The book “Ukraine’s Revolt, Russia’s Revenge” provides an important introduction to understanding the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. It presents a unique perspective on the Ukrainian revolution of 2013-2014 and the subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea, framed through the lens of American diplomat Christopher Smith, who witnessed these events while working at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv from 2012 to 2014.
This year’s publication contains a wealth of information gathered and experienced by the author during his time in Ukraine, covering Ukrainian politics, street developments, a broad analysis of the international context, and vivid descriptions of people and places in Ukraine during the “Euromaidan” revolution at the end of 2013. It also seeks to offer a narrative counter to the Russian portrayal of the revolution that ousted Russia’s ally, Victor Yanukovych, and the nature of the American role in it, representing historical contexts that preceded the Russian military intervention in Ukraine on February 24 of this year.
From the Hetmanate to Maidan:
Ukraine officially gained independence on August 24, 1991, following an almost unanimous vote by the parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, Ukraine’s path to establishing an independent state has been winding, evident over more than a thousand years. Geography has played a significant role in its fate, with Kyiv being invaded by the Mongols on December 7, 1240. A second pivotal historical point, known as Ukraine’s golden age, was the “Hetmanates,” a state located in Southern Ukraine’s plains, founded by Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648 through a grand revolution that culminated in a series of Cossack uprisings against the powerful Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Khmelnytsky later opted for integration into the Russian Empire under Tsar Alexei Romanov in January 1654. In 1722, Tsar Peter I (Peter the Great, 1672-1725) abolished the Hetmanates, incorporating their territories into his vast empire.
With the formation of the Soviet Union, Moscow exhibited no tolerance for any national differences among its republics, considering nationalism a destructive force manipulated by foreign enemies. However, the author hints that Ukraine suffered significantly during the communist era from several crises, the most notable being the immense famine that afflicted the country between 1932 and 1934, known as Holodomor (death by hunger), resulting from Stalin’s decision in 1929 to impose collectivized agriculture on the peasant population.
In February 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in an attempt to ease existing tensions, but given the centralized nature of the Soviet Union, this made little difference. Nevertheless, this move gained great significance six decades later when Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea in March 2014, reintegrating it into Russia in defiance of an international treaty signed with the United States that pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence.
Since Ukraine’s independence, there have been concerted efforts by Russia to ensure Kyiv remained within its sphere, leaving Ukraine oscillating between maintaining its traditional ties to Moscow and its growing aspirations toward the European Union. Political, economic, security, and cultural integration within the dynamic family of European states has always been a hope for progressive Ukrainian democrats, particularly in western Ukraine.
However, this contentious issue has remained unresolved, as Ukrainian presidents adopted a balanced approach until Viktor Yanukovych, a Russia ally, was elected in February 2010. This led to widespread protests beginning on November 21, 2013, after Yanukovych rejected an agreement with the EU, turning “Euromaidan” into a focal point of rebellion against Yanukovych, uniting supporters of EU integration.
Violence and Dictatorial Rules
The author highlights the developments witnessed in “Euromaidan” during the protests and the resulting widespread violence from government forces against these demonstrations, suggesting that these actions left blood on the granite cobblestones of Maidan, at the foot of St. Michael’s Cathedral. Approximately 2,000 riot police entered the square to forcibly evict hundreds of remaining demonstrators, despite strong messages from the American ambassador urging Yanukovych’s government not to use violence.
By mid-December 2013, the Ukrainian state was experiencing severe polarization between two power centers: one being the internationally recognized, democratically elected government of President Yanukovych, and the other, the European Maidan, which was an emerging, organized, and steadily evolving mass movement with supporters across the country.
From mid-January 2014, Kyiv’s attention shifted to the Ukrainian parliament, where it passed several new laws reflecting Yanukovych’s attempts to suppress the opposition, including contentious rules regarding parliamentary voting procedures. This led to protests returning to the square, with opposition leaders calling for early presidential elections and a new constitution, while the United States pressured the Ukrainian government by imposing multiple visa-related sanctions.
Reaction from Crimea:
In the context of the protests in Kyiv at the end of 2013, the Presidium of the Crimean Supreme Council called upon Yanukovych to declare a state of emergency. On February 5, 2014, they issued a resolution urging Crimea to demand wide-ranging autonomy if the central government made significant changes to the existing situation, proclaiming that they would not allow Crimea to fall to extremists and neo-Nazis seeking to seize power in Ukraine by dividing the country. Therefore, the Crimean people would never participate in illegitimate elections nor recognize their results, nor would they live in a fascist Ukraine, requesting Russian support.
Beginning February 18, Kyiv witnessed a sharp escalation in violence between demonstrators and police. The Ukrainian Security Services announced they might take extraordinary measures following the violence. The escalation and security tensions in Kyiv continued for three days, raising concerns about the potential involvement of the Ukrainian army, possibly worsening the confrontations. However, American diplomacy intensified its efforts during this phase to prevent this dire outcome, pushing for early presidential elections through the parliament. As conditions worsened, Yanukovych fled to Russia.
Following Yanukovych’s escape and that of many of his associates, the new government, which took power, faced a massive array of challenges both domestically and internationally, as Russia announced a suspension of financial support, with only $3 billion of the promised $15 billion disbursed indefinitely.
According to the author, Yanukovych’s ouster was never a victory for U.S. foreign policy, as it was never an objective of American policy. Still, he hints that Washington’s policy cannot be denied as it seeks its interests, while preserving Ukraine’s ability to choose a European future was certainly a goal for the United States. However, this aim consistently took a backseat to helping Ukraine avoid the kind of disasters that erase the humanitarian boundaries within which governments must operate.
It is essential to note that the claim of a significant U.S. role in creating the current chaos in Ukraine to draw it into the Western camp lacks a comprehensive and genuine understanding of how the U.S. government operates abroad under the Obama administration.
A Surprising Russian Move:
While the new Ukrainian government struggled to assert Kyiv’s authority fractured across the nation and began addressing many inherited issues from the Yanukovych system, Vladimir Putin’s government was planning a sudden move in the Crimea region, setting its sights on two main objectives: Crimea, which had been part of Russia prior to 1954, and southeastern Ukraine, which hosts a majority Russian-speaking population. Putin aimed to adopt an increasingly hybrid strategy combining military power to distract the West while avoiding strict sanctions.
Immediately following the victory of Euromaidan, an extraordinary session convened along the Crimean coast in Sevastopol for the city council, establishing an executive body to manage the city, appointing Russian businessman Alexey Chaly as its head. Participants at the meeting raised Russian flags near the state administration building of the city. Simultaneously, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia had no intentions of any military intervention in Ukraine, yet the movements on the ground in Sevastopol reflected a planned Russian intervention in Crimea, parallel to the regional administration’s efforts in Crimea to hold a referendum on independence from Ukraine.
Acting Ukrainian Defense Minister Igor Tenyukh reported about 18,000 Russian soldiers in Crimea, adding that Russia was rotating specialized military units within its mechanized brigades. On March 16, Crimea held a referendum regarding the region’s future, with results showing voter support for separation from Ukraine at around 96.7%. Thus, Crimea officially declared itself “independent” and legally prepared for incorporation into the Russian Federation.
In the meantime, President Putin signed a decree recognizing Crimea as an independent state before its formal annexation to Russian territory, while he sharply criticized the West for “double standards,” which were evident in their recognition of Kosovo’s independence while opposing Crimea’s status.
The Extent of the Crisis to Donbas:
Similar to the situation in Crimea, matters began to escalate in eastern Ukraine. In Donetsk, approximately 2,000 separatists attacked police with hand grenades and seized the regional administration building, raising the Russian flag, as one separatist announced that the group demanded an extraordinary session of the Donetsk regional council to discuss a referendum on joining the Russian Federation.
In Luhansk, another crowd of several thousand attacked the headquarters of the Ukrainian security service to release 15 previously detained separatists and seize weapons, resulting in injuries to two individuals in the process. In Kharkiv, competing demonstrations supportive of Ukraine and loyal to Russia largely avoided direct confrontation.
In reality, there was ambiguity regarding Russia’s ultimate strategy concerning eastern Ukraine, whether they would opt for the path of Crimea’s annexation or try to establish another “frozen conflict” zone like Transnistria, or continue until another compatible regime was installed in Kyiv.
Indeed, both Donetsk and Luhansk conducted referendums regarding their future governance, with the official results announcing broad support for independence from Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian government contested the integrity of the referendums, subsequently refusing to recognize their results.
Yet, Russia refrained from immediately acknowledging the legitimacy of the voting in the eastern Ukraine referendum; instead of labeling it as a binding vote leading to independence, Moscow suggested that it should “stimulate dialogue” between the eastern regions and Kyiv. This was far less than the anticipated endorsement from Moscow’s allies in the east, as separatist leader Denis Pushilin asked Russia to consider the joining of Donetsk to Russia the day after the vote, but received no response from Moscow. The strong international backlash against Crimea’s annexation seems to have influenced the Russian economy and thus its stance regarding the annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics.
In conclusion, the author believes Russia has sought to promote the U.S. role in fueling the Ukrainian crisis as a pressure tactic against Moscow. Still, he suggests that American diplomacy rests on the notion that U.S. long-term interests are best represented when they are grounded in the values and moral obligations that Washington defends; in other words, any short-term gain that disregards moral considerations will always be against America’s long-term interests.
The author notes that one of the most significant tools of current American superiority, in addition to its immense military power, is the global appeal of American values, as well as the persistent concerns of Washington’s adversaries that these ideas might persuade their peoples that they deserve better, which was clearly reflected in the case of Ukraine in 2014. Consequently, the author advises American leaders that there is an urgent need to continue adhering to American principles, not only because they are right but because they represent a strategic advantage and the core strength of the current American model; thus, abandoning this commitment would mean relinquishing one of the foremost determinants of Washington’s leadership role.
Source:
Christopher M. Smith, Ukraine’s Revolt, Russia’s Revenge, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2022.
