The relationship between South Sudan and Uganda, two countries located in East Africa, is currently experiencing an alarming escalation of border tensions. Notably, local authorities in the “Bugi” area of the Maygwei County in South Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria State reported significant incursions by Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) in September 2024. Additionally, Ugandan soldiers have moved into the Raja County of Western Bahr el Ghazal State in an effort to exploit gold deposits, leading to the displacement of local communities and the establishment of settlements in areas such as Katoko, Gotlila, Arambil, Adodi, and Barajadowania. The UPDF has also established more than eight new outposts along the border and deployed additional patrolling units. These developments have intensified tensions between the two nations, resulting in various potential repercussions.
Several factors have influenced the dynamics and future of the escalating conflict between South Sudan and Uganda.
Firstly, South Sudan appears to be favoring a de-escalation approach to resolve disputes with Uganda. This was evident when the Transitional Parliament of South Sudan called for an urgent resolution regarding the incursion of the Ugandan army on the borders of Eastern and Central Equatoria states on August 13, 2024. The Speaker of Parliament, Jemma Nunu Kumba, emphasized the critical nature of the border issue, asserting that South Sudan’s foreign policy demands peaceful solutions to conflicts, while advocating for thorough discussions with relevant government ministers. Despite this stance, some parliament members accused Uganda of meddling in South Sudan’s affairs. Notably, John Acanj Deng, a parliamentarian and member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), alleged that the Ugandan military had crossed into South Sudan and claimed responsibility for the deaths of 17 individuals, including seven women, in Kajo Keji County. He underlined the necessity of safeguarding South Sudan’s territorial integrity.
Moreover, the South Sudanese army has indicated a preference for peaceful resolutions to the border tensions with Uganda. This was evidenced by a statement from the spokesperson of the South Sudanese army, Lul Ruai Koang, in late September 2024, where he underscored the importance of resolving border disputes through diplomatic negotiations and suggested managing the issue via a joint technical boundary commission tasked with demarcating the borders. This statement followed reports of Ugandan military violations in the Kajo Keji area of Central Equatoria State, where plans were underway to establish a Ugandan military camp.
Secondly, the ruling system in South Sudan appears to prioritize the stabilization of relations with Uganda. The government seems to be avoiding an escalation with Uganda, owing to their mutual coordination and collaboration. For instance, UPDF troops previously helped protect South Sudan’s capital, Juba, from attacks by the SPLA-IO, the primary rebel group during the early stages of South Sudan’s civil war from 2013 to 2018. The collaborative efforts continued thereafter, including a recent joint operation in August 2024, where Ugandan People’s Defense Forces and South Sudan’s SPLA joined forces with troops from the Central African Republic to attack three camps belonging to the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Central African Republic.
Additionally, it was reported that UPDF also deployed around Juba while Sudanese President Salva Kiir was out of the country in late 2023 as a precautionary measure against a potential military coup, thus emphasizing Uganda’s role in supporting President Kiir’s regime.
Thirdly, the intertwining goals and interests of both countries complicate the dynamics of their relationship. Reports suggest that about 90 Ugandan People’s Defense soldiers arrived in Wau, the capital of Western Bahr el Ghazal State, accompanied by members of the National Security Service of South Sudan on August 7, 2024, along with a group of engineers. They were purportedly conducting mining activities near the border with the Central African Republic under the protection of South Sudanese security forces. On the other hand, Uganda hosts the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers in Africa, with approximately 1.7 million individuals, most of whom are from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Furthermore, South Sudan has often overlooked previous Ugandan incursions into its territory, as the ruling system has not adopted decisive actions to resolve the existing border tensions between Kajo Keji County in South Sudan and the Moyo region in Uganda. This border has historically experienced crossings and violations during past Sudanese civil wars, especially before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 and continuing after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, exacerbated by territorial disputes over areas like “Soniu.” Tensions increased significantly in 2014, resulting in the death of at least 20 individuals.
The northern border stretch between South Sudan’s Maygwei County and Uganda’s Lamwo region has repeatedly witnessed border tensions. The UPDF attacked villages and displaced civilians in 2015, with further incursions reported in Ikotos County of Eastern Equatoria State in 2022. These tensions persisted despite both sides signing a memorandum of understanding aimed at reducing border tensions and completing border demarcation in late 2015, with no significant progress made since the agreement.
Potential Repercussions
The current border tensions between South Sudan and Uganda have several potential repercussions:
Firstly, dissatisfaction towards the South Sudanese governing system may intensify. The lack of a decisive official stance against Uganda’s border violations could lead to increased public criticism of President Kiir’s regime. This concern is exacerbated by the government’s recent decision to postpone presidential elections for two years, originally scheduled for December 2024, allegedly to allow time for essential preparations like conducting a population census, drafting a permanent constitution, and registering political parties. This marks the second such postponement, following a prior delay in 2022.
Secondly, South Sudan’s economic conditions may suffer due to these developments. The incremental approach of the Ugandan army towards controlling shared border territories—especially in Western Bahr el Ghazal State—raises the prospect of Uganda seizing gold mines, which would affect the country’s gold supply and revenue. This situation could worsen the already fragile economic state, worsened by interruptions in oil pipeline operations from South Sudan to Port Sudan, owing to increased armed confrontations between the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces, which have escalated since April 2023. Losses to South Sudan’s economy could amount to about $100 million monthly, according to the chairman of the parliamentary Oil Subcommittee, Majaya, in March 2024. The oil sector accounts for around 90% of South Sudan’s revenue and represents virtually all its exports. Consequently, this financial loss could lead to skyrocketing market prices, fuel shortages, prolonged power outages, and disruptions in the supply of basic services to citizens.
Thirdly, insecurity along the shared border may escalate. The recent surge in Ugandan military activities targeting border areas in South Sudan since August 2024, including the establishment of military bases in Eastern Equatoria, incursions into villages, destruction of property, and civilian casualties—coupled with the digging of water wells and encouragement of Ugandans to settle in the area—indicates a longer-term strategic ambition of Uganda to establish permanent claims over these regions, likely motivated by valuable gold reserves and fertile agricultural lands. This precarious situation may rally local youths in South Sudan to confront Ugandan transgressions.
Fourthly, the neutrality of South Sudan in the Sudanese crisis may be compromised. Increased clashes may arise between the Rapid Support Forces, aiming to exploit the border instability for mining interests in Western Bahr el Ghazal, and the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces, seeking to fortify their military presence in the region. Such dynamics could undermine South Sudan’s attempts to maintain a neutral stance in the ongoing conflict in Sudan. This situation threatens the viability of South Sudan’s mediation initiative, proposed by President Kiir during Sudanese Sovereign Council Chairman Al-Burhan’s visit to South Sudan in mid-September 2024.
Lastly, the influence of the Rapid Support Forces in South Sudan may grow. International reports indicate these forces are providing assistance and support to local youth mobilizing against the UPDF, particularly as they extend their presence into gold and copper-rich territories like “Rudum,” “Kafia Kingi,” and “Songu.” The RSF has utilized its advancements at the cost of the Sudanese army in South Darfur to strengthen its control over these areas. Furthermore, political and economic connections have reportedly developed between the RSF and senior officials in President Kiir’s administration, facilitating logistical support, including fuel, from South Sudanese border regions, particularly the city of Wau, which has been crucial in the RSF’s confrontations against the Sudanese army since the conflict’s onset in mid-April 2023.
In conclusion, the prospects of expanding tensions along the border between South Sudan and Uganda appear likely in the coming period, particularly due to a negative legacy of recurring confrontations. However, this may not translate into a substantial conflict that significantly affects the overall relations between the two countries, given the intertwined interests guiding both sides and South Sudan’s inclination towards conflict resolution through peaceful means rather than extreme stances. Nonetheless, there remains a concerning trend of growing public discontent among local communities in South Sudan, urging the government to adopt resolute positions against Ugandan military incursions, potentially exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy facing the ruling regime, which has been on the decline in recent times.
