In this paper, I will focus on a term that has been circulating for over two decades: “New Ottomans.” This term refers specifically to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by the trio of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Abdullah Gül.
Conditions for the Emergence of Turkish Political Islam
It is widely believed in the Arab world that Erdoğan is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, with some going so far as to describe him as the true guide of the international organization of the group. To understand the nature of this relationship beyond political polarization, it is necessary to explain the intellectual character of Turkish Islam and transition to its political aspect; therefore, I advise those who have not yet reviewed the latest article to return to it for a deeper understanding of this issue.
As previously mentioned, Turkish political Islam is fundamentally different from its Arab counterpart; its earliest manifestations began with Bediüzzaman Said Nursi immediately after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However, he later withdrew from political activity, limiting his endeavors to religious and missionary work. Political Islam had no significant presence until the rise of Adnan Menderes, a Tatar origin, to the position of Prime Minister in 1950, initiating political and economic reforms, benefiting from the Marshall Plan economically and Truman’s doctrine militarily to protect Turkey from communist expansion. With the cessation of American economic aid and the deterioration of living conditions, a group of young military officers educated in the United States led Turkey’s first military coup on May 27, 1960, under the command of Colonel Alparslan Türkeş. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the coup’s motivations and the plethora of hypotheses about it, one of its reasons was to alleviate the oppressive, enforced secular constraints adopted by the Turkish government since the time of Atatürk and the return of the call to prayer in Arabic. Menderes’s objective with these steps was to reconcile with the Islamic identity of the people to combat the growing power of socialist currents during an economic crisis. Consequently, these officers presented themselves in their coup statement as “protectors” of the secular system and allies of the West, loyal to NATO and Baghdad. Menderes is still held in high regard by Islamic currents in Turkey, despite not being affiliated with any Islamic group, as he represented what they believe to be the first attempt to restore the Islamic identity of the Turks, regardless of his motives.
After the execution of Menderes and other military figures on September 17, 1961, political Islam did not resonate until Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party in alliance with the Nur movement. Therefore, one can date the emergence of political Islam to the year 1970, which marks the founding of the party.
Erbakan had no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, as his life and education were split between Turkey and Germany. The intellectual framework of Turkish Islam did not require importing ideas from an external organization; it had its intellectual and religious resources drawn from the Nur movement, Sufi movements that span across the country, a glorious political history for the Turks represented in the Ottoman Empire, and its predecessor, the Seljuk state, alongside the ideology of the Islamic Caliphate, which had Istanbul as its center. This had been the title of the Ottoman sultans since Abdulhamid II assumed leadership in 1876. In contrast, the Brotherhood was nearly defunct at that time, only resurfacing in the latter half of the 1970s, after receiving strong support from former Egyptian President Sadat.
The Turkish Islamic movement has three founding fathers: Bediüzzaman Nursi, the spiritual father of missionary Islam; Fethullah Gülen, the spiritual father of social Islam; and Necmettin Erbakan, the spiritual father of political Islam. The latter exploited the followers of both movements, the believers in Sufi paths, and the conservative Turkish electorate for votes. He engaged in multiple struggles with the two staunch secular wings of Atatürk’s regime within the military and judiciary. His first party was dissolved just nine months after its establishment, and he subsequently founded the National Salvation Party in 1972, thus entering— for the first time—a party with an Islamic orientation into the parliament, becoming a partner in a coalition government with the secular Republican People’s Party, founded by Atatürk, in 1974, during which Erbakan held the position of Deputy Prime Minister.
In 1980, Turkish Army Commander Kenan Evren led a military coup that resulted in the suspension of the constitution, the dissolution of Erbakan’s second party, imprisonment of its leaders, and freezing of political life, leaving political Islam without representation in the Turkish political sphere. However, with Turgut Özal, of Kurdish origin, assuming the role of Prime Minister in 1983, Turkey adopted a new policy opening up to the East and the Islamic world. Özal, who was religious and belonged to the Naqshbandi Sufi order, was reported to pray secretly in the presidential palace after taking office. He was shrewd and cautious in dealing with the military and compensated for the absence of political Islam, being the first Turkish leader to understand the impossibility of merging with the West and began to practically reconsider the theory adopted by the Republic of Turkey since its inception in 1923, pointing toward the West as if the Arab and Islamic worlds were mired in backwardness and there was nothing Turkey could gain from relations with them.
Turkey experienced significant economic development during Özal’s tenure, marked by his several first-time visits as a senior Turkish official to Arab and Islamic countries. He adopted a liberal economic policy, leading to Western support, while the Turkish army remained conservative economically and suspicious of foreign openings and investments. He also established a close friendship with the founder of the “Islamic Gulen Movement,” Fethullah Gülen, allowing for increased activity for Gülen’s movement inside Turkey, with many members entering state institutions. Alongside the economic successes achieved, the military’s influence began to wane. Özal initiated a political opening that allowed Erbakan to return to political activity, leading to the founding of his third party (Welfare Party) which formed a coalition government in 1996, with the secular True Path Party led by the famous Bosnian-origin Turkish politician Tansu Çiller.
Political Islam owes a great deal to former Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal after Menderes. Although neither leader was a part of the Islamic movement, Özal’s conciliatory policies towards the Islamic identity and his successful economic policies significantly empowered it later on. Hence, former Turkish President Abdullah Gül decided in 2012 to open an investigation into the circumstances surrounding Özal’s death in 1993, as some believe he was poisoned due to the military’s opposition to his comprehensive policies and his attempts to resolve the Kurdish crisis. Indeed, his grave was exhumed, and an autopsy was conducted, revealing significant amounts of poison in his body. However, investigators could not determine whether this poison was administered intentionally or was a result of long-term accumulation. Media loyal to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sought to exploit this incident, alongside the findings of the investigation that emerged recently and Özal’s strong popularity, to hint at a role for Gülen’s group in his death due to their hardline stance on the Kurdish issue, leveraging it in Erdoğan’s conflict with Gülen to tarnish Gülen’s image.
A “white coup” took place called the “memorandum coup,” presented by the chiefs of the Turkish army, accusing Erbakan of seeking to undermine the secular system of the Republic of Turkey. As a result, he resigned from government in 1997, and participation from him and his party in political activity was banned for five years; however, the party reformed itself under a new name (Virtue Party) in 1998, achieving good results in the 1999 parliamentary elections, with one of its young members succeeding in the Istanbul mayoral elections, that being Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Erbakan can be considered a revolutionary with a Turkish national Islamic orientation as he had clear positions of animosity towards Israel and sought several times to cut relations with it while in opposition. He also called for stronger ties with Arabs and the Islamic world, and established in 1997 the group of eight emerging Islamic countries, which included, alongside Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Malaysia, and Indonesia. However, his economic policies were not successful, and he could not achieve any significant accomplishments; his rhetoric often overshadowed effective action. When he failed to provide anything tangible for the Turkish citizen, he resorted to blatantly using religion in political propaganda. His policies became increasingly erratic and inconsistent. He signed a security and military cooperation agreement with Israel to assure the West and the military, then after entering prison and being banned from political activity, he led the party into media confrontations that harmed the party’s and the Islamic movement’s image, such as his insistence on allowing the veiled MP Merve Kavakçı to enter the parliament, which contradicted the then-existing Turkish legal system, inciting public opinion against the party, and also managing the party authoritatively from within his prison cell by imposing Mohammad Rajai Quotani’s candidacy on young party members, leaving behind the competing young candidate Abdullah Gül. All these policies contributed to the internal disunity of the party alongside a ruling from the Turkish Constitutional Court to dissolve the party in 2001. Consequently, the youth splintered off to establish the Justice and Development Party in the same year, while Erbakan, as was customary, re-established his party under a new name, the Happiness Party.
In 2010, Erbakan accused the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan of drowning the country in debt, increasing poverty and unemployment rates, claiming that what they call development is just a grand deception, eventually accusing Erdoğan of deceit and receiving Zionist support.
Characteristics of Turkish Political Islam Compared to Arab Political Islam
Turkish political Islam grew and flourished, experiencing its journey from within Turkey, shaped by its reality, circumstances, historical heritage, political thinkers, and the character of piety and understanding of Islam among the Turks, with external influences being minimal. The external influences are merely general considerations when discussing the unity of the Islamic nation and fostering cooperation with it—issues not only shared among Islamists but also many political currents across all ideological perspectives. This contrasts sharply with Arab political Islam, which often neglects domestic issues, lacking deep engagement with them. They rely on borrowed theories more than immersing themselves in the reality to derive theoretical frameworks. Personally, as previously mentioned, I believe the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood was borne from the ideas of non-Arab Islamists, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Abul A’la Maududi, and certain Ottoman Turkish elites who fled to Cairo after the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate, while Hasan al-Banna was merely an active young face representing their ideas.
Turkish political Islam never engaged— even once— in any assassination operations, violent acts, or terrorism, nor did it attack the state or its institutions, despite a state of hostility and serious conflict with it, which is fundamentally different from the Arab political Islam experience; the Brotherhood themselves acknowledge employing political assassinations and at times justifying violence against the state. The Brotherhood is considered the spiritual father of all jihadist Islamic movements extending to ISIS, whose alleged successor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was nurtured within the Brotherhood, as attested by Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi himself. While the Brotherhood may not have directly engaged in violence, their ideas fostered an environment ripe for those hungry for rebellion through violence, with ideological leaders like Sayyid Qutb being regarded as a towering figure whose theories underpinned every armed terrorist action. The Brotherhood has never distanced itself from his views on the “jahili” society, barring the second guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi, in his book “Preachers, Not Judges,” deemed non-authoritative within the Brotherhood, which views him as not being genuinely part of them. His leadership period was marked by instability, needing a decisive leadership regardless of how closely he represented their thoughts; his struggles with prominent Brotherhood figures are well-known.
Turkish political Islam is predominantly Turkish nationalist before being Islamic. Islam is part of its nationalism and one of its constituents, forming the intellectual or ideological kinship necessary for the revival of the Turks, leading them within the Islamic world during the Seljuks and their global leadership during the Ottoman period. Thus, Islam serves Turkey and its nationalism, rather than the opposite. Turkish political Islam is more congruent with its Turkish identity and essence, while Arab political Islam looks down upon the idea of Arab nationalism, dismissing it as a cultural, geographic, and intellectual framework for the region’s peoples, viewing it as a “jahili” call they must repent from. Attempts by some advocates, who held nationalistic or socialist backgrounds and were not part of political Islam from its inception, to reconcile Arab nationalism with Islam, asserting that there’s no real conflict between them, such as Fahmy Howeidy, Counselor Tarek El-Beshry, Muhammad Imara, and Muhammad Selim Al-Awa, or through writings by primarily nationalistic authors or those with national tendencies seeing Islam as part of nationalism— not limited to a single party or religious group, such as Counselor Abdul-Razzaq al-Sanhouri, Ismet Sivas, Jamal Hamdan, and the founder of the Christian Ba’ath Party, Michel Aflaq— ultimately failed and were rejected by the Islamic movement generally, and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically. To them, nationalism is seen as a “jahili” call and the nation as a mere handful of earth of no value, contrasting sharply with the Turkish political Islam’s perception of Turkish nationalism, enhanced by Islamists more than by secularists. Erdoğan established in 2009 the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS), and strengthened the role of the International Organization of Turkish Culture (TÜRKSOY), founded by Özal in 1992, wherein Erdoğan in 2013 included six federations from the Russian Turkic origins (Altai, Tatarstan, Tuva, Yakutia, Khakassia, and Bashkortostan), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the autonomous region of Gagauzia in Moldova. Notably, these member communities (Muslims, Orthodox, Buddhists, and Shamanists) represent the idea that nationalism is the overarching framework, not religion; Turkish identity serves as the common thread that binds them, with both organizations led by a Turkish official, showcasing the clarity and unambiguous nature of Turkish political Islam’s national identity, contrasting with the often troubled and inconsistent identity in Arab political Islam.
Turkish political Islam is very keen on the integrity and strength of the Turkish state, maintaining a strong army, and has never sought— even once— to dismantle the state and rebuild it to meet its standards or confronted the military with calls for its downfall. The strength of the state and its institutions is integral to its convictions. Despite existing conflicts, it understands this conflict as political, not existential, regarding the state, its institutions, and military as sacred entities deserving of respect. Conversely, the foremost objective of Arab political Islam tends to be the destruction of all national and historical legacies and the drive to dismantle state institutions, which has led many to fear it, turning into a force obstructing any democratization process in the Arab world.
Turkish political Islam has become pragmatic. Its evolution has led to an understanding that secularism, in its true essence, benefits it rather than opposes it, defining it as the state valuing its values, identity, and religion without excluding any party or adopting supernatural ideas. As previously noted, it allied with a woman, making her Deputy Prime Minister, and supported Tansu Çiller to lead the Turkish state; thus, the Turkish Islamic trend demonstrates flexibility and an ability to deal with reality. This reality can be gleaned from examining its history, development, crises, and the resulting moves towards adopting a more open and realistic policy, while crises tend to exacerbate extremism in Arab political Islam. For instance, crises prompt the Brotherhood towards the philosophy of Sayyid Qutb instead of Hasan al-Banna, or to favor Hassan al-Banna over Omar al-Talmessani, or to follow ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas rather than the ideas of ibn Rushd. However, once in power, their clandestine operational nature and inability to function in the open lead to confusion and doubts from others. Hence, they resemble any closed political systems, unable or unwilling to evolve; development would simply mean their collapse. Thus, their only response to crises is intensified extremism, closure, and raising the banner of victimhood.
Turkish political Islam capitalized on small, seemingly insignificant opportunities neglected by the military government, actively participating in unions, municipalities, and student associations to prepare its cadres, learning how to manage the state. This fostered the ability to distinguish theory from reality, adjust and rectify policies, and work discreetly away from propaganda to deliver real services and reforms that inspire trust in its capacity to govern. This is evident in Erdoğan’s adept management of Istanbul’s municipality. Once the Justice and Development Party attained power, it presented 350 projects in its first month post-election and began implementing them immediately. In contrast, the Brotherhood, for instance, often utilized these opportunities for emotive propaganda framed around slogans or engaged in electoral bribery, exploiting community poverty by transforming to charitable organizations, lacking a concrete program or practical project they could execute, let alone offer theoretically viable propositions. When the necessity arose for such a program – to exhaust religious propaganda for its purposes – they presented what they termed the “Renaissance Project,” which was merely a collection of vacuous phrases devoid of substance, unable to withstand the scrutiny of even minimally competent experts. This left the Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat al-Shater to posit that the project was “just general ideas” and not “an implementable project.”
Turkish political Islam enlisted various specialists from all fields and political spectrums, regardless of their ideological beliefs, presenting itself as a political party rather than a religious organization. Their competition with others revolved around an economic and political project within Turkey, affirming their status as part of the republic, respecting its symbols, foremost among them Atatürk. Erdoğan himself stated, “We are the grandchildren of Atatürk.” Furthermore, Turkish Islamists did not engage in identity-struggle games; they allied during the transitional phase with all parties and collaborated with them, integrating right-wing, nationalist, and liberal elements into their party. Conversely, Arab political Islam’s initial motivation is often to retaliate against past foes, dragging society into a struggle over historical figures and igniting identity conflicts that overshadow any economic or political dialogue. This inability to compete with their rivals in meaningful areas leads them to market themselves based on representing Islam versus rejectionist attitudes.
Arab political Islam, particularly the Brotherhood, can easily conspire against their states, undermining internal unity while working with regional and international systems to undermine the existing governance due to political disagreements. This, however, is utterly infeasible for Turkish Islamists; throughout their oppression by the Turkish army and state institutions, they did not flee abroad, nor did they incite from exile against their homeland or seek revenge against the army, even though the repression they suffered is incomparable in severity to that in the most oppressive and bloody Arab regimes.
New Ottomanism The term “New Ottomanism” emerged in 1974 when the national coalition government between the secular, Atatürkist Republican People’s Party, led by Bülent Ecevit, and the National Salvation Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan—then the Deputy Prime Minister—collaborated with Turkish military generals to invade Northern Cyprus and declare its independence from the Republic of Cyprus. This also increased interventions by Turkey in the affairs of countries previously under Ottoman rule, including those with Muslim minorities of Turkish descent or those who converted to Islam during that era, such as Bulgaria and Romania. Greece, Cyprus, and these Eastern European nations employed this term to imply that the Republic of Turkey, which declared its neutrality and disavowed its Ottoman legacy, was returning to colonial Ottoman policies through a consensus between secularists, Islamists, and the military.
The Nature of the Relationship between the Brotherhood and Erdoğan
The relationship between Turkish political Islam, represented by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Arab political Islam, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, appears convoluted. This ambiguity exists not only among the opposition to this trend but also among many young members of the Brotherhood and their sympathizers. If we were to practically characterize this relationship through the historical narratives of both movements, we could describe it as a “mutually beneficial relationship” between both parties. There is no ideological bond, shared experience, or unified historical context connecting them aside from the natural sympathy and emotional warmth present among various ideological currents worldwide, similar to liberals, socialists, and nationalists. This does not indicate a unified political organization or a group linking them. Such emotions often target the public but do not necessarily reflect shared interests or a dependency of one side on the other at the leadership level.
The Muslim Brotherhood has utilized the Justice and Development Party and Erdoğan’s persona to engage in political propaganda, claiming to establish an ideological and organizational link with the Turkish experience and attributing its successes to themselves, asserting that what has been achieved in Turkey is what awaits Arab countries if their populations choose them electorally. Moreover, on a global scale, they aim to convey that the ascent of an Islamic-oriented party in one of the most secular countries serves to affirm their theory that ensuring stability for these nations and securing interests can only be achieved through them, rather than through traditional regimes. They emphasize that they are neither against Israel nor the West, nor trade liberalization, noting how their “Islamic” comrades rose to power in Turkey without military coups akin to those faced by the Brotherhood in Sudan or civil wars like that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, nor through revolutions where they maintained sole control, as seen in Iran. Instead, they took power through a peaceful democratic political process, striving for international support and assistance.
Upon Erdoğan assuming power, Turkey was grappling with the repercussions of the 2001 economic crisis, needing foreign investments to boost state revenues from foreign currencies and increase export rates. However, the problem with the Turkish industrial product was its duality: “more expensive than Chinese and lower quality than Western.” Consequently, it needed new markets governed by emotional ties to Turkey to facilitate purchases, largely found within the vast Arab market built on a surplus of oil-propelled wealth after the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which could be attracted through sentiment to Turkish products and investments, and tourism. Achieving these targets required numerous operational steps; thus, Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership, coupled with his impassioned speeches, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s academic ideas and proposals, and Abdullah Gül’s congenial demeanor along with his experience gained while working in Saudi Arabia, formed a new strategic framework for Turkey’s foreign moves, redirecting towards the East, consolidated by Davutoğlu’s renowned book “Strategic Depth,” discussing Turkey’s actual strategic depth concerning the Arab and Islamic worlds alongside a “zero problems” policy with neighbors and mutual free trade agreements with many Arab countries without visa entry. This coincided dramatically with Turkish drama that appealed to nostalgia for the imagined “Islamic greatness” of the Ottoman Empire and romantic dramas representing Turkey’s upper classes, providing a captivating image for the Arab viewer and enticing them to travel for tourism and investment, even real estate purchases and perhaps residency. In summary, Turkey skillfully utilized soft power in marketing itself, while Arabs failed to do so.
From 2002 to 2011, Turkey’s policy towards Arabs was based on mutual respect, non-interference in domestic affairs, prioritizing trade and investment, and discussing Palestine’s cause sympathetically, which was not typically heard from Turkish politicians. At the same time, it maintained close ties with the West and Israel. The Brotherhood proved to be highly beneficial for Turkey during this period. Many of its followers and sympathizers held substantial funds in the Gulf, actively promoting tourism in Turkey and facilitating trade. Thus, emerged a mutually advantageous relationship for both parties without any ideological bond or a unified political organization linking them.
Turkey’s policy relied on reviving Turkish-Ottoman history as a means to create connections with its Arab surroundings, promoting itself within the Islamic world, striving to break the isolation imposed since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and developing new markets that kept it from being subservient to the Western market incapable of competing with its economic interests. With Turkey realizing that it would not likely join the EU, it adopted policies and strategies to build a new vision for themselves, termed “new Ottomans,” until weakness seeped into the Arab world, with many of its countries enveloped in strife and civil wars, emboldening Turkish policies, stirring an appetite for influence beyond trade and investments, aiming to expand its reach through the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Currently, the Brotherhood is weakened, lacking support or refuge, finding only Turkey to provide shelter and protection. From its territory, their media platforms operate while Turkey benefits from their financial deposits in its banks and their real estate and commercial investments in its economy.
Between Atatürk and Erdoğan
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan established the Second Turkish Republic, which outwardly differs yet fundamentally aligns with the original Turkish Republic created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. I believe there to be no real conflict between the two men; they are both Turkish nationalists. Any other ideology—whether secular or Islamic—comes second. Both seek Turkey’s revival and greatness. Both founded a republic born from a crisis Turkey faced and aimed to resolve this historical predicament placed upon Turkey’s geography after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk discovered the replication of a republic lay in integration with the West to secure economic aid, modern technology, and military protection against Soviet expansion. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, and with Turkey’s diminished value and role in the West, coupled with the cessation of Western support and economic assistance, Erdoğan and his associates turned toward the East and the Islamic world, identifying an Arab void, political weakness, economic devastation, cultural decline, and a clear absence of Arab national identity. They exploited all these factors to capitalize on trade and investments, effectively transforming the Arab world into a “hypermarket” for Turkish products. Following the Arab denouement post-2011, Erdoğan began to aim for more substantial aspirations, taking advantage of the weakness in Arab countries that he had never dreamed of reaching.
Turkey’s current objective is to negotiate with Europe not in Turkey’s name, as it has alone diminished in value, unable to reap significant rewards from the West. Rather they negotiate concerning their security and stability, forming a geographical and security barrier to protect against chaos and the influx of refugees from the Arab world. They negotiate with Israel regarding Hamas and Gaza, with Russia on ensuring stability and security in Syria, and pipelines of gas toward Europe, while with the United States, they seek to balance against the rising Russian role in Libya and Iranian influence in Iraq, among other issues. Turkey’s role is poised to hold considerable weight, which does not indicate a departure from Atatürk’s policies or a distancing from the West and the United States; quite the opposite, it strengthens its position, gains, and leverage as it negotiates with the West, Israel, Iran, Russia, the Arabs, and the United States to secure greater benefits. Therefore, all the files become interrelated and cannot be separated from one another, indicating no contradiction between Atatürk and Erdoğan in essence. This reflects the reality of international state relations, where states are not charitable organizations governed by values or abstract principles; they are motivated purely by interest.
Conclusion
By virtue of geographical, historical factors, and overlapping interests and conflicts, Turkey is of significant importance to the Arab world. One cannot surpass it or limit relations to a state of perpetual conflict. The Arab world cannot withstand a blockade from Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and an unstable relationship with Pakistan, while struggling for water and life to the south against Ethiopia, with Israel at its core. The only resolution available is to find common ground with Turkey, a compromise achievable and not impossible. The core issue lies in the weaknesses of our policies and a lack of Arab coordination, even at minimal levels. We need an Arab project spearheaded by a power center to establish a regional network that brings this area together under one umbrella, ensuring the interests of all while avoiding conflict over them.
Political Islam in Turkey is civilizational, articulating a shared identity and promoting cooperation among Muslim nations, rather than an ideology based on enforcing Islamic law or establishing what is termed a “Caliphate.” All discussions that Arab political Islam has consumed time and effort on amidst the Arab world are mere mobilization tools to attract the masses and are not factored— in any form of relevance— into the calculations of Turkish decision-makers. They define their party as a conservative nationalist Turkish party.
Counting on Erdoğan’s downfall or exit from power in any form in favor of another regime may be misplaced; the alternative would emerge from the same political spectrum with different tactics—even if it were the Atatürkist Republican People’s Party; the equation in Turkey has shifted. Issues such as Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Eastern Mediterranean gas have become integral components of Turkish national security and cannot be overlooked by any political party taking power tomorrow. Following the widespread popularization of the Justice and Development Party’s political strategies, no opposing party can afford to relinquish control, nor can they withdraw from Syria, Iraq, close military bases in Qatar, or abandon Turkey’s interests in Cyprus and Mediterranean gas. Thus, Arabs need to prepare themselves to confront a new Turkey, regardless of its leadership, and establish a framework for understanding and dealing with Turkey from a position of strength.
There is an urgent need among Arabs to distinguish between the aspirations and ambitions of many young individuals and a substantial section of the populace that identifies with Islamic parties and a closed organization that poses a threat to the state, ready to conspire against it under the pretexts of confronting “injustice,” the “infidel” authority, or cooperating with a “fraternal Islamic country” like the Brotherhood. We must open dialogues with them regarding the state’s form, the implications of their Islamic perceptions on it and society, and reach a consensus on general rules that would allow them political activity transparently and freely.
