With the weaponization of Russian gas exports following the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022, it has become clear that the European Union’s exposure to Russian uranium supplies presents a potential strategic risk. Uranium, in its various forms—raw, processed, enriched, and fabricated fuel—is essential for the operation of nuclear power reactors, which generate nearly a quarter of the electricity in the EU. In 2024, the EU imported just over €700 million (equivalent to $791 million) worth of Russian uranium products out of total Russian energy imports amounting to €22 billion.
In this context, the Bruegel Center in Brussels published an analysis by Olena Lapenko, Ben McWilliams, Georg Zachmann, and Roman Nitsovych on April 14, 2025, titled “Ending EU Imports of Russian Uranium.”
The analysis addresses the potential risks faced by the EU as it continues to rely on uranium supplies from the Russian state corporation Rosatom and explores alternative measures to address this imbalance. Within the analysis, the authors emphasize the significance of the European bloc choosing an appropriate timing for gradually banning imports of uranium from Russia, aligning this with serious policies to secure alternative supplies and increase investments in this sector.
Excessive Dependence:
The EU imports products from Russia that encompass all stages of the uranium fuel cycle, mostly in finished forms (both enriched uranium and fuel assemblies). There are 99 operational nuclear reactors in the EU with a capacity of 97 gigawatts, 19 of which (with a capacity of 11 gigawatts) are Soviet-era VVER reactors, with Rosatom supplying the majority of the necessary fuel.
In 2023, 23% of the natural uranium used in the production of final nuclear fuel in the EU was sourced from Russia, equivalent to 3,419 tons. That same year, EU imports of converted uranium from Russia amounted to about 3,543 tons—representing 27% of the total supplies of this type within the EU.
Additionally, in 2023, the EU imported 38% of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants from Russia, amounting to 4,647 tons, with France and Germany being the largest importers in the form of uranium hexafluoride and uranium dioxide. The total imports of fabricated nuclear fuel from Russia reached approximately 573 tons, up from 314 tons in 2022.
The sharp increase in Rosatom’s exports to the EU can be partially attributed to proactive strategies aimed at stockpiling nuclear fuel in anticipation of any future trade disruptions. VVER reactors currently have an average of two to three years’ worth of fuel to mitigate supply interruptions.
Strategic Risks:
By continuing to purchase uranium products from Russia, the EU faces four main risks:
- Energy Security Threat: Russia is not a reliable trading partner for the EU, evidenced by the drastic adjustments following the sharp drop in Russian natural gas exports. An abrupt and unexpected halt to Russian uranium exports could disrupt supply chains, potentially leading to short-term adverse effects.
- Deepening European Division: The strengthening of bilateral relations between Russia and EU member states that import uranium products could divide EU members and give the Kremlin leverage that obstructs progress on joint foreign policy decisions. For instance, Rosatom is currently building a new nuclear power plant in Hungary, a country that has blocked EU sanctions against Moscow.
- Exposure to Sanctions: Rosatom is deeply embedded within the Russian military complex, including nuclear weapons production. It maintains extensive business ties with numerous sanctioned defense companies like Rostec and shares technology and resources with sanctioned military research institutes. Moreover, the EU’s dual policy of cooperating with state-owned Russian companies like Rosatom while tightening sanctions creates loopholes, as Rosatom holds multiple contracts with third countries for building nuclear plants and supplying nuclear fuel, enabling financial transactions that could bypass sanctions.
- Financial Lifeline for Russia: In 2024, the EU paid over 700millionforimportingRussianuraniumproducts.Whilethisamountissubstantial,itpalesincomparisontoRosatom′soverseasearningsof700millionforimportingRussianuraniumproducts.Whilethisamountissubstantial,itpalesincomparisontoRosatom′soverseasearningsof18 billion in 2024 and is minor compared to the EU’s estimated annual Russian gas bill of €15 billion.
European Alternatives:
Replacing enriched uranium or fabricated fuel sourced from Russia necessitates building additional conversion capacities, either domestically or through import. Facilities operated by companies like Orano in France, Cameco in Canada, and ConverDyn in the US aim to increase their processing capacities. Westinghouse and Cameco are also exploring the possibility of constructing a new facility in Springfields, UK, which could add 5,000 tons of natural uranium conversion capacity, potentially allowing for reprocessed uranium as part of the recycling supply chain monopolized by Rosatom’s subsidiary TVEL.
The EU has favorable prospects for diversifying its local supply of enriched fuel, with Orano planning to enhance its capacity by 2,500 tons while Uranenco aims to increase its capacity by 1,800 tons across three projects within and outside the EU. These expansions will allow for significant replacement of the current 6,600 tons of enriched nuclear fuel purchased collectively from Russia by the EU and the US.
In terms of final fuel, Framatome has established a joint venture with the Russian TVEL for the production of nuclear fuel tailored for VVER reactors in Lingen, Germany. After the Russian-Ukrainian war, these plans were modified to focus on a production line exclusively led by Framatome, though the facility still operates under a license from Russian TVEL.
Meanwhile, Westinghouse and Inosa already produce fuel suitable for VVER reactors, having supplied Ukrainian power plants with industrial fuel for several years, in addition to signing contracts with utility companies operating VVER reactors in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Finland, and Bulgaria.
Gradual Phase-Out:
The analysis underscores the urgency of adopting a structured, gradual European approach to reducing imports of Russian uranium, focused on two key priorities: expanding local supplies and enhancing competitiveness, while gradually limiting Rosatom’s access to markets. Indeed, there are ready plans to expand local supplies that need appropriate support.
Companies operating within the EU or allied nations possess adequate technological and economic capabilities to sufficiently expand their production capacities. However, increased investments require extended timelines, potentially reaching seven years for new facilities to become operational.
When considering a gradual ban to limit Russian imports, this could begin with curbing imports of enriched natural uranium, with supply disruptions manageable due to existing inventories. A second step would involve expanding the ban to include imported manufactured fuel for VVER reactors. In either case, public utility companies would need a solid legal basis for the ban and to declare force majeure regarding long-term contracts with Rosatom, some of which extend into the 2030s.
In all events, the EU should reassess investment in logistics and strengthen partnerships with nations that have stable uranium supplies, including Canada, Australia, and Namibia, while developing alternative supply routes from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian producers.
Source:
Olena Lapenko, Ben McWilliams, Roman Nitsovych, and Georg Zachmann, “Ending EU Imports of Russian Uranium,” Bruegel, April 2025. Accessible at: Bruegel
