New Syria: Major Challenges of the Transitional Phase

After the fall of the Assad regime, Damascus quickly became a focal point for senior Western officials and several Arab leaders, many of whom engaged in direct talks with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of the new Syrian administration. A primary concern for all Western officials in Damascus was urging Syrian leaders to protect and represent “minorities” in the new governance system while also calling for measures to avoid threatening the security of neighboring countries, including Israel. Several Arab officials echoed this sentiment, stressing the need to broaden the political base of governance to include all components of Syrian society.

Commentators, particularly some Syrians, expressed skepticism about the official Western and Arab concern for Syrian “minorities,” often overlooking the new Syrian leaders’ declaration that equal citizenship would be the guiding principle in the relationship between the Syrian state and its people. These commentators argue that the first priority in post-Assad Syria should not be the governance structure or even a new constitution, but rather maintaining security, starting with dealing with remnants of the regime and armed militias, up to seeking and prosecuting those involved in crimes against the people, violation of human dignity, and the shedding of innocent blood. Many Syrians are evidently concerned that without the new state fulfilling these responsibilities, Syria could quickly descend into a cycle of vengeance and retribution.

Najib Mikati, who met with al-Sharaa in Damascus on January 11, 2025, making it the first visit to Syria by a Lebanese Prime Minister since 2011, seemed to demand, at their ensuing press conference, that the new Syrian administration work swiftly to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon (noting that very few remain). Mikati did not hesitate to say that the presence of Syrians in Lebanon posed a political and socio-economic burden on all Lebanese components, implicitly highlighting that the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are Sunni Arabs, while ignoring the role of Hezbollah—part of the Lebanese government—in destroying the towns and villages of these refugees.

However, others, including political activists in Syria, argue that the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees from Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan must be a priority—not just due to the dire and harsh conditions surrounding Syrian refugee camps but also for the need to restore demographic balance among the population.

The differing perspectives on the Syrian new government’s priorities often reflect the interests, goals, and motivations of their proponents, whether they are representatives of states or Syrian actors and observers. As in all major change scenarios, it is not always easy to find a unifying framework for the debates triggered by the victory of popular revolutions in countries marked by ethnic and religious diversity, closely tied to their regional context and possessing significant geopolitical importance. Below is an attempt to explore a slightly different list of the most significant challenges facing the new Syria, related to both the general characteristics of state existence and the demands imposed by the Syrian transitional situation.

Rebuilding the Defense Institution

States, all states, are primarily built on the shoulders of soldiers, followed by ministers, judges, merchants, and engineers. The responsibility of safeguarding the country’s security, securing its borders, and asserting its sovereignty over land and people falls to the military. Without an effective defense institution, achieving stability is impossible. Since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in the spring of 2011, the ousted Syrian army chose to side with the regime against the people, and as the leaders of the new Syria fought against that army for years, it was natural for the Ministry of Defense to be restructured.

Evidently, the new Syrian leadership chose to rebuild the defense institution from the roots, including its structure, personnel, and soldiers. The first step in this rebuilding was Ahmad al-Sharaa’s announcement that several military personnel from the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or its allied groups would receive military ranks as part of the “Counteroffensive” initiative. Two officers were granted the rank of Major General: Major General Marhaf Abu Qasrah, who was announced as Minister of Defense, and Major General Ali Nour al-Din Na’asan, who became Chief of Staff for the new Syrian army. Others received ranks of Colonel or Brigadier. It is believed that these officers will form the core structure of the new army, although they may include several officers who previously defected from the former regime’s army and aligned with revolutionary forces, commonly known as the Free Syrian Army, as well as some retired officers, especially those with specific military specializations who were not involved in crimes against the people and revolutionary forces.

Even though a new constitution has not yet been drafted or ratified, the new Syrian leaders announced their intention to end compulsory military conscription, relying instead on volunteers. In the initial phase, Syrian leaders intend to achieve two goals simultaneously: to dissolve all armed revolutionary factions and to have their members, or those willing, join the new army or security forces. Ahmad al-Sharaa convened a broad meeting on December 21, 2024, which included most leaders of armed factions, to persuade them to disband their organizations and join the Ministry of Defense’s forces. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff held subsequent meetings with faction leaders to discuss the army’s structure and agree on procedures for integrating the fighters from various factions into the new forces. Notably, the Minister of Defense emphasized that the structure of the new army would be based purely on citizenship criteria, avoiding any religious, sectarian, or regional considerations. But is there a problem then?

Dozens of armed groups engaged in the Syrian revolution have emerged for various reasons—some are political-ideological, while others are ethnic-national or regional. In Idlib, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has successfully unified armed groups within a single framework, sometimes using force, which transformed into an operations management before launching the “Counteroffensive.” Turkish officials also reported that they recommended the leaders of the groups operating under the umbrella of the National Army of Syria to join the new Ministry of Defense. Despite confirmed reports indicating that most factions accept the idea of disbandment and arms surrender to integrate into the new army, ambiguities still surround the stance of some groups, while others have outright rejected the project, justifying their position for one reason or another.

In Suwayda, a Druze-majority region, for instance, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, considered the spokesperson for the Druze community, stated that Suwayda would not permit the Operations Management forces to control the province and its government facilities, adding that the militias under his followership would not surrender their weapons until a new constitution was established—implying a desire for a decentralized governance system as per al-Hijri’s demands. Various armed forces in the southern province refused to adhere to al-Hijri and initiated meetings with the new Minister of Defense, expressing their willingness to join the army. Notably, some prominent Druze figures are reportedly pushing to end the rebellion against the Ministry of Defense, cautioning that a Druze isolation from Damascus would lead to the marginalization of the sect in the construction of the new Syria.

In Daraa, Ahmad al-Awda managed to amass a military force of several thousand residents. Al-Awda maintains close relationships with Jordan, the Emirates, Russia, and the United States; he accepted a settlement with his supporters in 2019 when Russian forces in Syria launched a program of reconciliations with armed opposition groups. After the liberation of Aleppo, on the third day of the “Counteroffensive,” al-Awda began efforts to seize control over Daraa province. After stabilizing the leadership of the “Counteroffensive” in Damascus, al-Awda met with Ahmad al-Sharaa, during which they agreed on deploying Operations Management forces to Daraa and taking control of government facilities and the Syrian-Jordanian border crossing. However, there are conflicting reports about whether al-Awda had indeed agreed to integrate his forces into the Ministry of Defense, despite many Daraa residents, considered the cradle of the Syrian revolution, opposing rebellion against the new Syrian leadership.

A major challenge, however, lies with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by a Syrian Kurdish party closely linked to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and supported by the U.S. Sources within the Syrian administration confirm that negotiations have been underway for weeks between representatives of the SDF and the Ministry of Defense. On January 19, the Syrian Minister of Defense commented on these reports, indicating that his ministry would not accept granting any of the invited forces special status within the new army. This remark from the Minister seems to have been a preemptive response to what appeared to be demands from the SDF’s leadership for a special status and separate entity within the Ministry of Defense’s structure.

Considering that the SDF’s weaponry represents a contentious issue intersecting between the new Syria, Turkey, and the U.S., it is likely that the direction of this matter will only crystalize following the Trump administration’s position on the U.S. military presence in Eastern Syria and its protective relationship with the SDF. Efforts by Masoud Barzani, who met with the Syrian-Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi on January 17, might be one of the most striking attempts to reach a political settlement regarding the Kurdish weapons issue in Eastern Syria, even before Trump took office in Washington.

Unifying the Land and Establishing Central Authority

The unification of Syria and the restoration of central authority over the land and its people stands as a pressing challenge facing the Syrian administration, intricately tied to the disarmament of factions and the rebuilding of the military institution. Given that regionalism characterizes most armed factions, the integration of these factions into the Ministry of Defense and its forces is essential for facilitating the unification process and establishing central sovereignty. This situation does not apply uniformly as it does in the provinces of Suwayda and Daraa and in northeastern Syria.

In Suwayda, a substantial portion of the Druze public does not share al-Hijri’s and the associated armed groups’ viewpoints regarding the new Syrian administration. While the province possesses unique characteristics prompting several groups to favor a somewhat decentralized governance system in the future, many Druze wish to launch the nation-building process based on the principle of Syria’s unity, its people, and the inclusion of all components in governance discussions. However, al-Hijri has gained support from various armed factions in Suwayda, and without a significant change in his stance toward the current central authority, the new Syrian administration may ultimately resort to using force to reintegrate Suwayda into the state.

In northeastern Syria, the situation appears more complicated, not only due to the considerable military resources of the Syrian Democratic Forces but also because Kurdish control over most of Hasakah and Raqqa provinces receives support from the U.S. and is under the auspices of roughly two thousand American troops stationed in Eastern and northeastern Syria. Increasing reports indicate that Iran seeks to establish communication channels with the SDF, while the Netanyahu government is pressuring the Trump administration to maintain U.S. forces in Eastern Syria and provide essential protective cover for the Kurdish fighters. The presence of Kurdish armed forces in northeastern Syria, and their ties to the PKK, have long been a major concern for Turkey. This reality makes the fate of northeastern Syria closely connected to the Trump administration’s stance and ongoing communications between Ankara and Washington, especially regarding whether Trump will decide to withdraw U.S. forces from the region.

The area controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces accounts for up to one-third of Syria’s territory and is the main center for wheat cultivation in the country; it also holds a significant portion of Syria’s oil and gas resources. Given that this area has been a hub of ISIS activity and controls significant borders with Iraq and the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, regaining control is a combined security and political matter that directly impacts the security and stability of the new Syrian state. While Damascus might be patient in finding a peaceful method to assert its authority in Suwayda, controlling the eastern and northeastern regions has become a vital necessity that cannot be overlooked.

The situation in Daraa, by contrast, appears less complex than in Suwayda and northeastern Syria. On one hand, the fighters there could not prevent the military administration from establishing control over state institutions and governance in Daraa, nor could they stop it from taking full control of border crossings with Jordan. On the other hand, it is a certainty that the popular and tribal base, along with a majority of activists and political forces in the province, align with the new administration in Damascus and oppose any rebellion against the new authority. Most people in Daraa are Sunni Arab Muslims; as the first center of the uprising against the previous regime, its inhabitants suffered from the regime’s policies of repression, extermination, and forced displacement aimed at quelling the revolution. Consequently, the people of Daraa see the victory of the revolution as their own victory, as well.

Israeli Incursion

Shortly after the fall of the Assad regime and the consolidation of control by Syrian Islamists in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and their allies over Damascus, the Israeli government launched a large-scale aggressive campaign against Syria. Israeli air force jets targeted most abandoned Syrian army camps, operational sites, depots, and research centers, as well as nearly all remaining Syrian air force bases, aiming at what was left of Syria’s defensive capabilities. In the Golan border area, Israeli forces advanced several kilometers eastward into the Syrian territory, based on a UN-approved disengagement line established in 1974, and northward to the Syrian-Lebanese border, seizing the strategically important summit of Mount Hermon.

The Israeli government has been conducting aerial operations in Syrian airspace since 2014, targeting what it claimed were Iranian positions or supply lines to Hezbollah. Despite Russian forces controlling the air security in Syria, their actions suggest a lack of concern for confronting Israeli aggression, possibly due to Moscow’s discontent with Iranian influence expanding within Syria. However, the Israeli offensive following the fall of the Assad regime significantly differed.

The Israeli government justified its air campaigns and ground incursions by expressing distrust in the intentions of the new rulers in Damascus and the necessity of addressing weapons storage sites and Hezbollah supply lines, notwithstanding the declaration of the new Damascus leaders indicating they would pose no threat to any neighboring countries and were keen to purge Syria of any Iranian or Hezbollah influence. The Israeli airstrikes ceased after about two weeks of devastating bombings, yet the ground incursions took on a seemingly long-term occupation nature, as Israeli forces expelled Syrian farmers from border villages and fields, setting up equipment and establishing facilities indicative of a permanent presence.

Initially, unable to resist, Syrian leaders ignored the Israeli aggression. Considering that Israeli attacks appeared to provoke Damascus into some form of reaction, hoping to undermine the new Syrian leadership and its forces, Syria’s response was marked by caution, and perhaps even fear. Ultimately, however, Israeli occupation constitutes a severe violation of the sovereignty of the new Syria, presenting a blatant challenge to its leadership and its relationship with its people both within and outside the occupied regions. It remains unclear if Damascus’s allies in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are pressuring the U.S. administration to enforce Israeli withdrawal from the areas they occupied, especially after Damascus has begun to assert security in those territories. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether Damascus is preparing to counter aggression through alternative means if diplomatic efforts fail to persuade Israel to retreat to the 1974 separation line.

Unity of the People and the Emergence of a New Political Class

The military personnel that seized control over Syria through a series of coups since 1963 systematically eliminated the political class that led the struggle against occupation and subsequently took the reins of governance in the independent state. Most military figures in the post-1963 state hailed from minority sects, until Alawite officers monopolized power after a coup in 1966. The rulers and officers viewed the traditional political class, predominantly composed of urbanites and Sunni Arabs, as both a political and sectarian competitor, and therefore worked diligently to obliterate its role and existence; moreover, coup-making officers utilized all available means to prevent the traditional political class from regenerating itself, even after it had exited the sphere of governance and power.

It is evident that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its allied forces in the “Counteroffensive” represent just one of the factions that shaped the complex and fragmented political and military landscape of the Syrian revolution. Over close to fourteen years, various groups and organizations, along with many intellectuals, activists, and former officers, have taken part in the Syrian revolution. While the nature of the transitional phase imposes a singular leadership in the process of building the state and its institutions, excessive focus on individualism will result only in the emergence of a repressive regime.

The vast majority of the movements, factions, and figures involved in the revolution originate from Sunni Arab backgrounds or Sunni Arab Islamists; nevertheless, there are also individuals who are neither Sunni Arabs nor Islamists. There are Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians, as well as a number of Alawites, who aligned with the opposition or participated in the revolutionary movement; there are also leftist, nationalist, and liberal intellectuals, as well as several former Baathist state officials who declared their support for the revolution and its people since the early stages.

There is no doubt that the emergence of a new political class is one of the essential conditions for the birth of a new state and the stabilization of its governance system. The diversity within this new political class will enhance the legitimacy of the new state and unify its people around it. However, neither unity nor legitimacy can be achieved without a degree of consensus among political actors regarding the foundational principles of political cohesion in the new Syria. While political currents may diverge on economic policies or the priorities of education and health, a prior agreement on the identity of the new Syria, the conditions and nature of its regional and international alliances, and the overarching values for the Syrian population and its state is crucial.

Without this necessary level of consensus, political activity within the new state may devolve into a zero-sum struggle. As political clashes intensify, the potential for an insurrection against the regime and its political pluralism will likely increase.

Consensus and Security

Shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian leaders announced plans to convene a comprehensive national conference comprising between 1,000 to 1,500 members for dialogue, aiming to lay the foundations for state-building, outline general direction for the transitional phase, and form a committee to draft a new constitution. However, the national dialogue conference project soon faltered. Firstly, no clear standards were established for choosing conference members. It quickly became apparent that a conference of such magnitude might not effectively facilitate national dialogue or achieve any degree of consensus among Syrians. Additionally, the formation of a legislative council from this conference that would bestow transitional legitimacy upon the leadership of the transitional phase and its government remained unclear.

Ultimately, the conference project was postponed multiple times; nearly two months after the fall of the previous regime, methods for conducting the conference or determining a timeline for its convening had yet to be clarified. However, the transitional phase cannot endure without a national body or council dedicated to establishing the foundations for national consensus, acting as a national reference for the transitional governance, and thereby determining the priorities of the transitional phase along with the means to achieve them. It is evident that the stagnation or sluggish progression towards institutionalizing the transitional phase impacts all urgent requirements necessary for guiding the country towards establishing the new state and a unified, sovereign government.

The series of operations targeting armed gangs undertaken by the new Syrian administration reflects the pressing need to rebuild a security and defense institution capable of addressing the country’s needs. As the new administration seeks to avoid using violence in efforts to achieve unity and assert sovereignty, the safest path to preclude violence may lie in the existence of a capable security and defense institution capable of persuading divisive forces of the futility of opposing unity and sovereignty. This applies equally to the requirements for confronting Israeli aggression and incursions.

All revolutionary transformations carry what is known as the legitimacy of victory, which is fueled by the winds of freedom and hopes for independence and prosperity. However, victory’s legitimacy is often short-lived, and its decline can ignite disputes and exacerbate divides over interests or lead to a loss of clear vision regarding pathways for progress. This is something the new Syria must avoid with all its insight and wisdom.