the Cracks in the Arab Structure: The underlying disagreements among Arab countries will be utilized by both the United States and the Arab states themselves. The Gulf relationship harbors hidden tensions between the trio of Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia regarding many issues, such as: Who will be the American foothold in the Gulf? Who will take on diplomacy by proxy? Who supports the Sudanese army, and who stands with the Rapid Support Forces? What are the limits of support for the Muslim Brotherhood? Meanwhile, in the Maghreb, tensions are equally serious, with instability in Libya and upheaval in the Tunisian administration, not to mention the underlying embers between Morocco and Algeria.
Third: The Battle of Reconstruction in Gaza (followed by the battle for reconstructing the camps in Jenin and its surroundings, and the reconstruction battle in Southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut). Here, one must stop at a dangerous indicator, especially regarding Gaza’s reconstruction. It is clear that Egypt seeks to reap as many “financial gains” as possible in this matter through:
- A. Financial extortion of fees for truck entry, without considering the conditions of governmental management in Gaza or the reality of Gazan society. The astronomical figures reported regarding the fees for entering and exiting individuals or trucks, heavy equipment, or even manipulating goods indicate increased pressure on Gazan citizens and obstructing the flow of aid, effectively making the Israeli inspector a party in determining the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship at the border between Egypt and Gaza.
- B. Egypt will likely strive for Egyptian military companies or other civilian Egyptian firms to take the lion’s share in reconstruction projects. While some of these endeavors may seem justified, prioritizing financial gain over Arab, Islamic, and moral solidarity with an afflicted people is troubling, especially given that Egypt’s corruption rate according to Transparency International’s 2024 report is at 70%, an increase of 5% from the previous year, placing Egypt at 130th (out of 180 countries) in the corruption index.
- C. The Egyptian administration is keen to undermine the image of “sacrifice and resistance” exhibited by the Islamic resistance in Gaza to prevent it from becoming a model for bolstering the resistant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood within Egypt.
The delay in starting reconstruction under “logistical” excuses, or by fabricating Arab-Arab disputes or establishing committees to review then subcommittees, is a familiar tactic in Arab diplomacy used to evade commitments and shift responsibility to others. This adds a burden to the Gazan citizen, who may consider emigration. Recently, an Arab satellite channel (Al-Arabi) aired a detailed report on immigration facilities to Canada (swift response to immigration requests, covering all travel and accommodation costs, and working to guarantee job placements, etc.). We might even see similar facilitation towards Gulf countries, and some are considering replacing Asian labor with Palestinian labor in the Gulf. Thus, Egyptian corruption intertwines with both Arab and Western temptations to displace Palestinians from their homeland.
Fourth: Disruptions to Supply Routes for Lebanese Resistance and the Role of Iraqi Resistance: The structure of authority in both Iraq and Syria indicates a kind of political pager (not electronic) in each, which will be detonated when deemed appropriate by its sower. Pressure on both sides has begun to relax; Hezbollah, too, has made many statements hinting at exhaustion on one side and readiness to gradually withdraw from military engagement on the other. There is also a profound disturbance in the image of the party’s leadership and performance, evident in its acceptance to retreat from the southern front, placing the responsibility “exclusively” on the state, as articulated by new leaders of the party. This image is not dissimilar to the stark scene in southern Syria and on the Golan front, where Israel delineates borders without even receiving a verbal condemnation from the concerned parties. We are also reading reports about delegations of Jewish rabbis visiting Syria, along with American and European tolerance towards the new regime in terms of its political classification or lifting the embargo, without revealing the motives of this Western generosity. According to the published list from the U.S. Treasury Department, there are 38 parties under siege, but sometimes the embargo is lifted after these parties comply with American demands. Will the new Syrian administration—claiming transparency and accountability to the people—disclose the essence of the U.S.-Syrian dialogue concerning lifting the siege? What are the conditions for lifting the siege? Is there a connection to the resettlement of Palestinians and eradicating their organizations, or perhaps to recognizing Israel or soft normalization? We want to know, as silence is terrifying and suspicious.
Fifth: The Security Coordination Authority and its Functional Role: The picture grows bleaker with the “unsurprising” role of the Security Coordination Authority; it is not concerned with driving out the occupation as much as it is with “diminishing the forces of resistance and constricting their political role in managing Palestinian affairs.” This role is not separate from its security duties as outlined in the security coordination appendix since Oslo and thereafter. It has even decided to stop monthly salaries for the families of martyrs and prisoners.
However, the worst possibility is that pressure will be applied on the resistance to release Israeli prisoners all at once, which would free Netanyahu from most of the internal pressures on him and enable him to resume fighting with the aim of “eradicating resistance from the sector” and opening the path for emigration. This scenario is becoming clearer in southern Lebanon, where Netanyahu has postponed the withdrawal date, accepted by Lebanon and the Arabs, then established military sites in Lebanon without finding any response beyond customary statements. The exhausted resistance has returned to confine responsibility within the Lebanese state.
Sixth: The Medium-Term Horizon: Conversely, Israel sees that the radical solution to its problem lies in the expulsion of Palestinians abroad, as Israeli diplomacy does not want to return to discussions of the two-state solution, which enjoys the broadest international support among alternative settlement frameworks, especially since Trump attaches no value to this alternative and has not even mentioned it. Acceptance of a two-state solution (regardless of its burdens) could mean civil war in Israel, as the 780,000 settlers in the West Bank will not withdraw under a government that supports them, given the prevailing biblical inclination among them. They believe that Arabs will gradually accept annexation, as indicated by the historical conflict between the two parties.
Netanyahu is building his strategy on the assumption that Arabs will accept all his demands, though acceptance varies in speed from one state to another. Some accept directly and promptly, while others impose conditions but allow Israeli flights to cross their airspace and permit Israeli tourists to enter, and so on gradually. There are countries that claim not to normalize but do not view their dealings with Mossad as a form of normalization.
Finally: We are a nation whose diplomacy is founded on the principle that “the enemies of the nation are allies of the regimes.” How can matters proceed in such a state? Given that we are a nation where the interests of its regimes outweigh those of society and the state, how can this not be the shortest path to disaster? Europe and America, especially with Trump, will not reconsider their policies regarding the Palestinian issue except concerning the threats posed to their strategic and tactical interests. Why isn’t the language of interests—interests of nations and societies—the base of Arab political behavior? And why isn’t supporting resistance used as a tool of pressure? Without that, we will reap more disappointment, and then we will sing the praises of leadership wisdom… perhaps.
