On February 12, 2025, the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that negotiating with the United States would not serve the country’s national interests, emphasizing its commitment to negotiations based on dignity, wisdom, and benefit. Iran leveraged the celebrations marking the 46th anniversary of the Iranian revolution, which overthrew the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on February 10 and 11, 2025, to not only rally internal support for the regime but also to reaffirm its rejection of the initiative proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump for new negotiations.
After Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described negotiations with the U.S. as “undignified” and “unwise,” President Masoud Bezhkishan accused his American counterpart on February 10, 2025, of seeking to “subjugate Iran,” adding that “Iran will never bow to outsiders.” Bezhkishan’s comments received clear acceptance and support from hardline conservative factions, as highlighted in an editorial by Kayhan’s editor-in-chief, Hossein Shariatmadari, on February 11, 2025, in which he stated that “Bezhkishan’s speech was clever; he ridiculed the mad and foolish American president.”
Tehran’s Rejection
Iran’s insistence on rejecting Trump’s new negotiation initiative can be understood through several key considerations:
Iran’s Fears of Comprehensive Negotiations: Iran believes that the negotiations proposed by the U.S. president may not be limited solely to the nuclear program, despite its vital importance to both the U.S. and Israel. Iran perceives that Trump will likely seek to broaden the scope of negotiations to include all contentious issues, from the nuclear program to ballistic missile capabilities, and Iran’s influence over Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemen. These militias continue to pose direct threats to U.S. and Israeli security and interests, especially after a decrease in threats from other groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, whose military capabilities have been severely diminished during recent conflicts initiated by Israel in Gaza and Lebanon since October 7, 2023.
This negative Iranian perspective was echoed in statements made by Mohammed Baqir Qalibaf, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament), on February 9, 2025, asserting that Trump’s initiative is rejected and calling on President Bezhkishan’s government to adhere to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s recommendations to avoid negotiations with Washington. He noted that Trump does not intend to halt Iran’s nuclear program but rather to disarm Iran, including its conventional capabilities.
Trump’s Focus on Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: The ballistic missile program was a particular focus of Trump’s during his first term. In August 2020, he attempted to secure a UN Security Council resolution to extend the ban on Iran’s development of ballistic missiles, but he failed to achieve this due to widespread rejection from the council’s members, with only the U.S. and the Dominican Republic supporting the proposal. However, this failure in his first term may not occur again in his second, especially since Trump is still at the beginning of his term. Furthermore, countries that previously opposed U.S. policy towards Iran, such as Britain, France, and Germany, may not hold the same stance currently given their significant shrinking of relations with Iran over mentioned issues, alongside other concerns, such as Iranian military support for Russia in the war against Ukraine.
Iranian Opposition to Negotiating with “Soleimani’s Killer”: Certain factions within Iran insist that negotiating with Trump, who authorized the operation leading to the assassination of former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, is unacceptable. This significant blow remains something Iran has not yet reconciled. These factions view any acceptance of negotiations with Trump as potentially undermining the Iranian regime’s image internally, particularly at a time when it faces strong domestic pressures due to waning external influence—exacerbated by the strategic realities imposed by Israeli conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. Some opposing forces continue to exploit these developments to stir domestic unrest, similar to the widespread protests in mid-September 2022 that subsided only in early January 2023 following the death of Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the morality police. Nonetheless, this particular view may not exert strong pressure on the regime’s leadership concerning the possibility of negotiations with Trump later on, especially if they consider such negotiations a strategic necessity to avoid direct war or large-scale military strikes.
Distrust in Washington’s Commitment to Any Potential Agreement: Iran has yet to find a solution to the dilemma surrounding its nuclear program negotiations; during Biden’s administration, this issue was the primary obstacle to reaching an agreement due to a lack of trust in the U.S.’s commitment to maintaining the deal. Iran aimed to secure a commitment in its talks with the Biden administration that the U.S. would not withdraw, but its request was firmly rebuffed based on the premise that the sitting president cannot bind or restrict the next president’s policies with such a commitment. Undoubtedly, this dilemma exacerbates under Trump’s presidency, especially given his history of withdrawing from various international agreements.
Uncertainty Around Israeli Government Intentions Towards Iran: Despite Trump repeatedly asserting that reaching a settlement regarding Iran’s nuclear issue would prevent any military action from Israel, Iran does not consider this a guarantee that the current right-wing government led by Benjamin Netanyahu would refrain from executing security operations targeting Iran—aimed at delivering severe blows to its nuclear program and assassinating key Revolutionary Guard leaders. Israel has successfully targeted several Iranian nuclear scientists prior to and during the recent conflict, the most notable being Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of the Military Research and Development Center, assassinated in November 2020. Israel also attacked Iranian nuclear facilities from within, such as the Natanz reactor, which was struck twice in July 2021 and April 2022, and it eliminated several senior Revolutionary Guard commanders during the last war, including Razi Mousavi, who was responsible for military support to proxies and was killed in December 2023, and Mohammad Reza Zahidi, commander of Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, assassinated on April 1, 2024.
In conclusion, this refusal may not signify a final stance; it can be argued that Iran seeks to negotiate with the United States as an option it may resort to later on. However, it is simultaneously striving to improve its negotiation terms, which has led it to postpone considering this option for as long as feasible, given that negotiating with Trump at this moment could yield significant concessions on various contentious files. Until that moment arrives, Iran will continue to reject U.S. negotiation calls, which coincide with threats involving Israel’s potential “reckoning” with Iran.
